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2Abstract
This thesis is an historical account of the British
government's regulation of the immigration to the United
Kingdom of Jewish refugees in flight from Nazi persecution.
The focus of the study is the administration of immigration
controls, with particular emphasis on the groups of refugees
for whom entry was possible and the conditions subject to
which they were admitted. The administrative process is also
examined in the context of policy. The results of the
government's efforts to control the influx are set against
policy goals, in order to assess both the extent to which
the quest for control was successful, and the extent to
which it led to unintended consequences. The relationship
between policy and procedure is thus a key theme of this
study.
The bulk of the thesis is concerned with policy-making and
administration within government, and is based on documents
in the Public Record Office(PRO). Other sources used include
private papers of ministers and officials, records of Jewish
organisations, archives of refugee committees and
interviews, listed in the bibliography. The material largely
concerns the work of Whitehall departments, inter-
departmental relations and activities at Cabinet-level. Home
Office policy and practice are covered in particular detail.
The contributions of other government departments,
particularly the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Labour and
the Treasury, are also discussed. Another important topic is
the policy-making and administrative role of non-
governmental organisations, especially refugee committees.
The introduction is followed by a chapter outlining the
legal and administrative history of immigration control
since 1905. succeeding chapters deal chronologically with
the British response to the immigration of Jewish refugees
from 1933 to 1942. The conclusion discusses whether British
policy was humanitarian or self-interested. Two appendixes
contain brief biographical notes on persons relevant to the
thesis and a list of Home Secretaries and Home Office
Permanent Under Secretaries.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the appearance in 1967 of the pioneering study by
Arthur Morse, While Six Million Died, the urge to understand
the response of "bystander" nations to the plight of Jews in
Nazi Europe has inspired a succession of books by British
and American authors'. We now have a number of studies which
document the refugee policies of the governments of the UK
and the USA, and their inaction in the face of the
Holocaust 2 . Alongside the work of documenting the response
of bystander nations, historians are also engaged in
establishing the context in which these governmental
decisions were made, so that specific policies towards Jews
in Europe may be explained and evaluated 3 . To do this, as
well as describing what actually occurred, it is necessary
to recreate the broad spectrum of governmental concerns and
activities in the period, which provided the context for
decisions concerning refugees and Jews 4 . It will then be
possible to analyse what happened; furthermore, equipped
with knowledge of these events and an understanding of the
choices which produced them, one may make a critical
examination of government policy and address the question of
1 Arthur D Morse, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle
of American Apathy, New York 1967.
2 For full length scholarly studies of British
government policy see references in bibliography to works by
Sherman, Wasserstein and Gilbert; for American government
policy see references in bibliography to works by Wyman
Feingold, Friedman, Penkower, Breitman and Kraut.
A bibliography of works on bystander nations, and on
rescue options and liberation, is to be found in Michael J
Marrus, The Holocaust in History, New York 1987. Pp. 253-
255; see also Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None Is Too
Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948, New York
1983; Michael Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees,
1933-1948, Sydney 1985.
For a fuller exposition of this approach, see
Richard Breitman and Alan M Kraut, American Refugee Policy
and European Jewry, 1939-1945, Indiana 1987, pp. 1-10.
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whether there were valid alternatives in the period under
study.
This thesis is within a developing tradition which seeks to
place a fateful episode in Jewish history within the context
of the wider society. It is in the first instance a case
study of UK immigration controls and policy towards Jewish
refugees. Refugee policies and practice are placed within
their political and administrative context, in order to show
the frame of reference within which British decisions on
refugee policy were taken. They are also examined for any
assistance they can give in understanding what might have
happened, in particular why more was not done to offer
refuge and rescue to Jews in Nazi Europe. How did it come
about that perhaps 70,000 European Jews were admitted to the
UK prior to the outbreak of the Second World War? By what
process was this quantity of admissions arrived at? The
answers to these questions will, it is hoped, assist in
addressing questions which envisage other possible outcomes:
first, why the numbers admitted to the UK in the years
between 1933 and 1942 were neither higher, nor lower;
second, why, in the years between 1942 and 1945, more effort
was not made to save Jews from mass murder. This study is
therefore both an account of British aid to Jews in flight
from Nazism up to 1942, and a prologue to the British
response to the Holocaust. It seeks to establish an
understanding of the restrictiveness of refugee policy and
of the choice not to solve Jewish refugee problems in Europe
prior to the Holocaust. It concludes by seeking to use this
understanding to throw light on the British failure to act
to provide refuge and rescue to Jews during the Holocaust
period.
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Refugees, in international refugee law, are persons who have
already left the country in which they fear persecution. In
this work, however, the term "refugee" is also sometimes
used, as it was in the period covered by this study, in a
broader, less technical sense, to include also persons more
correctly described as "would-be refugees" or "potential
refugees", in other words, people who wished to flee from
the countries where they were residing, but had not yet
succeeded, and in many cases never did succeed in doing so.
Liewise, the term "refugee policy" is used to refer to
policy towards both "actual" and "potential" refugees.
Only David Wyman's study of American policy, Paper Walls,
covering the period between 1933 and 1941, has been
distinctively concerned with the process of admission, which
is the subject of this thesis 5 . Works on British government
policy which are particularly important for the purposes of
this study, are AJ Sherman's Island Refuge, Britain and
Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933-1939, and Bernard
Wasserstein's Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939_19456.
These studies of the British response to Jews seeking to
escape from Nazi Europe address the question of admissions
to the UK, but this is but one strand among many. The
greater part of Sherman's study of the pre-war era is
devoted to British involvement in international action on
the refugee problem. Wasserstein gives a great deal of space
David S Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee
Crisis, 1938-1941, Amherst 1968.
6 AJ Sherman, Island Refuge, Britain and Refugees
from the Third Reich, 1933-1939., London 1973; Bernard
Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945,
Oxford 1979.
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to the question of entry to Palestine throughout the Second
World War. His discussion of admissions to the UK is much
shorter, and gives detailed consideration to just two
proposals for the admission of specific groups of Jews, only
one of which appears to have been put to the Home Office.
Neither Sherman nor Wasserstein uses Home Office files in
the Public Record Off ice(PRO), but both authors use source
material originating in the Home Office and now located in
other departments' files. Sherman used a small quantity of
material in the possession of the Home Office, to which he
was granted brief access 7 . This present study is largely
based on sources in the PRO. It refers to many of the same
sources as Sherman and Wasserstein and complements their
findings, but also employs files of a wide range of
departments which they did not use, particularly the Home
Office, the Ministry of Labour and the Treasury.
Policies and procedures
This thesis deals with the response of the British
government to Jewish refugees and to Jews seeking to leave
Nazi Europe in the years between 1933 and 194a. Its primary
concern is with UK immigration controls, and it examines
both the mechanisms of the administrative process, and how
control was operated in practice. It is also concerned with
policy - its formation, aims, and execution. It asks what
the government sought to achieve in its handling of Jewish
refugee immigration, and the extent to which it succeeded.
The thesis is thus a study of policies and procedures, and
the complex relationship between them. Immigration controls
are examined as the expression and instruments of government
Sherman., op. cit, p.9; personal communication to
this author, September 1988.
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policy, and procedural considerations are seen in turn as
determinants of policy.
This study also reflects the author's concern with
immigration controls and refugee policies in 1933-42, as
precursors of their present-day British counterparts. The
decision to embark on this research arose originally from
the realisation that the response of the Home Office to
Jewish refugees in the 1930s contained parallels with
present-day Home Office practice, in particular, the pre-
occupation of Home Office ministers and officials with
achieving firm immigration control. The practice of altering
immigration procedures in response to a new influx of
refugees, by introducing visa requirements to control their
entry, was utilised after the Anschluss in 1938 to control
the entry of Jewish refugees, and utilised again in 1985 to
control the entry of Tamil citizens of Sri Lanka who sought
asylum from events in their own country. The imposition of
visas was, however, only one among a series of British
reactions to a succession of crises and extensions of the
rule of Nazi Germany to new territories, which caused Jews
to seek refuge or rescue from Nazi Europe. With each new
crisis British policy and procedures were adjusted to deal
with pressure for entry from increased numbers of
applicants.
The organisation of the thesis reflects this cycle of crisis
and adjustment. Chapter one establishes the organisational
system which dealt with refugee immigration, by setting out
the legal and administrative framework of immigration
control. After this preliminary chapter, events unfold in
the five subsequent chapters, each of which starts with a
16
crisis, and then examines the impact of this crisis on
British policy, procedures, and practice. Thus, each of the
four pre-war chapters takes as its starting point a new
episode of persecution by the Nazi regime, which created new
pressure for refugee admissions to Britain. Chapter two
begins with Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany in the first
quarter of 1933, chapter three with the Anschluss, when
Germany annexed Austria in March 1938, chapter four with the
Kristallnacht pogroms in Germany in November 1938, and
chapter five with the refugee crisis in Czechoslovakia
following the Munich Agreement in September 1938. Each of
these pre-war crises on the Continent produced a
reconsideration of British policy and led to changes in
refugee admissions to the UK.
The sixth chapter, which dealsLthe war-time years 1939-1942,
is different, in several respects. For the UK, the outbreak
of war was a crisis, but one that had little to do with
refugees. The main impact of the war on the refugee question
was to prevent further refugees from coming to the UK. The
war certainly led to pressure for new refugee admissions,
but this had a relatively insignificant impact. In late
September 1939 War Cabinet ministers made an explicit
decision to subordinate refugee policy to the need to win
the war, and established a rule against humanitarian
admissions of refugees. The organisation of the treatment of
policy issues in this chapter reflects the different nature
of the policy process during the war. Establishing at the
outset the transition to war-time priorities, the chapter
then explores, under the two broad headings of policy
towards refugees in the UK and admissions policy, aspects of
17
policy affecting refugees which ran parallel over the same
time-period.
British refugee policy and the Holocaust
In the UK, the knowledge that the Nazis were implementing a
programme of exterminating the Jews of Europe came in mid-
1942. This news did not produce a relaxation of the
restrictive policies which had been established, although
many people within government and outside it expected that
it would. Ministers decided that the rule of excluding
humanitarian refugee admissions, made three years earlier,
must remain intact. The Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison,
played a leading part in asserting that such a policy was
correct. The decision to maintain this strict stance on
admissions was, so this thesis argues, the culmination of a
succession of pre-war and war-time controls on Jewish
refugees, imposed within the context of a pre-existing
restrictive immigration policy, which had by this time set
British policy in a restrictive mould. The British response
to the earlier crises, it is submitted, prefigures the
response to the Holocaust.
The full range of the components of the British government's
stance on refuge and rescue during the Holocaust, of which
refugee policy was only one, has not been addressed here.
Another important factor, to which brief reference will be
made, was the explicit ruthlessness of British war-time
policy towards the populations of occupied Europe, which
included bombing of civilian targets and starvation of
civialian populations. Nevertheless, refugee policy and the
context in which it was formulated is a factor without which
18
British policy during the Holocaust cannot be explained or
evaluated.
Policy and action
The structure of this work reflects not only the evolution
of refugee policy but also the relationship between policy
and action. It is concerned in particular with the way in
which both the actions taken, and the officials who carried
them out, related to high-level policy decisions. Thus,
chapters two, three, four and five, which deal with the pre-
war era, separate the treatment of the policy system, in
which top-level decisions about refugee policy were made,
from the organisational system in which this policy was
mediated and executed. Each of these four chapters is sub-
divided into a section on policy, followed by a section on
administration. The policy sections highlight the issues
each new crisis raised, the formal response at Cabinet level
and the operational procedures that were activated as a
result of Cabinet decisions. They show the involvement of
ministers in attempting to adjust to changed circumstances,
the interplay in top-level decision-making between the
priorities of different departments, including
considerations involving foreign policy and public funds,
and the principles behind discussions of procedural
questions. The administration sections are broadly concerned
with what may be termed implementation. These sections show
how policies worked out in practice. They show both the
extent to which policies were carried out and the extent to
which they were modified. The administration of admissions
by the Home Office is described, showing the management of
refugee casework in conjunction with other departments and
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outside bodies, and the conditions imposed on the various
categories of refugees seeking admission.
This separation of policy and administration also highlights
the extent to which policy resulted from action on the
ground, rather than preceding or determining it. "Policy" is
here used in several senses. It is used in a narrow sense to
mean the determinants of action: formal intentions arrived
at by Cabinet decisions; operational decisions expressed in
circulars and other detailed rules of administrative
procedure which provide the framework for action. The
description provided here of the way in which immigration
controls on refugees evolved illustrates the observations of
Barrett and Fudge in Policy and Action, that, when
procedures are refined in practice, the line where policy
ends and implementation begins is difficult to define, and
that original policy aims may be significantly altered in
the course of implementation8.
"Policy" is also used here in a broader sense, to include
objectives which, although not formally articulated, are
also determinants of action, and which may be in large part
derived from practice. The research findings presented here
support Barrett and Fudge's questioning of the validity of
the "policy-centred approach" to the analysis of public
policy, in which implementation is conceived of as a
'rational' process of putting policy into effect. They argue
for a conception of policy as sometimes being a response to
pressures and problems experienced on the ground, and
8 Susan Barrett and Cohn Fudge, Policy and Action:
Essays on the Implementaion of Public Policy, London 1981,
pp . 11-13.
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sometimes the result of innovations by persons who are not
formally part of the policy process 9 . The usefulness of such
an "action centred" approach in explaining what occurs in
practice is illustrated by the close links found here
between administrative action and the evolution of policy.
For example, initiatives by refugee organisations and
practices developed by officials, generated new policy.
Jewish organisations gave a lead in presenting policy issues
for decision, and set up administrative arrangements for
dealing with refugees to which the government responded.
Officials evolved guidelines and schemes for the management
of casework which resulted in new policy. In late 1938, for
example, Home Office and Ministry of Labour officials, for
reasons which included manpower economies, agreed to alter
and lighten the conditions which would be imposed on
thousands of refugee domestics, knowing that they might face
criticism if it became known that this had been done without
parliamentary approval. Procedural developments with policy
implications such as this were possible because plans for
managing the refugee influx were, on the whole, not formally
articulated. Most policy questions were not specifically
dealt with, many policy objectives were not explicit, and
very little broad policy was committed to writing. Officials
therefore had considerable scope for decision-making in line
with their perception of departmental objectives.
The absence of clear and comprehensive policy statements was
not the result of a failure in the functioning of the
system, although it exposed its limitations, but flowed from
conscious government policy. The government hoped to
Ibid., p.12.
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preserve sovereignty and freedom of manoeuvre on all aspects
of the refugee issue. For much of this period, the
government aimed to have the minimum possible policy on
refugees in Europe. An important reason for the maintenance
of such a guarded approach towards the formulation of policy
was the belief that the more policy the UK had on this
problem, the more it would be compromised and forced into
responsibility for solving it. It was the aim of the British
government to avoid such responsibility. Minimising the
making of a policy on refugees was seen as a means of
minimising British involvement in action on refugees,
whether international or unilateral. British policy thus
aimed to contain the size of the refugee problem and the
scale of its impact on the UK. The government's nervousness
of having publicly known policies on refugees meant that, in
the early years, the safest response was thought to be to
leave the problem alone, in the hope that it would be dealt
with, and, it was hoped, "liquidated" - a term much used in
the mid-thirties - through the efforts and funds of private
organisations.
As regards UK admissions, the government decided in 1933 to
treat the refugee problem as an immigration problem which
could be managed by reference to existing immigration
policy. The Home Office tried to say as little as possible
about the details of refugee admissions policy, or the
numbers and types of refugees admitted, refusing to collect
formal statistics on Jewish refugee arrivals. The Home
Office sought freedom of manoeuvre on individual cases and
on policy questions, relying as far as possible on
departmental discretion in deciding refugee matters. As
chapter one shows, Home Office spokesmen had for several
22
years been defending the policy of using discretion to
decide refugee admissions, on the ground that this
guaranteed both the maintenance of strict immigration
controls and the right of refugees to obtain sympathetic
consideration of their cases. The flexibility of this system
was constantly put forward by Home Office spokesmen as one
of its main justifications.
The power and autonomy of the Home Office was also enhanced
by this exercise of unpublished discretion in immigration
cases. The Home Office could publicly insist on strict
immigration policies, but in practice modify this, without
compromising its rights. It accepted and relied on a
guarantee offered by Anglo-Jewish leaders in 1933 that no
Jewish refugee who was admitted would be allowed to become a
charge to public funds, but made no formal commitment in
return. The exercise of Home Office discretion was in some
cases inadequately explained to persons who had to implement
it. For example, Home Office lack of explicitness affected
passport control officials who handled refugee visa
applications under Foreign Office authority in central
European cities shortly before the outbreak of war. Certain
passport control off icers(PCOs) strongly objected to what
they saw as dangerous laxity in Home Office attitudes to the
admission of refugees. The virtually mutinous manner in
which PCOs made known their objections to what they saw as
the Home Office's undermining of the basis of control might
perhaps have been avoided, if they had been candidly told
that Home Office policy was to allow the entry of certain
groups, notwithstanding their inability to comply with all
the usual immigration requirements.
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It is possible to envisage a clearer policy approach based
on clearer directives, or on quotas, as in the policy of the
United States government. A policy based on quotas would
however have been much less flexible, as alterations would
presumably have required changes in the law, a requirement
which proved a stumbling block to campaigns to make US
admissions policy more generous. In the absence of any such
clarity at the formal level of policy, official discretion
became the means by which the details of policy were
resolved and flexibility maintained. The wide scope for the
exercise of discretion by officials involved in refugee
immigration meant that precedents were set and schemes and
practices evolved which functioned as policy, in the absence
of more explicit guidelines such as quotas, or more specific
guidance from higher authority.
An informal policy-making community, whose principal
participants were Whitehall officials and a select group
drawn from the voluntary sector, generated many of the
policy decisions on the refugee issue. It acted both as a
source of pressure for change and as a force for the
maintenance of existing policy. Such policy communities have
been defined by Martin Laff in as "a relatively closed group
of participants, including civil servants, professionals,
politicians with a specialist interest in the policy area
and other interested actors". This description aptly
summarises the composition of the informal network which
concened itself with refugee policy in this period10 . Laffin
posits the existence within such policy communities of
10 Martin Laff in, Professonalism and Policy: The Role
of the Professions in the Central-Local Government
Relationship, Aldershot 1986, p. 2.
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internal "negotiated orders" which reflect the significance
attached to participants' claims to knowledge, value stances
and inter-relationships. A particularly important ingredient
in the "internal order" of the refugee policy community was
the long-established trust established between Home Office
officials, such as EN Cooper, and Jewish leaders, especially
Otto Schiff of the Jewish Refugees Committee. As a result,
close and informal co-operation was possible, so that Home
Office officials were in daily, even hourly, contact with
representatives of the refugee organisations. The refugee
organisations were also viewed within the Home Office as
part of the environment in which the government's policy
community was operating, and therefore needing to be
consulted and, if at all possible, satisfied. The middle-
ranking civil servants at the centre of the policy community
forged links across departmental divides, through their
contacts over both formal policy matters and discretionary
decisions. Members of the informal policy-making community
settled many questions concerning refugees among themselves,
and at times invoked higher authority, to insist on new
procedures or more resources, or to resolve some inter-
departmental deadlock.
The working relationship described in chapters two to four
between EN Cooper and Otto Schiff is a particularly striking
example of such collaboration. Differences between the two
men were resolved so promptly that they left few traces.
The Schiff-Cooper nexus is a good example of a
characteristic which Richardson and Jordan, in Governing
Under Pressure, consider to be typical of policy
communities, namely, the attaching of high priority to the
speedy achievement, in a confidential atmosphere, of
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pragmatic accommodation by consensus". The dealings between
the two men also illustrate another tendency which has been
remarked on by these authors, which is the propensity of
civil servants within such policy communities to identify
with the needs of "their" lobby. Cooper, it will be argued,
came both to share and to articulate many of the concerns
regarding Home Office activities which Schiff put forward on
behalf of refugee organisations and refugees' 2 . Policy
outcomes such as those described in this study, where the
focus is on decision-making in the absence of parliamentary
scrutiny, may, as Richardson and Jordan suggest, perhaps
better accounted for by analysis of the role played by
specific policy communities, than by studies of politicians'
statements or parliamentary influence'3.
The process by which policy was supposedly translated into
action not only informed the formal policy process but, to a
significant degree, displaced it. This process extended far
beyond the details of control. It will be argued here that
considerations of the management of the system largely
determined the policies adopted, so that the Home Office's
quest for firm immigration control, by filling the vacuum in
policy-making, became not merely a substitute for policy,
but policy itself.
The war-time chapter, unlike the four preceding chapters, is
more concerned with policy than administration. This
JJ Richardson and AG Jordan, Governing Under
Pressure. The Policy Process in a Post-Parliamentary
Democracy, Oxford 1979, pp. 103-5.
12 Ibid., p.55-?
13 Ibid., p. 74
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reflects the fact that in war-time Britain there was tight
control from the top over refugee matters, restricting the
scope for officials either to make policy, or to make
exceptions to policy. In consequence there was less
administrative experience to be fed back into the policy
process than before the war, particularly as regards Jewish
refugee admissions, which were at such a low level that they
generated very little new input. At the same time, non-
urgent policy decisions could be shelved until the end of
the war.
The organisation of the war-time chapter reflects the
altered relationship between policy and implementation.
Policy was now more specific, and formal policy reached down
further, dominating the organisational machinery. The
relationship of the policy process with the administrative
process was therefore more hierarchical than in peacetime,
bearing a much closer resemblance to the conception of the
policy process as a "chain of command", in which policy is
made on high and carried out by those below. This change was
reflected in the way in which British refugee policy was
subordinated to new wartime priorities in September 1939.
Chapter six starts with Cabinet-level decisions about the
consequences of the transition to wartime priorities for the
broad principles of refugee policy. Peacetime Cabinets had
not spent much time on refugee questions, but a section
concerning controls on aliens in wartime Britain shows how
much more involvement the War Cabinet had in these matters.
This section deals with security measures and internment,
refugee employment, emigration and the financial plight of
A
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refugee oranisat1on% A separate s4ction deals with refugee I3
admissions in wartime, examining the scope for entry for
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humanitarian, political and employment reasons. The focus of
the final section is Home Office policy arct
the response of near-total
inaction to the plight of Jews in Europe in the last four
months of 1942.
The refugee problem in context
This is a study of British administration, in which the
Jewish refugee problem, far from being a central concern,
was a relatively unimportant matter which had to jostle for
attention with matters of far greater immediate importance
to ministers and their officials. The low priority accorded
to the refugee question reveals much about the process of
government, because it was, in the greater part, left to
officials. People, as much as priorities, figure in this
story, particularly the civil servants who decided much of
the detail of pre-war refugee policy, illuminating as they
did so not only inter-departmental relations in Whitehall,
but also their relations with ministers and with outside
organisat ions.
The refugee committees figure importantly in this study,
which thereby tells part of the history of the voluntary
sector and its relations with government. The degree to
which informal arrangements supplemented formal structures
in refugee matters is shown by the use the Home Office made
of such outside organisations in "aliens work".
Increasingly, the Home Office relied on the voluntary
sector, both to manage refugee casework and to provide
control, thereby saving resources and avoiding the need for
administrative machinery, At the same time, it was becoming
28
drawn into financing refugee organisations, and maintaining
refugees. The refugee organisations and their officers were
not engaging in pure philanthropy, but were interested
parties affected by government policy and involved in its
implementation. They had their own agenda, and did not
always represent the interests of individual refugees. The
role of representation by the voluntary organisations was
crucial in enabling refugees to come to the UK. Broadly,
those whose entry was not recommended by one of the refugee
organisations faced exclusion, a system which suited the
Home Office and the main refugee organisations. Refugees
themselves were thus excluded from direct representation in
this policy process.
The scope of this study is restricted in a number of ways.
It includes some particulars of Nazi persecution of Jews,
but it does not systematically discuss British
interpretations of what such persecution revealed about Nazi
intentions towards the Jews of Europe 14 . Neither does it
explore the question of the influence of public opinion on
policy makers. This deliberate omission reflects the fast
that the government officials, whose activities are the main
concern of this story, were relatively remote from public
opinion in the broad sense, to which they, unlike elected
representatives, were not directly accountable. The concern
of this study is how officials interpreted their duty, and
the central tension in this account of British refugee
14 For the question of information about the
persecution of Jews and the Holocaust see: Andrew Sharf, The
British Press and Jews under Nazi Rule, Oxford 1964; Walter
Laqueur, The Terrible Secret: An Investigation into the
Suppression of Information about Hitler's Final Solution,
London 1980; for British Jews' awareness of the Holocaust,
see Richard Bolchover tAnglo_Jewish response to the
Holocaust', Oxford M Litt. 1987.
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policy is not between public opinion and the government, but
in the struggle of ministers and officials to balance
humanitarian considerations against perceptions of the
national interest. These apparently conflicting priorities
were not only considered in themselves but came into such
questions as the distribution of responsibility between
public and private bodies, or whether it was desirable for
the UK to engage in unilateral action, as opposed to action
in conjunction with other nations, or even no action at all.
In repeatedly considering these questions among themselves
and with ministers, officials engaged directly in debate
with trusted outsiders. They also took into the account the
views of other outsiders, such as parliamentary critics of
British policy and individuals with specialist knowledge of
refugee matters. More remote expressions of public pressure
and public opinion were not systematically investigated by
officials, and although borne in mind during the policy
process, they seem to have been generally discussed more in
terms of the presentation of refugee policy than in its
formulation. Thus, outraged responses from the British
public were evoked by Kristallnacht in 1938, and by the
British government's policy of mass internment of refugees
in 1940, but their impact on policy was principally a matter
for the Cabinet rather than for civil servants.
Within the British government the scope for action to help
Jewish refugees was from the start defined as limited, the
need for action largely denied, and the motivation to act
often lacking. Without pressure, organisation and finance
from the refugee organisations, the entry of even the 70,000
refugees who did come to the UK would have been
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inconceivable. The following account of the British response
emphasises that, while it made efforts to mitigate the
Jewish refugee problem, at no time did the British
government commit itself to solving it, nor did it ever
consider it to be in the UK's interest to try to do so. The
Home Office had no departmental responsibility for the
plight of Jews in Europe. What it did have was a duty to
regulate alien admissions and to deal with aliens once they
entered the United Kingdom. It aimed both to maintain
control over refugee admissions and to avoid refugees
becoming a charge to public funds. On each of these counts
it partly succeeded and partly failed.
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CHAPTER 1
IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
Introductory
Adolf Hitler, the leader of the Nazi Party
(Nationalsocialistiche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei - NSDAP) in
Germany, took office as Chancellor of the German Republic on
30 January 1933. The Nazi regime rapidly began to undermine
the German constitution and civil liberties, and to single
out Socialists, Communists, trade unionists and Jews for
persecution. On 23 March 1933, a cowed Reichstag passed
Hitler's Enabling Act, giving the government powers to
promulgate emergency legislation which amounted to legal
authority for dictatorship. In late March the government
imprisoned thousands of people, and for the first time put
detainees into concentration camps. Much Nazi propaganda was
directed against Jews. Nazi hooligans and members of the
SA(Sturmabteilung - stormtroopers) made violent attacks on
Jews and Jewish businesses, and on 1 April the Nazis
organised a boycott of Jewish businesses and professionals'.
In March 1933 many Jews in government posts and in the
professions were dismissed. The first piece of Nazi anti-
Jewish legislation, the Law for the Restoration of the
Professional Civil Service, was promulgated on 7 April 1933,
and provided a legal basis for the exclusion of Jews and
political opponents of the Nazi regime from the civil
service. Another law of the same date excluded Jews from
legal practice. There followed a succession of anti-Jewish
laws which excluded "non-Aryan" professionals and academics
1 Lucy S Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-
1945, Harmondsworth 1977, pp. 78-86.
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from a range of government posts, and established "non-
Aryan" quotas in schools and universities. The term "non-
Aryan" was defined in a law of 11 April to include anyone
with a Jewish parent or grandparent: religious affiliation
was employed to resolve cases of racial ambiguity. These
laws had all been passed before the end of April, and in the
ensuing months a multitude of other anti-Jewish measures
followed2 . Many Jews decided to seek refuge abroad.
Refugees from Germany began to arrive in the UK in February,
March and early April 1933. The numbers arriving were not
great, but an increase in alien arrivals was noticed by the
immigration authorities. This new wave of immigration posed
urgent questions for the British government. The refugee
exodus from Germany showed no sign of abating. The
government faced pressure to review the adequacy of existing
immigration laws and procedures to deal with the continuing
influx. Some voices loudly opposed refugee admissions and
called for stronger controls. Others pressed for relaxation
of existing controls to faciliate the entry of refugees3.
Alternatively, if the existing machinery gave satisfactory
control over this influx, no changes would be necessary.
At this date, the British Government had few anxieties about
uncontrolled entry from abroad. The system of controls on
aliens, dating from 1905, had been tightened up after the
end of the First World War. New legislation in 1919-1920 had
2 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
A parliamentary question by Josiah Wedgwood on 21
Feb 1933 supported relaxation of controls to admit Marxist
refugees from Germany; a question by E Doran on 9 Mar 1933
sought measures to prevent the entry of Jews from Germany.
Sherman, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
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introduced a comprehensive and highly restrictive system of
controls, which was equal to dealing with any unwelcome
alien immigration. By 1933 Home Office ministers and
officials working on aliens matters had accumulated enough
experience in the administration of this system to be able
to assess how it would cope with an influx of refugees.
The decision about how to respond to the influx, while it
involved purely technical questions of effectiveness, was
made within the broader context of current immigration
policy. Since the end of the First World War, British policy
had been to impose strict limits on alien immigration for
settlement purposes. Broadly, admission for settlement was
granted only to persons whose presence was thought to
present some benefit to the country, or to individuals who
were regarded as having a strong claim on personal or
compassionate grounds 4 . Before 1914, immigrants had been
admitted for permanent residence, subject only to the
exclusion of those who failed to satisfy certain statutory
conditions. That policy had been reversed following the
First World War, when it was decided to keep permanent
increases to the alien population within fairly rigid
limits. Successive governments had continued this policy. By
1930 so much had changed since the days when entry for
permanent residence had been the norm, that the Permanent
Under Secretary at the Home Office, Sir John Anderson, could
say that immigration "in the ordinary sense of the term" was
no longer allowed 5 . Concern over the state of the economy
Harold Scott, memorandum, 19 Nov 1929, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/56.
Anderson, minute, 2 Jan 1930, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/56; see also JR Clynes(Home Secretary) to
Josiah Wedgwood, 22 Jul 1930, PRO HO 45/24765/432156/64.
34
and high levels of unemployment ensured that in 1933 this
policy of restriction was still in force. Other western
European countries were following similar policies. Thus,
when Nazi persecution became so oppressive that Jews in
Germany began to flee abroad, the countries of potential
refuge were already entrenched behind highly restrictionist
immigration policies6.
The question of how the British government should respond to
Jewish refugee immigration involved considerations of
policy, law and practice. Did the existing machinery give an
adequate level of control? Was it desirable to make any
adjustments or exceptions to admissions policy and
procedures? The government's deliberations over these
questions in April 1933, which resulted in an interim
decision to make do with the system as it was and to reject
formal relaxation of existing controls, are the subject of
the early part of the next chapter. First, however, the
remainder of this chapter will provide the context for the
April 1933 discussions, by giving a brief outline of the
British system of immigration law and practice. The legal
basis of the system will be covered first, with special
reference to the status of refugees. The latter part of the
chapter will look at the administration of immigration
control. This latter section will demonstrate the extent to
which the government encouraged participation in aliens
controls by representatives of outside bodies. In particular
it will be apparent that a habit of close co-operation on
aliens matters between the Home Office and representatives
6 See Herbert A Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from
Germany - Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses(I)', Leo Baeck
Institute Yearbook XXV, London 1980, pp. 313-361, esp. pp.
346-358.
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of Anglo-Jewry had been firmly established well before the
arrival of the first refugees from Germany7.
The le gal basis of immi gration control
The Aliens Act 1905.
The modern system of immigration control in the UK dates
from the Aliens Act of 1905. The Act was brought in largely
in response to agitation opposing the influx of Jews fleeing
poverty and persecution in eastern Europe. Consideration of
the question included a Royal Commission which reported in
1903, and months of parliamentary controversy. A highly
restrictive Aliens Bill, abandoned in 1904, was followed by
the milder 1905 Act, passed in the last days of a
Conservative administration. Before this Act, there had been
no immigration controls, but under previous legislation the
government had kept returns from shipping companies relating
to immigrant landings 8 . The 1905 Act introduced a system of
controlling aliens at the ports, through inspection of alien
arrivals, but it did not set out to be exhaustive. The
system was selective, subjecting only the bulk of the
poorest class of alien passengers to inspection by
immigration officers, but placing no such obstacles in front
For the scope and purpose of immigration law, see
Ian A Macdonald, Immigration Law and Practice in the United
Kingdom, 2nd ed., London 1987, pp. 1-20; for the old law
relating to refugees, see ibid., pp. 7-8 and 276; also Ann
Dummett and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens Aliens and
Others: Nationality and Immigration Law, London 1990; see
TWE Roche(an ex-immigration officer), The Key in the Lock. A
History of Immigration Control in England from 1066 to the
Present Day, London 1969.
8 For legislation prior to 1905, see Vaughan Bevan,
The Development of British Immigration Law, London 1986, pp.
63-65.
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of the majority of alien visitors. The Act applied only to
ships which carried more than a certain number of alien
passengers travelling steerage class. Such a vessel was
designated an "immigrant ship". Ships carrying less than the
minimum number of steerage class passengers (in practice
20), and all cabin class passengers on any ship, were exempt
from inspection. Alien steerage class passengers on an
immigrant ship, if they could not establish on inspection
that they were capable of "decently" supporting themselves
and their dependants, were liable to be refused entry as
"undesirable immigrants", along with other undesired
categories such as the insane, the diseased and the
criminal 9 . The Act also introduced Immigration Boards which
heard appeals against refusals of leave to land.
As a result of public concern that the UK's tradition of
granting refuge should not be abandoned, a limited
concession for aliens seeking asylum was included in the
The Aliens Act 1905 came into force on 1 Jan 1906.
For the 1905 Act see Lloyd P Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant
in England, 1870-1914, London 1960; Bernard Gainer, The
Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905,
London 1972; John A. Garrard, The English and Immigration: A
Comparative Study of the Jewish Influx, 1880-1910, Oxford
1971; Jill Pellew, 'The Home Office and the Aliens Act,
1905', The Historical Journal, vol. XXXII, no. 2, (1989),
pp. 369-385, describes the administration of the Act from
the perspective of those charged with carrying it out; for a
critical assessment of the 1905 Act, see Sir Edward Troup,
The Home Office, London 1925, pp. 143-144. Troup was Home
Office Permanent Under Secretary in 1908-1922.
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1905 Act'°. This took the form of an exception from refusal
of leave to land on grounds of poverty for immigrants who
could prove that they were seeking entry "solely to avoid
prosecution or punishment on religious or political grounds
or for an offence of a political character, or persecution,
involving danger of imprisonment or danger to life or limb,
on account of religious belief". Such a person should not be
refused "on the ground merely of want of means, or the
probability of his becoming a charge on the rates". While
this exception had important limitations, these provisions,
interpreted generously by a Liberal administration, enabled
many refugees who would otherwise have been refused entry to
gain admission between 1906 and 1914. The figures for 1906,
a year in which pogroms in Russia reached new extremes, show
the admission to the UK of 505 persons under the refugee
exemption, a very high figure compared with subsequent
years. However, the difference the exemption made in
practice should not be overstated. The numbers admitted
under the exemption were a relatively small proportion of
entrants, the majority of aliens inspected passed the
poverty test, and refusals on any grounds were relatively
10 In 1929 William Haldane Porter, the first Chief
Inspector of Immigration, opposing the revival of
immigration boards and the exemption for political refugees,
said that their inclusion in the 1905 Act had been the
result of pressure from the Jewish community and that they
had been designed to prevent the exclusion of Jews who could
plead political or religious persecution. Refugees were now,
he said, mainly Italian anti-Fascists, while Jews in Russia
and Poland were no longer refugees, so that Jewish arguments
for the admission of refugees were "out of date". He claimed
that when two out of the three members of an immigration
board had been Jewish, Jews had succeeded "in practically
every case". Haldane Porter, memorandum, 11 Dec 1929, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/56.
Aliens Act 1905, s. 1(3). The definition excluded
persecutees not facing prosecution or punishment, unless
exposed to the risk of imprisonment or facing danger to life
and limb because of their religion.
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rare, a total of 7,594 persons being refused admission
during this eight-year period. The vast majority of Jewish
immigrants who came to the UK between 1905 and 1914 had no
need to claim any exemption, and thus the total numbers who
could have claimed to be refugees is not known. Total
numbers of alien admissions declined in this period, as most
emigrants from eastern Europe now preferred other
destinations, particularly the USA, for reasons unconnected
with the British controls, although the existence of the
UK's new law undoubtedly had a deterrent effect on
immigration12.
Aliens controls from 1914
On the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 the
government passed the Aliens Restriction Act. This
introduced sweeping powers to make orders imposing
restrictions on aliens entering, leaving and remaining in
the UK, and gave wide scope to provide for the deportation
of aliens, going far beyond the powers contained in the 1905
Act' 3 . After the end of thewar, the Aliens Restriction
(Amendment) Act 1919 continued and extended the 1914
provisions into peacetime, and introduced important new
measures of restriction. The 1914 and 1919 Acts together
provided the statutory basis for immigration control in the
post-war era, the 1914 Act being the principal Act, while
the 1919 Act required annual renewal. Detailed regulations
12 See works by Garrard, Gainer, Pellew, and Troup,
cited n. 9 above.
13 Unlimited powers to make orders for the
deportation of aliens were contained in the Aliens
Restriction Act 1914, s. 1(1)(c); limited powers to expel
"undesirable aliens" had been contained in the Aliens Act
1905, s. 3.
39
for the administration of control were contained in the
Aliens Order 1920, which was repeatedly amended until its
repeal in 195314. In addition to the laws governing aliens,
certain prerogative powers of the Crown continued alongside
the statutory code. These powers were exercised by the
government of the day, without the need for parliamentary
approval. They enabled the Home Office to take arbitrary
action against aliens, and rendered lawful the internment of
enemy aliens in both world wars'5.
The acquisition of British nationality was covered by
separate legislation. Persons possessing British nationality
throughout the Empire were known as British subjects. Aliens
who wished to become British subjects could apply for
naturalisation, a discretionary process, normally after five
years' residence. British subject status was acquired
automatically by alien women on marriage to a British
subject. Conversely, on marriage to an alien, a British
woman ceased to be a British subject16.
The 1919 system was more comprehensive than the repealed
1905 Act, as all aliens were now subject to entry
14 See Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919, s.
16(1). S. 16(2) of the Act provided for the repeal of the
1905 Act on a date or dates to be specified by Order in
Council. The rules for determining eligibility of aliens for
entry were removed from Acts of Parliament to regulations.
Henceforth, changes in these rules were effected by amending
the Aliens Order.
15 Gordon J Borne, Elements of Public Law, London
1967, pp. 52-59; Macdonald, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
16 The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act
1914 remained the principal Act until the introduction of a
new code in 1948; Sir Frank Newsam, The Home Office, London
1954, pp. 102-4, summarises nationality law prior to 1948;
for full discussion, see Mervyn Jones, British Nationality
Law and Practice, Oxford 1947.
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controls' 7 . The new code also swept away protective measures
which had mitigated the impact of the 1905 system.
Immigration Boards were abolished, leaving aliens with no
right of appeal against refusal of leave to land. Another
casualty of the 1919 Act was the exception from the poverty
test for refugees, which disappeared'8.
Refu gees. the law and the tradition of as ylum after 1919.
The abolition of the exception from the poverty test had
removed from the law any trace of legal protection for
refugees. Nevertheless, there remained certain features of
the old system which could weigh in favour of refugees. The
UK had a history of granting asylum to those fleeing
political persecution. Following the repeal of the 1905 Act,
no part of this tradition was enshrined in law. Thus there
was no right of asylum for refugees. The only right was that
of the state, to grant asylum if it saw fit. In July 1929
the Home Secretary, JR Clynes, reminded the House of Commons
of the government's freedom to choose whether or not to
admit any particular asylum-seeker, in the course of his
explanation of the government's decision to refuse admission
to Leon Trotksy. The brief prepared for this occasion was to
17 Troup welcomed the 1919 Act as the introduction of
an effective system of control to replace the ineffective
1905 Act. Troup, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
18 For the impact of the 1919 Act on Jews, see David
Cesarani, 'Anti-Alienism in England after the First World
War', Immigrants and Minorities, vol. VI, no. 1 (1987), Pp.
5-29.
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provide the basis for Home Office formulations of the
position during the 1930s19.
Despite the absence of legal rights for refugees or a right
of appeal on entry, the Home Office maintained that the
British tradition of granting refuge was being maintained in
practice. In the rhetoric of debate on refugee questions,
the tradition of asylum was accorded a quasi-constitutional
sanctity, which would be invoked repeatedly during the years
of Nazi persecution. Advocates of a more generous response
to the plight of refugees would demand that British policy
show greater adherence to this tradition. They could be sure
that no government spokesmen would think it politically
possible to argue for its abandonment. On the contrary,
successive Home Secretaries would assert that, despite
restrictions, British policy remained as far as possible in
accordance with the tradition. Yet these assertions often
amount to little more than the claim that British policy had
attained conformity with the asylum tradition merely through
treating refugees no worse than other aliens. Home
Secretaries claimed that a policy of refraining from
imposing more severe restrictions on refugees than on other
aliens, and admitting refugees who were already eligible for
entry within the terms of current immigration policy, was
part of the tradition of asylum, but they were confining the
19 See HHC Prestige, memorandum, 'The Right of
Asylum', 11 Jul 1929, PRO HO 45/15156/541506; speech of John
Robert Clynes, Home Secretary, on the refusal to admit
Trotsky, Hansard, vol. 230, cols. 1441-1443, 24 Jul 1929;
Home Office (S Hoare?) to Under Secretary of State, 22 Dec
1932, PRO HO 45/15156/541506/2; Paul F Grey, memorandum,
'The "Right of Asylum" for Political Refugees: developments
in the general attitude adopted by Great Britain and in the
powers possessed by the executive', 10 Jan 1935, PRO FO
371/19653, W291/7/98, f.8; Roger H Makins, minute, 16 Feb
1935, PRO FO 371/19675, W1370/356/98, f.113.
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operation of this humanitarian tradition within the terms of
an immigration policy based on national interest20.
In late 1929 and 1930 the complete reversal in immigration
policy which had taken place since the 1905-1914 period was
cited by Home Office representatives as a reason for
rejecting proposals for the revival of the rights enjoyed by
refugees under the repealed 1905 Act. The Permanent Under
Secretary, Anderson, advised that the policy of strictly
limiting admissions for settlement made it necessary for
ministers to keep control over decisions at the port of
entry in their own hands 21 . The exception from the poverty
test for refugees under the 1905 Act had been part of the
old policy of allowing immigration for permanent residence,
subject only to the exclusion of those who failed to satisfy
certain statutory conditions. It had been a very limited
concession, merely relieving refugees of the Act's
requirement that applicants for entry be refused if
destitute 22 . Sir John Pedder of the Home Office observed
that the "so-called 'right of asylum'" was "no more than a
bogey to talk about", but claimed that the essence of the
British tradition of asylum had nevertheless been
20 Sir John Gilmour, Home Secretary, Hansard, vol.
276, cols. 2557-2558, 12 Apr 1933; Sir Samuel Hoare, Home
Secretary, Hansard, vol. 333, cols. 991-994, 22 Mar 1938;
see also Makin g , minute, 16 Feb 1935, PRO FO 371/19675,
W1370/356/98, f.113; for the conclusion that, "Great Britain
has ceased to be a country of asylum on a large scale", see
Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem: Report of a
Survey, London 1939, p. 345.
21 See Anderson, minute, 2 Jan 1930, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/56.
22 Harold Scott, memorandum, 19 Nov 1929, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/56.
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preserved 23 . The Home Secretary, Clynes, accordingly assured
Josiah Wedgwood MP that the disappearance of the limited
right of asylum from the statute book had not affected the
practice of giving sympathetic consideration to applications
from refugees 24 . Clynes also reassured the President of the
Board of Deputies of British Jews that refugees from
religious persecution received sympathetic consideration25.
In this period Home Office representatives also opposed the
revival of a right of appeal on entry, as a fetter on
discretionary control over port decisions. In addition, they
argued that a right of appeal would be impractical to
administer, given the greatly increased scale on which the
inspection of immigrants was now taking place. Whereas under
the 1905 Act immigrants had landed at 14 ports in the year
1911, and only 38,399 had been inspected, by 1928 immigrants
were landing at almost every port in the UK and the number
inspected had risen to 439,41926.
Home Office discretion over port decisions was thus
perceived within the Home Office and presented to critics of
the system as being both an essential safeguard for the
government's restrictive immigration policies and a
guarantee that the applications of refugees would receive
sympathetic consideration. The efforts of the Home Office to
23 Pedder, minute, 14 Dec 1929, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/56.
24 Clynes to Wedgwood, 22 Jul 1930, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/64. Clynes cited the admission of refugees
from Fascist Italy and Russian stowaways from Archangel.
25 Clynes to D'Avigdor Goldsmid, 5 Feb 1930, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/56.
26 Ibid.
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function at one and the same time as the standard bearer of
the tradition of asylum as well as the watchdog for the
national interest in allowing only limited immigration,
required careful balancing in the formulation and
presentation of policy. In defending the restrictive nature
of the post-1919 immigration system, Home Office officials
derived reassurance from the knowledge that representatives
of the Jewish community had no wish to see a return to the
days of unrestricted mass Jewish immigration27 . They also
pointed out that the rigours of the system were mitigated
for Jewish applicants by informal arrangements which made it
possible to obtain exceptional consideration in deserving
cases 28 . All these factors would influence the policy of
both the Home Office and of Jewish leaders towards the
refugee influx from Germany.
Apart from the tradition of asylum, two other features of
the existing system provided some persons who had already
entered the UK with protection against removal in certain
circumstances. First, the Extradition Act 1870 conferred
protection against extradition to persons alleged to have
committed political offences 29 . Second, stateless persons
were safe from deportation, because the Home Office did not
27 Haldane Porter, minute, 11 Dec 1929, Pedder,
minute, 14 Dec 1929, PRO HO 45/24765/432156/56.
28 Haldane Porter described an unofficial arrangement
between the Home Office and the Jews' Temporary
Shelter(JTS), a Jewish charity dealing with immigrants,
(described more fully below), whereby the JTS put forward
after investigation cases of aged parents or orphans whose
relatives in the UK were prepared to receive and maintain
them: male orphans except those of tender years were
excluded on the ground that they would come on the labour
market. Haldane Porter, minute, 11 Dec 1929, PRO HO
45/24765/432156/5 6.
29 Extradition Act 1870, s. 3(1).
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attempt to deport persons who were stateless, as no country
could be forced to receive them. This gave protection to
stateless persons already in the country, but made it hard
for them to gain admission, because the authorities, knowing
that it would be impossible to enforce their departure,
granted visas to stateless persons very sparingly, only for
limited periods, and only where the person was in possession
of a return visa30.
The administration of immi gration control
The oranisation of control
The administration of immigration control and the related
field of nationality was the province of the Home Office.
The Home Office was also responsible for the police and
public order, factory inspection, matters concerning
children, the Channel Islands and certain other matters31.
The Home Secretary was assisted by a Parliamentary Under
Secretary. At the head of the permanent officials of the
Home Office was the Permanent Under Secretary. Under him at
times was a Deputy Under Secretary or a Principal Assistant
Under Secretary, and always several Assistant Under
Secretaries. The day-to-day running of individual divisions
within the department was carried out by Assistant
Secretaries. At the next level down in the hierarchy were
two dozen or more individuals at the grade of Principal, who
30 Sir John Gilmour, memorandum , 'The Present
Position in regard to the Admission of Jewish Refugees from
Germany to this Country', AR(33)2, 6 Apr 1933, Cabinet
Committee on Aliens Restrictions, PRO CAB 27/549.
31 For the history of the Home Office, see Sir Frank
Newsam, op. cit.: see pp. 95-101 for aliens controls; see
also Jill Pellew, The Home Office 1848-1914: from Clerks to
Bureaucrats, London 1982.
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were often granted a high degree of responsibility. Below
these grades were several grades of executive and clerical
officers, who were excluded from policy-making32.
The Home Office had carried out statutory duties of
collecting statistics on alien arrivals at ports for many
years prior to 1905. A small new department of the Home
Office was set up in 1904 to take responsibility for a
number of subjects, including aliens. This evolved in 1912
into B Division, which dealt with aliens, nationality and
naturalisation, and some other matters. Within B Division
was the Aliens Division, later known as the Aliens
Department.
The Aliens Branch, later known as Immigration Branch, which
contained the immigration inspectorate, was attached to the
Aliens Division. A sizeable immigration service had been
set up under Home Office control after the First World
War34 . At its head was the Chief Inspector of Immigration,
assisted by two senior inspectors. William Haldane Porter,
previously the sole inspector under the 1905 Act, became the
first Chief Inspector of Immigration in 1919. There were
also several inspectors with responsibilities for regions or
districts within which ports were located. Controls at the
ports were the province of some dozen chief immigration
32 For further particulars of the personnel of the
Home Office, see British Imperial Calendar and Civil Service
List, London, annually, 1933-1942.
See Pellew, 'The Home Office and the Aliens Act',
op. cit., pp. 370-371; Troup, op. cit., pp. 142-155.
Prior to this, immigration officers were officers
of Customs and not under direct Home Office control.
Instructions were issued by the Board of Customs with the
concurrence of the Home Secretary. See Haldane Porter,
minute, 11 Dec 1929, PRO HO 45/24765/432156/56.
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officers, with a staff of over 100 immigration officers and
50 assistant immigration officers, in addition to staff at
headquarters. This establishment did not alter greatly over
the next three decades. The numbers of immigration officers
remained between 150 and 200. The staff of the immigration
service dealt with persons landing in the UK at certain
ports designated as approved ports for the landing of
passengers 35 . Certain aerodromes were also designated as
approved ports, but in the early 1920s the scale of air
traffic had not yet justified the appointment of full-time
immigration officers36.
From the First World War, all passengers had to be in
possession of passports or other documents establishing
nationality and identity 37 . Passports were little used
before 1914, but during the war an elaborate system of
passport control by means of visas was introduced,
supervised by the War Office's Military Intelligence
department. After the war the government decided to continue
the visa system, as a security device as well as for
See Haldane Porter, memorandum, 'The Control of
Passengers and Alien Seamen in Time of War', 31 Jan 1921, in
Subcommittee on Treatment of Aliens, Committee of Imperial
Defence, Standing Subcommittee on the Co-ordination of
Departmental Action on the Outbreak of War, 29 Mar 1923, PRO
CAB 15/10, pp . 21-24, dC paper No 411B; for numbers of
immigration officers whose employment was sanctioned by the
Treasury during the period covered by this thesis, see PRO T
162/847/E20500/2 (for 1929-1936) and PRO T 162/847/E20500/3
(for 1936-1946); at the peak of refugee admissions in May
1939 the authorised number of immigration officers totalled
only 170, including temporary and supernumerary staff:ibid., HR Foyle to W Wilson, 5 May 1939.
36 Traffic increased greatly during the 1930s,
requiring more staff at airports, See e.g. Crapper(HO) to
Secretary, 31 Dec 1934, PRO T 162/847/E20500/2.
The passport system had been defunct before the
war except in Russia and Turkey, according to Haldane
Porter, memorandum. 31 Jan 1921, see n. 35 above.
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immigration control purposes. The visa system was now placed
in the hands of passport control officers(PCOs), who were
responsible to the Passport Control Department of the
Foreign Office, but received their instructions, in effect,
from the Home Secretary38.
Admission Drocedures
Immigration control at the port of entry into the UK began
with inspection at the port by an immigration officer. Not
all passengers would need to produce visas. A visa is not a
guarantee of admission, but a form of entry clearance. Where
a visa is a pre-requisite of entry, someone arriving without
one will normally be refused entry. In the inter-war years,
the passports of aliens coming from many foreign countries
had to bear a British visa. Aliens from such countries were
required to have visas before they set out, whatever the
purpose of their journey to Britain. The visa application
was made to a British PCO or Consul, located in a major city
abroad. Many countries now had visa requirements and so a
traveller might need one or more transit visas for
intermediate countries, as well as a visa for the country of
destination, which was obtained first. A British visa would
be granted, subject to payment of a prescribed fee, if the
applicant's plans did not conflict with the requirements of
the Aliens Order, and there were no objections to the alien
personally. Visa decisions could be made on the spot but
certain decisions were referred to higher authority in
London. The grant of the visa was endorsed on the passport,
generally by means of a rubber-stamp, and handwritten
particulars were added. In some cases the passport control
38 Haldane Porter, memorandum, 31 Jan 1921, see n. 35
above.
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officer might also send a secret signal to the port
authorities by means of coded messages written in the
passenger's passport.
A passenger who landed in Britain armed with the appropriate
visa could expect to be granted leave to land. This might
still be refused at the port of entry if the basis for the
grant of the visa appeared invalid. The fact that the
passenger's circumstances had already been investigated
before the visa was authorised eased the job of the
immigration authorities at the ports and reassured the
passenger in advance that refusal was unlikely. The
conditions under which the immigration officer granted leave
to enter would be endorsed on the passport. In 1933 the vast
majority of alien travellers were not subjected to any
formal conditions - these were only imposed in cases were
there seemed cause for extra caution. The most common
conditions imposed were a condition against employment or a
time limit, and sometimes both. The use of landing
conditions grew drastically. At Harwich, for example, where
many refugees landed, cases in which time or employment
conditions were imposed increased by 79% from 10,105 in 1932
to 18,074 in 1934. In 1931 it was decided to impose a new
form of conditional landing to prevent aliens landing as
students or visitors from taking employment: over 22,000
aliens were subjected to this condition in 1933. Persons
coming for employment also had to be in possession of a
permit issued to the employer by the Ministry of Labour. At
the ports, new arrivals who were coming for residence and
Home Office memorandum, 5 Feb 1935, PRO T
162/847/E20500/2.
40 Ibid.	 I LONDON I
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employment were also advised that on reaching their
destination they should register their residential addresses
and any subsequent changes with the police. On first
registration the police issued the alien with an Aliens
Registration Book, a small grey booklet which was to be
produced for amendment when necessary41 . The Home Office
kept a card index of all aliens landing, which in
conjunction with the Central Register of Aliens, based on
aliens registration records, enabled aliens' movements to be
monitored closely42.
Security and Dolitical considerations
In the course of the 1920s, visa requirements were
progressively reduced by means of agreements to abolish
visas which were concluded with Western European nations43.
The process began with France and Belgium in 1921 and 1922,
and by the end of 1927 such agreements also embraced the
former enemies, Germany and Austria. By contrast, visas were
still required by citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland,
41 The authority to impose landing conditions was
contained in the Aliens Order 1920, Article 1(4); for the
requirement to produce a Ministry of Labour permit, seeibid, Article 1 (3)(b); for Home Office practice on the
imposition of conditions, see S Hoare to R Morrison, 22 Jun
1933, PRO FO 372/2949, T7159/509/378, f.288, explaining that
no formal permission to reside in Britain was granted to any
foreigner; See also, 'Memorandum on United Kingdom
Immigration Laws and practices and the present policy of Her
Majesty's Government on the reception of immigrants',
CIE/CT/15, 8 Jul 1938, Intergovernmental Committee, Evian,
July 1938, Technical Subcommittee, PRO FO 919/9.
42 Troup, op. cit., p. 146.
Such reductions had been envisaged by the
architects of the inter-war system. See recommendations of a
meeting of a Sub-committee of the Aliens and Nationality
Joint Standing Committee, appointed to deal with the
controls abroad of passenger traffic to the UK, 27 Feb 1919,
minutes, Aliens and Nationality Joint Standing Committee,
vol. 1, ff.33-35, PRO HO 45/19966.
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whose territories were the main source of Jewish
immigration.
Another means of limiting the disruption to traffic caused
by the visa system was through the exemption of transmigrant
traffic. This flow of passengers in transit through Britain
was a source of profit for British shipping lines, and did
not require very stringent controls. The Aliens Order
exempted transmigrants from many of the restrictions on
aliens generally. They did not require visas, providing the
masters or owners of the ships which brought them to Britain
had given security (usually in the form of a bond) that
transit passengers would be properly maintained and
controlled during transit, and would not remain in the
country for any other purpose without permission 44 . A
similar system of bonding had been in use under the 1905
Act, exempting transmigrants from inspection, in the days
before passports and visas had been required 45 . When
drafting the legislation of 1905 and 1919, the authorities
had also known that they would be able to rely on the
unofficial machinery of the Jews' Temporary Shelter(JTS) to
provide additional control of the transmigrant traffic.
Conveniently, and at no cost to public funds, Jewish
transmigrants from Poland and elsewhere in central and
eastern Europe, who now passed through Britain rather than
settling there, were subject to the firm charitable policing
of officials of the JTS. The JTS had been established in the
east end of London by Anglo-Jewish leaders soon after the
expansion of Jewish immigration in 1881, and was maintained
Aliens Order 1920, art. 4(1).
Aliens Act 1905, s. 8(1), s. 8(1)(b).
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by funds raised in the Jewish community. JTS workers met
Jewish migrants arriving at the ports and railway termini,
helped them with short-term accommodation and sufficient
financial support for a brief stay, and supervised their
compliance with immigration controls. The work of the JTS
was highly valued by the Home Office, and close working
relations had been established between JTS officers and
Aliens Department officials46.
The Home Office aimed to keep interference with tourist and
commercial traffic to the minimum consistent with the
desired level of control on the influx of immigrants. Any
reduction in immigration conditions cut down the need for
follow-up and casework, and while concern with control was
the Home Office's priority, this had to be balanced against
staff shortages and reluctance to expand the arm of
government. Other departments also pressed for reduced
controls to foster tourism, commerce, cultural exchange and
good international relations. Thus visa abolition was
accompanied by other concessions, including special
arrangements for "no passport" excursions to the UK47.
The visa system was also seen as a defence against potential
foes. The war-time visa system had been designed to prevent
the entry of suspected enemy agents and to reduce passenger
46 For the JTS see its Annual Reports; for Anglo-
Jewry's work with Jewish immigrants and transmigrants, see
London, 'Jewish Refugees, Anglo-Jewry and British Government
Policy', in D Cesarani ed., The Making of Modern Anglo-
Jewry, Oxford 1990, pp. 163-190, esp. pp. 167-168.
See Gilmour to Danesfort, 25 Nov 1933, PRO HO
45/15882/666764/50; No-passport excursions increased
dramatically between 1930 and 1934. A suggested expalanation
for the increase was the UK's going off the gold standard.
Home Office memorandum, 5 Feb 1935, PRO T162/847/E 20500/2.
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traffic to the minimum in the interests of national
security. While war-time security considerations no longer
applied in 1919, the planners of the post-war system were
highly conscious of the potential offered by passport
control for the pursuit of British security objectives in
peacetime. In February 1919, for example, Haldane Porter
told a meeting of a sub-committee considering the controls
abroad of passenger traffic to the UK that "one of the chief
functions of the Controls after the war would be to exclude
Bolshevik agents from the UK"48.
The Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee approved the new
passport control system for the UK in August 1919. Later
that month, Colonel VGW Kell, the head of M15 49 , pointed out
that without a system which embraced the whole of the
British Empire there would be a very dangerous gap in the
fence erected around Britain. Kell proposed a scheme of
passport control offices throughout the Empire to complete
the chain of control. He stressed that the collection of
intelligence would be "closely bound up with that of Ports
Control in that the surveillance of persons in transit to
and from the various ports of the Empire will provide not
only the cover necessary, but the bulk of the material for
records." He envisaged that the primary considerations of
port controls would be naval and military security and the
prevention of Bolshevik activities 50 . As the identity of
48 Minutes of sub-committee meeting, 27 Feb 1919, (see
n. 43. above), f.35.
For Kell, see appendix I.
50 See Report of Passport Control Sub-committee, 15
Sept 1919, Kell to Haldane Porter, 28 Aug 1919, Memorandum
no. 67, Aliens and Nationality Joint Standing Committee,
vol. 2, (no page no.), PRO HO 45/19966.
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Britain's main enemy altered in the 1930s, the security
authorities utilised passport control officers, many of whom
held military rank, to gather intelligence on Nazi Germany.
The head of the Passport Control Department in the late
1930s was Captain M Jeffes. His deputy, RT Parkin, assistant
director of passport control, had been a member of M1551.
Doubts as to the value of the security aspect of the
controls existed within the government. Early in 1922 Edward
Bridges was working in the Treasury's Establishment
Division, where his duties included sanctioning the salaries
of passport control officers. Seemingly provoked by a
Foreign Office request for additional staff for Riga, the
centre for much of the Russian traffic, Bridges made a
distinction between what he termed the "Scotland Yard
aspect" of passport controls and the "immigration aspect".
To abandon the former, and confine the system to the latter,
Bridges suggested, might not mean the loss of "anything of
real benefit". His superior, Maurice Headlam, agreed that
the system was anachronistic, unpopular, perhaps even not
self-supporting through visa fees; Headlam also doubted
whether it even achieved its intended object "of keeping out
undesirables"52.
Yet the system survived such scepticism. The secret services
were soon reliant on the intelligence role of passport
control in peacetime. Had it been abandoned, they would have
51 In 1919 Parkin was in M15 and worked on drafting
instructions to passport control officers, See Report of
Passport Control Sub-committee, 15 Sept 1919, Memorandum no.
67, Aliens and Nationality Joint Standing Committee, vol. 2,
(no page no.), PRO HO 45/19966.
52 Bridges, memorandum, 8 Mar 1922, Headlam to
Bridges, 29 Mar 1922, PRO T 162/76/E7483/1.
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wanted a substitute. This was demonstrated in early 1923,
when the Foreign Office's Nevile Bland protested at Treasury
proposals for certain reductions in passport control posts.
Reductions were now considered possible as visa abolition
agreements covered increasing numbers of countries in
Western Europe. Bland objected that this would result in the
loss of the "cover" provided by passport control for secret
service work and require corresponding addition to the
secret service Vote for work now performed by passport
control at an equivalent cost. By 1925 it was agreed that
the Foreign Office would no longer need to consult the
Treasury over filling posts in passport control, provided no
increased expenditure was involved and a preference given to
ex-servicemen was maintained53.
As well as being concerned about security considerations in
peacetime, the authorities were soon discussing the
treatment of aliens in wartime. These questions formed part
of the planning for future wars, which was commenced within
the Committee of Imperial Defence(CID) soon after the end of
the 1914-19 war. At this stage the main threat was assumed
to come from the Soviet Union, and the authorities'
anxieties about Russians as future enemies extended to an
estimated 92,000 Russian residents, of whom perhaps half
lived in the east end of London 54 . Most of these Russians
were Jews who had come to the UK before 1914, and had thus
completed the five years' residence in the UK prescribed for
applicants for naturalisation as British subjects. Many
Treasury memoranda and correspondence with Foreign
Office, 7 Feb 1923 to 30 Apr 1925, Ibid.
Shorthand note of meeting on 8 Jun 1920, CID Sub-
committee on Treatment of Aliens in Time of War, Report,
Proceedings and Memoranda, PRO CAB 15/10, p. 64;
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still had Russian nationality, for a variety of reasons,
frequently because they could not afford the prescribed fees
for naturalisation. In addition, many applications made by
Russians were being covertly and systematically delayed by
the Home Office for up to 15 years on top of the five year
period of statutory residence, a practice which Sir John
Pedder, Assistant Secretary responsible for aliens matters
in the Home Office, defended in 1924, although by 1929 such
delays were regarded as unacceptable by a majority of senior
opinion within the Home Office55.
In June 1920, at a meeting of the sub-committee of the CID
concerned with the treatment of aliens in time of war,
Pedder imagined that, although the "Russians" were long-
standing residents, it would be quite intolerable in war-
time to have "a solid block of enemies like that" in the
east end of London 56 . Pedder rejected Kell's idea of putting
a cordon round that part of the east end, saying that this
would not be as easy as a camp, and might be more expensive.
Kell accepted the inevitability of mass internment, advising
that the aliens "should be interned first and let out
Pedder supported this practice, see minute, 28 May
1924, PRO HO 45/24765/432156/17: his remarks are quoted in
Cesarani, 'Anti-Alienism', op. cit., p. 17; Sir John Pedder
(1969-1956) retired in 1932, with the rank of Principal
Assistant Secretary. For his career, see Pellew, 'Home
Office and Aliens Act', op. cit., pp. 374-375; for Home
Office views in 1929-1930, see minutes by Haldane Porter,
Scott, Pedder, Anderson and Arthur Short (Parliamentary
Under Secretary), PRO HO 45/24765/432156/56.
56 Note of meeting on 8 Jun 1920 (see n. 54 above), p.
64.
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afterwards, when possible". 	 Thus despite the tenuousness
of the links of these Jewish residents with their Russian
homeland, they were presumed to require require mass
internment as enemy aliens; when detailed planning of war-
time controls resumed in the late 1930s the presumption
remained that the mass of enemy aliens would immediately be
interned.
The management of control
The Home Office's Aliens Department was responsible for
dealing with aliens after landing in the UK. It also dealt
with questions of immigration policy and practice, and
liaison with other ministries. The day-to-day conduct of the
work was managed by Assistant Secretaries, together with
their immediate subordinates who were Principals. In the
1933-9 period much of the policy work was handled by an
Assistant Secretary, Sir Ernest Holderness. Holderness was
eventually superceded by EN Cooper. Between 1925 and 1932,
Cooper held the office of Superintending inspector in the
Aliens Branch. By 1930 he had been seconded for duty as a
Principal to B Division, in the course of a planned
reduction in supervisory staff of the Aliens Branch and
strengthening of B Division, to which much administrative
work was being transferred 58 . By 1932 Cooper was a permanent
member of the Aliens Department, where he held the rank of
A senior Customs official named Mackie asked if
such measures would apply to Russian Jews as they had done
to German Jews; he claimed that a great number of the
Russians "are really Jews and are not regarded by the
population as Russians. They carry their race on their
face." Ibid. p. 66. Mackie also claimed that "a very large
percentage of these Russian Jews are not of any military
value at all". Pedder said this was merely a prejudice.
58 Anderson to Secretary, 16 Dec 1929, PRO T
162/846/E20500/1.
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Principal until he became an Assistant Secretary in 1940,
keeping this rank until his retirement in 1943. Cooper
devoted a large proportion of his time to work with refugees
and dealing with refugee organisations, and his contribution
is extensively covered in this study59.
The Aliens Department did not have a large staff. Many of
its policies in the period under examination must be seen as
attempts to economise on manpower. One method was to reduce
time spent on individual cases, by limiting the numbers of
cases followed up, and simplifying procedures. Interviewing
callers was time-consuming. In 1937 officials hoped that the
numbers of callers might decrease when the Division moved to
less accessible premises 60 . Manpower resources could be
increased by involving other departments in aliens work; by
drafting in immigration officers; by making use of customs
officers; and by giving junior staff extra responsibility.
During the refugee crisis of 1938-9, temporary and permanent
increases in manpower were sanctioned, but at no stage was
expansion contemplated on a scale proportionate to the
explosion in casework caused by the refugee crisis. The
great expansion took place in the voluntary sector.
Co-oDeration with advisor y committees and other government
deiartment s
The Home Office had a tradition of co-opting voluntary
organisations, including several in the Jewish community, in
aliens work, and some were accorded what was in effect semi-
See Appendix 1 for Cooper's career.
60 Sir Ernest Holderness, memorandum on aliens
procedures, 1935, PRO HO 213/328; for Home Office concern
about the adequacy of arrangements for interviewing callers
on aliens matters, see PRO HO 213/1.
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official status. Civil servants had for years fostered close
working relations with particular individuals holding
leading positions in these organisations or within the
Jewish community. This is illustrated in the period 1919-39
by the history of two non-statutory committees which the
Home Office set up to assist with the design, operation and
monitoring of statutory controls.
The Aliens and Nationality Joint Standing Committee
The most important of these committees was the Aliens and
Nationality Joint Standing Committee(ANJSC), which existed
between 1919 and 1932. Senior Home Office officials had
suggested in late 1918 that it would be useful to have a
standing inter-departmental committee with executive powers
on aliens questions. This was partly in response to
allegations of friction and lack of co-operation between
departments over aliens work during the war. The ANJSC was
set up by Home Secretary Edward Shortt on 7 February 1919.
This committee, which was serviced by Home Office officials,
was designed to improve interdepartmental communication and
co-ordination. Any department might refer to it "any
question as to nationality or the control and treatment of
aliens". The committee included representatives from about a
dozen interested departments. It was chaired by Sir John
Pedder, who had been one of its principal advocates. The
committee was dissolved, without any protest from other
departments, in April 1932, following Pedder's retirement,
having not met for the previous five years. In its first
years, however, the Committee was very active, dealing with
60
the drafting of the new Aliens Order, and designing the
post-war system of control61.
The committee also dealt with aliens questions which were
the legacy of the war, some of which were of particular
concern to the Jewish community. Numerous refugees, known as
"war refugees" had been admitted during the war. Most came
from Belgium. The war refugees included some 10,000 Jews,
many of Russian or Polish nationality, some 2,800 of whom
remained in Britain in February 1919. Some were the
destitute dependants of Jewish men of Russian nationality
who had gone to Russia for military service under a
convention agreed in 1917. These Jewish refugees and their
dependants had been cared for by the Jewish community, which
had set up the Jewish War Refugees Committee(JWRC), an
expansion of the Jews' Temporary Shelter. In 1919 an officer
of the JWRC, Erich Turk, attended ANJSC meetings which
considered the progress of repatriation. These meetings also
decided whether to authorise the continued use of public
funds for maintenance of destitute Jewish families, for
which the government had taken over responsibility during
the war 62 . By November 1919, only 14 of the refugees from
Belgium remained in Britain, plus 155 refugees from France,
mainly convention cases, and 85 from other parts of the
61 See four volumes of AJNSC minutes and memoranda, 7
Feb 1919-30 Sept 1922, PRO HO 45/19966. For appointment of
committee members, see PRO HO 45/19966/374034/2. The AJNSC
had representatives nominated by eleven government
departments in addition to the Home Office. It was dissolved
on 4 Apr 1932, see PRO HO 45/19966/374034/28.
62 Minutes and memoranda of AJNSC, vol. 1, ff.75-6,
79-80, vol. 2, ff.34, 79-80, PRO HO 45/19966.
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world 63 . The committee had a Jewish member, E Sebag
Montefiore, whose appointment Pedder recommended, in order
to retain the benefit of the "very great advantage in
dealing with Jewish questions which had been derived during
the war from his presence on the Civilian Internment Camps
Committee." 64 Sebag Montefiore used his contacts with
Jewish bodies abroad to speed repatriation.
The suggestion that this committee should be abolished was
put forward within the Home Office in early 1932. The Home
Secretary, Sir Herbert Samuel, agreed, accepting that the
aliens questions which were arising were more suitable for
ad-hoc conferences than for a large general committee. For
the remainder of the decade, there was no standing committee
concerned with alien immigration 65 . Committees concerned
with refugees were found not within government, but outside
it, set up by the Jewish community, Christian religious
bodies, and others. Many Jewish public figures did voluntary
work for the Jewish committees. Samuel was the most
illustrious of these, and became founding chairman of the
Council for German Jewry in 1936.
63 See 'The Jewish Refugees', in Report on the Work
undertaken by the British Government in the Reception and
Care of the Belgian Refugees, London 1920, pp. 26-27, PRO HO
45/10738/261921; Erich Turk (secretary of the JTS), 'Note on
the Work of the Jewish War Refugees Committee', 15 Nov 1919,
ibid., Appendix No 4: pp. 52-8. For Turk, who became the one
Jewish trustee of the Czech Refugee Trust Fund in 1939, see
Appendix 1
64 Pedder, minute, 4 Feb 1919, PRO HO
45/19966/374304/2.
65 B Division also sent a representative to two
Committee on Imperial Defence sub-committees. The job of the
first was to prepare and co-ordinate war-time control on
aliens. The second dealt with control of aliens in secret
munitions work. Holderness to Currie, 17 Nov 1938, PRO HO
45/24918/545775/49.
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The Aliens Deportation Advisory Committee
In 1932 an Aliens Deportation Advisory Committee (ADAC),
composed of non-official persons and chaired by Roland
Vaughan Williams KC, Recorder of Cardiff, was set up by the
Home Office. Its role was to advise the Home Secretary on
individual deportation cases. The decision of whether to
refer cases to the committee was entirely at the discretion
of the Home Secretary. The only cases to be referred were
those under article 12(6)(c) of the Aliens Order, which
authorised the making of a deportation order where the
Secretary of State deemed it "conducive to the public good."
Only cases of established residents were considered suitable
for referral. Thus persons who overstayed their leave to
land and unlawful entrants were expressly excluded from the
ADAC's remit. This Committee proved troublesome, and by
November 1938 the Home Secretary had referred no cases to it
for over two years66.
The history of the ADAC illustrates aspects of the Home
Office approach to aliens controls which have a bearing on
this study. As the practice of the 1920s has shown, Home
Office ministers and officials believed in including
prominent figures from the Jewish community in the process
of immigration control. In the 1930s they remained open to
suggestions from Jewish leaders about immigration policy and
the machinery of control, as the origins of the ADAC
illustrate: an undertaking to set up such a body was given
66 Holderness to Currie, 17 Nov 1938, PRO HO
45/24918/545775/49; papers containing the background to the
setting up of the ADAC are in PRO HO 45/15171/552811, for
the period 1930-1933. It was set up on 1 Mar 1932: papers on
the appointment of its members are in PRO HO
45/14909/617473; for ADAC's work in 1932 see PRO HO
45/15171/552811/7. For changes in 1936 see below.
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in 1930 by JR Clynes, then Home Secretary, to a deputation
from the Jewish Board of Deputies, whose Aliens Committee
had regular meetings with the Home Secretary of the day. The
suggestion was nevertheless hardly accorded high priority,
as the ADAC was not set up until two years later67.
The internal discussions about who should sit on the
committee demonstrate the high regard which certain
officials had developed for Otto Schiff. Schiff, a
Frankfurt-born City stockbroker, and President of the Jews'
Temporary Shelter since 1922, was the leading figure in
Anglo-Jewish charitable work for aliens 68 . He was awarded
the OBE for his work for Belgian Jewish refugees in the
1914-18 war. He became the leading figure in British Jewry's
response to the refugees, a contribution acknowledged by the
award of the CBE in 1939. Schiff was the Jewish leader in
whom the Home Office placed most trust. His working
relationship with EN Cooper was particularly close, and they
became trusted friends. Many of the detailed schemes for the
entry of Jewish refugees evolved from their collaboration.
It was natural for Home Office officials to think of
enlisting Schiff's help when planning the ADAC. In April
1930, the Home Office's Harold Scott suggested that a person
of standing in the Jewish Community, such as Schiff or his
brother, should be the chairman of the new deportation
advisory committee. Pedder disagreed, saying he did not
think that
the chairman should be of Jewish extraction. Mr Schiff would
not be persona grata to more than one section of Jews.
Personally he might be a very good member but I should not
67 For initial Home Office reactions to this
suggestion in 1929-30, see PRO HO 45/24765/432156/56.
68 For Schiff, see appendix 1.
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choose h
	 - though valuing his services to the HO
highly."
In March 1931 Scott nevertheless suggested a Jewish KC as
the ADAC's first Chairman. He also suggested Otto Schiff as
a member. There was no dispute that there should be a Jewish
member on the committee. The Home Secretary, Clynes, had
wished to include Professor Harold Laski of the LSE, on the QJ/&Q3,
ground that he was a leader of the Jewish community of
Manchester and could represent the Jewish point of view on
the tribunal. However, before the committee came into being,
Clynes was displaced by a change of government. The ADAC was
ultimately set up by Clynes' successor, Sir Herbert Samuel,
Home Secretary from August 1931 to September 1932. When the
Committee was finally appointed in March 1932, its six
members included one Jew, Colonel FD Samuel, who had been
recommended by Otto Schiff70.
Pedder admitted to delay over getting the committee going:
other work was more urgent, while the advantages of the
committee were "mainly 'window dressing'". It would not make
the work easier or better, and he saw disadvantages in
"washing dirty linen in public'" 71 . When the ADAC finally
started work, its practical impact was extremely limited. It
provided a possibility of review in the very small number of
cases referred to it - some 20 per year - and it tended to
uphold the proposed deportations in two cases out of three.
More significantly, the attitudes of senior Home Office
69 Pedder, minute, 15 Oct 1930, PRO HO
45/15171/552811/1.
70 Scott, minute, 27 Mar 1931, PRO HO
45/15171/552811/1; for Schiff's recommendation, see Newsam
to Sir H Samuel, 17 Feb 1932, PRO HO 45/14909/617473/2,
71 Pedder, minute, 5 Jun 1930, PRO HO
45/15171/552811/1.
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officials to wider aspects of immigration control were
revealed in their dealings with the committee. In particular
they illustrated a strong preference for relying on their
own discretion and reluctance to be hampered either by legal
technicalities or the views of outsiders72.
The most striking difference between immigration control in
the inter-war period and the present day is that no formal
conditions of any kind were imposed on the majority of
aliens. The Home Office, wishing to restrict the activities
of certain persons who had not been subjected to formal
conditions on entry, resorted to interpretations of the law
which lacked any genuine foundation. In 1932 the Home Office
decided to make deportation orders against a group of aliens
who had been allowed to enter without formal conditions, on
the basis that their presence was not conducive to the
public good. The sole ground for this contention was that
they had taken employment.
When these cases were referred to the ADAC, its Chairman
objected that entering employment could not in itself be
regarded as not conducive to the public good, whatever
economic considerations might apply. He concluded that in
the absence of any formal conditions, the aliens concerned
were free from restriction and could not be deported on this
basis. In a reply from the Permanent Under Secretary, Sir R
Russell Scott, the Home Office countered with the argument
that the alien's stay in Britain "was subject to an implied
condition, resulting from the alien's own statements to the
72 See correspondence between the Home Office and the
Board of Deputies, Jan to Mar 1933, PRO HO
45/15171/552811/9.
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immigration officer, that he would not take employment", and
the deportion orders therefore justified because the men had
entered employment "when they were not free to do so." The
aliens concerned were former British nationals who had taken
US citizenship; on arrival they had apparently disclaimed
any intention of settling or working. Such persons could be
assumed to be aware that the Aliens Order required persons
wishing to enter employment to obtain Ministry of Labour
permits, a provision allegedly well publicised to visa
applicants in the USA. The dispute with the ADAC was settled
on the basis that the Home Office would follow the
committee's advice on the cases in question. It was also
agreed that in future the Home Office would impose both time
and employment conditions on similar cases, and that only
cases of persons settled in the UK would go to the ADAC73.
The referral of cases to the ADAC was further restricted
from February 1936. After a difference of opinion over a
case involving certain Italians who had bribed an
immigration officer in order to get a relative into the
country, the Home Office's Alexander Maxwell observed
critically- that the committee was inclined to give the alien
the benefit of the doubt and to reject the Home Office view
that the onus was on the alien to show his worthiness to be
allowed to remain. Scott agreed that in future the
department would refer to the ADAC only cases where "the
Home Office itself felt doubts, or there is room for
controversy, or a likelihood of serious protests"74.
See Roland Vaughan-Williams KC (the chairman) to
Porter, 27 Jul 1932, PRO HO 45/14909/617472/5; Home Office
memoranda, Sept 1932, RR Scott to Vaughan-Williams, 3 Nov
1932, PRO HO 45/15171/552811/7.
Maxwell, memorandum, 29 Feb, 1936, PRO HO 213/239.
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The Aliens Department faced a continual problem of overwork.
Its officials did not welcome interference from outside
bodies. This would make more work for them, and cause
delays, as Holderness emphasised in 1935, when assembling
arguments to counter an MP's proposal for a new advisory
committee on immigration matters. By this date the Aliens
Department was overburdened with a large volume of
correspondence. Fifty or sixty persons were interviewed each
day, with immediate decisions needed in many cases. Every
effort was made to encourage holiday and business travel by
imposing the minimum of restrictions on it. The chief
problem was presented by persons who made a visit a pretext
for prolonging their stay indefinitely75.
Other government departments
The Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The involvement of the
core of central government in immigration control was
limited. Prime Ministers generally took little or no
interest. On rare occasions the Home Secretary brought up
aliens questions in the Cabinet. The question of refugees
from Germany occupied the Cabinet on two occasions in April
1933. In the intervening week they were the subject of a
report by a Cabinet Committee which met once only. The
Cabinet did not formally discuss refugees from Germany again
until after the Anschluss in March 1938 76 . From 1938 on, as
Holderness, memorandum, 'General System of Aliens
Control', 1935, prepared for the Home Secretary for the 1935
Home Office vote, in connection with an advisory committee
suggested by Sir A Wilson, PRO HO 213/328.
76 In July 1935 the Home Secretary raised a question
concerning admission of certain refugees from Germany inthe
Cabinet, but the issues were political and did not concern
asylum. Cab. 36(35)9, 10 Jul 1935, PRO CAB 23/82.
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the refugee crisis intensified and war approached, Cabinet
ministers other than the Home Secretary, including the Prime
Minister, became more involved in refugee policy. Two
further Cabinet Committees on refugees were established. The
Cabinet Committee on the Refugee Problem was set up in
January 1939, and met seven times in that year. The Cabinet
Committee on the Reception and Accommodation of Refugees was
set up at the end of 1942 and met, with periods of activity
punctuated by long gaps, until mid 1945.
The Treasury . The Treasury was involved in immigration
control through its role in the control of public
expenditure. Its Establishment Division sanctioned the pay
and employment of persons involved in immigration controls.
The Treasury's role in advising on expenditure of public
funds obliged it to express views on whether the UK should
contribute to international organisations concerned with
refugees and on specific aid projects for refugees. In the
mid-1930s the Treasury view on refugee policy issues was
sought in particular by Foreign Office officials dealing
with Britain's international role in the protection of
refugees. Certain Treasury officials, distanced from both
Home Office preoccupations with maintaining control and
Foreign Office diplomatic objectives, showed humanitarian
concern with Jewish refugees and readiness to consider
spending public funds to help them. Through the Treasury's
international activities, its officals had developed
networks of foreign political and business contacts, and the
Treasury had some success in dealing with Nazi Germany
For the Cabinet Committee on the Refugee Problem
see PRO CAB 98/1; for the Cabinet Committee on the Reception
and Accommodation of Refugees, see PRO CAB 95/15.
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during the 1930 g . It was therefore natural for Treasury
officials to be involved in negotiations over refugee
finance with Nazi Germany, and to play a leading part in
British negotiations with the government of Czechoslovakia
over aid to refugees after the Munich Agreement. The
Treasury also became actively involved in overseeing the
expenditure of moneys made available by the British
government for refugees from Czechoslovakia.
The Fprein Office. The permanent officials of the Foreign
Office had frequent dealings concerning aliens with Home
Office officials. On aliens matters the Foreign Office
operated largely as an intermediary, since policy was
primarily made by the Home Office. The Foreign Office's duty
was to play its part in carrying out this policy and to
explain it to aliens and foreign governments. The Foreign
Office was frequently in receipt of representations from
aliens and people concerned with immigration cases, which it
would transmit to the Home Office. Many such cases resulted
from Foreign Office responsibility for the Passport Control
Department(PCD). The PCD came under the supervision of the
Foreign Office's Treaty Department, which had a general
concern with the procedural aspects of international
agreements, passports and visa questions, nationality,
naturalisation and deportation. The Foreign Office also
transmitted messages between the Home Office and foreign
governments, and brought matters to the attention of other
British government departments, particularly the Dominion
and Colonial Offices. Thus Foreign Office officials raised
questions concerning the admission of Jewish refugees to the
mandated territory of Palestine with the Colonial Office,
which in turn consulted the Government of Palestine. For
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Foreign Office purposes, countries outside the British
Empire were grouped into several areas, each of which was
covered by separate department. Germany, for example, was
the concern of the Central Department78.
The Foreign Office had a specialist department concerned
with the League of Nations which formulated British policy
on international efforts to help refugees. In the mid-1930s
the key official in this department was Roger Makins, who
took the lead in Foreign Office policy-making on refugees
from Germany79 . From early 1939 the work was allocated to a
Refugee Section set up within the Foreign Office, which
later became the Refugee Department. Foreign Office
officials involved in this work became expert on refugee
matters, and were a source of well-informed criticism of
Home Office attitudes and policies, while acknowledging Home
Office primacy in matters concerning immigration to the UK.
Inter-deDartmental consultation. The Aliens Department had a
wide range of contacts with other government departments
over casework. The Ministry of Labour was involved in alien
employment matters, issuing labour permits to employers who
wished to take on aliens who currently resided abroad; the
employer forwarded the permit to the alien for presentation
on arrival in the UK. Applications from aliens already in
the UK for permission to take employment were dealt with by
the Home Office, which gave a decision after consultation
78 See Foreign Office List, London, annually, 1933-48.
Roger Makins, now Lord Sherfield, underlined the
extent to which he was reponsible for formulating refugee
policy, particularly during and after the Evian conference
in 1938, when interviewed on 13 Dec 1990 by this author. For
Makin g , see Appendix 1.
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with the Ministry of Labour. The ministry's policy was to
refuse applications which might displace British residents
from employment. Information on undesirable aliens was kept
on a blacklist maintained in co-operation between these
ministries, on which employers who broke the regulations
were placed, as well as aliens who were not to be readmitted
or granted extensions. In cases of aliens applying to start
businesses, the Home Office consulted the Board of Trade.
After the Special Areas Acts of 1934 and 1937, the
Commissioners for the Special Areas also became involved in
the applications of alien manufacturers who might set up
business in depressed parts of the country.
The Secret Service organisations M15 and M16 also played a
part in aliens controls. M15, the Security Service, was
responsible for security within the Empire, while M16, the
Special or Secret Intelligence Service(SIS), was responsible
for foreign agents and the collection of intelligence and
counter-intelligence abroad: both agencies provided the Home
Office with advice on aliens who might be undesirable80 . One
example from May 1933, showing secret service involvement in
visa controls on refugees abroad, was a warning to the Home
Office from Sir Vernon Kell of M15 that two refugees from
Germany who were suspected Communists, and therefore viewed
as undesirable, were intending to appply for visas in
Holland. Their names were consequently added to the "black
list" of undesirable aliens who were to be denied entry, and
warnings were sent out to Passport Control not to grant them
80 For M15 and MI 6 prior to the Second World War, see
FH Hinsley and CAG Simkins, British Intelligence in the
Second World War. Volume 4. Security and Counter-
intelligence, London 1990, pp. 3-26.
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visas without reference to London81 . The Special Branch of
the police, whose members had specialist knowledge of
polittcal matters, also provided information on aliens. The
A
locally based police, as well as handling aliens
registration, also assisted in the enforcement of
immigration control, conducting investigations, and warning
and detaining aliens on behalf of the Aliens Department. The
Home Office also acquired new casework through the receipt
of recommendations and certificates from criminal courts
regarding aliens' convictions of offences rendering them
liable to deportation82.
Conclusion
In aliens matters generally the Aliens Department was more
than happy to co-operate with outside organisations. As the
refugee influx developed the Home Office increasingly sought
advice and assistance from refugee organisations, which
developed a system of specialised committees to advise on
specific categories of application. In addition members of
professions which refugees hoped to enter, such as medicine
and dentistry, also set up advisory committees to make
recommendations to the Home Office. The work of such
committees will be dealt with in the context of the British
response to refugees from Nazism, in the chapters which
follow.
81 See copy correspondence, Sir VG Kell and Home
office minutes, May 1933, PRO LAB2/2084/ETAR/4174/33.
82 For deportation, see Aliens Order 1920, art. 12.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTROL WITHOUT VISAS:
THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF REFUGEE IMMIGRATION, 1933-1938
Policy
Cabinet decisions in April 1933
The Cabinet meeting on 5 April 1933
The initial influx of Jewish refugees from Germany to
Britain was reflected in a small increase in the entry
statistics for alien visitors in the first quarter of 1933.
Between 300 and 400 Germans, most of whom were thought by
the immigration authorities to be Jews, had been admitted as
visitors up to 30 March 1933. On three days in early April a
further 150 or so had been admitted, far in excess of the
usual traffic. The number refused entry to date was
estimated at less than ten'. These figures, extracted by the
Home Office from its records of alien immigration, did not
reveal the precise numbers of refugees among the new
arrivals, nor how many were Jews.
A figure for the number of Jewish refugees appeared in the
Jewish Chronicle, Anglo-Jewry's weekly national newspaper,
on 14 April 1933. The newly formed Jewish Refugees Committee
had estimated that 200 Jews had recently arrived in Britain
1 These figures were given by the Home Secretary, Sir
John Gilmour, to the Committee on Aliens Restrictions, on 6
Apr 1933. Conclusions, Committee on Aliens Restrictions,
AR(33) 1st Cons., 6 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 27/549. This file
contains the records of the Cabinet Committee on Aliens
Restrictions: (1) the Committee's composition and terms of
reference; (ii) a memorandum by the Home Secretary dated 6
Apr 1933; (iii) the record of the Committee's one meeting on
6 Apr 1933; (iv) the Committee's report of 7 Apr 1933; and
other documents to which reference will be made. All
references to these papers are to the comprehensive
collection in CAB 27/549. Sherman refers to the report in
(iv) as PRO CAB 24/239, CP 96/33, and to the memorandum in
(ii) as Appendix I to the report.
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from Germany. The single paragraph in the Jewish Chronicle
also reported that some 30 of the new arrivals had passed
through the hands of the Jews' Temporary Shelter, (the
Jewish charity dealing with impoverished transmigrants2),
implying that some of the refugees had insufficient funds
for their immediate needs.
The nationality of the refugees was a matter of concern both
to the authorities and the Jewish community. The
overwhelming majority of the new arrivals possessed German
nationality3 . The secretary of the JTS, so the Jewish
Chronicle article reported, had said that the bulk of the
new arrivals were "highly cultured people and Germans by
birth, only a few being Poles" 4 . The Jewish Chronicle did
not need to spell out to readers the differences between
Jews of German and Polish nationality. Many Jews of Polish
nationality were now resident in Germany. Many had been born
there, but this alone did not bestow entitlement to German
citizenship 5 . Among Jews in Germany they constituted a
minority which was poorer and far less assimilated than the
German Jews. Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany was
particularly intense against Jews of non-German nationality.
As the exodus of refugees developed in the spring of 1933,
2 'Refugees in London. The Work of the Jews' Temporary
Shelter', Jewish Chronicle, 14 Apr 1933, p. 21; for the JTS,
see pp. 51-52, 60-61, 63 above.
Jewish Refugees Committee(JRC) statistics indicate
that 1,199 out of 1,343 refugee women and 2,226 out of 2,712
refugee men admitted from Mar 1933 to Oct 1934 were German
nationals. See JRC, Monthly information circular, May 1934,
Archives of the Society for the Protection of Science and
Learning, (hereafter SPSL), Box 116/2.
See n. 2 above.
For the German state and eastern Jews between 1871
and 1914, see Jack Wertheimer, Unwelcome Strangers: East
European Jews in Imperial Germany, Oxford 1987, pp. 1-74.
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the British immigration authorities adopted a policy of
withholding visas from Jews who were of non-German
nationality or stateless, if they suspected them of being
refugees from Germany. One ground the Home Secretary gave
for this decision was that Jews of non-German nationality
could return to their own country6.
The issue of refugees from Germany was raised in the Cabinet
by the Home Secretary in early April 1933. The inclusion of
this item in the Cabinet's agenda resulted primarily from
the need to agree a speedy response to an initiative from
Jewish leaders, who asked whether controls could be relaxed
to ease the entry of refugees. Moreover, they offered the
community's guarantee to take responsibility for them. The
offer had the attraction that it seemed to promise a way out
of the government's anxieties about the consequences of
admitting destitute Jews to Britain. Public pressure both
for greater restriction and for greater generosity also
existed, but this alone would hardly have been sufficient to
stimulate the Cabinet into instituting an urgent review of
controls 7 . The new item came up at the morning Cabinet
meeting on 5 April 1933. The minutes of this meeting record
that the Home Secretary, Sir John Gilmour, informed his
colleagues, as a matter of urgency,
that in consequence of events in Germany there had been a
considerable increase in the number of Jews entering this
country under the Aliens Act. In two days alone, there had
been about one hundred admittances. Most of these were
persons of the professional classes on temporary visits.
6 Sir John Gilmour, 'The Present Position in regard to
the Admission of Jewish Refugees from Germany to this
Country', 6 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 27/549.
For parliamentary pressure over refugee admissions
on 21 Feb and 9 Mar, see Sherman, op. cit., pp. 27-8.
76
There had been some entries, however, of Jews who were
completely destitute.°
This was the first occasion when the problem of immigration
control posed by the exodus of Jewish refugees from Germany
was raised formally at Cabinet level. The issue which the
Home Secretary put forward for particular consideration was
how the government should react to refugees who were or
might soon be completely destitute. By granting the new
arrivals leave to land, immigration officers were accepting
them as eligible for admission as visitors, but those who
lacked adequate means clearly did not comply with the
requirements of the Aliens Order 9 . The Home Secretary now
raised the possibility of a different approach to the cases
of Jewish refugees. His words were recorded as follows:
Representatives of the Jewish community had visited the Home
Office with a scheme to provide money and work for destitute
Jews. These representatives had anticipated that the numbers
might be as many as 3,000 to 4,000. The matter was rather
complicat and he thought it was one for a Cabinet
Committee
8 Cab. 23(33)5, 5 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 23/75.
The brief minutes of the meeting do not record that
the Home Secretary offered any explanation for the admission
of completely destitute persons notwithstanding the
requirement in the Aliens Order that visitors show means of
support. Details of such a case were included the next day
in a Home Office memorandum, which stated that only three
Jewish refugees from Germany had been unable to satisfy the
immigration officer as to their means of maintenance. An 18-
year old apprentice tailoress, in possession of £2, had been
allowed to land for a limited period "in view of special
hardships in her case...purely on compassionate grounds".
Yet a German engineer, aged 31, who had lost his job owing
to persecution and was in possession of 100 Marks, had been
refused leave to land, as had a German law student, aged 22,
in possession of 170 Marks. Gilmour, memorandum, 'The
Present Position etc.', 6 Apr 1933, see n. 6 above. It thus
seemed that, in selected cases only, sympathy for the plight
of a refugee might be allowed to override the letter of the
Aliens Order.
10 Cab. 23(33)5, 5 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 23/75.
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The description of the Jewish proposals in the Cabinet
minutes was not a completely accurate summary of a set of
written proposals which the Home Office had received, signed
by four Jewish leaders. The Jewish document made no mention
of "work", for example. However, the document itself was not
the sum of all the Jewish representations. There is, for
example, no reference in it to the concessions which Jewish
leaders were seeking, but such matters may have been put
forward verbally when Jewish leaders called at the Home
Office with the document'1.
The great attraction of this Jewish initiative for the
immigration authorities was the offer of finance. By
guaranteeing that no Jewish refugee would be allowed to
become a charge on public funds, the Jewish proposals
offered substantial insurance against the risk of admitting
large numbers of refugees who were or might become
destitute. This made it possible to consider the Jewish
request that policy towards refugees from Germany be
changed. The authorities were being asked both to allow all
Jewish refugees from Germany to enter, whether or not their
means were sufficient, and to allow those already admitted,
or to be admitted in future, to prolong their stay in the UK
while the emergency continued. The authorities had already
incurred the potential embarrassment of admitting several
hundred refugees, some of whom might soon be destitute, and
11 'Proposals of the Jewish Community as regards
Jewish Refugees from Germany', (n.d.), Appendix I to Gilmour
memorandum of 6 Apr 1933, see n. 6 above. The four
signatories were Neville Laski KC, President of the London
Committee of Deputies of British Jews (hereafter the Board
of Deputies), Lionel L Cohen, KC, Chairman of the Board's
Law, Parliamentary and General Purposes Committee, Leonard
G. Montefiore, President of the Anglo-Jewish Association,
and Otto Schiff.
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whose applications for extensions would have to be decided
over the ensuing weeks. Thus the Jewish proposals were
highly relevant to the current casework of the Aliens
Department as well as having implications for daily port
decisions on new arrivals'2.
These issues were presumably in the mind of the Home
Secretary, but very little background seems to have emerged
during the Cabinet meeting. The minutes refer briefly to the
Jewish guarantee:
A short discussion confirmed the view of the Home Secretary.
As against the objection of admitting persons who might
become destitute was the guarantee of the Jewish community,
as well as evidence that some industries (e.g. the fur
industry of Leipzig) might be transferred to this country.
The Cabinet agreed to set up a new Cabinet Committee chaired
by the Home Secretary to examine the Jewish proposals'3.
In the preceding pages the entire minutes of the short
discussion of this item in the meeting have been quoted or
paraphrased. Cabinet minutes are not necessarily full or
precise records of discussion but they record concerns
expressed in relation to the issue in question, concerns
which would be in the minds of those subsequently involved
in drafting memoranda and discussing the issue. Particularly
important were concerns recorded in the minutes, which would
provide the mandate and initial brief for the implementation
12 The concessions requested by the Jewish leaders
were summarised in the Home Secretary's memorandum of the
following day.
13 The Committee members were the Home Secretary(in
the chair), the Foreign Secretary and/or a representative
(the same alternative applied to the next three ministers),
the Colonial Secretary, the President of the Board of Trade,
the Minister of Labour, and the First Commissioner of Works,
Cab. 23(33)5, 5 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 23/75.
79
of the Cabinet's instructions. The discussion in the Cabinet
on 5 April had been of the short duration appropriate to an
item which did not rank high in the order of priorities and
on which no written briefing material was as yet available.
The account given of the Cabinet meeting in Sherman's Island
Refuge contains inaccuracies. He notes the brevity of the
discussion, yet makes it seem much longer and fuller than it
was, because he presents the meeting as if it had included
contributions by the Home Secretary which were in fact
contained in a document dated the following day 14 . Sherman
also introduces quotations from the Jewish proposals as if
they were given to the meeting, but there is no evidence
that any document referring to the Jewish proposals was
produced at the Cabinet meeting'5.
The question of what level of refugee numbers was seen as
acceptable, and by whom, was a key issue throughout this
period. For this reason it seems justifiable to go over the
details of what was said on this issue in the Cabinet
meeting, particularly as these matters came up at a high
level so rarely. The report in the Cabinet minutes stated
that Jewish representatives had estimated that the numbers
might be "as many as 3,000 or 4,000". Sherman quotes this
phrase, but footnoted not as part of the Cabinet minutes,
but as if it came from the Jewish proposals, or perhaps from
14 Following the Cabinet decision to refer the
question to a specially constituted committee, a memorandum
signed by the Home Secretary was prepared for the new
committee's first meeting. Sherman quotes more than once
from this memorandum (which was dated 6 Apr, although he
dates it 7 Apr) as if the Home Secretary had communicated
portions of its contents to the Cabinet meeting. Neither the
minutes nor any other material examined by this author
suggest that these points were made on 5 April. Sherman, op.
cit., pp. 29-31.
Ibid., p. 30.
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the Home Secretary's memorandum' 6 . Sherman's account may as
a result give the impression that the attitude of Jewish
leaders was that such numbers were disturbingly high. The
Home Secretary's memorandum of the following day did contain
a reference to Schiff's figure, reporting that he estimated
"that the total number should not exceed some three or four
thousand 17 , which suggests that Schiff was representing an
influx of such dimensions as acceptably small. Schiff was
far from sounding a note of alarm, and at this juncture, the
emphasis in what Jewish leaders were saying to the
government was very much on the side of reassurance.
Nevertheless, Jewish leaders had no wish to encourage large
numbers of refugees to come to the UK.
The Cabinet Committee on Aliens Restrictions
By the time the committee set up by the Cabinet met on 6
April, the Home Office had produced a memorandum signed by
the Home Secretary to provide a basis for discussion. This
summarised the influx to date, and explained how refugees
from Germany had been dealt with at the ports, showing that
the authorities had already tightened up the administration
of port controls. The memorandum reported that it was
believed that
a number of persons who have recently arrived from Germany
and have been given leave to land as visitors, are in fact
Jews whose journey has been prompted b 0the desire to escape
from prevailing conditions in Germany" .
The 300 to 400 persons admitted up to 30 March whom the
authorities believed to be refugees had been allowed to land
16 Sherman, op. cit., p. 30, n. 22.
17 Gilmour, memorandum, 6 Apr 1933, see n. 6 above.
18 Ibid.
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on the basis that they qualified for admission as visitors.
Many of the new arrivals, although presenting themselves as
visitors, had also admitted to the immigration officer that
they were refugees. The practice at the ports had now been
modified. New guidelines for such cases had already been
applied in the cases of 100 to 150 such persons admitted
since 30 March. Now, in all cases, where a newly-arrived
passenger from the Continent seemed to be a refugee, and
leave to land was granted by the immigration officer, he
would routinely attach a short time condition - one month in
most cases - plus a condition forbidding employment 19 . Such
conditions were routine precautions used for the small
fraction of total alien arrivals whose intentions raised
doubts. By making a new rule of practice that such
conditions should be attached in refugee cases, the Home
Office had decisively singled out refugees as a problematic
category of visitor. The Home Office, while it treated
refugees from Germany as problematic visitors, also regarded
them as a category deserving of sympathy, hence the low rate
of refusals and the exceptional treatment accorded in
certain cases, which included admitting destitute persons
despite the Aliens Order requirement that visitors show
means of maintenance20.
The immigration authorities were thus already highly
conscious of the difficulty of distinguishing refugees from
other visitors. The time had not yet arrived when the
authorities would refuse to believe that any Jew coming from
Nazi Europe could be a genuine visitor who would depart, and
19 Ibid., and AR(33) Conclusions, PRO CAB 27/549.
20 For one such case see n. 9 above.
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would decide that Jews could not be allowed to set foot in
Britain until their circumstances had been thoroughly
investigated. Many of the early refugees were indeed
visitors, in the sense that they did not plan to remain in
Britain for long. Some did not yet even consider themselves
refugees 21 . State persecution of Jews in Germany was a
recent phenomenon in the spring of 1933. Jews in Germany and
abroad hoped that the emergency would not last long. As the
extremes of Nazi persecution appeared to subside during the
ensuing months, many refugees returned voluntarily from
Britain and other countries of temporary refuge to
Germany22.
Within Whitehall, too, hopes persisted of an improved
internal situation in Germany. However, the Home Office was
bound to think in terms of the possible impact on Britain,
and to take into account signs that the influx of Jewish
refugees from Germany was neither a short term phenomenon
nor one whose dimensions could be reliably predicted. The
Home Office, urgently seeking information on the extent to
which Jews were seeking refuge abroad and the response in
countries adjoining Germany, had prepared a list of
questions for answer by British representatives on the
21 Susanne Horwell(née Caspary), who subsequently
worked for the JRC, has recalled that when she came to
England from Berlin in 1933 she did not regard herself as a
refugee. When her brother-in-law advised her to register
with the Jewish Refugees Committee, she asked what was a
refugee, and was told, "That's you". Susanne Horwell,
interview with this author, 19 Apr 1988.
22 JRC statistics for May 1933 - Oct 1934, (n. 3
above) showed that of 4055 arrivals (excluding a further 868
family members), 5 had died, the fate of 651 was unknown,
1852 had remained in the UK and 1547 re-emigrated. The
destinations of those re-emigrating were: Palestine(149);
East or South Africa(167); South America(48); the USA (50);
elsewhere in Europe(295); 760 had been repatriated to
Germany, most(688) being German citizens.
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Continent23 . The Home Secretary, who chaired the meeting of
the new Cabinet committee, read out two telegrams from the
British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold, which
suggested that Schiff's figure of between 3,000 and 4,000
arrivals might be an underestimate 24 . Rumbold's figures
showed a continuing large-scale exodus of Jews to
neighbouring countries. There were indications that Nazi
policies might yet drive out far greater numbers. One of the
telegrams passed on a report that, at a recent meeting of
the German Cabinet at which an informant had been present,
the German Chancellor, Hitler, had asked "for information
about the number of Jews who had left Germany recently and
remarked that he hoped, in time, to get rid of every Jew in
the country". The report suggested that Hitler had failed to
foresee that other countries' immigration restrictions would
be bound to curtail the scale of the desired Jewish exodus.
On this consideration being pointed out by a colleague,
Hitler had "looked very surprised and admitted that this had
never occurred to him" 25 . Whether this report was accurate
is secondary to its probable impact on those responsible for
23 Holderness to MH Huxley, 5 Apr 1933, PRO FO
371/16720, C3159/319/18, f.177.
24 The ministers present at the meeting were: Gilmour,
the Home Secretary (in the chair); Sir Henry Betterton,
Minister of Labour; William Ormsby Gore, First Commissioner
of Works; Douglas Hacking, Parliamentary Under Secretary of
State, Home Office. Four senior Home Office officials were
present: Sir Russell Scott, Permanent Under Secretary; E
Davies, Chief Inspector (Aliens Branch); Sir Ernest
Holderness, Assistant Secretary and Frank A Newsam, Private
Secretary to the Home Secretary. Also present were: RT
Parkin, Assistant Director, Passport Control department;
Humbert Wolfe, Director of Services and Establishments,
Ministry of Labour; ACC Parkinson, Assistant Under Secretary
of State, Colonial Office, and CS Dodd, Foreign Office.
25 The two telegrams were appended to the record
(Conclusions) of the meeting, but the telegram containing
the confidential report of the recent German Cabinet meeting
was not appended to the Committee's report to the Cabinet.
See AR(33) 1st Cons, n. 1 above.
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maintaining effective British immigration restrictions26.
This must have been to underline the need for vigilance, in
the knowledge that at this stage realistic estimates of
future numbers were impossible.
The Jewish proposals
What did the Jewish proposals offer? The document which
Jewish leaders had submitted to the Home Office consisted of
seven short paragraphs, over the signatures of four Jewish
leaders, itemising new arrangements being made by the Jewish
community to provide for Jewish refugees. The most important
single element of these provisions from the point of view of
the Home Office was a guarantee to ensure that no refugee
became a burden on public funds. The guarantee was expressed
in the commitment that, "all expense, whether temporary or
permanent accommodation or maintenance will be borne by the
Jewish community without ultimate charge to the state". The
guarantee was not limited either as to its duration or as to
the numbers to whom it would apply. It was not, however,
intended to be seen as limitless, because Jewish leaders
intended that refugees would not remain in the long term,
but would re-emigrate. This was emphasised by a further
crucial element in the package of proposals, the affirmation
that negotiations were in progress "with a view to the
ultimate transmigration of the refugees to countries other
than England". Jewish leaders were undertaking this immense
responsibility to ensure that refugees did not become a
burden. They emphasised that refugees would be looked after
from the moment they landed until their eventual departure.
26 The absence of any record of this exchange in
published reports of German Cabinet meetings suggests that
it did not take place. The author gratefully acknowledges
the advice of Dr Peter Longerich on this point.
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To cope with new arrivals, representatives of the Jews'
Temporary Shelter would meet all continental trains. The
authorities were asked to telephone the Jews' Shelter with
advance details of Jewish refugee arrivals. Emergency
accommodation for up to 500 people at the Shelter and at
other hostels had been secured. More permanent homes would
be found for the refugees amongst the Jewish community.
Jewish schoolchildren and students would be coming to
continue studies disrupted in Germany, and a hospitality
committee had been set up to deal mainly with professionals
and students27.
Overall, the proposals provided reassurance that the
community would contain the influx. The machinery being
created would be supervised by an organising committee under
Schiff's chairmanship. Additionally the Jewish leaders
proposed that it should be made a condition of entry that
newly arrived refugees from Germany register at the Shelter.
This package of proposals continued the tradition of Anglo-
Jewish charitable efforts to ensure that poor Jewish
immigrants and transmigrants caused minimal embarrassment,
but with the addition of the huge and unprecedented
commitment of the guarantee.
What did the Jewish leaders ask for in return? The Home
Secretary summarised the Jewish requests as follows.
Firstly, in relation to those seeking entry at the ports,
they asked "that all German Jewish refugees from Germany
should be admitted without distinction". Secondly, "those
already admitted, for the purpose of visits or who may be
27 'Proposals of the Jewish Community',(n.d.),
Appendix I to AR(33)Conclusions, 6 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 27/549.
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admitted in the future should be allowed during the present
emergency to prolong their stay indefinitely". To agree to
deal with refugees in this way would would have amounted to
granting all such persons a right of asylum, which would go
directly against current immigration policy28 . The Jewish
proposals also failed to address the problem of what was to
happen to the refugees in the longer term.
The Cabinet Committee's recommendations
The Home Office memorandum emphasised that while Jewish
leaders had emphasised temporary admissions, they had not
addressed the crucial underlying question of whether such
refugees could be allowed to become permanent residents. The
question of permanent stay, and the right to take employment
must arise sooner or later. It would be difficult in
practice to insist that refugees return to face the
situation from which they had recently fled. The main issue
for the committee to consider was therefore the possibility
that large numbers of refugee admissions would lead to "a
considerable addition to the permanent population of this
country" 29 . The one group singled out in the Home Office
memorandum as possible candidates for absorption had been
fur traders from Leipzig, but applications for permission to
work were envisaged from teachers, doctors, dentists,
clerks, domestic servants, hospital nurses and many others.
Re-emigration might cut down the numbers of refugees in
Britain, but there was no certainty about settlement
prospects overseas. Permission to settle in the UK would
28 The Jewish Chronicle article of 14 Apr( n. 2
above), mentioned the Jewish initiative, and used the
expression "right of asylum".
29 Gilmour, memorandum, n. 6 above.
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involve a potential threat to British jobs; it would also
involve a potential welfare burden, because the Jewish offer
of temporary maintenance, entirely credible for the moment,
left open the question of whether a proportion of the
refugees might not ultimately come to rely on public funds.
These considerations applied equally or with greater force
to destitute refugees. Thus the fundamental question was the
same, whether or not refugees could on arrival comply with
Aliens Order provisions designed to exclude the destitute30.
Although the question of permanent settlement had been
declared to be the "main issue" it was not resolved at the
committee meeting. The two ministers and four Home Office
officials present needed a speedy decision on the immediate
issue of control. Should the Home Office relax immigration
restrictions as the Jewish proposals envisaged?
Alternatively, should controls be significantly tightened? A
third alternative, of leaving the system more or less
unchanged, was the solution favoured by the Home Office. The
committee accepted the Home Office preference for leaving
the controls more or less as they were. A Home Office
official, Sir Ernest Holderness, the Assistant Secretary
concerned with aliens matters, proposed an additional
requirement that refugees register with the police as soon
as they reached their destination. This was accepted. Such
registration had no implications for eligibility to enter
Britain, being a measure of post-entry control, although
imposed at the port 31 . The imposition of strict landing
conditions was to continue.
30 Ibid.
31 For registration with the police see Aliens
Restriction Act 1914, s. 1(1)(f); Aliens Order 1920, art. 6.
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The Committee had thus rejected the Jewish suggestion of
granting the refugees a right of asylum. Its response to the
Jewish guarantee was to recommend telling Jewish leaders
that, although there could be no question of relaxing entry
restrictions for the benefit of German Jewish refugees, in
the cases of refugees already admitted temporarily,
applications for further extensions would be considered
"provided that the Jewish Community were prepared to
guarantee, as far as might be necessary, adequate means of
maintenance for the refugees concerned" 32 . This wording
appears to have made consideration of all future extensions
dependent on the guarantee.
The guarantee provided the Home Office with security against
the burden of future refugees who fell into financial
difficulties. It also offered relief from possible trouble
over the cases of several hundred people already admitted,
whose departure it might be difficult to enforce, but whose
impoverished presence might embarrass the authorities. The
guarantee thus had from the outset an immediate attraction
for the Home Office, which would face criticism if refugees
were admitted and later became a public liability. On the
other hand, no commitment had been made either to admit
anyone who did not appear eligible, or to grant extensions
in all refugee cases. Thus the Home Office had obtained
instant benefits from the guarantee without incurring
specific obligations.
32 Committee on Aliens Restrictions: Conclusions, 6
Apr 1933,(n. 1 above); Report, 7 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 27/549.
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The long-term question regarding permanent settlement posed
in the Home Office memorandum had not been answered.
Provisions had been made to cover temporary entry, but
temporary entry signified the probability of permanent
immigration; reliance on the Jewish guarantee would increase
the number of potential candidates for absorption. Members
of the committee showed no enthusiasm for the prospect of
absorbing refugees. Home Office and Board of Trade
representatives claimed that
there did not appear to be much weight in the argument that
new businesses might be brought to this country by the
refugees. In the case of two trades which were mentioned
(the fur trade and the fancy leather trade) it was stated
that this country already had a preponderating interest,
which was mainly in the hands of the British Jewish
Community.
The Minister of Labour, Sir Henry Betterton, said he would
refuse to agree to anything which might produce the
embarrassment of "a perceptible increase in the unemployment
figures"
On 12 April 1933 the Cabinet considered and accepted the
Committee's recommendations. An interim solution had been
found which appeared to leave immigration procedures
substantially unaltered, and involved no drastic increases
in immigration. Considerations of Britain's image abroad
reinforced ministerial hopes of avoiding the embarrassment
which might result from the enforced return to Germany of
refugees who otherwise qualified for entry as visitors. In
the course of the Cabinet meeting some enthusiasm was
expressed for inviting to Britain distinguished individuals
displaced by persecution in Germany. Yet the warning in the
Committee's report of the possibility of greatly increased
Conclusions, 6 Apr 1933, (n. 1 above).
90
"pressure to migrate" from Germany, coupled with the
uncertainty about numbers, dictated caution34.
The committee's meeting had demonstrated the uncertainty of
re-emigration prospects. The Colonial Office representative
had stated that no prospects of settlement could be expected
in the colonies. Arrangements were however being made to
facilitate the early settlement of Jewish refugees from
Germany in the mandated territory of Palestine35.
The committee, as it emphasised in its report, had dealt
with the question only on an interim basis. The matter
should be reconsidered in a few weeks, tlwhen more experience
of the problem had been gained" 36 . Yet no such re-
consideration ever took place, despite an instruction from
the Cabinet that the committee should keep an eye on the
position. The committee was simply not re-convened by the
Home Secretary 37 . For the next five years, refugee
admissions would create a steady demand for absorption. This
demand was satisfied only in selected cases. Meanwhile the
Home Office accumulated increasing experience of handling
refugee cases, largely in co-operation with the voluntary
organisations set up to help refugees.
Conclusions, Cab. 27(33)8, 12 Apr 1933, PRO CAB
23/75; Committee on Aliens Restrictions, Report, 7 Apr 1933,
PRO CAB 27/549.
Conclusions, Committee on Aliens Restrictions, see
n. 1 above.
36 Ibid.
Conclusions, Cab. 27(33)8, 12 Apr 1933, PRO CAB
23/75; see account of this meeting, Sherman, op. cit., pp.
32-33; for the Committee's failure to re-convene, see
Foreign Office minutes, 4 and 10 Oct, 1933, PRO FO 372/2949,
T4351/509/378, f.273.
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Persecution of Jews. the refugee Droblem and Anglo-German
relations
For Jews in Germany, the alternative to emigration would
have been living with antisemitism or the cessation of
persecution. In the early years it was possible to hope that
persecution in Germany would abate. The British government
regarded persecution of Jews as an obstacle to Anglo-German
relations, while taking great care over how this concern was
expressed by its spokesmen in public. The Cabinet meeting on
12 April 1933 decided not to publish a despatch from Rumbold
which detailed German persecution of Jews and others.
Nevertheless, at the suggestion of the Prime Minister,
Ramsay MacDonald, it was agreed that the Foreign Secretary,
Sir John Simon, would say something in the next day's
foreign policy debate in the House of Commons to mark
British alienation as a result of Nazi outrages 38 . Simon's
remarks, which were far frominflammatory, nevertheless
caused discomfort within the Foreign Office39.
Rumbold himself had written a penetrating analysis of
Hitler's Hem Kampf, in a despatch which became required
reading within the Foreign Office40 . Until his retirement in
the summer of 1933, Rumbold used his ambassadorial position
38 Cab. 27(33)8, 12 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 23/75.
Simon. Hansard, vol. 276. cols. 2808-2810, 13 Apr
1933; for a Foreign Office official's critical reaction see
Michael Heatley, minute, 28 Apr 1933, PRO FO 372/2949,
T4295/509/378, f.241; see also the remarks of Sir Austen
Chamberlain, a former Foreign Secretary, in the same debate,
ibid., col. 2739; in early July both Chamberlain and Simon
made further references to the issue. Hansard, vol. 280,
col. 358(Chamberlain) and col. 452(Simon), 5 Jul 1933.
40 See Martin Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, London
1973, pp. 377-379.
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to confront representatives of the German government with
British disapproval of excesses of persecution. In May he
lectured Hitler on his anti-Jewish policies, with what he
interpreted as a beneficial result 41 . Rumbold was strongly
anti-Nazi, and concerned about Nazi persecution of Jews, but
he also had certain antisemitic assumptions, which enabled
him to find German anti-Jewish attitudes understandable. In
late March 1933 he expressed the view that there had been a
Jewish problem which was becoming serious in Germany before
Hitler, accepting claims that Jews had "practically
monopolised some professions and have obtained the plums of
a great many others", and regarding as "only natural" the
bitter resentment of the academic youth at these alleged
successes "at a time when the learned professions are
hopelessly overcrowded" 42 . In April 1933 he sent home a
despatch in which he said it was "only natural" that the
Jewish community as a whole was "held up to obloquy
indiscriminately for the sins of its most prominent
representatives", such as "undesirable" eastern European
Jewish immigrants to Germany, certain of whom had recently
been involved in highly publicised financial scandals43.
Thus, although he stressed that in attempting to account for
Jewish unpopularity, he was seeking to explain it, but not
to condone outrages, his explanation condoned much of the
prejudice which made such outrages possible 44 . In private,
Rumbold was both ready to help Jewish refugees, and prepared
41 Ibid, pp . 380-381.
42 Rumbold to Simon, 28 Mar 1933, PRO FO 371/16720,
C3074/319/18, f.140.
Rumbold to Simon, 13 Apr 1933, PRO FO 371/16722,
C3594/319/18, f.1.
Ibid.
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to give vent to anti-Jewish prejudices. Thus in 1939, having
agreed to become chairman of a new body, the Co-Ordinating
Foundation, which aimed to re-settle German Jews overseas,
he expressed dislike of discussing confidential matters in
front of the organisation's secretary, "a German Refugee Jew
who is well off" who had "all the unpleasant Jewish
characteristics"45.
Rumbold was not alone in combining inability to comprehend
or condone outrages against Jews with readiness to accept
the naturalness of much German antisemitic prejudice, and
acceptance of antisemitic stereotypes. Neville Chamberlain,
in letters to his sisters following the Kristallnacht
pogroms in November 1938, expressed his inability to
understand these acts of barbarity, which he unhesitatingly
condemned, but accepted that prejudice against Jews was
understandable, and acknowledged that he himself felt it46.
Chamberlain was not only shocked, but intensely frustrated
by the Kristallnacht outrages, because they impeded his aim
of maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Germany, and
the main impulse for his perfunctory efforts to analyse
German antisemitism appears to have arisen from this pre-
occupation.
The British government's position on the significance of
Nazi outrages against Jews for Anglo-German relations during
the years prior to the Second World War may be summed up as
Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 444-447; see Kushner,
'Beyond the Pale? British reactions to Nazi Anti-Semitism',
in idem and Ken Lunn eds., The Politics of Marginality. The
Radical Right and Minorities in Twentieth Century Britain,
London 1990, pp. 143-160.
46 See chapter four.
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being that normal relations would be possible, if only the
extremes of persecution could be contained. German
antisemitism was a fact of life, but there seemed no
necessity for it to lead to such outrages. British observers
seized eagerly on suggestions that the Nazi authorities were
curbing the excesses of their followers. The Nazis fostered
the belief abroad that foreign criticism of their followers'
atrocities would only provoke further violence. Such
intimations were noted by British politicians and Anglo-
Jewish leaders, who tried to prevent the Nazis' anti-Jewish
boycott on 1 April 1933 by moderating the outraged reactions
abroad to recent Nazi excesses. A key ingredient in the
British initiative was a plan to publish a declaration
signed by Sir Herbert Samuel and Lord Reading, playing down
atrocity reports and deploring attempts to boycott German
goods, which the Foreign Office believed might have a good
effect, but it failed to stop the boycott 47 . British
government representatives and Anglo-Jewish leaders also
cultivated discreet contacts with more moderate elements
within the German government.
The British government's care to limit public criticism of
German internal affairs was matched by cautious concern lest
the refugee issue should unduly damage relations with
Germany. Efforts were made to ensure both that the UK did
not become unduly prominent in international action on the
refugee problem, and that trusted British figures occupied
key positions on international refugee committees. It was
considered desirable that League of Nations activity aimed
See Foreign Office correspondence, minutes and
memoranda, 31 Mar - 7 April 1933, PRO FO 371/16720,
C2998/319/18, f.97.
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at assisting refugees should not add to the isolation of
Germany from the international community, still less hasten
German withdrawal from the League. At the same time British
representatives tenaciously reiterated the duty of Germany
to solve the problem it had created, and emphasised that
other nations could not be expected to take up this burden
unassisted48.
Anglo-Jewish leaders also hoped that Nazi anti-Jewish
persecution would diminish. They made unsuccessful efforts
to restrain Jews in the UK from calling for the use of
boycott tactics against Nazi Germany49 . Jewish leaders also
challenged Nazi antisemitic propaganda but defence of the
reputation of Jews in Germany gave way to a growing emphasis
on documenting the persecution which they faced50.
Increasingly, Anglo-Jewish leaders felt they must explore
avenues of refuge for Jews who wished to leave Germany: as
persecution grew, the search for refuge became more urgent
and more demanding. The formation of the Council for German
Jewry(CGJ) in 1936, with the aim of organising large scale
emigration overseas, publicly acknowledged the urgent need
to find new homes for the Jews of Germany. But asylum in
countries of first refuge such as the UK was from the start
seen as a transitional stage for most Jews from Germany.
48 Sherman, op. cit., pp. 35-84.
See e.g. H Hankey, minute of meeting with Leonard
Montefiore and Neville Laski, 22 Mar 1933, PRO FO 371/16720
C2978/319/18. f.82; for Anglo-Jewish reactions to campaigns
for boycotts against Germany, see G Lebzelter, Political
Anti-Semitism in England, 1919-1939, London 1978, pp. 136-
154; G Alderman, The Jewish Community in British Politics,
Oxford 1983, p. 121.
50 Montefiore, The Jews in Germany. Facts and Figures,
London, Jan 1934; idem., The Jews in Germany. Facts and
Figures. Pamphlet No 2, London Sept 1934; idem, The Jews in
Germany. Pamphlet No 3, London Sept 1935.
96
Throughout, Jewish leaders and	 the British government
gave high priority to containing and reducing the numbers of
refugees in the UK, as will be apparent from the accounts of
the exploration of emigration prospects and of refugee
employment which follow.
The exDloration of emi gration urosDects
The organisation of Jewish work for refugees and emigration
to Palestine
The UK itself was intended to play only a peripheral role as
a refugee haven. Designation of the UK as a minor haven by
Jewish organisations reflected both British government
policy and Anglo-Jewish priorities. Jewish leaders agreed
that Palestine occupied the prime position as a potential
refuge; a consensus that existed alomgside deep divisions
over the political future of Palestine and over prospects
for Jewish assimilation within the countries of Europe51.
The policy of Anglo-Jewish work for refugees was shaped by
the consensus over the primacy of encouraging immigration to
Palestine; its organisation reflected the wide spectrum of
political positions held by Jews in the UK on Zionism and
the future of Palestine. The concerns of the Jewish Refugees
Committee(JRC), set up in March 1933 by Schiff, were largely
limited to helping refugees in the UK. In contrast, the
Central British Fund for German Jewry (CBF), which provided
the JRC's funds, had a far broader perspective, aiming to
foster reconstruction rather than relief. The CBF was set up
51 Fuller discussion of these themes may be found in
this author's 'Jewish Refugees', op. cit, pp. 167-168, 173,
184-189.
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after the JRC, following a meeting of Jewish leaders at the
Rothschild bank's headquarters at New Court in the City of
London. Relief for refugees in the UK was only one of the
CBF's commitments, and although the JRC's needs had the
first claim on CBF funds, the amount spent on the JRC was
small in comparison to large-scale expenditure on projects
supporting emigration to Palestine 52 . The emigration of
German Jews to Palestine became Jewish Agency policy in the
spring of 1933, and was pursued with particular zeal by
Zionists within the CBF53 . The funds the CBF allocated to
Palestine were largely to finance development projects such
as housing, which would increase the country's wealth and
capacity to absorb new arrivals, at a time when British
government policy linked authorisation of new Jewish
immigration to the country's economic absorptive capacity.
The structure of the CBF reflected a decision by Zionists
and non-Zionists to co-operate over fundraising for
refugees. Co-operation was based on an agreement over how
the proceeds of appeals for funds should be divided and
controlled. The regular Zionist appeal for funds was
suspended: in return, a portion of the funds raised would be
applied for Palestine purposes under Zionist control. The
agreement was reflected in careful balancing of Zionist and
52 For the CBF and CGJ see: Norman Bentwich, They
Found Refuge: An Account of British Jewry's Work for Victims
of Nazi Oppression, London 1952; Joan Stiebel (Schiff's
private secretary) 'The Central British Fund for World
Jewish Relief', Transactions of the Jewish Historical
Society of England, 27(1982), pp 51-60; Amy Gottlieb,
Archives: The Central British Fund for World Jewish Relief.
London 1988, (introduction to microfilm publication of CBF
archives).
H A Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi
Policies and Jewish Responses,(II)', Leo Baeck Institute
Year Book, XXVI, London 1981, pp. 343-409, esp. 353-357.
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non-Zionist members on the key Allocations Committee of the
CBF and the appointment of two joint secretaries: a Zionist,
Bakstansky, balanced by a non-Zionist, Stephany. Conflict
between Zionist and non-Zionist factions within the CBF
marred, but did not prevent, continued co-operation on the
refugee issue54 . Despite Zionist uncertainty whether the
partnership constituted too great a compromise, co-operation
continued when the Council for German Jewry(CGJ) was set up
in early 1936 to organise a massive programme of permanent
emigration overseas55.
The Jewish refugee organisations had close links with Jewish
organisations in Germany and in the USA. The CGJ formally,
spanned all three countries, but the British section of the
CGJ remained dominant. Anglo-Jewish leaders made repeated
efforts, of which the formation
	 of the CGJ was one, to
involve American Jewry as a senior partner in the financing
of their refugee work, but met with little success. The
leading American Jewish charity, the American Joint
Distribution Committee(AJDC) had many other calls on its
funds, but nevertheless agreed in 1939 to contribute to the
maintenance in the UK of two groups of refugee
transmigrants, most of whom were bound for the USA 56 . AJDC
leaders, however, regarded the dominance of Palestine
projects and Zionists within the CBF and the CGJ with
D Cesarani, 'Zionism in England, 1919-1939',
Oxford D Phil. 1986, pp. 355-369.
Ibid.
56 These were St Louis passengers and inmates of
Richborough camp - see Chapter four.
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serious disquiet, which they conveyed to confidants within
the Anglo-Jewish elite57.
The Jewish refugee organisations were linked to the Board of
Deputies by a network of cross-memberships and co-options58.
The Board as such did not engage in refugee work, but its
Aliens Committee received regular reports from Otto Schiff,
who conducted most negotiations over refugee matters with
the Home Office. Board leaders concentrated on representing
Anglo-Jewry as a whole and fostering good relations between
Jew and non-Jew in the UK. They saw admission of refugees to
the UK as a subsidiary aspect of the German crisis. The
Board's Joint Foreign Committee(JFC) pursued a policy of
supporting the cessation of persecution against Jews in
Europe, and frequently contacted the Foreign Office in this
connection. To the extent that emigration was necessary, the
Board supported the pre-eminence of Palestine as a country
of settlement for refugees, a policy confirmed by a
conference called by the JFC in October 1933.
Informal, personal links within the Anglo-Jewish elite
played an important role in determining Jewish policy on
refugee questions. Members of the Rothschild family made a
particularly significant contribution to the policy process
and to the organisation and funding of refugee work. The
offices of the Rothschild merchant bank at New Court in the
City were the venue for innumerable meetings and lunches, at
See e.g. David M Bressler to Joseph C Hyman, 1 May
1935, Archives of the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee, 1933-1944, New York (henceforth AJDC) 559; Morris
C Troper, tMemorandum re: conversation with Lord Samuel', 17
Feb 1939, AJDC 575.
58 See this author's 'Jewish Refugees', op. cit, pp.
168-9.
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which committees were set up, policy decided, difficulties,
often between Zionists and non-Zionists, ironed out, and
initiatives organised. Alongside the formal institutions of
Anglo-Jewry - the Board of Deputies, the Chief Rabbi and the
Jewish refugee organisations - the Rothschild organisation
combined the functions of a debating chamber, a court of
arbitration and appeal, a source of funds, a reservoir of
diplomacy and an informal channel to the British government,
presided over by members of the family who were responsible
for the family bank, notably Anthony de Rothschild and his
older brother Lionel, who died in 1942. In late 1939
Anthony de Rothschild took over the chairmanship of both the
CBF and the Central Council for Jewish Refugees(the CGJ
renamed in war-time).
Anthony de Rothschild took pains to disclaim a
representative role and to deny that he and members of his
family had influence in Jewish matters, but was nevertheless
treated by both Anglo-Jewish leaders and by British
ministers as a particularly important representative of Jews
in Britain60 . During the Second World War both Chaim
Weizmann, the Zionist leader, and Selig Brodetsky, president
of the Board of Deputies, emphasised the importance they
attached to de Rothschild's access to ministers. In November
1941, for example, Weizmann told Lord Rothschild of his
concern to keep in contact with Anthony de Rothschild,
complaining that although de Rothschild	 was the leader of
a section of opinion in Anglo-Jewry which was non-Zionist
and assimilationist, he was consulted by Eden, who would
For Anthony de Rothschild, see Appendix 1.
60 Lord Rothschild, note of lunch with Weizmann on 14
Nov 1941, Rothschild Archive(henceforth RA) X1/35/61.
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"wheedle private opinions out of him" over dinner, and then
confront Zionists with the claim that these views were
representative of large sections of British Jewry 6 . In
October 1941, Lord Moyne, the Colonial Secretary, invited
Anthony de Rothschild to advise him of the opinions of
British Jews about the possibility of limiting post-war
emigration to Palestine 62 . Moyne, disturbed by Weizmann's
demands for admission of an estimated three million refugees
to Palestine after the war, was reassured to hear that de
Rothschild did not accept Weizmann's figure. Sir Cosmo
Parkinson, Permanent Under Secretary at the Colonial Office,
who was present, questioned de Rothschild about Brodetsky
and his position as President of the Board, "adding that he
thought it had been a very great mistake that a foreigner
like this should be appointed to this post" 63 . Brodetsky
himself, conscious of de Rothschild's ease of access to
Eden, consulted him in February 1942 about the possibility
of approaching Eden over requests to help Romanian Jews
emigrate in order to escape extermination64.
In de Rothschildwork on the refugee issue he built on good
connections with ministers and officials and enlisted the
services of individuals with past experience in government
service 65 . Along with other members of the family, he also
61 Ibid.
62 Moyne to de Rothschild, 9 Oct 1941, RA XI/35/61
63 Anthony de Rothschild, 'Memorandum of interview
with Lord Moyne', 16 Oct 1941, RA XI/35/61.
64 Brodetsky to de Rothschild, 3 Feb 1942, de
Rothschild to Brodetsky, 4 Feb 1942, de Rothschild to Lionel
Cohen, 6 Feb 1942, Cohen to de Rothschild. 11 Feb 1942, RA
XI/35/62.
65 See, e.g., his work in 1933 on the formation of the
Palestine Liaison Scheme, RA XI/31/3.
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contributed generously to refugee appeals and assisted
numerous individual refugees. Lionel's efforts to rescue
Jews included writing to Germany in the spring of 1939 with
a request for four men to come to the UK, to join the large
team of gardeners on his estate in Hampshire66.
Such efforts to save individuals by bringing them to the UK
were emergency substitutes for opportunities for permanent
refuge overseas. By 1939 restrictions on emigration to
Palestine had forced many Jews who had hoped to go there to
seize such alternatives as were offered 67 . In 1933, however,
the British government shared the Jewish view that Palestine
could make a far more substantial contribution than the UK
to solving the Jewish refugee problem. It was not intended
to exacerbate Arab feeling against Jewish immigration to
Palestine by allowing in large number of German refugees;
nevertheless, in April 1933 the government announced speedy
adjustments to Palestine's immigration procedures, covering
both immigrants in the labouring category and persons
possessing defined amounts of capital, to facilitate the
entry of German Jews 68 . Palestine provided permanent homes
for perhaps four times as many Jews from Germany in the five
years between 1933 and 1937, as against an estimated 10,000,
present in the UK by early 1938, of whom only a minority had
66 One of these refugee gardeners, Ernst Guter, was
given support by Lionel to study economics. Guter was later
interned, and deported on the Ettrick to Canada, where he
remained, becoming an economist. Ernst Guter, interview with
this author, 7 May 1989.
67 Ernst Guter had been intending to emigrate to
Palestine. Ibid.
68 Conclusions, AR(33)1, PRO CAB 27/549; Simon;
Hansard, vol. 276. cols. 8210-8212, 13 Apr 1933.
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resident status 69 . Palestine was thus fairly described in
1935 by the head of the Foreign Office's League of Nations
and Western department, Maurice Peterson, as "our
contribution to the refugee problem"70.
Refugee emigration to the dominions
The dominions sought immigrants from the UK at times during
the inter-war period. The passing of the Empire Settlement
Act in 1922 and the setting up of an Oversea Settlement
Department(OSD) within the Dominion Office were aimed at
fostering co-operation between UK and dominion governments
in encouraging and aiding migration to the dominions71.
Immigrants of British stock were preferred. Various
categories of immigrant, including male agricultural workers
and female domestic servants, obtained assisted passages
from the UK, but this declined and by 1933 was at low ebb72.
From 1933 the possibility of resettling German Jews in the
dominions and colonies was explored by Anglo-Jewish leaders.
They succeeded in enlisting the help of persons in senior
positions within the British government. However, despite
extensive efforts by British officials and ministers,
motivated largely by the wish to reduce refugee numbers in
the UK, dominion governments either rebuffed or ignored
69 Strauss,'Jewish Immigration (I)', op. cit., Table
I, p. 346, 'Jewish Immigration (II)', op. cit., Table X, pp.
354-345.
70 Peterson, 18 Feb 1935, PRO FO 371/19676,
W1370/356/98, f.113.
71 The 1922 Act applied only to Canada, Australia and
New Zealand; for a summary of British policy from 1918-1932
see See Civil Estimates, Class II, 7, Oversea Settlement',
PRO DO 175/14508/4, p. 1.
72 Ibid., pp. 2-10.
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proposals asking them to co-operate in arranging schemes to
accept Jewish refugees73.
In June 1933, Dennis Cohen, acting on behalf of the JRC,
approached Humbert Wolfe, Principal Assistant Secretary
responsible for the Ministry of Labour's Employment and
Training Department, with whom he was on first-name terms.
He wished Wolfe, who was himself Jewish, to raise with the
Canadian government the possible settlement of Jewish
doctors in remote districts of Canada, hoping for a waiver
of restrictions requiring foreign doctors to re-qualify.
Failing this, the Jewish organisation would pay maintenance.
Cohen thought that a government-to-government approach would
be more effective than direct enquiries from Jewish
representatives to the Canadians 74 . Wolfe set in motion an
approach to the Canadians, but obtained only negative
results. He next explored possibilities with the other
dominions, but was again met with the reiteration of strict
immigration regulations. Wolfe made further efforts, for
example, sending to Malcolm MacDonald, then Parliamentary
Under Secretary to the Dominions Office, who was also
Chairman of the OSD, a list, provided by the CBF, with
details of 85 refugees in the UK who were "likely to be
useful citizens": he explained that the Ministry of Labour's
concern in the matter was to see "that there is not any
avoidable addition to our unemployment register" and that it
For Canadian policy see Abella and Troper, op.
cit.; for Australian policy, see Blakeney, op. cit; for
South Africa, see Frieda H Sichel (herself a Jewish refugee
to South Africa from Germany), From Refugee to Citizen: A
Sociological Study of the Immigrants from Hitler-Europe who
Settled in Southern Africa, Capetown 1966.
Cohen to Wolfe, 27 Jun and 7 Jul 1933, PRO LAB
2/1189/ETAR/5513/1933.
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would therefore "welcome any reasonable scheme which could
absorb some of the refugees". The Ministry's sensitivity
about unemployment figures thus provided an argument for
supporting Jewish leaders' efforts to organise refugees'
early re-emigration from the UK75 . Another possible
advantage from such migration was mentioned by Sir Geoffrey
Whiskard, Chairman of the OSD, who wrote to Sir Edward
Harding, Permanent Under Secretary at the Dominioris Office,
saying that
The Jews who at various times have reached this country as
refugees and have settled here have never, so far as I am
aware, been other than a source of strength to us, and the
presence in the Dominions of a certain number of Jewish
refugees who might well reach positions of influence and
importance, and would have every reason to be grateful to
the British Empire in general and this country
particular, might well be politically beneficial
The CBF was asked to provide reassurance that dominion
governments would not have to pay the expenses of deporting
refugees who failed to make a living: it undertook to bring
back individuals who failed to make good, whether through
' 'Central British Fund for German Jewry. List of
Applicants for Posts received by the Jewish Refugees
Committee, June 25th 1933',(nd.), Gomme to Wolfe, 4 Jul
1933, Wolfe to Cohen, 7 Jul 1933, Cohen to Wolfe, 7 Jul
1933, Wolfe to Cohen, 8 Jul 1933, Cohen to Wolfe, 13 Jul
1933, Wolfe to Cohen, 15 Jul 1933, Wolfe to MacDonald, 22
Jul 1933, PRO LAB 2/1189/ETAR/5513/1933.
Dennis Cohen's role in these initiatives was taken
over in July 1933 by JL Cohen, formerly a lecturer in
economics at the London School of Economics, now an
economics adviser with the firm Marks and Spencer, who had
lent him for six months to the CBF. Part of Cohen's brief
was to make a world survey to see where German refugees in
Britain could be placed. JL Cohen, memorandum 'Possibilities
in the Colonies', 24 Jul 1933, Schiff to Wolfe, 25 Jul 1933,
PRO LAB 2/1189/ETAR/5513/1933. The Colonial Office seemed
prepared to send out a circular letter to colonial
governments asking about employment and settlement
possibilities: Cohen arranged for a Colonial Office official
to visit Schiff to look at emigres' case cards.
76 GW[Whiskard] to Harding, 25 Jul 1933. PRO DO
57/175/14414/5. See also Stephenson to Dixon, 31 Jul 1933,
ibid.
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their own failure to adapt or because of local conditions;
it would not accept financial responsibility for refugees
settled in the dominions, stating that local committees
would look after their welfare 77 . Finally, in September, a
letter signed by the Dominions Secretary, JH Thomas, was
sent to the High Commissioners for Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and South Africa stressing how much the British
government had done for refugees, including making
concessions on immigration policy. Refugees in the UK were
presented in as favourable a light as possible, no doubt in
order to persuade dominion governments to take them off the
hands of the British government and the JRC. Enclosed with
this plea was a copy of an eloquent letter from Simon Marks
about the plight of the refugees, which emphasised how much
they had to offer a country that accepted them78 . The
outcome of this initiative was discouraging. The
representatives of New Zealand and South Africa replied with
a reiteration of their restrictive immigration policies.
Australia and Canada chose not to reply at all. After
Besso to Schiff, 27 Jul 1933, Stephany to Besso, 4
Aug 1933, PRO LAB 2/1189/ETAR/5513/1933.
78 Gomme, memorandum 'German Jewish Refugees', n.d.,
sent 8 Aug 1933 to Plant (OSD), Schiff to Gomme, 15 Aug
1933, Plant to Gomme, 9 Aug 1933, Gomme, minute, 11 Aug
1933, Gomme to Wolfe, 21 Aug 1933, Cooper to Gomme, 26 Aug
1933, Thomas to Howard Ferguson (Canada), SM Bruce
(Australia), Sir TM Wilford (New Zealand), C de Water (South
Africa), 13 Sept 1933, (enclosing Marks to Thomas, 14 Jul
1933), PRO LAB 2 1189/ETAR/5513/1933. Thomas's letter
contained a reminder that he had circulated copies of Marks'
letter to certain dominion government representatives in
July. See also Dominions Office, Home Office and Ministry of
Labour correspondence and memoranda during the drafting of
the letter, 8 Aug to 7 Sept 1933, PRO DO 57/175/14414/2.
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several months, the Dominions Office decided to let the
matter drop79.
Lord Bledisloe, Governor-General of New Zealand, expressed
sympathy with the refugees, especially "German scientists of
Semitic origin", but stated that no openings were available,
and that even it there were openings, his government would
be reluctant at present
to take any step...from humanitarian motives which might
leave the impression that German Jews of any description
were being welcomed to this Dominion during a period of
acute econgic depression to the possible detriment of New
Zealanders
He also voiced the fear "that immigrants from Germany might
be at heart, if not openly, Communists, and spread
revolutionary propaganda to the social unsettlement of the
local community", but asserted that the country's aliens
controls were adequate to deal with this possibility. Such
an evocation of the spectre of the entry of refugee
communists, swept immediately aside with confident
assertions about the effectiveness of aliens controls,
closely echoes statements made by the Home Secretary to the
Cabinet Committee in April 193381: an impression remains in
both cases of anxieties that could not be altogether
JM Young (Prime Minister's Office, Wellington) to
Thomas, 8 Dec 1933, Wilford to Thomas, 15 Dec 1933, Lord
Bledisloe(Governor-General of New Zealand) to Thomas, 22 Dec
1933, Thomas to Marks, 24 Jan 1934, GW[Whiskard], minutes, 5
and 23 Apr 1934, Thomas to Ferguson, 23 Apr 1934, PRO DO
57/175/14414/11; a file now destroyed recorded that the
South African High Commissioner told the Dominions Office in
Dec 1933 that it would be "quite impossible for the
government, in view of the already high percentage of Jews
in the Union, to encourage in any way any artificial
increase in their numbers". Reference to file 14414/10 in
PRO DO 5/10.
80 Lord Bledisloe to Thomas, 22 Dec 1933, PRO DO
57/175/14414/11.
81 Gilmour, memorandum, 6 Apr 1933, already cited.
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dismissed. Cooper later provided information for dominion
governments about steps the Home Office had taken to prevent
"Communists and other undesirable aliens from Germany"
coming to the UK "in the guise of refugees" 82 . Such worries
can only have added to the disinclination of these
governments to surrender any aspect of the control offered
by handling cases on their individual merits, and may
explain some of their reluctance to make broad commitments
to accept certain classes or specified numbers of refugees.
The episode illustrates not only the failure on the part of
dominion governments to work with representatives of British
government to help German Jewish refugees, but also
Dominions Office reluctance to put these autonomous
governments under strong pressure to co-operate. In May
1936, when Jewish representatives saw Sir Eric Machtig,
Assistant Under Secretary at the Dominions Office, about a
scheme to settle young German Jews in Australia, they were
told that the preference of both governments that the
migrants be British left little scope for including German
Jews 83 . The High Commissioner for Refugees, Sir Neill
Malcolm, reported later that year that the Australian
government was willing, but hampered by its economic
situation; he thought it reasonable for their attitude to
be: "We will help in a quiet and unostentatious way with
great good will but don't ask us to undertake large scale
schemes, which in these days would excite opposition and
82 See references to destroyed DO files (of 18 Sept
1933) and 14414/7 of 17 Oct 1933, PRO DO 5/10.
83 Bentwich to Machtig, 4 May 1936, Plant, minutes, 8
Jan 1936, 6 May 1936, PRO DO 57/175/14414A/1.
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make the position more difficult." 84 Michael Blakeney's
research has demonstrated that the Australian government
continued to make a distinction between individual and block
arrangements for the entry of Jewish refugees. Individual
non-British migrants benefitted from reductions in
Australian requirements for landing money, reduced yet
further for migrants nominated by persons or organisations
prepared to guarantee that they would not be a charge on the
state 85 . The guarantee arrangement, modelled on the Anglo-
Jewish guarantee, apparently flowed from suggestions made by
Bentwich86 . On the other hand, the Australian Department of
the Interior of August 1936 opposed group immigration
schemes for Jews, claiming that Jews as a class were not
desirable emigrants because they did not assimilate and
generally preserved their identity as Jews 87 . Australian
Jewish organisations, like their government, also preferred
to restrict the size of groups entering the country88.
Discreet small-scale emigration to Australia of selected
German Jews from both Germany and the UK was arranged
through several initiatives, in which Anglo-Jewish leaders
provided much of the impetus which activated the Jewish
84 MacDonald to Malcolm, 24 Dec 1936, Malcolm to
Macdonald, 3 Jan 1937, PRO DO 57/175/14414A/3.
85 Blakeney, op. cit., pp. 103, 111.
86 Ibid., p. 111. Blakeney's date for Bentwich's
meeting Australian minister Earle Page, which he says led to
this change, is however May 1936, i.e. after the April date
he gives for the Cabinet's policy decision.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., p. 113.
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community in Australia89 . Bentwich "sifted" Jews in Germany
to assess their suitability for re-emigration to
Australia90 . A scheme for German Jews to come to the UK for
a few months, to learn English before re-emigration to
Australia was agreed between Cooper and Schiff. One feature
of the agreement was a "pool" system, whereby new entrants
had to be balanced by departures from the UK 91 . In 1937,
however, a modest Jewish scheme for admission of
agricultural trainees to the UK pending re-emigration to the
dominions, foundered on Canadian refusal to make an
exception to immigration regulations, despite Cooper's
efforts to pave the way through a friend in the Canadian
High Commission92.
One problem in arranging large-scale schemes, as British
officials and Jewish leaders agreed in March 1937, was that,
"any attempt to force the pace, or to do anything
spectacular, would only result in increased restrictions, as
had been the case in South Africa" 93 . Increased pressure
89 For the conservative response of the Australian
Jewish community to the refugees, and pressure on new
arrivals to assimilate, see ibid., pp. 109-116; see also
Bentwich's note of contacts with Australian Jewish
organisations and Australian government representatives,
forwarded by an Australian government representative in
London to the Dominions Office, Dept of External Affairs to
ET Crutchley, 28 Nov 1936, PRO DO 175/14414A/3.
90 Bentwich, Wanderer between Two Worlds, London 1941,
p . 270.
91 London, 'Jewish Refugees', op. cit., p. 174.
92 See correspondence between Cooper and Wyndham
Deedes of the Inter-Aid Committee for Children from Germany,
Oct 1936-Jul 1937, Cooper to Lieut-Col GP Vanier(Canadian
High Commission), 30 Mar 1937, Vanier to Cooper, 16 Jun
1937, PRO HO 213/267.
JLM[Sir John Loader Maffery, Permanent Under
Secretary, Colonial Office], minute, 24 Mar 1937, Plant,
memorandum of meeting with Felix Warburg, 31 Mar 1937, PRO
DO 57/175/14414 A/3.
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from refugees seeking asylum in South Africa had recently
led to the introduction of severe restrictions. South Africa
was the destination for some 1,066 Jewish refugees in the
years 1933-5: a figure representing about one third of total
Jewish immigration, which const4tuted about one fifth of all
immigrants 94 . However, when, following the passing of the
Nuremberg laws in Germany the previous year, refugee
immigration increased in 1936, agitation in South Africa
against alleged flooding of the country by "unassimilable"
Jewish immigrants, resulted in the imposition of increasing
restrictions, by the United Party government under General
Smuts. New cash deposits of R200 were required from
intending immigrants: this would exclude Jews from Germany,
who could not take more than a twentieth of the required sum
out with them. Jewish organisations abroad chartered a
special boat, the Stuttgart, which in late October succeeded
in landing 537 refugees in Cape Town just ahead of the
deadline for the new deposits. With the arrival of the
Stuttgart, anti-refugee agitation grew again, and the
government hastily passed a new Aliens Act stemming the
influx of refugees, and introducing an Immigrants Selection
Board, with absolute power to grant or refuse permits to
aliens, who had to show not only good character, but that
they would become readily assimilable (a term used in
previous legislation) to the white inhabitants of the
country, and would neither harm its welfare or pursue an
overcrowded occupation. The total number of German-Jewish
immigrants to South Africa for 1936 was 2,549, but after
October, numbers declined dramatically; in 1937 new German-
These figures, and the remainder of the paragraph
are based on Sichel, op. cit., pp. 13-20(the work of Louis
Hotz), and pp. 20-5.
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Jewish admissions dropped to 481, followed by 238 in 1938
in 1939, just over 1,000 German Jews were granted permission
to enter or take up permanent residence - there was a slight
easing of restrictions after Kristallnacht. The total number
of refugees to South Africa from Nazi Europe is estimated at
between 6,000 and 7,000. Developments there showed how
frantic efforts by refugees to beat one set of restrictions
could generate clamour for yet more restrictions: a worrying
example of what the refugee immigration issue could do if it
became a subject of public controversy.
British reluctance to press dominions governments for help
became temporarily less marked after Kristallnacht, but in
late November 1938, Malcolm MacDonald, now Colonial
Secretary, was told by Canadian High Commissioner, Vincent
Massey, that "unfortunately the Jews were not generally good
settlers on the land, they hastened into towns and cities",
and that in cities like Toronto with large numbers of Jews,
"any increase would start an anti-semitic movement" 95 . The
Canadian government maintained its unbending stance. Canada
admitted non-Jewish refugees from Czechoslovakia in 1938-9,
but made a derisory contribution in giving refuge to
European Jews - it found room for fewer than 5,000 between
1933 and 194596. Australia offered to take 15,000 over three
years (of whom less than half arrived); the Australian High
Commissioner, SM Bruce, had urged his government to agree to
MacDonald, memorandum of meeting with Massey, 29
Nov 1938, PRO DO 121/2.
96 The figure of 5,000 is given by Abella and Troper,
op. cit., p. xxii; see ibid., p. 131 for an example of
British Foreign Office disdain for the Canadian record; see
chapter 5 below for the Canadian response to refugees from
Czechoslovakia.
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twice this number 97 . Altogether, Australia took about 10,000
refugees from Nazism (excluding deportees during the war),
the majority arriving in 1938_4098.
Pressure such as that employed by Malcolm MacDonald
reflected the height of the pre-war refugee crisis and its
impact on the British government. In late 1945, when the
disposal of far smaller numbers Jewish survivors of the war
in Europe was discussed, the Dominions Office took great
care to ensure that dominion governments were not alarmed by
the prospect of pressure to take Jews from Europe. Sir John
Stephenson, Deputy Under Secretary at the Dominions Office
commented, "The Dominions will be very reluctant to accept
these intractable and unassimilable settlers and they would
certainly take exception to a proposal which in terms
suggested them as a possible home for the Jews"99.
The administration of admissions
The British government required refugees to fit into
existing immigration policy. Throughout this period,
government spokesmen emphasised that refugees were being
admitted or refused entry as foreigners, rather than because
they were refugees or Jews. If they could qualify like other
aliens, or show that their circumstances justified making an
MacDonald, memorandum of two talks with Bruce, 1
December 1938, PRO DO 121/2.
98 F Straton to Official Secretary, Office of High
Commissioner for the UK, 28 Mar 1945, DO 57/1331/M1164/5;
for the Australian record, see Blakeney, op. cit.
JES(Stephenson] to Secretary of State, minutes, 1
and 11 Oct 1945, PRO DO 35/1589; see also Addison, minute,
7 Oct 1945, ibid.
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exception to the regulations, they might be admitted. If
they could not, their plight did not of itself constitute a
passport to admission. In public, the Home Secretary
preferred to speak of them as foreigners, avoiding
compromising references to Jews, refugees, or asylum,
stating that, "in accordance with the time-honoured
tradition of this country no unnecessary obstacles are
placed in the way of foreigners seeking admission" 00 . He
refused to give guidance on how German Jews seeking
admission might qualify for entry, but fell back on a well-
worn formula: each case would be considered "on its
individual merits".
Policies relating specifically to refugees were nevertheless
evolved. The first part of this section covers policy on
refugee employment, beginning with a discussion of the
extent to which the admission of refugees was seen as
beneficial. It will be apparent that, while the government
took no formal steps to recruit refugees or facilitate their
entry, Home Office and Ministry of Labour officials
exercised discretion to allow certain refugees to enter
employment. Next follows a detailed discussion of the
employment prospects of three categories of refugee:
academics, trainees and dentists, and some of the problems
they faced. Home Office manpower problems are then outlined
in connection with the management of immigration controls on
refugees, and it is shown how the contribution of the
voluntary organisations to controlling the influx mitigated
government manpower shortages. The chapter ends with Home
100 Gilmour, Mansard, op. cit., vol. 276, col. 2558,
12 Apr 1933.
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Office assessments of the results of the first five years of
refugee immigration.
Refuee emDlovment
The benefits of admitting refugees
The Cabinet Committee, its agenda set by the Home Office and
therefore pre-occupied with questions of control, had
focussed on the potential problems and embarrassment
resulting from the entry of Jewish refugees, and the
reassurance offered by the guarantee. The possible benefits
which might accrue from the entry of refugees from Germany
had been dealt with dismissively	 by the committee, and no
action was taken on Cabinet instructions that the committee
follow up the possibility of offering hospitality to
distinguished men who could not continue their careers in
Germany'° 1 . Support for encouraging the selective
immigration of refugees who wished to work came from Sir
John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, who argued in a House of
Commons debate that the country could at the same time
utilise the refugee crisis for its benefit and show sympathy
and generosity to refugees: he claimed that "the admission
to this country of people of good character who bring their
trade and experience with them is a gain and not a loss to
"102this country	 . The previous speaker, Sir Herbert Samuel,
had spoken on similar lines, mildly suggesting "a little
relaxation of the very severe conditions of admission into
this country", but acknowledging that the state of economy
and widespread unemployment would prevent action on a large
101 Conclusions, AR(33)1, PRO CAB 27/549; Cab.
27(33)8, 12 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 23/75.
102 Simon, Hansard, op. cit., vol 276, col. 2810-2812,
13 Apr 1933.
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scale'° 3 . Yet no formal steps were taken by the government
to ease or encourage the admission of refugees. Instead, it
was left to non-governmental bodies to launch initiatives
designed to facilitate the immigration of refugees who might
prove useful.
The Ministry of Labour and refugee employment
Numerous refugees were allowed to enter employment. Many
were permitted to do so because they were able to comply
with Aliens Order provisions protecting the resident work
force; others received exceptional consideration from the
Ministry of Labour as refugees. An analysis of the records
of 773 refugees who had been granted permission to take
employment, carried out by a Ministry official in October
1934, led him to conclude that less than a third should be
classified as "refugee" cases, meaning cases in which "the
humanitarian and compassionate aspect of the case has been
the deciding factor i.e. cases which in normal times would
be rejected on various grounds". The "refugee" cases,
totalling 215, were mostly au pair domestics, plus a
considerable number of "the clerk type", "a sprinkling of au
pair teachers and nurse trainees but practically every type
is represented". The official categorised the remainder of
the cases into three groups: 230 "ordinary" work permit
cases, comprising "the clerk-student type, domestics and
teachers...an odd few in clothing and textiles"; 186
"professionals", mainly university cases under the aegis of
the Academic Assistance Council(AAC); lastly, 142 "training
scheme" cases, mostly in the manufacturing and distributive
side of the clothing trade, tailoring, furs, boots and
103 Samuel, ibid., col. 2807.
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shoes, and a few woodworkers, cabinet-makers and mechanics,
principally connected with radio and garages. It was
impossible to estimate the numbers of cases in which
permission to take employment had been refused, since some
refugees ultimately obtained permission after being refused
several times'°4.
The majority of those allowed to work had originally entered
as visitors 105 . Admission to the UK (a Home Office matter)
had been "granted freely", difficulties having been largely
overcome by means of the provision of financial support by
the JRC and private individuals, according to RE Gonime of
the Ministry of Labour's Aliens Restriction Branch, in a
summary of government policy drafted in August 1933. The
employment of refugees after admission was a separate issue,
since refugees, made subject to an occupational condition on
entry, needed specific authorisation to work. Permission had
been "freely" given for refugees to undertake various forms
of study, including lawyers and members of the medical
profession who were required to obtain British
qualifications in order to practice. The appointment of some
of the more distinguished academics to research posts,
subsidised by the AAC, had been permitted. Businessmen had
been allowed to engage in such activities as manufacture,
import and export trading and the fur trade. Sympathetic
consideration had also been given to cases where
the employment is of a minor character or the post is in
effect being created in special circumstarices...Jewish women
have been allowed to take up posts of a domestic or semi-
104 Ministry of Labour, memorandum, 'Refugees from
Germany irrespective of nationality', 3 Oct 1934, PRO LAB
8/78.
105 Holderness to Under Secretary, 26 Oct 1934, PRO
LAB 8/78.
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domestic character, i.e. as domestic servants, nursery
governesses and teachers of the German language, in private
houses".
Authorisation had also been given to firms prepared to
employ a refugee "over and above their actual requirements".
There was also a new JRC trainee scheme. Jewish refugees in
the UK, Gomme concluded, were in the main "a very good
type", yet, because they were mainly professional men and
students, the possibilities of absorption were "necessarily
limited" 106 . Gomme's memorandum, prepared for the purpose of
encouraging dominion governments to accept refugees from the
UK, both represented the refugees in an especially
favourable light and stressed how much the UK was doing to
help them107.
The proportion of refugees who came from the professional
class - approximately 50 per cent - was far higher in the UK
than among those going to other countries in western Europe.
For example, comparative statistics prepared near the end of
the year, showed the professional class constituted only 15
per cent of refugees going to Czechoslovakia and 12 per cent
of those going to Holland; these countries had a higher
proportion of refugees categorised as workers: 46 per cent
in Czechoslovakia and 23 per cent in Holland, compared with
just over 7 per cent in the UK. The UK was receiving a
higher proportion of students than these countries. Ernest
Cohen, who prepared these figures, attributed the
disparities both to the higher cost of travel to the UK and
to the attraction the country possessed for the highly
106 Gomme, memorandum, (n.d. August 1933), on German
Jewish Refugees, PRO LAB 2/1189/ETAR/5513/1933.
107 See p. 106 above.
119
educated'°8 . Nevertheless, the greater efficiency of entry
controls to the British Isles and the policies of both the
British government and of refugee orgariisations must have
been important contributory factors.
Refugee academics in general and physicists in particular.
The UK was the first refuge for perhaps half the 2,200
refugee scholars who emigrated from Germany by 1938109. In
May 1933 William Beveridge, then director of the London
School of Economics, set up the Academic Assistance Council
(AAC), which in 1936 became the Society for the Protection
for Science and learning(SPSL)°. The AAC helped displaced
scholars and scientists to pursue their careers, through
information about possible openings at academic institutions
in the UK and elsewhere, and by the provision of modest
maintenance grants. The AAC only took up the cases of a
108 Ernest Cohen 'Some notes on the problem of Jewish
refugees from Germany', (n.d., first half of December 1933),
PRO HO 45/15883/666764/77. The survey was based on 2,500 JRC
case cards. Cooper described it as "very interesting",
Cooper to Gomme, 13 Dec 1933, ibid.
109 Gerhard Hirschfeld,'"A High Tradition of
Eagerness...": British Non-Jewish Organisations in Support
of Refugees', in ed. Mosse, Second Chance, op. cit., pp,
599-610, esp. p. 604.
110 Beveridge had written to Sir John Simon, thanking
him for his recent remarks in the Commons, and mentioning
his plan for a new organisation for refugee academics.
Beveridge to Simon, 21 Apr 1933, Archives of the Society for
the Protection of Science and Learning(hereafter SPSL), Box
111/5, f.266.
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small minority of the people who sought its aid, although
advice was given to many more"1.
Physics, along with chemistry and philology, each of which
generated roughly 170 AAC cases, were the disciplines with
the highest number of case files for single specialties,
although perhaps three times as many were generated by the
multiplicity of medical specialties. A sample of eleven
consecutively numbered case files taken from the section of
the AAC archive concerning physicists with names beginning
with the letters K or L, conveys something of the range of
refugee candidates and the options available to them112 . The
individuals concerned possessed a wide range of
nationalities, and most were wholly or partly Jewish. Many
British scientists subscribed to the AAC, and the files aslo
show support for individual refugees from members of the
scientific community, through help with recommendations,
funds and hospitality. However, cases in which good contacts
helped people to find a way to continue their careers in the
UK were offset by cases in which even the most prestigious
recommendations were of little avail.
For the archives of the AAC and SPSL in the
Bodleian Library (henceforth SPSL) see Nicholas Baldwin,
t Catalogue of the Archive of the Society for the Protection
of Science and Learning', Bodleian Library, Oxford, 1988 (NR
31126); for the work of the AAC and SPSL see Norman
Bentwich, The Rescue arid Achievement of Refugee Scholars.
The Story of Displaced Scholars and Scientists 1933-1952,
The Hague 1953; William Beveridge, A Defence of Free
Learning, Oxford 1959; Gerhard Hirschfeld, " A High
Tradition of Eagerness..."', op. cit., pp. 600-606.
112 The archive contains a total of 163 physicists'
case files. The 11 cases discussed here are in a box of 12
files concerning physicists whose names begin with K or L:
the latter part of the K files and the first part of the L
files (the 12th file is a case of a later date). The files
were chosen simply because they were in the box containing
the file of Nicholas Kurti, itself chosen because of a Home
Office decision on the case in a policy file.
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The AAC was able to assist a number of refugee physicists,
helped by contacts between physicists in Britain and Germany
which pre-dated the Nazi regime. In the field of low
temperature physics, German science had much to offer, and
several senior and more junior researchers in this field
were able to continue their careers in the UK. Oxford
University's Clarendon laboratory became the new home of a
group of refugee physicists, recruited through the efforts
of Professor Frederick Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, with
financial backing in the form of a number of short-term
scholarships provided by Imperial Chemical Industries(ICI).
Professor Franz Simon arrived from Germany in April 1933,
and helped several of his former students, including this
author's father, to come to Oxford with Id scholarships
where they enhanced the reputation of the university's
Clarendon Laboratory, especially in the low temperature
field 113 . Lindemann already had links with Simon's research
group: a few years previously he had bought a hydrogen
liquefier from Simon, and later arranged for a miniature
helium liquefier designed by Simon in collaboration with
Kurt Mendelssohn to be brought over from Breslau and
113 Franz Simon, entry in ed. H. Strauss and W. Rbder,
International Biographical Dictionary of Central European
Emigres, 1933-1945, Vol II, London 1983, p. 1085; Imperial
War Museum, Dept of Sound Records, Britain and the Refugee
Crisis, 1933-47,(hereafter IWH Refugees), interview with
Lady Charlotte Simon, tape 4529: Lady Simon, interview with
this author, 22 Sept 1985; for the background to the
Clarendon's lack-lustre history prior to the 1920s and
1930s, see N Kurti, Oxford physics, opportunity lost in
1865?', Nature, vol. 308, no. 5957, pp. 313-314, 22 Mar
1984.
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installed at Oxford by Mendelssohn" 4 . A few months later
both Simon and Mendelssohn arrived in Oxford as refugees.
The sample includes two cases of low temperature physicists
who came from Germany to the UK and remained permanently.
The case of Nicholas Kurti, a Jew of Hungarian nationality,
who arrived in September 1933, was considered by Cooper to
merit an exception to Home Office policy of not usually
granting "refugee favours" to persons who did not have
German nationality' 15 . Kurti, a former student of Simon's,
was coming to take up an Id research scholarship at the
Clarendon Laboratory, and later received a second Id
scholarship. In 1939 he was granted British nationality; he
later became Professor at Oxford and a Fellow of the Royal
Society116 . The other low temperature physicist, a German of
half-Jewish descent also entered Britain in 1933, and, once
his Id scholarship expired, received financial help which
included a grant from Queens College, Oxford, and support
from a wealthy British colleague. He had remained in the UK
on a temporary basis, declining suggestions that he pursue
jobs in Burma, China and Ecuador, was naturalised in the
114 Lindemann reported this advance in an article with
TC Keeley in the 11 Feb 1933 issue of Nature,'Helium
Liquefaction Plant at the Clarendon Laboratory'. The author
is indebted for this information to a talk by David
Shoenberg, 'Early Low Temperature Physics in Cambridge',
given at seminar, 'Chapters in the History of Low
Temperature Research in Great Britain', organised by the
History of Physics group of the Institute of Physics, at the
Royal Institution, 26 Oct 1988. Unpublished manuscript in
possession of Dr Shoenberg: copy in this author's
possession.
115 Cooper to Gent, 5 Jan 1934, SPSL 333/5, f.144.
116 File of Nicholas Kurti, SPSL 333/5, ff.136-163.
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first half of 1939 and worked for the government during the
Second World War on secret atomic weapons research117.
çks
The majority of theLare very slender, and concern people
whose cases the AAC did not take up and who never succeeded
in coming to Britain. A German physicist, described in AAC
records as an Aryan engaged to a Jewess, who wished to leave
Germany for this reason, but was still working in Germany in
1935 when his case was drawn to the attention of the AAC: it
was considered dangerous even to write to him. In the post-
war follow-up of AAC cases it was learned that he had left
Germany in 1937, worked in Japan for five years, and then
moved to a post in Taiwan. By 1948 he was lecturing and
doing research at the Taiwan National University in Formosa,
with no plans to return to Germany' 18 . There was no
information on the fate of a German Jewish theoretical
physicist aged 23, who had obtained the AAC's address from
the eminent physicist Max Born, and wrote from Berlin in
late 1934, seeking help in obtaining a position abroad119.
Another physicist who never came to the UK was Wiadimir
Lasareff, a stateless Jew born in St Petersburg before the
Russian revolution, who had lost his post in Berlin and in
July 1933 obtained a two-year job in Liege, Belgium. He
enclosed a letter of recommendation from Albert Einstein,
but the AAC was unable to help him. In 1946, in the course
of the AAC's post-war follow-up, Lasareff reported that,
after five months' imprisonment in Breindonck concentration
camp, he had left Liege in 1942, joined a resistance force
117 File of Heinrich Kuhn, SPSL 333/3, ff.45-102.
118 File of Wolfgang Kroll, SPSL 333/1, ff.1-16.
119 File of Roif Landshoff, SPSL 333/8, ff220-245.
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until the Liberation, then served voluntarily with US forces
in Belgium and Germany, and had since resumed his scientific
activities at the University of Liège20.
The USA was the most common final destination for those who
succeeded in leaving continental Europe, as was the case of
a German citizen of Greek Orthodox religion and
Greek/British origin, dismissed from the University of
Göttingen in 1936, who eventually obtained a post at the
California Institute of Technology121 . Another German
citizen, also found work in the USA, in Pennsylvania' 22 . The
USA was also the eventual destination of one of the two
women in the sample, an Austrian Jewish schoolteacher of
physics and mathematics in her mid-thirties named Herta
Leng. The AAC forwarded Leng's details to a university in
South Africa, with no apparent result' 23 . Another source
shows that Leng entered the UK in January 1939 on a
children's transport sponsored by American Quakers - a
cousin helped her obtain a British visa, and she remained
for several months, employed as a cook, before re-emigrating
in November 1939 to the USA, escorting 16 refugee children.
She was assisted by both the British and American
Associations of University Women, obtaining a teaching post
at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, and
eventually became a professor'24.
120 File of Wladimir Lasareff, SPSL 333/9, ff.246-278.
121 File of Spiro Kyropoulos, SPSL 333/6, ff.103-135.
122 File of Helmut Lansberg, SPSL 333/7, ff.217-219.
123 File of Herta Leng, SPSL 333/7, ff.279-307.
124 Herta Leng, entry in ed. H. Strauss and W. Röder,
International Biographical Dictionary, op. cit, p. 708.
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The other woman in the sample, a German-Jewish physicist,
sought the AAC's help in 1934, and was advised to remain in
Germany, but went to Copenhagen to work with the eminent
physicist Niels Bohr. After the German occupation of Denmark
she moved to a less conspicuous place of work; by 1944 she
was said to be safe in Sweden where she had gone with
Bohr' 25 . Another German Jew whom the AAC did not encourage
to come to the UK had previously gone abroad, after
completing his studies in Germany, to take up a post as head
of the Department of Mathematics at the Muslim University of
Aligarh in India. He asked the AAC for help in 1935 because
he, along with other Europeans and Hindus, was losing his
post for political reasons, and could no longer get work in
Germany. The AAC gave him advice about getting another job
in India, but discouraged him from seeking work in Europe:
the file does not record the final outcome'26.
For those refugee physicists who did arrive, the UK
functioned largely as a country of transit. Many re-
emigrated, most ending in the USA, including the majority of
the most eminent, who were not allowed to take permanent
posts 27 . Physicists not among the elite of researchers,
such as schoolteachers, were regarded by the AAC as being
outside the scope of its work, and as having no prospects of
employment in the UK. One Austrian Jew who had lost his
125 File of Hilde Levi, SPSL 333/12, ff.366-93.
126 File of Hans Lessheim, SPSL 333/11, ff.308-65.
127 See Paul K Hoch, 'Some Contributions to Physics by
German-Jewish Emigres in Britain and Elsewhere', in ed.
Mosse, Second Chance, op. cit., pp. 229-41; case files in
the archives of the Emergency Committee for Aid to Displaced
Foreign Scholars, now in the manuscript collection of the
New York Public Library, often contain duplicates of AAC
questionnaires completed by refugees.
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secondary school teaching post in March 1938 after the
occupation of Austria, who had maintained active involvement
in radiological research in Vienna, succeeded in August 1938
in gaining short-term permission to enter the UK, where he
had relatives and contacts. Several eminent and well-
connected people made efforts to assist him, and a scientist
subscriber to the AAC gave him hospitality, but the AAC was
unable to help him on a formal basis, and seeing no chance
of finding an occupation in Britain in the short period for
which he was permitted to remain, he acted on the AAC's
advice to take up a visa for the USA. He soon obtained a
research grant at an American university, and by 1947 was an
assistant professor at Harvard University128.
The Ministry of Labour, like the Home Office, combined
severe restrictions and a stern public stance with
considerable readiness to make exceptions to the letter of
the regulations in practice. The divergence between official
policy and practice reflected an ambivalence at the heart of
the government's thinking. Ministers and officials were
convinced that they had to be seen to be taking a firm line,
but officials were nevertheless often generous to individual
refugees. Because the details of day-today decision-making
were concealed under the cloak of ministerial discretion,
these conflicting pressures could co-exist, but at the price
of vagueness and hypocrisy in the government's public
stance. The more generous aspects of government practice
were largely unacknowledged, which undoubtedly acted as a
brake on generosity in practice.
128 File of Gustav Kürti, SPSL 333/4, ff.103-135.
127
Official Ministry of Labour policy dictated that refugees,
like other aliens, must not cause unemployment among British
workers. Strictly, this meant refugees should be refused
permission to take a job unless no suitable British person
could be found. The application of these regulations to
refugee academics was selective, but, as a rule, academics
could obtain only temporary posts, and, like other refugees,
were expected to re-emigrate. A Ministry official told an
AAC representative in May 1933 that the privilege of
automatic permission to remain permanently was only for
"persons of unquestioned repute e.g. Professor Eiristein"(who
chose to take up residence in the USA); it would be hard to
defend flexibility towards the "rank and file" of refugee
academics, who represented "a greater threat to British
labour", and the Ministry needed to show that it was
conscientiously protecting British jobs 129 . By July 1935,
148 of the refugee academics had found temporary posts; only
60 had permanent academic positions' 30 . The AAC focussed
increasingly on transmigration, and it funded refugees' job-
hunting trips to the USA 131 . Yet in December 1935 the Home
Office made the concession of giving 31 selected proteges of
the AAC and their families permission to settle in the UK,
although they had been in Britain for less than three years,
well below the standard minimum four-year period of
residence for work-permit holders. The cases had been
carefully chosen by the AAC, and a reasoned argument for
129 Gent, memorandum of interview with RE Gomme,
Aliens Restriction Branch, 26 May 1933, SPSL 113/5, ff. 731-
732.
130 Hirschfeld, '"A High Tradition"', op. cit., p.
604.
131 Esther Simpson, (secretary of the AAC), IWH
Refugees, tape 4469.
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each put to the Home Office. Sir John Simon, sympathetic to
academic refugees from the outset, now Home Secretary, gave
his personal approval; to avoid possible embarrassment for
the Home Office and the AAC, the lucky 31 were to be asked
to keep their privilege secret'32.
After 1935 especially, the UK functioned mainly as a country
of transit for refugee scholars. The majority went on to the
USA, which had by 1940 become "the real host country for
German academics"' 33 . By 1946, only 400 from German-speaking
areas remained in the UK, plus another 200 from other
areas' 34 . The government, by allowing a select few to
remain, but pressing the majority to re-emigrate, showed
that although it perceived academics as an elite whose entry
was advantageous, it was generally not committed to
following through such perceived advantages. Instead it
subjected academics to the restrictive policies on alien
immigration and employment, and to departments' need to be
seen to uphold them. In late 1933 the AAC agreed to Ministry
of Labour urgings that it undertake greater responsibility
for individual refugees - the arrangement echoed the
authorities' previous acceptance of the Jewish guarantee135.
The government thus obtained the benefits offered by refugee
academics, without incurring either expense or risk, both of
which were borne by the refugee organisations. The
apparently "liberal" and exceptional policy of admitting a
132 Correspondence between AAC and Home Office, Nov-
Dec 1935, SPSL 111/6, ff.370-406.
133 Hirschfeld, '"A High Tradition"', op. cit., p.
605.
134 Ibid.
135 Gomme to Adams, 22 Sept 1933, Adams to Gomme, 27
Nov 1933, SPSL 113/5, f.741.
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large number of refugee academics to the UK was, as
Hirschfeld observes, an expression of self interest, which
"amounted to nothing more than deriving the benefit without
running any risks"36.
The JRC training scheme
Both the government's general reluctance to take substantial
risks, and its readiness to make minor exceptions, was shown
in other arrangements for refugee employment. The JEW
training scheme was one of these. In the period 1933-1937,
requests for permission for refugees to take employment
largely concerned refugees already admitted as visitors, but
subj'ect to conditions against employment. The JRC training
scheme attempted to create acceptable employment
opportunities for such persons, and the Home Office and
Ministry of Labour readily agreed that a limited number of
young refugees admitted as visitors could accept trainee
jobs. Later, however, Cooper found it necessary to intervene
to counter JRC statements suggesting that permission given
to refugees to take jobs as trainees had made it a condition
of their remaining in the UK that they stay in these jobs.
JRC policy in 1933 did not encourage refugees to come to the
UK for work or settlement, but aimed to enable refugees
already present in the country to maintain themselves, and,
if possible, improve their qualifications, so that they
would soon be able to re-emigrate overseas: the training
scheme reflected these aims. It was designed to benefit men
who had entered the UK, but were subject to entry conditions
which did not permit them to earn their living. Such
136 Hirschfeld, t "A High Tradition"', op. cit., p.
604.
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individuals might well become the financial responsibility
of the Jewish community before long. The scheme was aimed
at young people aged 18-25 who had previously had
professional training and been employed, mostly as clerks or
in the legal profession, but had been forced to leave their
posts and were unlikely to return to Germany. Negotiations
in May 1933 with Home Office and Ministry of Labour
officials, in which the JRC was represented by Schiff and
Bernard Davidson, soon resulted in the approval of a scheme,
whereby firms in Britain might provide industrial training
facilities for up to 100 refugees at any one time. The
scheme was designed not to offend against existing
employment policy by making inroads into the home labour
market. Trainees would be taken on for a minimum of 12
months, but told that they could not stay in Britain in the
long term, and would be required to confirm in writing that
they understood this. The JRC would select trainees
carefully, provide financial assistance and assist with
emigration at the end of the training period' 37 . Officials
later agreed to a proposal of Schiff's that trainees might
be placed in posts pending approval of their applications
Cooper subsequently agreed that firms might take on trainees
for a one month trial period 138 . The dealings between Home
137 Gomme, memorandum, 'Jewish Refugees from Germany',
20 May 1933, PRO HO 45/21609/675231/1; Wolfe to Schiff, 16
Jun 1933, Gomme to Cooper, 17 Jun 1933, PRO HO
45/21609/675231/2; Schiff emphasised the severe restrictions
of the scheme and the JRC's insistence on the lack of
employment prospects for refugees in a letter to the
proprietor of the Daily Express newspaper, in which an
article calculated to heighten anxiety about refugees from
Germany taking British jobs had appeared on 21 Sept 1933.
Schiff to Beaverbrook, 25 Sept 1933, Schiff to Cooper, 25
Sept 1933, PRO HO 45/15882/666764/25.
138 S Hoare to Schiff, 1 Aug 1933, PRO HO
45/21069/675231/3; Davidson to Cooper, 13 Oct 1933, Cooper
to Davidson, 24 Oct 1933, Davidson to Cooper, 25 Oct 1933,
PRO HO 45/21069/675231/4.
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Office officials and JRC representatives show the high
degree of mutual trust between them, which enabled the
authorities to feel able to bend regulations and short-
circuit procedures holding up the scheme's implementation.
Cooper later found it necessary to underline the voluntary
nature of the trainees' obligation to stay in jobs arranged
through the scheme, and to criticise unjustified JRC
pressure on refugees to stop them giving up trainee jobs. He
had learned that Davidson of the JRC, who ran the scheme, in
his efforts to reinforce pressure on unhappy trainee8 to
continue in their placements, had persuaded RE Gomme of the
Ministry of Labour to write a letter threatening that
trainees who left their posts would face cancellation of
their permission to stay in Britain. But, as Cooper
insisted, the refugees had not been admitted on any
condition that they enter training, and could not therefore
be ejected merely because they had chosen to give up a
trainee post. He said that where a trainee proved
unsatisfactory there would ordinarily be no objection to the
JRC putting forward an alternative proposal or suggesting
that he might resume his interrupted studies in the UK until
other arrangements could be made 39 . He confirmed that Home
Office policy was
not to raise objection to the prolongation of stay of German
Jewish refugees so long as they have means to support
themselves without employment, unless, of course, in
particular cases, you [the Ministry of Labour] are a3 to
recommend to us that employment should be permitted.
139 Gomme to Cooper, 13 Dec 1933, enclosing copy
letter to Davidson of 12 Dec 1933, Cooper to Gomme 21 Dec
1933, Cooper, minute, 30 Dec 1933, Gomme to Cooper, 3 Jan
1934, PRO HO 45/21069/675231/5.
140 Ibid.
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The differences of approach just described show that Home
Office and JRC attitudes to controlling the activities of
refugees were far from identical; on this occasion a Home
Office official tried to correct a move by a JRC
representative to put refugees under unfair pressure.
Refugee dentists and the British professional lobby
Doctors and dentists constituted the largest occupational
group among German-Jewish emigrants to Britain registered in
1933 141
. However, the grant of permission to refugee medical
and dental practitioners to practice in the UK was greatly
restricted, as a result of pressure from professional
lobbies' 42 . Policy towards refugee dentists who wished to
work in the UK illustrates the degree to which policy-makers
responded to pressure from the UK's dental professional
lobby. The British Dental Association(BDA) adopted a
restrictionist policy which did not appear to ministers and
officials to be either in the interests of the quality of
the dental profession or of the nation's teeth. The Home
Office, however, felt unable to oppose BDA restrictionism,
which was supported by the General Medical Council(GMC).
After Germany passed the Nuremberg laws in September 1935,
requests to the GMC for the registration of German dentists
141 See figures cited in Doron Niederland, 'Areas of
Departure from Nazi Germany and the Social Structure of the
Emigrants', in WE Mosse ed., Second Chance, op. cit., p. 59.
142 See Paul Weindling, 'The Contribution of Central
European Jews to Medical Science and Practice in Britain,
the 1930s-1950s', in WE Mosse ed., Second Chance, op. cit.,
pp . 243-254; for antisemitism and opposition to Jewish
immigration in the Medical Practitioners Union, see Frank
Honigsbaum, The Division in British Medicine, London 1979.
pp . 274-279.
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on the Dental Register of the UK suddenly increased'43.
Senior representatives of the medical and dental
professions met Home Office officials in November 1935 to
consider 125 refugee applications. They were conscious that
the UK needed more and better-qualified dentists.
Insufficient students were entering the dental profession,
the UK had a relatively low number of dentists per head of
population compared with Germany and the USA, about half the
15,000 dentists on the UK's register lacked recognised
qualifications and the majority of these were "thoroughly
bad dentists" 144 . Unqualified practitioners were represented
by a separate body regarded as more vocal than the BDA.
Dentists in the UK were not expected to welcome the
strengthening of the profession by means of the addition of
large numbers of refugees, although, as Michael Heseltine,
Registrar of the General Medical Council(GMC) said, "on
their individual merits there might be a case for the
establishment in the UK of these German dentists, whose
qualifications would be superior to at last 40% of our own
practitioners", butLexpected opposition from the
professional dental organisations to the influx of such a
large number' 45 . The BDA already had a policy of resisting
less qualified competitors at home, and now opposed the
143 Applications for registration were made under the
Dentists Act, 1878.
144 S Hoare, memorandum, 'German Jewish Dentists', 8
Nov 1935, PRO HO 213/264. Those present at the meeting were
Hoare and Holderness from the Home Office, Sir Norman
Walker, President of the GMC, Michael Heseltine, Registrar
of the GMC and a Mr Barry, Secretary of the Dental Board of
the UK.
145 Ibid.
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entry into the profession of refugees, whose qualifications
were often superior'46.
German dental qualifications were recognised in the UK,
unlike those of doctors. Successful German applicants for
registration were warned that this was a separate issue from
permission to enter or practice in the UK, and to contact
the Home Office before taking steps to come to the UK' 47 . A
separate worry was that the entitlement of a German national
to obtain registration in the UK rested in part on evidence
of entitlement to practice in Germany, and it seemed that
under the Nuremberg laws Jews were being refused entitlement
to practice medicine in Germany. Sir John Simon, the Home
Secretary, assumed that the British authorities would find a
way round such a law, rather than refusing registration on
grounds unconnected with qualifications, saying:
The truth is that what this country wants is better
dentists: when you have the toothache, it is extraordinary
how littç you care whether you are relieved by Jew or
Gentile" i8
Any perceptions within the Home Office that the national
interest would be best served by admitting numerous refugee
dentists were, however, subordinated to unwillingness to
provoke a confrontation with the British dental lobby. The
Home Office decided to consult representatives of both the
UK's dental associations before deciding its policy towards
146 Weindling, op. cit., p. 249.
147 GMC draft letter to applicants, (n.d.)., Nov 1935,
S Hoare to Heseltine, 25 Nov 1935, Heseltine to Hoare, 26
Nov 1935, PRO HO 213/264.
148 Simon, minute, 21 Nov 1935, PRO HO 213/264.
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persons whom the GMC decided to register' 49 . Of applications
received prior to 18 March 1936, 58 had been turned down and
61 recommended for admission to the register. The Home
Office decided to admit any of the 61 who might apply, but
to close the door on further applicants; the decision was
fairly widely known, and appeared in print in the BDA's
journal. In June 1936, Home Office officials considered what
policy they should adopt towards a further 90 successful
applicants (out of a total of 321 applicants), 15 of whom
had been unsuccessful in the previous round, so should have
been let in then' 50 . It was decided that, having announced a
ban ) the Home Office could not lift it, even in the cases of
the unlucky 15 who had failed first time round. TB
Williamson of Home Office placed particular emphasis on an
undertaking hi department had "virtually given" to the BDA
to admit no further dentists beyond the original 61 without
prior consultation. It was agreed however that one or two
exceptions might be made, for example in the case of someone
outstandingly eminent who could find a ranking colleague in
Britain to support his admission as being in the national
interest' 51 . The episode illustrates that the Home Office,
although prepared to make rare exceptions, felt hamstrung by
its own past commitment to limit refugee admissions. Such
difficulties provided some justification for the Home
Office's reluctance to make commitments to quotas or to
promise to admit specific numbers of any class of refugee.
149 S Hoare, minute, 8 Nov 1935, PRO HO 213/264.
150 TB Williamson, memorandum, 12 Jun 1936, PRO HO
213/265.
151 Ibid.; McAlpine, minute, 16 Jun 1936, Holderness
and Scott, minutes, 19 Jun 1936, PRO HO 213/265.
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Refugee dentists admitted to practice also faced objections
to their being granted permission to change their names,
required by aliens under the 1919 Act' 52 . The Home Office
had decided in 1931	 not to enforce these discredited
and ineffective provisions against aliens of good character
in future, "unless the change tends to camouflage the fact
that the person concerned is not a British subject" 53 . In
September 1937 the BDA objected on behalf of its members in
Glasgow to the grant of permission to a refugee dentist to
use a shortened version of his name, claiming that this
would tend to obscure in the eyes of possible patients the
fact of his alien origin. This was regarded as an additional
hardship to his competitors, on top of the admission of
foreign dentists without the necessity of taking an English
qualification 154 . The BDA's particular concern was that the
grantee, in advertising the change of name in a Glasgow
daily paper, as he was required to do under the Act, had
included reference to his profession and qualifications,
although he had now promised the BDA not to refer to them
again in the press. It was too late to reverse the decision
to let the dentist shorten his name from Gummersheimer to
Gummers, a name which an Assistant Secretary in the Home
Office considered did not suggest anything very foreign,
but had "a Dickensian flavour", concluding that it would
have been better not to allow it' 55 . Permission for dentists
to change their names had been very rare in the past and
152 Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919, s. 7.
153 Memorandum, 'Change of Name', Jun 1931, PRO HO
347/26, p. 733.
154 WC Senior(BDA) to TB Williamson(HO), 21 Sept 1937,
CG PRO HO 213/210. Permission had been granted on 14 Jul
1937 for the standard fee of five guineas.
155 Markbreiter, minute, 30 Nov 1937, PRO HO 213/210.
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Home Office officials decided that it would rarely be given
in future156.
The dental lobby's influence on government policy strictly
limited the admission of refugee dentists. By May 1937 only
78 dentists (the great majority admitted before February
1936) and 183 doctors( the great majority admitted before
March 1935) had been permitted to practice in the UK157.
After the Anschluss, a professional advisory committee
restricted admissions from Austria to 40 dentists and 50
doctors who would be allowed to re-qualify 158 . Only during
the Second World War did pressure on medical services lead
to regulations facilitating the temporary employment of
refugee doctors and dentists in British hospitals and
clinics159.
Employment policies on academics, trainees and dentists show
the important role played by bodies outside government in
shaping official policy. The AAC and the JRC facilitated
refugee employment, within strict limits; the British dental
lobby, on the other hand, made the government less generous
than it would otherwise have been. The crucial contribution
156 Miss JI Wall to Senior, 2 Dec 1937, ibid; see also
Markbreiter, remark quoted in summary of cases,
'Applications from Refugees for permission to change their
names under Section 7 of the Aliens Restriction (Amendment)
Act 1919', (n.d., after June 1937), PRO HO 213/210.
157 Weindling, op. cit., p. 248; see correspondence
and memoranda, Sept 1936 to Feb 1937, PRO MH 58/332, for
Home office referral to the Ministry of Health of
applications by refugee doctors and nurses.
158 Weindling, op. cit., p. 249;
159 For temporary employment of alien doctors and
medical students in the UK, including specially recruited
doctors from the USA, see PRO MH 76/236.
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made by voluntary organisations to managing the refugee
influx will now be examined in more detail.
Immi gration control. manpower limitations and the role of
the voluntary oranisations
Manpower shortages
Home Office manpower shortages meant detailed casework could
only be done on a fraction of aliens' cases' 60 . The volume
of work increased during the 1930s, but there was no
corresponding increase of staff either at the ports or
within the Aliens Department. Thus, at Harwich, a port by
which many refugees entered, there was a great increase in
traffic and casework between 1932 and 1937, while levels of
staff remained unchanged. In 1937, 96,171 aliens landed at
Harwich, over a third more than in 1932, and the number of
conditional landings, which now stood at 24,867, had more
than doubled, b4.Lt only 15 immigration officers were
stationed there - only one more than in 1932. Home Office
administrators used these figures to obtain Treasury
permission for small increases in staff in 1938, but these
did not correspond to the growth in refugee cases.
Complaints about the disproportionate pressure of work
caused in B Division by refugee cases recurred throughout
the 1930 g . In July 1938, Maxwell, seeking Treasury agreement
160 In 1934, B Division, responsible for the
administration of the aliens legislation, consisted of six
administrative class officers, and 33 clerical staff shared
with A Division(which covered nationality matters among
several other topics). The Aliens Branch, whose work B
Division controlled, was concerned with enforcement at the
ports, and consisted of ten Inspectors, 13 Chief Immigration
Officers, 149 Immigration Officers, and four interpreters.
Clerical staff at headquarters totalled 33; clerical
provincial staff consisted of one shorthand typist. Home
Office memorandum, 21 Dec 1934, PRO T 162/847/E20500/2.
139
to the secondment to the Home Office of one Assistant
Principal from the Department of Agriculture for Scotland,
complained that "the necessity of finding a Private
Secretary for Winterton [Lord Winterton, the UK delegate to
the Evian refugee conference] is the last straw" 161 . Such
manpower shortages suggest the degree to which the Home
Office had come to rely on the resources of the voluntary
organisat ions.
The role of voluntary organisations
Most of the day-to-day management of the refugee influx was
carried out through voluntary organisations. Prominent among
these were the JRC, the Germany Emergency Committee of the
Society of Friends, and the AAC, all of which were set up in
March-May 1933. The refugee committees worked in close co-
operation with the immigration authorities, making the Home
Office's task of control much easier and saving the Aliens
Department an enormous amount of administrative effort. The
authorities relied on the voluntary organisations to manage
casework, and drew on them for information and statistics
about refugees. Government departments placed increasing
reliance on refugee committees to take responsibility for
individual refugees, to ensure their compliance with
immigration controls and to act as intermediaries. The
voluntary organisations performed much of the work of
sifting refugees, assessing which of them were desirable
immigrants. The major organisations attained a quasi-
official status, which reflected the sheer scale of their
161 Maxwell to Rae, 2 Jul 1938, PRO T
162/582/E4080/2; In Nov 1938 the Home Office's Principal
Finance and Establishment officer blamed the need to obtain
the short loan of a Principal from another division on the
increase in aliens work resulting from the general European
situation. HR Hancock to Secretary, 15 Nov 1938, ibid.
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operations, their close links with the authorities, and
their undoubted ability to influence an individual's
immigration prospects. Home Office policy was to foster the
growth of the voluntary organisations, and avoid moves which
might threaten friendly relations with them. As numbers of
would-be-refugees - and of refugee organisations - grew with
the Austrian crisis of 1938, the major organisations,
encouraged by the Home Office, formed a Co-ordinating
Committee to act as a channel for communications and
representations on policy matters, and to reduce overlap162.
The authorities placed particular reliance on the Jewish
guarantee. When Neville Laski, President of the Board of
Deputies, hinted in July 1933 to Sir Robert Vansittart,
Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, that the
growth of the refugee problem might result in the inability
of the Jewish community to expand its liability under the
guarantee, Foreign Office officials affirmed their
determination that the promise should be kept' 63 . The Home
Office regarded the guarantee as a crucial element in its
policy on refugees: officials dealing with aliens matters
regularly cited the guarantee as evidence that the situation
was well under control. London, home of the majority of
Britain's Jews, also had by far the largest concentration of
refugees: it was therefore important for the government to
deal with municipal anxieties regarding possible claims for
162 For the formation of the Co-ordinating Committee,
see: minutes, 1 Apr 1938, PRO HO 213/42, p. 3; memorandum
from refugee organisations, 'The Treatment of Refugees in
the United Kingdom', 3 May 1938, PRO HO 213/43, para. 10
Sherman, op. cit. pp. 99-100.
163 See Laski to Vansittart, 27 Jul 1933, PRO FO
371/16756, C6860/6839/18, f. 171; JVW Perowne, memorandum, 9
Aug 1933, PRO FO 371/16756, C7633/6839/18, f. 284.
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public assistance by refugees in the capital' 64 . In October
1933, Sir Ernest Holderness of the Aliens Department
reassured an official in the Public Assistance Department of
the London County Council(LCC) that refugees would not
become a burden:
I do not think that there is any reason for apprehension
that any considerable number of the refugees who have been
admitted to this country will become destitute. All those
who have been admitted or granted extensions of stay have
satisfied us either that they have themselves sufficient
means or that their friends and relatives in this country
are prepared to accept sufficient responsibility for their
maintenance or that their maintenance is guaranteed by the
Jewish Refugees Committee. Any who cannot satisfy us in
regard to their maintenance are refused admission.. . .The
bulk of those who have been admitted so far belong to the
professional class, - doctors, lawyers, students etc., and
in a large number of cases they continue to receive
remittays from their relatives in Germany for their
support
Incidents of friction did occur between the immigration
authorities and Jewish bodies. In November 1933, there was,
for example, a controversy, reported in the pages of the
Manchester Guardian, over allegations that officials were
asking refugees at the ports if they were Jewish. Refugees
had stated that the question was put in such a way as to
sound unsympathetic. The allegations were confirmed by Helen
Bentwich of the JRC, and a complaint had been made to the
Home Office, which stated that any immigration officer who
demanded to know whether a refugee from Germany was a Jew
would be exceeding official instructions'66.
164 For Jews and politics in London in the inter-war
years, see Geoffrey Alderman, London Jewry and London
Politics, 1889-1986, London 1989, pp. 54-103.
165 Holderness to Blight(LCC), 19 Oct 1933, PRO HO
45/15882/666764/46.
166 See newspaper cuttings from Manchester Guardian,
17 and 18 Nov 1933, PRO HO 45/15882/666764/67; conceivably,
officials asking such questions were seeking to establish if
passengers were refugees and thus covered by the guarantee.
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The results of control
The numbers of cases in which Germans were refused admission
were small. Refusal figures were very low compared with
landings, a gap which became increasingly marked, since the
figure for refusals remained fairly constant, while landings
increased. A total of 435 Germans were refused leave to land
in 1933, compared with 243 in 1932. The level of refusals of
Germans remained constant, at slightly under one per day in
the years from 1934 to 1937. There had meanwhile been a
steady increase in the numbers of Germans entering, from
over 41,000 in 1932, to over 51,000 in 1933 and over 80,000
in 1937. The increase in Germans remaining in Britain may be
roughly estimated by the annual increase of landings over
embarkat ions:
Annual increase of landin g s over einbarkations.
	
1932	 1,262
	
1933	 3,263
	
1934	 955,
	
1935	 1,976,
	
1936	 3,136
	
1937	 1975
	
Total	 11.305167
If the figures had represented refugees exclusively (which
they did not) and included 85-90% Jewish refugees, they
would more or less have produced the working figure of
10,000 Jewish refugees being used in the Home Office in
167 Home Office, Reports Under the Aliens Order 1920,
Statistics in regard to alien passengers who entered and
left the United Kingdom, 1932-1939, in House of Commons
Papers.
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early 1938168. The figures above exclude non-Germans, such
as Austrians, some of whom sought refuge in the UK prior to
the Anschluss. The excess of landings of Austrians over
embarkations was below 900 up to the end of 1934, over 1,000
in 1935, 3,000 in 1936, and over 5,000 in 1937. The figure
was lower again in 1938 at just over 2,500, but by this time
Austrians were largely recorded as Germans. The figures for
1938 showed refusals of leave to land of 274 Germans and 215
Austrians. In the first two quarters of 1939, a total of 186
Germans and 5 Austrians were refused leave to land.
Such statistics took no account of persons who entered
clandestinely and escaped detection. A small number of
individuals who entered or attempted to do so in breach of
the law were caught by the authorities, and several persons
deported. Other unlawful entrants, who were stateless, could
not be dealt with by deportation, and they therefore
remained in the UK'69.
At the end of 1933, a confidential letter containing the
government's view of the current state of refugee admissions
was sent to the British Embassy in Paris, after approval by
Home Office officials.
For your Drivate information, the Home Office are not at all
dissatisfied with the present position as regards the
numbers and quality of refugees from Germany over here
(which compares very favourably with that of some other
countries including France). But we most certainly don't
168 The low 1934 figure partly reflected the re-
emigration of refugees who had arrived in the previous year;
see CB McAlpine, memorandum, 1 Mar 1938. PRO HO 213/94.
169 Gilmour, Hansard, op. cit., vol. 281, cols. 576-
577, 12 Nov 1933.
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want present numbers increased and it is our policy
therefore to do nothin g to encourage further immigration170.
Refugee admissions, backed by the Jewish guarantee, created
a steady but unsatisfied demand for absorption of those who
remained in the UK. Yet in May 1935 the Home Office was
apparently confident that the situation was still well under
control. A Home Office official stated,
With the assistance of the Jewish Refugees Committee we
expect to be able, within a reasonable time, to absorb the
greater number of the refugees who have now been here for
one year d upwards into the economic life of the
country"'
This comment was made in the course of providing the Home
Office view on whether current refugee problems should
become the responsibility of a new organisation under the
League of Nations. The official voiced Home Office
opposition to the setting up of such a body, which might
prove a source of embarrassment "if it pressed us to admit
more refugees to this country". Three years later, when
numbers stood at approximately 10,000, the Home Office still
claimed that the number of Germans seeking entrance to
Britain had not previously been such "as to occasion any
real anxiety either as regards number or quality"72.
These assurances need to be seen in the context in which
they were made. On such occasions the Home Office was
170 Perowne to Cooper, 24 Nov 1933, PRO FO 371/16740,
C10229/1621/18, f.404; Perowne to Peake, 4 Dec 1933, PRO FO
371/16740, C10426/1621/18, f.412; Cooper to Perowne, 5 Dec
1933, PRO FO 371/16740, C10770/1621/18, f.428; see Sherman,
op. cit., p. 42.
171 S Hoare to Makins, 15 May 1935, PRO FO 371/19676,
W4255/356/98, f.334.
172 Home Office memorandum, (n.d.), sent by JRD
Pimlott to OC Harvey, 15 Mar 1938, PRO FO 372/3282,
T3517/3272/378, f.18; for the Home Office view in Sept 1936,
see Sherman, op. cit., pp 72-3.
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opposing pressure for further admissions by reference to
past success in control. Yet independent confirmation that
the Home Office was satisfied with the result of voluntary
regulation to date is given by the low rate of port
refusals, the rarity of deportation and the grant of
permission to a proportion of refugees to remain
permanently. The fact that naturalisatiori, normally based on
five years' residence, was not granted to refugees generally
before 1938, meant that the authorities retained the
ultimate sanction of deportation. In early 1945 Sir John
Simon told Hoare, who had succeeded him as Home Secretary,
that he had "long resisted official advice at the Home
Office just before your time as to the naturalisation of
Germans and Italians", because he saw no sense in depriving
the Home Office of "the possibility of expulsion if the need
arose"73.
Home Office statements on the success of the department's
refugee policies should also be placed within the broader
policy objective of ensuring the maintenance of British
sovereignty over whom to admit. British representatives
vigilantly opposed any development in international
instruments protecting refugees which might result in
increased pressure for further admissions. Thus, a 1935
memorandum on government policy explained that the British
government had made no decision the year before regarding
accession to the 1933 League Convention concerning the
International Status of Refugees,
largely owing to the fear that the convention, though itself
covering only the categories of refugee dealt with by the
173 Simon to Hoare, 27 Feb 1945, Templewood papers,
XVII/8.
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Nansen Office, might form a precedent for some similar
instrument in respect of other categories of refugees. It
was felt it might be difficult, under the growing pressure
from societies interested in the German refugee problem, to
resist a demand for the extension of the terms of the
convention to all refugees and Stateless persons, and the
Home Office was particularly anxious to avoid any such
commitment, which would aar to perpetuate the problem of
German and other refugees
British officials dealing with these questions also stressed
that sovereignty was vital to secure the continued
selectiveness of refugee admissions, which ensured that
Jewish refugee admissions did not impose an undue burden. In
January 1938 Cooper emphasised that any agreement detracting
from this sovereignty and producing pressure to absorb
temporary cases would make the UK less willing to receive
further groups of refugees 175 . However, without any
alteration in international instruments, changes in the
refugee problem after the Anschluss produced new pressures
both to absorb refugees and to admit them. The Home Office
responded with new restrictions, as the next chapter shows.
174 See memorandum, originally drafted by CH Fone, 21
Jun 1935, PRO FO 371/19677, W5796/356/98, f.28, esp. para.
30 (printed version dated 9 Aug 1935).
175 Cooper, Home Office draft statement at opening of
conference on German refugees, 21 Jan 1938, PRO FO
371/22525, W985/104/98, f.64.
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CHAPTER 3:
NEW RESTRICTIONS AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS: MARCH TO OCTOBER 1938
Policy
The Home Office decides to reintroduce visas
The case for visas
Visas had not been required by German or Austrian passport
holders coming to the UK since 1927, when Britain and two
ex-enemy countries had concluded visa abolition agreements,
which provided corresponding benefits for British
travellers. The start of the refugee crisis had not led to a
decision to raise visa barriers once more. In April 1933 the
Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office, Sir Russell
Scott, had advised the Committee on Aliens Restrictions that
if the government wished to stop or restrict the immigration
of Jews of German nationality in future, this would have to
be achieved by means of re-introducing the visa system for
all German entrants. At that time the Home Office did not
consider such a drastic measure necessary 1 . The position
remained therefore that the bulk of refugees holding German
passports were processed on arrival at the ports.
The low rate of port refusals of German passport-holders in
the years 1933-1937 indicates that the absence of compulsory
pre-selection did not pose a significant problem. In some
cases refugees might have had prior contact with the British
authorities, through making enquiries at consular offices
abroad and even obtaining visas on a voluntary basis.
Meanwhile, the Home Secretary still held in reserve the
option of bringing back compulsory visas for Germans. If
1 Conclusions, Committee on Aliens Restrictions AR(33)
1st mtg, 6 Apr 1933, PRO CAB 27/549.
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circumstances changed, they could be reintroduced by
terminating the recent agreement with Germany. The Germans
would undoubtedly retaliate by re-imposing a visa
requirement on British travellers. Visas, as well as being
inconvenient, also had to be paid for by the applicant,
although this was not a rich source of government revenue.
At the beginning of March 1938 the need to bring back visas
for Germans was under discussion within the Home Office. One
strong proponent of the reintroduction of visas was CB
McAlpine, a Principal in the Aliens Department. On 1 March,
as the prospect for an exodus from Austria drew nearer,
McAlpine summarised the case for visas. The numbers of
refugees in the country were growing, while getting rid of
refugees would become increasingly difficult. Germans,
admitted as visitors, but subsequently applying to remain as
refugees, were adding to the refugee statistics. Austrian
Jews were making preliminary enquiries about refuge in the
UK and an influx from Austria was to be expected2.
It would become harder to ensure that German and Austrian
refugees left the UK, whether by compulsion or through
voluntary departure. People who became stateless became
undeportable, and statelessness was on the increase. The
operation of a new German decree of 3 February, which
imposed the penalty of deprivation of German citizenship on
exiles who failed to register at a German consulate within
three months, would soon add to the numbers of stateless ex-
German refugees. Austrians might become stateless in several
ways. If Jews fled persecution in Austria after a German
2 CB McAlpine, memorandum, 1 Mar 1938, PRO HO 213/94.
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takeover, they would not be accepted as German citizens.
Alternatively, Austrian exiles, even if they acquired German
citizenship before fleeing abroad, would soon lose it under
the new decree.
The prospect of voluntary departures was decreasing.
Increasing statelessness among refugees, combined with their
growing impoverishment, made it harder for them than in the
past to gain admission abroad, whether on a permanent or
temporary basis. Deportation was not a practical
alternative. The stateless were undeportable; other
refugees, if they still held a nationality, were technically
deportable, but, if it became known that the government was
deporting refugees to Germany, an outcry could be expected
in the UK, where forcible return to Nazi persecution was
seen as inhuman. Exclusion at the ports was not a desirable
solution: the Home Office did not relish the extra work and
public criticism which numerous port refusals would entail.
An estimated 10,000 Jewish refugees were present in the UK,
mostly concentrated in certain parts of London. McAlpine
accepted that refugees had brought benefits to the UK, but
these benefits, he argued, had to be weighed against the
danger of a spread of anti-Jewish feeling. He concluded that
the present system of control was not adequate. The way to
stop or at least check the flood was "to prevent potential
refugees from getting here at all", which would have to be
done by means of visas, making it possible to select
immigrants "at leisure and in advance". This was the proper
course "if the restriction of Jewish immigration was deemed
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to be a national necessity" 3 . However, no decision in favour
of visas had yet been made in early March 1938, when Home
Office officials claimed at a meeting at the Foreign Office
that the introduction of visas would not really help, and
that the answer was to strengthen control at the ports4.
The Anschluss and the decision to bring back visas
The course of events led to a speedy decision. The leisurely
period of deliberation envisaged by McAlpine before a final
decision on visas could be made, was cut short on 11 March
1938 by the German takeover of Austria. Immediately, there
was a perceptible increase in the numbers of Jews with
Austrian passports arriving at British ports, a number of
whom were refused entry 5 . The numbers would increase when
the borders of Austria, closed at present, re-opened. On the
morning after the demise of the Austrian state, Holderness
asked the Foreign Office to keep the Home Office informed of
any signs that refugees could once again leave Austria.
Within the few hours that had elapsed since Austria was
occupied, one of the leaders of the Jewish organisation had
already found time to upset the Home Office's equilibrium,
with the news that the Jewish guarantee no longer held good
for new admissions 6 . The bearer of this bad news may have
been Schiff; it was he who signed the formal letter which
Ibid.
H Jones, minute, 15 Mar 1938, PRO FO 372/3282,
T3398/3272/378, f.8.
William Strang, memorandum of telephone conversation
with Holderness, 12 Mar 1938, PRO FO 372/3282,
T3272/3272/378, f.1; MJ Creswell, Sir AN Noble, RH Makins,
memoranda, 14 Mar 1938, PRO FO 372/3282, T3272/3272/378,
f.1; Sherman, op. cit. pp. 86-93.
6 Strang, memorandum of telephone conversation with
Holderness, 12 Mar 1938, PRO FO 372/3282, T3272/3272/378,
f.1.
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followed two days later. This promised that the CGJ would
honour its commitments to refugees who had already entered
the UK, but regretfully explained that the guarantee would
only extend to new admissions in cases where the Jewish
organisation had given its prior approval7.
Any remaining hesitation about visas within the Home Office
now evaporated. In less than a week, a changeover to visas
became government policy8 . The Home Secretary, Sir Samuel
Hoare, raised the issue in the Cabinet on 16 March,
reporting that "many persons were expected to seek refuge
from Austria". He was recorded as having said that he "felt
great reluctance in putting another obstacle in the way of
these unfortunate people" - an undoubted reference to visas.
He also mentioned a "curious" MI 5 report "suggesting that
the Germans were anxious to inundate this country with Jews,
with a view to creating a Jewish problem in the United
Kingdom" 9 . Th4 Cabinet agreed that the question be dealt
with by the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary or a
representative, the President of the Board of Trade and the
Minister of Labour, whose brief was both to adopt "as humane
an attitude as possible", and avoid "creating a Jewish
problem in this country". Since the start of the week Home
Office officials had been airing the visa issue with their
Foreign Office counterparts. In interdepartmental
discussions Home Office representatives placed more emphasis
Schiff to Under Secretary(Home Office), 14 Mar 1938,
PRO T 161/997/S45629; Robinson to Bland, 14 Mar 1938, PRO FO
372/3282, T3398/3272/378, f.8.
8 An announcement of the decision was cut out of the
Home Secretary's statement on refugee policy in the House of
Commons on 22 Mar 1938. See minutes and correspondence, 21
Mar 1938, PRO FO 372/3282, T3807/3272/378, f.56.
Cab. 14(38)6, 16 Mar 1938, PRO CAB 23/93.
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on needing stricter immigration control than on fears of
growth in antisemitism. Yet the aim of the changeover to
visas was clear: to prevent the unplanned accumulation of
many more Jewish refugees in the UK. The Home Office did not
seek blanket exclusion of all refugees. Its position was
rather that the new policy was needed because it had become
necessary to address questions of quantity and quality,
although neither had posed a problem so far'0.
On 1 April 1938, a Jewish deputation, which was allowed
advance notice of the imminent changeover to visas, heard
the Home Secretary speak of his department's concern over
the type of refugee who might now come to the UK:
It would be necessary for the Home Office to discriminate
very carefully as to the type of refugee who could be
admitted to this country. If a flood of the wrong type of
immigrants were allowed in there might be serious danger of
anti-semitic feeling being aroused in this country. The last
thing which we wanted here was the creation of a Jewish
problem. The	 putation said they entirely agreed with this
point of view
Schiff had on this occasion endorsed the need for visas for
Austriaris in particular, on the grounds that their
occupational structure would pose problems when it came to
re-emigration:
It was very difficult to get rid of a refugee...once he had
entered and spent a few months in this country. The
imposition of a visa was especially necessary in the case of
Austrians who were largely of the shopkeeper and small
trader class and would therefore prove much more difficult
to emigrate th the average German who had come to the
United Kingdom
10 Home Office memorandum, (n.d., Mar 1938), cited
above, n. 173. p. 150.
Home Office minutes of meeting with deputation, 1
Apr 1938, PRO HO 213/42.
12 Ibid.
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Once the reintroduction of visas became public in late
April, ministers used the refugee organisations' support for
the change to deal with critics in the House of Commons13.
Adjustments prior to the reintroduction of visas
The influx of refugees from Austria led the Aliens
Department at any early date to introduce new procedures for
handling Austrian refugee cases. In addition to the
requirement to register immediately with the police and not
to accept employment, refugees would be admitted on three
month time limits. The Home Secretary had stated in
Parliament on 22 March that sympathy would be shown to
refugees, but that a policy of indiscriminate admissions was
not possible. However, no guidance had yet been given on
which applications were to be dealt with favourably. It was
decided that, for the time being, all cases of Austrian
refugees should be referred to a principal. This ensured
that cases would be looked at by a relatively senior
official before refusal'4.
The Home Office had put up new barriers to control the flow
of further admissions, but accepted that refugees within the
country should not be forced to leave. Holderness, combining
sympathy for refugees in the UK with the aim of producing a
saving of time spent on casework, argued for a policy of
sparing them unnecessary controls. Holderness took the
position that it was necessary to grant refugees from
13 Butler, Hansard, op. cit., vol. 335, cols. 843-844,
4 May 1938; Hoare, Hansard, op. cit., vol. 338, cols. 2300-
2301, 21 Jul 1938.
14 Home Office memorandum regarding Austrian refugees,
probably by Holderness, n.d., March 1938, Jagelman,
memorandum, 'Austrian refugees', 31 Mar 1938, PRO HO 213/3.
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Austria and Germany asylum in the UK, both in internal
discussions and with the Ministry of Labour. In a letter of
late August he explained the Home Office position to the
Ministry of Labour, asserting that refugees could not be
made to return to their native country, and that, with the
exception of young people being retrained for emigration,
they were unable to find openings overseas. The Home Office
view was that in such cases permission to work would have to
be given freely. No useful purpose was served by the current
practice of keeping such persons on time conditions which
required continual review: continual interdeparmental
consultations created a great deal of unnecessary work and
interfered with aliens' securing employment, which led to
complaints. Officials had therefore reached a preliminary
agreement on changing procedures for such cases. The plan
was largely to phase out time conditions, and replace them
by employment conditions, which would be administered by the
Ministry of Labour. Holderness emphasised, however, the
understanding that, even if a refugee took unauthorised
employment, "there could be no question of making the man
leave the country". He envisaged that the voluntary
organisations would assist in ensuring that refugees
complied with employment restrictions'5.
Within the Aliens Department, Holderness went further in
search of ways to eliminate work on individual cases. He
argued that it was necessary "to face up to the position
that once we have allowed a refugee to stay here we must
expect to have him as a permanent resident". Periodic
reviews and probationary periods therefore served no
15 Holderness to Secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1 Apr
1938, PRO HO 213/3.
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purpose, and a system was needed which would largely
dispense with the use of time conditions. He hoped that an
employment condition would give adequate control in
employment cases. A procedure on similar lines could be
adopted for business cases. Businessmen, rather than being
restricted by means of time conditions, could be prohibited
from engaging in any occupation without the consent of the
Home Office; the terms of the condition could be modified
when some specific proposal was approved. He also hoped that
the number of cases in which visitors would be admitted
without any conditions would diminish, and that occupational
conditions would be imposed instead' 6 . Such measures, he
argued, were "long overdue and the only way to reduce the
turnover of work without sacrificing control completely"17.
In the event, the Ministry of Labour did not take on the
extra burden. The reductions in the use of time conditions
were not instituted immediately but in the autumn. Meanwhile
in the Aliens Department problems of overwork were mounting.
In the course of his review of procedures on 6 April,
Holderness revealed some methods the Aliens Department had
been using to get rid of refugees. In the past the Home
Office had been able to turn out a few refugees who had
shown themselves to be undesirable, but only after
"innumerable appeals, which mean much laborious work".
However, enforcing departure had grown increasingly
difficult. Many refugees found that they could not get their
passports renewed. Often the only way in which the Home
16 Holderness, memorandum, 6 Apr 1938, PRO HO 213/3.
17 Holderness, minute, 7 Apr 1938, PRO HO 213/3;
Holderness's views were endorsed by his superior, CDC
Robinson. Robinson, minute, 27 Apr 1938, £hid.
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Office was able to enforce departure of such virtually
stateless persons, was "to give a man a travel document and
threaten him that if he comes back he will be deported to
Germany"; however, the travel document had to be made valid
for re-entry, as, without this, the person would not get a
visa to go to another country. Moreover, it was in reality
unlikely that any threat to deport a refugee to Germany
would be carried out. The position of Jews in Germany was
worsening: accordingly, the Home Office felt
more obliged than before to give asylum to persons once
admitted to this country who cannot go elsewhere, and would
be sent to a concentration camp or otherwise ill-treated if
they went back tO Germany.
He looked forward to the imminent re-introduction of visas
to provide "a more effective control over the traffic and to
exclude a number of persons who obtain entry under the guise
of visitors"8.
Home Office policy-makers, as the views of Holderness
illustrate, made a distinction between refugees admitted to
the UK, to whom they felt humanitarian obligations and whom
it would be politically and practically difficult to remove,
and persons facing persecution abroad, who could easily be
prevented from entering. The Home Office did not wish to
return refugees to face Nazi persecution. This humanitarian
principle, however, was not accompanied by a sense of
obligation to rescue more than a limited number of
additional persecuted Jews from the Continent.
Within Whitehall, Holderness acknowledged that refugees who
entered the UK were likely to remain permanently, but his
18 Holderness, memorandum, 6 Apr 1938, PRO HO 213/3.
157
realistic conclusion was not made public. The degree to
which absorption of refugees was Home Office policy remained
a controversial matter, and it was prudent for spokesmen to
avoid spelling out publicly the extent to which absorption
was being contemplated. Home Office views on the degree to
which refugees should be regarded as permanent rather than
transitory residents underwent important changes in the
course of 1938. In this context, it must be emphasised that
in March 1938 the number of Jewish refugees in the country
was not thought to be greatly in excess of 10,000 and that
at that date Holderness was confident that the Home Office
would be able to keep any future influx within strict
limits. Different views developed within the Home Office as
refugee numbers in the UK expanded six or seven-fold during
the remaining pre-war months.
German proposals to avoid visas
Holders of passports of the defunct Austrian state were
notified of the changeover to visas by a simple announcement
that, if landing in the UK after 2 May 1938, they would
require visas. For German passport holders the effective
date had to be slightly later, because protocol and the
existing visa abolition agreement required that the German
government receive reasonable notice of the change. The
Foreign Office decided that one month would suffice, and
formal notice of termination of the agreement was given on
21 April, to come into effect exactly one month later, on 21
May19 . In the intervening month, German embassy officials in
London made strenuous efforts to avoid the imposition of
visas on all German nationals, trying to persuade British
19 Henderson to FO, 21 Apr 1938, PRO FO 372/3283,
T5179/3272/378, f.161.
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representatives that their objective of selecting refugees
in advance could be achieved by other means. In the final
week before the new system was due to become operational,
the Germans produced a new counter-proposal, offering that
the German government would prevent unwanted entrants from
coming to the UK by obstructing their departure from
Germany. The aspiring emigrant would not get a passport
valid for the UK without the production of written evidence
that the British government had authorised admission. This
proposal did not seem objectionable to Sir Nevile Bland,
head of the Foreign Office Treaty Department, where the
disadvantages of visas were strongly felt. Bland seized on
the proposed collusion with the German authorities as a
"perfectly reasonable" alternative to visas. On 19 May he
commented approvingly, "under their proposals it is we who
pass the refugee & the Germans only let him go when we have
chosen him"20.
However, Treaty Department pleas for the change to be
suspended pending consideration of this suggestion fell on
deaf ears at the Home Office. Confident in the knowledge
that on this issue their department had the final say, Home
Office officials ruled out further discussion with
representatives of the German government. They explained
that the Home Office regarded as unacceptable in principle
the suggested collusion with the Germans to detain people in
Germany. The Home Office also had practical objections to
the scheme, which failed to offer a means of pre-selecting
the numerous persons with valid German passports already
20 See minutes and correspondence, Apr-May 1938, PRO
FO 372/3283, T5565/6053/6353/6620/6639/3272/378, f.192; for
the Home Office side of these discussions, see PRO HO
213/95.
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beyond the borders of Germany, who would still be able to
travel to the UK21 . The short shrift the Home Office gave to
the German proposals showed a fixed determination to hold on
to the additional means of control so recently secured22.
Shortly after the outbreak of war, Herbert von Dirksen, in a
survey of his term as German Ambassador in London from April
1938 to August 1939, interpreted British insistence on
terminating the visa agreement, notwithstanding the German
counter-proposal - which he claimed had met British
technical objections - as a sign of British anxiety to
exclude persons suspected of Nazi leanings 23 .Deep distaste
and distrust for the German regime was felt within the
Aliens Department. However, Cooper and other members of the
Aliens Department appear to have co-operated on a
confidential basis over refugee matters with non-Nazi
elements within the German Embassy in London. Baron Wolfgang
zu Putlitz, who was in charge of the Consular Department of
the Embassy from June 1934 to May 1938, claimed in his
memoirs that he and certain colleagues found ways to help
refugees. In this context he singled out Cooper for
particular praise:
21 Ibid.
22 In March Bland concluded that the Home Office had
short-circuited agreed procedures by pushing through the
decision. Bland, minute, 21 Mar 1938, PRO FO 372/3282,
T3807/3272/378, f.56;
23 Herbert von Dirksen, 'Memorandum on the development
of Political Relations Between Germany and Britain During my
Mission in London, May 1938-August 1939', Sept 1939,
Document 29, Documents and Materials relating to the Eve of
the Second World War, (captured documents published by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR), Moscow 1948, Vol
II, Dirksen Papers 1938-1939, p. 153; see also idem.,
Moscau, Tokio, London, Stuttgart 1949, p. 214, English
version, Moscow, Tokyo, London, London 1951, p. 211.
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Luckily for us, the Chief of the Aliens Department at the
British Home Office, a Mr H[sic] N Cooper, was a man with
his heart in the right place, and as I was in constant touch
with him we soon became friends. Officially it was my duty
to see that life in England should be made as difficult as
possible for these wretched refugees, while the Nazis who
wanted to work there should be given every assistance.
"Party Comrade" Bene, a former agent for the hair tonic
"Trylisin", who had risen to the rank of Group Leader, was
often in my office dictating harsh instructions or listening
to my protests to Cooper which I made sound convincingly
Nazi. But since Bene was not particularly bright, he never
realised that I was acting, or that Cooper never took any of
my protests seriously. We had come to an agreement that I
should give him the full details of the various cases 24
privately, and then he could decide what action to take
No hint of such complicity with British officials over aid
to refugees is apparent from Putlitz's negative reaction on
learning of the decision to reintroduce visas: his main
concern seemed to be the extra clerical work involved in
having to issue large numbers of German visas for holders of
British passports25.
International nressure on the refu gee oroblem. oublic funds.
and the Treasury
Introductory
In the period 1933-1939 the UK government adopted a cautious
and conservative stance towards the potential contribution
of international agencies to aiding refugee emigration from
Nazi Europe. In 1933 the Foreign Office, which formulated
British policy on this issue, did not go so far as to oppose
the establishment under the League of Nations of a High
Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany, but devoted
effort to confining the scope of the High Commissioner's
24 Putlitz, Wolfgang zu, The Putlitz Dossier, London
1957, p. 97.
25 Creswell, minute, 26 Apr 1938, PRO FO 372/3283, T
5179/3272/378, f.161.
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activities26 . The Foreign Office did not welcome the
American suggestion in March 1938 that a separate
Intergovernmental Committee(IGC) on the refugee problem be
set up 27 . However, once it became clear at the Evian
conference in July 1938 that the establishment of the IGC
was unavoidable, the Foreign Office tried to curtail the
scope of the new organisation and to minimise its
interference with British sovereignty and foreign policy28.
The defensive British stance towards both the High
Commissioner and the IGC result.tfrom the government's
reluctance to become involved in solving refugee problems in
Europe. The reluctance stemmed largely from fears of
encouraging extensions of the refugee problem, and of their
consequent impact on the UK. It was expressed in
unwillingness to develop a refugee policy at all, and in
vigilance lest international agencies should impose
obligations which encroached on British sovereignty. Another
major pre-occupation of the Foreign Office was that the
evolution of international agencies should not worsen
relations with Germany. On the other hand, the desire to
foster Anglo-American relations exerted pressure in a
contrary direction, dictating a greater British involvement
in international co-operation on refugee matters than might
otherwise have been acceptable29.
26 Sherman, op. cit, pp. 35-84.
27 Ibid., pp. 95-97.
28 See Foreign Office minute, 'Final memorandum of
instructions for the United Kingdom Delegation to the
meeting of an Inter-governmental conference at Evian on July
6th to discuss the question of emigration from Germany and
Austria', PRO FO 371/22529, W8885/104/98, f.65, esp. para.
7.
29 Sherman, op. cit., p. 96.
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The result of balancing the arguments for and against
British participation in international action led the UK
government to adopt a policy of limited involvement. The
Foreign Office aimed for a level of British commitment which
was enought to satisfy the Americans, but was not anxious to
exceed this minimum. Yet if the UK government wished to
exert a restraining influence on the scope of any
internationally agreed action, it would be obliged to play
an active role in discussions on the subject. British policy
also aimed to foster, both by example and by diplomacy,
greater commitment to aiding refugees on the part of other
nations, the US government in particular.
British policy towards international agencies was thus ruled
by considerations formulated in terms of the national
interest. Several of these considerations entailed hostility
to the development of the capacity of international agencies
to engage effectively in humanitarian work. The British
government, on the occasions when it acted to aid refugees,
displayed a preference for unilateral action over action
dictated by international bodies. On the other hand, the
Foreign Office was less suspicious of bilateral
arrangements, and tried to draw both the US government and
western European nations into agreements in which a pledge
of aid from one nation was conditional on similar
commitments from other governments. Thus, in June 1939, the
UK agreed to accept refugee passengers from the St Louis on
the basis that Belgium, France and Holland were each taking
a share; in July 1939, reversing previous policy, the UK
offered to help finance refugee settlement overseas,
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provided that a contribution was also made by the US
government, and preferably other nations too30.
The nationalistic concerns outlined above shaped British
policies on how international organisations might aid
refugees. The possibilities of practical assistance fell
into three major categories: admissions to the countries of
refuge; permanent settlement prospects, both overseas and in
the countries of first refuge; and the provision of
government finance to aid emigration. The British position
on each of these aspects of the problem will be summarised
in turn.
On admissions, the British position - a position which
remained consistent and was successfully maintained - was
that no external agency or international agreement could be
permitted to fetter the government's sovereign right to
choose how many refugees to admit to the UK and to decide
cases individually. This had been Home Office position since
before 1933. It was supported by the Foreign Office, both on
the general grounds of defending British sovereignty, and
because control over admissions was part of the policy of
containment of the refugee problem.
The question of permanent settlement involved consideration
of possibilities in the UK, within the overseas Empire and
in foreign countries. The British government assumed that
countries of first refuge in Europe, such as the UK, could
be expected to act primarily as places of first refuge and
transit, and could not provide many opportunities for
30 See chapter four.
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refugees to settle permanently. Spokesmen claimed that only
a very limited number of refugees could be absorbed in the
UK, which, the Home Office repeatedly asserted, was "not an
immigration country" 31 . Nevertheless, awareness existed even
within the Home Office that if the UK's population continued
to show a tendency to decrease, the desire to attract
migrants from abroad was likely32.
The British government never discerned real prospects of
mass settlement within the Empire. The dominions' reluctance
to admit Jewish refugees, as the previous chapter has shown,
was hardly challenged33 . In late 1938 and 1939 settlement
possibilities in the colonies, especially in British Guiana,
Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, were milked by Chamberlain and
his colleagues for their political potential, but were
privately acknowledged by Foreign Office officials to be
largely illusory in terms of offering actual refuge on more
than a miniscule scale 34 . Palestine was permitted to receive
Jewish refugees on a permanent basis - one estimate claimed
that some 32,754 German Jews had been admitted to Palestine
31 See remark by Cooper, 'International Labour
Committee, Draft Minutes of seventy-sixth meeting held at
the Ministry of Labour on 17th May, 1938', PRO FO 371/22527,
W7650/104/98, f.85, p. 1.
32 Ibid., p. 3.
See Dominions Office. 'Memorandum as to the
attitudes of the Dominions towards the proposals to be
discussed at the International Conference at Evian', Jun
1938, Wiseman to Makin g , 20 Jun 1938, PRO FO 371/22527,
W8012/104/98, f.136.
"In all fairness it has to be admitted that the
offer of British Guiana and Tanganyika is largely an
illusory one, and this must inevitably become apparent in
due course." Makins, minute, 1 Dec 1938, PRO FO 371/22538,
W15621/104/98, f.249. Makin g was concerned that any offer
made by the UK should be a genuine one; at this juncture he
viewed Northern Rhodesia as the best possibility.
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in the years 1933-1936. Subsequently, however, in response
to Arab opposition, increasing restrictions on numbers were
imposed. The British government established a quota for
Jewish immigration to Palestine with the controversial White
Paper of May 193936. However, it rejected the notion that
the IGC could require the UK to commit itself to absorbing
specific numbers of refugees anywhere within the Empire.
British policy-makers combined hopes that the IGC's work
might expand settlement prospects in other countries, with
fears that if Jewish emigration was made too easy, this
would magnify the refugee problem, and encourage Poland and
Romania in particular to expel or force the emigration of
destitute Jews. The latter concern led to an ambivalent
attitude towards the success of privately organised and
financed refugee emigration - the only method which produced
actual openings for refugees. The main use to which the UK
put the IGC on settlement questions was negative, invoking
the primacy of the IGC's programme as a means to deflect
pressure in support of emigration arrangements falling
outside the narrow scope of the terms laid down by the IGC.
For British purposes, an important function of the IGC
therefore turned out to be as a means of containing both the
size of the refugee problem and the demand for emigration
prospects.
On public spending on refugees, British policy was that
refugee relief, emigration and settlement should not be
Shuckburgh to Makins, 30 Jun 1938, PRO FO
371/22538, W8786/104/98, f.6.
36 Palestine: A Statement of Policy, Cmd. 6019, May
1939.
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financed through governmental contributions to international
agencies, but paid for by refugees themselves and private
organisations. It was believed that any departure from this
policy carried the risk of increasing and perpetuating the
refugee problem, both by encouraging refugees to leave, and
by encouraging governments to expel them in a state of
destitution. This policy was broadly supported by the
Treasury, but was subjected to questioning, by Treasury
officials and others, as the crisis deepened. The government
eventually departed on several occasions from the principle
that it would not contribute funds to benefit refugees37.
A fourth possibility for potential action by international
agencies was to try to influence the policies of the German
government. The Foreign Office, however, preferred to
restrict their role so that they did not interfere with
conventional diplomacy. British fears that diplomatic
relations with Germany relations might suffer produced, for
example, anxiety over repercussions if Nazi anti-Jewish
policies were criticised at Evian. The British Ambassador in
Berlin also argued that such criticism might also produce a
worsening of the treatment of the Jews38.
The British government's reluctance to undertake commitments
to international action to help refugees was partly
counterbalanced by its limited readiness to take unilateral
action. Thus, in the fields of admissions, absorption,
commitment of public funds and in efforts to obtain some
moderation of the extremes of German anti-Jewish policies,
These are described in chapters four, five and six.
38 Henderson to FO, 4 July 1938, PRO FO 371/22529,
W8887/104/98, f.73.
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the British government took a series of initiatives in which
it acted alone. The possibility of international action was
nevertheless invoked repeatedly by British government
spokesmen in order to deflect demands for more extensive
unilateral action than the government was prepared to
undertake.
The diplomatic history of the period before Evian and
afterwards has been documented by other authors, and the
same ground will not be traversed in detail here 39 . This
section is concerned to highlight the implications for
British policy of the government's concern with sovereignty
and with containing the size of the refugee problem. It will
examine in particular how these goals affected British
attitudes towards the possible impact of international
agencies on refugee admissions to the UK, a theme which will
be followed up in subsequent chapters. The presentation at
Evian of Home Office policy on refugee admissions is dealt
with later in this chapter, in the context of immigration.
The present section also includes a discussion of the part
played by the Treasury in the pre-war period on the question
of British aid to refugees.
Three phases of policy: 1933-1939
British policy on the role of international bodies may be
divided into three phases. In the first phase, from 1933 to
1938, the British government worked to contain the role
Sherman, op. cit., passim; Joshua B Stein, eGreat
Britain and the Evian Conference of 1938', Wiener Library
Bulletin, 1976, Vol. XXIX, pp. 40-52; for American policy,
see Breitman and Kraut, op. cit., passim; for German policy
on Jewish emigration and the international organisations,
see Breitman, The Architect of Genocide. Himmier and the
T. _7	 ... 7..4	 T	 .1_.... I fl1	 A
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played by the League of Nations on refugee matters. The
decision to establish a High Commissioner for Refugees
coming from Germany under the League was acceptable to the
UK on the basis that the High Commissioner was separate from
the League itself, financed by private organisations, and
did not have power to negotiate with Germany. The UK limited
its ratification of the 1933 and 1938 League Conventions on
refugees, largely in order to protect British sovereignty
over admissions 40 . The High Commissioner was effectively
confined to providing juridical protection for refugees. In
late 1935 the first High Commissioner, James McDonald, an
American, gave up his post, itemising, in a much publicised
resignation letter, his frustration at the limitations of
what he was able to achieve. McDonald was replaced by Sir
Neill Malcolm, a British candidate, who was thought to be
more sympathetic to the UK government's priorities41 . The
policy of not granting government funds to the High
Commissioner, except for administrative expenses, greatly
limited what Malcolm could achieve. By June 1938 his
performance of his duties to support the development of
settlement opportunities abroad was confined to small-scale
successes in Australia and South America42.
40 A League Provisional Arrangement of July 1936 made
provision for a uniform legal status for refugees from
Germany, on the pattern of that provided for "Nansen"
refugees by the Convention relating to the International
Status of Refugees of October 1933. The UK ratified the 1933
Convention in October 1936, with reservations, Sherman, op.
cit., pp. 70-71; in February 1938, the League adopted a new
Convention designed to give a more permanent form to the
Provisional Arrangement. Ibid., pp. 80-83.
41 Sherman, op. cit., pp. 35-84.
42 For Malcolm's activities, see Lord Duncannon, tA
Summary of the Activities of the High Commissioner for
Refugees coming from Germany in Questions of Emigration', 14
Jun 1938, Duncannon to Makins, 14 Jun 1938, PRO FO
371/22527, W7706/104/98, f.93.
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The question of the future of the League's work for refugees
led to a recommendation by the Council of the League in May
1938, that a single organisation be set up to replace the
Nansen International Office and the High Commissioner for
Refugees coming from Germany, both of which were due to be
wound up at the end of the year43 . This plan was accepted by
the League Assembly in September 1938, which established
from the beginning of January 1939 a newly appointed Hig}
Commissioner of the League of Nations to deal with the
refugees hitherto coming under both agencies. One of the
duties given to the new High Commissioner was to maintain
relations with the newly established 1GC44.
The second phase of policy was short-lived. It began in
March 1938, soon after the Anschluss, when President
Roosevelt called for an intergovernmental conference on the
refugee problem, placing on the international agenda the
suggestion of setting up an intergovernmental committee on
refugees outside the League. In this phase the British
government made efforts to prevent any such organisation
from coming into existence, because it was seen as a source
of potential problems and unwelcome pressures. The second
phase ended with the UK's acquiescence in the formation of
the IGC at the Evian conference in July 1938.
Butler, Hansard, op. cit., vol. 336, col.7)
16 May 1938.
League of Nations, International Assistance to
Refugees. Report of the Sixth Committee to the Assembly'. A.
54. 1938. XII., Geneva, 28 Sept 1938, resol. 4. PRO FO
371/22535, W13140/104/98.
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The shift to a policy of containing the impact of the IGC
marked the start of the third phase. Once British policy-
makers realised that, although such an agency would be of
little use, it would be difficult to prevent its formation,
they re-directed their effort into trying to keep the IGC's
activities within what they regarded as proper bounds.
British policy aimed to limit the scope of the IGC, for
example, by linking its officers closely to the work of the
League High Commissioner for Refugees, and by treating the
IGC more as a series of infrequent meetings than as an
ongoing body with a permanent secretariat. British energies
were also expended on placing sympathetic individuals in key
posts in the organisation; one such success was the
replacement at the start of 1939 of the American George
Rublee, the IGC's first Director, who had resigned, by the
more amenable Sir Herbert Emerson. In general, the British
approach to the work of the IGC was governed by the goal of
ensuring that the IGC did not interfere with sovereignty
over admissions to territory under British control. The IGC
was treated as an instrument of national policy, to be
deflected, possibly even dismantled, if it threatened to
interfere with British interests, but meanwhile to be
utilised for whatever diplomatic gains it might offer.
British policy on refugees and the League of Nations in
early 1938
The potential role of the League in mitigating refugee
problems involved questions concerning both the scope of
League conventions on refugees, and the possible creation of
new agencies under the League. League discussions of refugee
problems also raised quetions of domestic policy concerning
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the machinery adopted by individual countries of refuge to
deal with refugee immigration to their territories.
In early 1938 the terms of a new League Convention on
refugees were being finalised. In addition, shortly before
the appearance of the American plan for an IGC independent
of the League, a proposal to set a new International
Commission under the League was made. Both the Convention
and the proposed new agencies had implications for
individual countries' immigration policies. The Home Office
wished to limit new obligations under the Convention,
expressing fears of excessive flows of German refugees to
the UK45 . In February 1938, at the League conference at
Geneva for conclusion of the new Convention, UK
representatives opposed any modification of the Convention
which would oblige the UK to agree to refugees temporarily
in the country remaining and establishing themselves 46 . The
British statement, which Cooper, who was the UK delegate,
had drafted, insisted on the UK's right to decide to whom it
would allow such facilities, and from whom it felt it
necessary to withhold them, and stressed that the
government's generosity to refugees might diminish if it was
obliged to absorb temporary residents as a result of the new
Convention, so that obligatory concessions for one .group
might lead to the withdrawal of concessions for others47.
See Cooper to William Hayter, 12 Jan 1938, Hayter,
minute, 14 Jan 1938, Hayter to Cooper, 22 Jan 1938, PRO FO
371/22525, W511/104/98, f.19. Hayter criticised Home Office
opposition to modification of the Convention to include
within its protection persons who left Germany after the
date of ratification.
46 Holderness to Under Secretary, 14 Jan 1938, PRO FO
371/22525, W637/104/98, f. 42; Cooper, draft of statement,
21 Jan 1938, PRO FO 371/22525, W985/104/98, f.64.
Ibid.
172
Cooper told a private conference session that the UK
government had been able "in quite a large number of cases
to agree to refugees remaining and establishing themselves",
despite the difficulty of absorbing foreigners in a highly
industrialised and thickly populated country48 . When the UK
signed the 1938 Convention it entered reservations which
nullified the effect of the provisions benefiting persons
admitted on a temporary basis49.
The Home Office, like the Foreign Office, preferred that
work for refugees should be continued by a body deriving
authority under the League, rather than a new autonomous
body, which, Cooper feared, might pursue "an idealistic or
adventurous policy which would not recommend itself to the
countries of temporary refuge". He suggested that a more
fruitful approach would be to explore settlement
possibilities overseas, but he did not address the question
of the machinery which this would require 50 . When a League
Council Committee of Three (with representatives from
Bolivia, the UK and France), meeting in Paris in mid-
February 1938, recommended a policy of absorption of
refugees in the countries of refuge, and suggested setting
up an intergovernmental body for this purpose, the initial
British response was negative 51 . In May 1938 Holderness
informed Makins that the Home Office was worried about the
48 League of Nations. Conference for the Conclusion of
a Convention, Provisional Minutes of First Meeting
(private), 7 Feb 1938, PRO FO 371/22526, W2318/104/98, f.27.
Sherman, op. cit., pp. 80-83.
50 Cooper to Hayter, 11 Jan 1938, Hayter, mm, 15 Jan
1938, PRO FO 371/22525, W527/104/98, f.38; Sherman, op.
cit., pp. 81-82.
51 Skrine Stevenson, minute, 16 Feb 1938, PRO FO
TSAA I1.A IflO	 C IAI •	 44.	 On_A
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proposal and would not accept it "unless we are satisfied
that it will serve a useful purpose and will not concern
itself in the internal affairs of other countries"52.
The Home Office's defensiveness towards proposals to extend
the existing international machinery to take in more aspects
of the refugee problem, was matched by its spirited defence,
at home and abroad, of the existing domestic machinery for
dealing with refugees. Thus, at the February 1938 conference
on the Convention, Cooper put forward the relationship
between the Home Office and the voluntary organisations as
an acceptable alternative to other countries' solutions,
such as that of Belgium, which had set up an Advisory
Commission to pronounce on individual cases and express
opinions on asylum decisions. He argued that, in view of the
close collaboration between the government and charitable
organisations, "it might be said that an advisory commission
exists in the United Kingdom in fact, if not in name", and
he supported a Swiss proposal that such arrangements be
treated as an acceptable alternative to an advisory
commission53 . Cooper's approach to the question illustrates
the British government's view that the voluntary
organisations performed a representative role which rendered
direct representation unnecessary; the fact that voluntary
agencies in the UK did not represent individual refugees was
not addressed. Similarly, demands from Eleanor Rathbone in
May 1938 for creation of more formal policy-making machinery
52 Holderness to Makins, 4 May 1938, PRO FO 371/22526,
W5829/104/98, f.300.
League of Nations. Conference for the Conclusion of
a Convention etc, Provisional Minutes of Sixth Meeting
(private), 7 Feb 1938, PRO FO 371/22526, W2318/104/98, f.27,
pp. 9-12.
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were met by the Prime Minister, Chamberlain, with a Home
Office-drafted parliamentary reply claiming that the
government's close collaboration with the voluntary bodies
was adequate for this purpose, and that it was relying on
the recently-formed Co-ordinating Committee to produce
constructive policy proposals54.
British preparations for the Evian Conference
In late March 1938 international pressure on the refugee
problem heightened as a result of the initiative of
President Roosevelt. The USA had not been particularly
welcoming to refugees, but, following the Anschluss,
Roosevelt had made certain concessions to refugees in the
USA. He now issued a summons to an international meeting on
the refugee problem, which was intended to launch a new
committee of government representatives, "for the purpose of
facilitating the emigration from Austria, and presumably
from Germany, of political refugees" 55 . Nations where
refugees had found, or hoped to find, a haven agreed to
gather at Evian in France in early July 1938 to discuss
collective action on the refugee problem56.
As the threat of war in Europe came closer, the Foreign
Office was alert for signs that the isolationism of the
Americans, who remained outside the League of Nations, might
be giving way to a readiness to become involved in European
problems. Thus, when Roosevelt suggested the idea of the
Chamberlain, Hansard, op. cit., 23 May 1938, vol.
336, cols. 834-836.
US Embassy, memorandum, 24 Mar 1938, AN Noble to
Shillito, 28 Mar 1938, PRO T 160/842/F13577/O1/1.
56 Sherman, op. cit., pp. 95-97, 100-123.
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conference, it was agreed that "on political grounds alone"
it was desirable to accept the American proposals in
principle 57 . As Makins has recalled, "We grabbed it" 58 . When
Anglo-American co-operation received a boost as a result of
the Evian meeting, the principal British objective in
becoming involved in the conference had been realised.
The impending conference required participating governments
to consider what international action on the refugee problem
was desirable and how this should be balanced against action
by individual governments. British reactions to these
questions, which raised both political and financial
considerations, involving the Foreign Office and the
Treasury in particular, will now be considered. Individual
governments were also under pressure to state how they were
prepared to contribute to the admission and settlement of
refugees, and the Home Office's main contribution to the
Evian preparations was to provide a statement of policy on
refugee admissions to the UK, which will be dealt with
separately.
The apparently contradictory and ambivalent postures which
British government representatives adopted towards the IGC
are more comprehensible if viewed as a reflection of their
commitment to British sovereignty over refugee policy. The
Foreign Office aimed to maintain British sovereignty
generally, and had the specific aim of restricting the size
of the refugee problem in Europe and its impact on the UK.
See minutes of interdepartmental meeting, 28 March
1938, PRO T 160/842/F13577/O1/1.
58 Lord Sherfield (Roger Makins), interview with this
author, 13 Dec 1990.
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It was therefore determined to show the German government,
and other interested governments which were known to be
watching - Poland and Romania in particular - that the UK
would not be blackmailed into taking destitute Jewish
refugees off the hands of other nations. The priority
therefore for British policy was not to rescue refugees, but
to force Germany - and other governments who sought to get
rid of their Jewish populations - to play according to
internationally agreed rules. Officials and ministers were
united in the determination that Britain would not be
dictated to by any external force - be it a foreign
government, an international organisation, or the sheer
pressure of the refugee exodus - as to the numbers of
refugees it would admit, the terms on which it would accept
them, or the funds it might spend on them.
The Treasury and the question of public funds for refugees
In the intensive interdepartmental discussions in Whitehall
which preceded the conference, Treasury officials were
detailed to draft the financial section of the instructions
to the UK delegation at Evian. This task was carried out
against the background of policy to date, which was that
public funds would not be spent on refugees. The funds of
the High Commissioner for Refugees had come from Jewish
organisations, not the League. In previous years, the
Foreign Office and the Treasury had been in agreement that
to spend money or establish machinery for dealing with the
refugee problem would risk perpetuating it, and that such
activities should be left to the private organisations59.
British government spokesmen still insisted that public
See e.g Herbert Brittain (Treasury) to Strang, 31
Jul 1935, PRO FO 371/19677, W7002/356/98, f.172
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money should not be spent on relief and settlement abroad.
The recent US proposals also envisaged that financing of
emergency emigration would be by private organisations60.
It was nevertheless realised that little could be done if
the problem, especially raising funds to help refugees, was
to remain in private hands 61 . Private organisations could
find jobs for refugees, but not organise their admission
abroad, while the head of any new body set up by the Evian
meeting might be able to do something to help people who
were still in Germany, but wished to leave. Nevertheless,
the consideration that help to refugees in the Reich would
provoke additional problems for Jews in Poland, Romania and
elsewhere, including Hungary, carried great weight with both
the Foreign Office and the Treasury. Poland and Romania had,
for example, raised their desire for aid to help reduce
their Jewish populations at the 101st session of the Council
of the League in May 1938 62 . Anxious to nip such hopes in
the bud, RC Skrine Stevenson of the Foreign Office advised
on the first day of the Evian conference that Poland and
Romania should not be refused entry to the meeting as
observers, as "they might learn from listening that the
German method of trying to get rid of minorities by bullying
them is not looked upon with any favour by the rest of the
world" 63 . British representatives planned to make the
Americans shoulder any blame for excluding Polish and
60 Sherman, op. cit., p. 95.
61 See minutes of 28 Mar meeting, n. 57 above.
62 Makins, minute, 'Consideration of the Refugee
Question at the 101st Session of the Council', 14 May 1938,
PRO FO 371/22527, W6714//104/98, f.47.
63 RC Skrine Stevenson, minute, 6 Jul 1938, PRO FO
371/22528, W8851/104/98, f.31.
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Romanian observers, who did ultimately attend the public
sessions. Makin g afterwards reported trying to discourage
the Polish observer from nursing expectations that the IGC
could assist his government 64 . An interpretation
diametrically opposite to the British government's line on
Poland and Romania was put forward by Sir John Hope Simpson,
director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs'
Refugee Survey, who argued that, if the proposed IGC failed
to act on the acute position of the Jewish populations in
these countries, then they would persecute their Jews. He
expressed this view in early June, when sending the galley
proofs of his Preliminary Report to Makins, in advance of
the Evian conference, and said that in his opinion the
problem of the Jewish populations in those countries
outweighed in importance the problem of German and Austrian
refugees65.
The anxieties outlined above were taken into account when
the Treasury considered the question. In this instance, as
in other matters concerning refugees, Treasury involvement
in refugee matters had arisen in a casual and ad hoc way,
when a question of finance arose. The Treasury's finance
division was accustomed to dealing with the UK's
contributions to the League of Nations, which included
questions of expenditure on refugees. In mid-June 1938
Edward Playfair, then a Principal within the finance
division, produced first draft of the Treasury response, on
the UK's line at Evian on the financing of any new agency.
64 See Makins, minute, ibid., quoted Sherman, op. cit.
p. 116.
65 Hope Simpson to Makins, 8 Jun 1938, PRO FO
371/22527, W7399/104/98, f.64.
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Playfair followed precedent, advising that it would be
unwise to depart from the previous policy of opposing
expenditure on refugees from Germany. British money had in
fact been spent very recently on assistance to Assyrian
refugees, but it could be argued that the Assyrians were a
special case. Playfair advised that if the principle of
spending League of Nations funds on refugees was conceded,
this would extend to refugees under the League's Nansen
Office, widening the scope of demands on the League and its
contributing governments, including the UK. He emphasised
the potential for further' claims on British funds, if the
countries represented at Evian showed readiness to make
financial contributions toward the emigration of Jews
expelled from Germany; he reiterated the familiar anxieties
over the response of such countries as Poland and Romania,
warning that:
other countries which are pursuing an anti-semitic policy
will take further measures to expel Jews, once they know
that someone else is prepared to come to their aid. Poland
and Roumania in particular have a Jewish population far
larger than that of Germany and Austria, and are known to be
anxious to take all steps to get rid of them as far as
possible; and it is significant that both countries are
interested in international efforts to promote emigration.
In the interests of the Jewish population of those
countries, it seems that too open a hand is inadvisable.
He concluded that policy on funds should remain unchanged66.
Nevertheless, support for spending public funds on refugees
cam from other, higher ranking Treasury officials.
Playfair's senior, SD Waley, Principal Assistant Secretary
concerned with finance, who was a Jew, argued that the UK
66 Playfair, memorandum, eAttitude of HM Government in
the United Kingdom', Playfair to IF, Inch to Playfair,
Playfair to Waley, 15 Jun 1938, PRO T 160/842/F13577/O1/1.
Playfair set out practical problems attached to making
financial contributions in the form of loans; see also
Playfair to IF, memorandum, 7 Jun 1938, ibid.
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should not take a position which implied that there were no
circumstances under which the government would consider
making a grant or offering a guarantee. He linked this
approach to an expectation that the conference itself would
achieve little:
I am afraid that the Evian Conference is bound to be
somewhat of a fiasco. Few governments seem likely to promise
to take more refugees than they are doing at present, or to
commit themselves to any definite number. The Conference
seems, therefore, likely to do no more than express platonic
sympathies and to set up an Intergovernmental Committee,
which does not seem likely to serve any useful purpose, and
may do actual harm by hampering the activities of the new
High Commissioner.... It seems to me that we ought not to
rule out of court the possibility of later on giving some
financial assistance in 69rder to obtain such constructive
results as are possible
He suggested that some understanding might be reached with
Jewish leaders over stopping, or at least limiting Jewish
immigration to Palestine, perhaps making feasible a real
settlement of Arab/Jewish conflict in Palestine. He also
proposed that limited financial help might make possible an
arrangement with Germany "to contribute to an orderly
solution of the problem, at any rate, to the extent of
allowing refugees to export sufficient capital in the form
of goods and capital equipment", enabling refugees to make a
new start abroad, rather than arriving destitute. He was
more hopeful that such arrangements could be made with
Hungary, Romania and Poland, who might agree to co-operate
over arrangements for the purchase of travel tickets on
terms which would not worsen their foreign exchange
position, and might also agree that Jewish inhabitants
should not be deprived of their livelihood faster than they
were able to emigrate. Such assistance as Britain and other
67 Waley to Phillips, memorandum. 'Evian Conference',
17 Jun 1938, ibid., with title, 'Political refugees from
Germany and Austria' added in Warren Fisher's hand.
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states could give, would put them in a stronger position to
urge "that the problem of reducing Jewish populations should
be undertaken in a gradual and orderly way and not by brutal
methods and wholesale expulsions". Waley concluded with the
following disclaimer: "Frankly, I cannot pretend to be
objective on this topic and am rather apologetic for
expressing any views at all68".
Sir Frederick Phillips, Treasury Under-Secretary, like
Playfair, expressed concern about the impact on Poland and
Romania. He said he expected that these countries would use
the conference to press for help. He was convinced that
Britain should therefore strive to confine the conference
agenda to refugees from Germany and Austria. If not, the
problem would grow even more unmanageable: "the more
facilities are provided the more refugees there will be to
provide for". Phillips dismissed the League as a potential
source of funds, but was, however, prepared to follow
Waley's suggestion of a flexible approach. He suggested that
the UK should be prepared to match any contribution the US
prepared to make, but that the British delegation should
refuse to enter into discussion of governmental
contributions until the US government, which had convened
the conference, had decided on such action. He warned: "the
Americans are past masters at pushing other people into
obligations and then backing out themselves". He concluded,
"We are
	
in the long run likely to escape some
governmental assistance either by grant or guarantee but we
68 Ibid.
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had better safeguard our position very carefully at this
stage69".
The notes made by Waley and Phillips were sent to the
Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, Sir Warren Fisher, and
afterwards to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John
Simon. Fisher echoed Waley's concerns, but in far broader
terms, putting forward the refugees' humanitarian claims and
the UK's tradition of asylum as a reason for the British
government to keep an open mind (without revealing it) on
the possibility of financial help to refugees
The principal element is of course the Jews who are exposed
to unspeakable horrors. It is clear that, however much we
sy-mpathise, we cannot provide a solution to this terrible
problem (which is not confined to Germany). But our historic
role of an asylum for political outcasts and our position as
the mandatory power for Palestine shd make us ready to do
what we can consistently with the legitimate interests of
our people at home and of the Arabs in Palestine. (On a
wholly lower plane of thought I may mention that this
country has frequently been the gainer by providing refuge
to foreigners highly qualified in various walks of life).
While therefore I wd[sic] start at the conference apparently
square-toed about the American exclusion of Government
Finance from any scheme of help, I think we shd[sicJ be well
advised from every point of view - if not from reasons of
humanity - to keep open minds (without avowing it) & be on
the look out for any opportunity of intelligent assistance
(this oç course won't help the majority of these poor
people) .
Simon initialled Fisher's note making no comment.
The final statement of the Treasury position for the brief
of the UK delegation contained the reservation, advocated by
Phillips, that the UK should not pursue the issue of
governmental finance unless and until the US had decided to
69 Phillips, memorandum, 21 Jun 1938, ibid.
70 Fisher to Chancellor, 21 Jun 1938, ibid.
183
proceed on this line 71 . Makins observed that "the hand will
not be an easy one to play", but assumed that the Treasury
brief meant that some form of UK government assistance would
ultimately be available, should this be the approach
favoured by the US government 72 . He sought further guidance
from the Treasury, emphasising "the overriding importance of
co-operating with the United States Government in this
matter to the fullest extent", and asked for authority to
agree to a commitment by the UK" 73 . In reply, PG Inch of the
Treasury said that if the US could not be moved to abandon
the idea of setting up an intergovernmental committee, the
UK government should "in the last resort" give discretion to
agree to the proposal, presuming that any contribution to
the agency's expenses and staff would involve a relatively
small amount74 . No sign should however be given that the UK
envisaged any further financial obligation. If this was
raised, the delegation should seek instructions 75 . The
Treasury thus opposed any UK government initiative to offer
finance. The crucial importance of government finance was
nonetheless apparent to British ministers and officials,
even though they agreed that the UK should not be prepared
to take a lead on this issue. For example, RA Butler,
Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Foreign Office said on
30 June at an inter-departmental meeting shortly before the
71 Playfair to Makins, 27 Jun 1938, ibid.
72 Making , minute, 28 Jun 1938, PRO FO 371/22528,
W8388/104/98, f.207.
Makins to Inch, 2 Jul 1938, PRO FO 371/22529,
W8851/104/98, f.31.
Inch to Makins, 4 Jul 1938, PRO FO 371/22529,
W8886/104/98, f.71; Foreign Office, 5 Jul 1938, PRO FO
371/22529, W8885/104/98, f.65.
Ibid.
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conference, that since the private organisations were not in
a position to finance emigration on a large scale, if no
finance was available from governments, "the whole scheme
would fall through"76.
Treasury officials' discussion of these matters show that,
notwithstanding the concern to limit public expenditure,
humanitarian concern for refugees was felt at the highest
levels within the Treasury, and included support for the
expenditure of public money on refugees. Waley and Playfair
in particular both played a part in supporting expenditure
on refugees during the next few years. The approach of
Treasury officials to refugee questions was neither
hamstrung by the Home Office's departmental pre-occupation
with firm immigration control nor by the Foreign Office's
concern to take a firm line with other governments. Their
own departmental pre-occupation with preserving and
controlling public funds did not necessarily prevent them
from.encouraging public expenditure on refugees, although
the sums whose expenditure they were contemplating at this
stage were relatively small. A factor contributing to their
cautious response to the Evian proposal was the Treasury
concern about value for money. While the Foreign Office was
ready, for political reasons, to become involved in a body
which was not expected to accomplish its stated objectives,
this was alien to a Treasury sense of priorities. Waley was
especially concerned about UK involvement in a new body,
whose effectiveness was not only in doubt but whose
existence might damage other efforts to help refugees.
Treasury officials seemed less nervous than many others of
76 'Record of interdepartmental meeting on 30th June
1938', PRO FO 371/22538, W8713/104/98, f.281.
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the humanitarian issues raised by the refugee problem. They
often found fault with the contradictions and limitations of
the approach of civil servants in other departments. Much of
the readiness to criticise was derived from the lofty
traditions of Treasury officials, highly conscious of being
an elite and used to maintaining a critical perspective on
departments for whose expenditure they were responsible. In
the period between the Anschluss and the war, Treasury
officials also provided hard-headed assessments of the
prospects for negotiation with Germany over refugees.
The Evian Conference and the Intergovermental Committee on
Refugees
At Evian, UK representatives reluctantly acceded to the
American plan to set up the IGC. The IGC's brief was to use
diplomatic means to persuade the German government to
contribute to the cost of expelling its Jews, by allowing
refugees to keep some of their capital when they emigrated.
This, it was hoped, would produce the possibility of orderly
emigration from Greater Germany.
Makins has recalled that he was reasonably satisfied with
the outcome of the Evian conference. He was able to exercise
considerable influence over its proceedings and he drafted
the conference report. He felt responsible for ensuring that
the conference produced some result, and felt burdened by
having the unimpressive Winterton (whom he has called a
"shell-back") as the British delegate 77 . At Evian, he
therefore worked with other countries' officials to salvage
something positive from the gathering.
Makins, interview with this author, already cited.
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Waley's expectation that the conference would produce little
of value for refugees was borne out. His prediction that the
IGC might have a negative practical effect also proved
correct. This was not for the reason Waley envisaged, (that
it would hamper the High Commissioner for Refugees), as the
High Commissioner's activities were not in competition with
the IGC. It was rather because the IGC and the prospects of
an IGC-negotiated agreement on the export of refugee capital
from the German Reich were invoked to deflect other
proposals for action, whether they were proposals for
governmental funding for refugees or proposals for the
provision of refuge by governments. The IGC's prospects
were also invoked against private fund-raising, the source
of the only practical help available.
Waley had suggested that the likely failure of the proposed
IGC to achieve anything was a reason for not excluding
alternatives, including perhaps contributions from
governmental sources. In the months after the conference,
this argument was more often than not turned on its head by
Foreign Office officials. They claimed that to make sources
of funds available from countries other than Germany, would
be to play into the hands of the Germans and of those
European governments who sought to unload unwanted Jews on
the charity of other countries. Foreign Office officials
raised the same objections to highly successful private
fund-raising for refugees, and therefore made efforts to
curtail the impact of appeals to the public, in case this
should cast the prospects of the IGC into the shade 78 . From
78 See chapter four for efforts to curtail the success
of the Baldwin Appeal.
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a humanitarian perspective, the flaw in the logic which
produced such moves by the Foreign Office was that private
fund-raising was the one means which actually enabled
refugees to escape, and government funds, had they been made
available, would have expanded these possibilities. The IGC,
on the other hand, failed to bring about any increase in the
prospects for refugees. Nevertheless, British officials
consistently discouraged refugee emigration outside IGC
auspices
Treasury doubts as to the prospects of the IGC continued.
Sir Frederick Leith-Ross of the Treasury, who was
experienced in international negotiation, tried to help the
IGC in its first months, when its officers were trying to
set up negotiations with the German government, but was not
optimistic of success. After meeting George Rublee, the
elderly American lawyer who had been appointed the IGC's
first director, Leith-Ross expressed his reservations to
both Dean Acheson of the US and Lord Winterton, the IGC's
British chairman, commenting that, while glad to assist, he
feared "that the problem of getting butter out of a dog's
mouth is a comparatively simple one as compared with getting
foreign exchange out of Germany at the present time"80.
Waley, who worked closely with Leith-Ross in this period,
spelt out Treasury doubts about the IGC's prospects to the
See e.g. Randall, minute, 7 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/22536, W14468/104/98, f.58, responding to a letter from
a man who had proposed ways of facilitating the immigration
to the UK of boys and girls from Germany.
80 Leith-Ross to Acheson and Winterton, 10 Sept 1938,
PRO T 188/225.
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first meeting of the new Cabinet Committee on the Refugee
Problem in January 193981.
Waley and the Foreign Office became involved in October 1938
in negotiations to overcome Board of Trade objections to
schemes designed to facilitate the transfer to the UK of
refugee capital, which entailed conceding a reduction in UK
export earnings82 . By late October AWG Randall of the
Foreign Office thought the Board of Trade should relax
"their present rigid attitude" and drop their objections. He
claimed that this was desirable on political grounds,
because it
would help Anglo-American relations if HMG could make a
substantial contribution. . .having welcomed the American
initiative at Evian and given the IGC hospitality in London,
we have accepted a certain responsibility for sing that
their work does not come to a complete deadlock
He argued that, although it had been accepted at Evian that
governments should not make a financial contribution, the
concessions currently in question could not strictly be
called financial. He concluded that"overriding
consideration" was Britain's "moral responsibility" to try
to find a solution of the refugee problem.
While Foreign Office officials expressed support for the
IGC, they do not seem to have had much faith in its
81 Cabinet Committee on the Refugee Problem, 24 Jan
1939, Conclusions, CRP(39) 1st Meeting, PRO CAB 98/1.
82 Lee(BOT), 'Transfer of Property of German
Refugees', (note of meeting on 6 Oct), PRO FO 371/22535,
W13549/104/98, f.258, Waley to Wilkinson, 12 Oct 1938, PRO
FO 371/22535, W13588/104/98, f.290.
83 Randall, minute, 25 Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/22535,
W13673/104/98, f.315; see also Halifax to Stanley, 3 Nov
1938, ibid.; a few days earlier Randall wrote: " HMG have
accepted a certain measure of responsibility for the
refugees", Randall, minute, 19 Oct 1938, ibid.
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prospects. Indeed, certain steps taken by the Foreign Office
were calculated to undermine the new body in its early
stages. The relatively low level at which the IGC proposed
to conduct negotiations seemed unpromising, in view of the
difficulties of dealing with the Germans at anything below
the level of the meeting between heads of state which had
produced the Munich Agreement. Rublee himself suggested that
Chamberlain might raise the matter with Hitler, a suggestion
which found favour with the British Chairman of the IGC,
Lord Winterton84 . Foreign Office officials were concerned to
minimise the damage to international relations which would
result from German refusal to co-operate with the 1GC 85 . The
concern that IGC initiatives might interfere with the
delicate state of Anglo-German relations without achieving
anything, led to British moves to delay and to undermine
Rublee's proposed mission to Berlin. It was suggested that
Rublee should not go until he had details of the numbers of
refugees countries would accept 86 . Rublee, following up
earlier American suggestions, then proposed that the British
Empire match the US contribution of 27,000 admissions
annually, by accepting 15,000 in the UK, colonies and Indian
Empire for temporary and permanent settlement, excluding
Palestine, and a further 12,000 in the dominions. The
British reaction, led by Winterton, was annoyance, rejection
84 TB Williamson, 'Note of Discussion at the Home
office on 5/10/38: Lord Winterton, Mr Rublee, Mr Pell, Mr
Cotton and Mr Williamson', 5 Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/22535,
W13305/104/98, f.206.
85 Makins, minute, 19 Oct 1938, Sargent minute, 20 Oct
1938, PRO FO 371/22535, W13860/104/98, f.359.
86 For Foreign Office views see TB Williamson, 'Note
of Conversation at Home Office on 4 October 1938: Lord
Winterton, Mr Hayter, Mr Rile y[correct spelling Reilly], Mr
Williamson, 4 Oct 1938. PRO FO 371/22535, W13304/104/98,
f.202.
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in principle of the notion that the UK being asked to state
specific numbers, and insistence that Rublee accept this
refusal: he was confidentially provided with some figures
for past admissions87 . In late October Rublee also
criticised Winterton for undermining the IGC's work for
refugees from Germany and Austria, through his readiness to
discriminate in favour of Sudetenland refugees from
Czechoslovakia, by promoting their efforts to emigrate
abroad on the basis that, as they were mostly non-Jews,
countries would be readier to accept them88.
The Foreign Office went so far as to suggest to the
Americans that the IGC be effectively closed down as a
separate body, and its responsibilities passed to the
British Foreign Office 89 . The Foreign Office official who
had been most active in work on refugees, Roger Makins, now
Lord Sherfield, has recalled how un-impressed he had been by
Rublee 90 . After six months Rublee, frustrated by lack of
support, both from the British and from Roosevelt, carried
out his threat to resign. His successor, whom Makins found
much more effective, was an Englishman, Sir Herbert Emerson,
87 Rublee, 'Director's First Report', (n.d.), sent
Williamson to Reilly, 7 Oct 1938, Reilly, minute, 10 Oct
1938, PRO FO 371/22535, W13405/104/98. f.226; Winterton to
Halifax, 13 Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/22535, W13673/104/98.
f.315; Winterton to MacDonald, 18 Oct 1938, PRO FO
371/22535, W13882/104/98, f.360.
88 Rublee to Winterton, 26 Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/22536,
W14354/104/98, f.24.
89 See chapter four.
90 Lord Sherfield, interview with this author, already
cited.
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formerly governor of the Punjab, who had already been chosen
in September as League High Commissioner for Refugees91.
The positions adopted by Lord Winterton and by Foreign
Office officials shifted uneasily and often illogically
between contradictory stances on the issue of the role of
privately funded aid for refugees. On the one hand they
relied on private funds to achieve a solution of the refugee
problem; on the other, they opposed the expansion of private
fund-raising, as a threat to the IGC's work. Meanwhile Sir
John Hope Simpson, the first of whose studies on the refugee
problem appeared in the summer of 1938, and who spoke
frequently on the issue, was persistently and publicly
underlining the need for governments to recognise that the
response of private charity was providing the only means of
escape. He was equally emphatic that private efforts could
only deal with the fringe of the problem, and called for
action by governments before it was too late. Hope Simpson
had been considered and rejected as a candidate for the post
of Director of the IGC, as he was seen as too critical, but
his analysis of the IGC's limitations for practical purposes
remained unanswerable92.
The practical limitations of the IGC as an instrument for
achieving humanitarian ends were, for the reasons outlined
above, not a particular worry for the Foreign Office, whose
91 For Emerson's appointment as High Commissioner for
refugees, see correspondence between Emerson and Makins, 22-
29 Sept 1938, PRO FO 371/22535, W13160/104/98, f.151 and PRO
FO 371/22535, W13699/104/98, f.342.
92 See for example, report of Hope Simpson's speech at
a dinner of the Royal Empire Society, Jewish Chronicle, 11
Nov 1938. p. 24; Hayter had advised Emerson to read
Simpson's work. Hayter to Skrine Stevenson, 10 Oct 1938, PRO
FO 371/22535, W13544/104/98, f.250.
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primary objective in relation to the Evian proposal - to
maximise its potential for developing closer Anglo-American
relations - was being amply realised. Yet the difficulty,
mentioned by Phillips, of getting the Americans to commit
themselves to doing anything concrete on the refugee
problem, remained to haunt British policy makers. During the
next few years, British policy makers made several
initiatives in the hope of giving the Americans a lead which
they might follow or preferably surpass. Disappointingly,
the US government repeatedly failed to follow British leads,
whether in expanding refugee admissions, in agreeing to
commit government funds to refugee settlement or in offering
to make territory available for settlement.
The Evian conference could be viewed as a success for
British policy for other reasons. The UK had not been forced
into any new commitments. The question of Palestine had been
kept off the conference agenda. The demands of Poland and
Romania for help in getting rid of their Jews had also been
consigned to the sidelines. The creation of the IGC,
accepted reluctantly by Britain, had it compensations. The
new body could be used to develop relations with the
Americans and might even produce improvements in the
situation of refugees. If IGC activities threatened to muddy
diplomatic relations with Germany, they could be undermined.
The main thrust of Foreign Office policy in relation to the
IGC, however, was to ensure that it neither interfered with
British sovereignty nor increased the size of the refugee
problem. When Emerson took over as director, Foreign Office
hopes of harmonious co-operation with the IGC increased93.
Lord Sherfield, interview with this author, already
cited.
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The administration of admissions
The imDact of visas
The Home Office now attempted to make its policy of careful
selection work. The first problem in the selection process
was to distinguish the potential refugee from the ordinary
visitor. Port controls were not adequate to identify or
exclude all visitors who were potential refugees. The Home
Office's CDC Robinson explained that at the ports there were
problems in refusing leave to land to "persons who are
apparently respectable and state that they are coming for a
short visit to see friends, relatives or business
acquaintances", because the opportunities for making
enquiries were too limited94.
The introduction of obligatory visas would make it possible
to investigate applicants thoroughly prior to arrival in the
UK. New instructions giving guidance to passport control
off icers(PCOs) in deciding visa applications emphasised that
the new visa procedure had been brought in to regulate the
flow of refugees 95 . The PCO's task was to distinguish bona
fide applicants for visitors' visas from persons who claimed
that they were going to Britain for some temporary purpose
"but whose real object is to apply, after arrival, to be
Robinson to Bland, 14 Mar 1938, PRO FO 372/3282,
T3398/3272/378, f.8
Passport Control Department, circular, 'Visas for
Holders of German and Austrian Passports entering the United
Kingdom', 27 Apr 1938, PRO FO 372/3283, T6705/3272/378,
f.326., para. 1.
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allowed to remain indefinitely" 96 . It was especially
necessary to investigate the circumstances of applicants for
visitors' visas "who appear to be of Jewish or partly Jewish
origin, or have non-Aryan affiliations". If a suspected
emigrant persisted in claiming to be a visitor, he should be
warned that he would be expected to leave at the termination
of his visit, required to sign an undertaking to do so, and
warned that, if he overstayed, steps would be taken to
compel his return, "notwithstanding any plea to the
contrary" 97 . If the PCO believed he was dealing with a
refugee case he then had to decide whether the applicant
seemed to fit into any of the categories which the Home
Office would consider for refugee entry to the United
Kingdom. The regulations reflected the government's
continuing interest in recruiting persons of international
repute in science, medicine research or art, or successful
industrialists who wished to make preliminary visits in
connection with transferring their businesses to Britain.
The applications of this elite were to be granted on the
spot, or not refused without sanction from London. Other
persons of standing in these fields were also not to be
refused without reference98.
At the other end of the scale were the rank and file of
people in commerce and the professions. Such persons, if
declared or suspected refugees, were, as a rule, to be
excluded99 . The policy of restricting access to the UK for
96 Ibid., para 2.
Ibid., para 4.
98 Ibid., paras 8 and 9.
Ibid., para 6.
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people in business or in professions, such as medicine and
law, reflected not only the assumption that such persons had
no prospects in the UK, but also fears about their prospects
of re-emigration, which, as has been shown, Schiff not only
shared, but regarded as an argument for the reintroduction
of visas. The instruction to refuse visas to such persons
was mitigated by the creation of a new category of
exceptions. These were cases which should be investigated
and referred, if the applicant was otherwise liable to be
refused, but was "in special danger because of his political
views or activities and there is on this account a special
cases for offering him asylum in the United Kingdom". A
similar exception was possible for people with friends or
relatives in the United Kingdom who could offer them
hospitality, or who had other means of temporary support in
the UK100.
The regulations also made special provision for students and
schoolchildren: "Students (non-refugee class)", defined as
persons "known not to have any Jewish or non-Aryan
affiliations", could be given visas on production of
evidence that they were to pursue an arranged course of
study and would have adequate funds while so engaged. Boy
students in the "refugee class", would be dealt with in the
same way, however, older students in the refugee class had
to prove acceptance on a course at a university or technical
college for a period of not less than two years, as well as
adequate funds'°'. The terminology used in the regulations
reflected the pervasive assumption that an applicant with
100 Ibid., para 7.
101 Ibid., para 9.
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Jewish affiliations was a potential refugee. The numerous
exceptions and cases which required referral show the extent
to which the authorities wished to maintain sufficient
flexibility to grant applications in cases where refusal
might be embarrassing or inappropriate, especially where
applicants might have connections in the UK to provide some
safeguard against their becoming a public charge after
entry.
Before a visa could be authorised it was necessary to
establish whether the individual in question fulfilled the
conditions for the category or categories of admission for
which he or she might be eligible. This involved much time-
consuming correspondence with guarantors and educational
institutions, the provision of references and
qualifications, and the production of evidence of means. A
great deal of extra casework for the authorities, including
many references back London, was thus generated by the new
regulations, although much of the groundwork could be done
by the voluntary organisations.
In defence of the new system, the Home Office emphasised
that it would save refugees the disappointment of fruitless
journeys to British ports. Jews in Germany who wished to
come to the UK now experienced frustrations of a different
sort. They were obliged to join crowds of visa applicants
waiting, sometimes for days, outside British consulates,
where they were an easy target for local Nazis, whose
methods of harrassment included forcing Jews outside the
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Vienna consulate to wash cars' 02 . In April 1938 a band of
Nazi stormtroopers belonging to the SA(Sturm-Abteilung)
announced a plan to enter the building and arrest all the
Jews applying for immigration papers within, but the Consul-
General forbade it'° 3 . During the Kristallnacht violence
Jews queueing outside the building were arrested'°4.
Vienna became a notorious bottleneck. Complaints about
delays, discouragement and discourtesy at British
consulates, especially Vienna, poured into the Foreign
Office, forwarded by refugee organisations, outraged British
and non-refugee travellers, and public figures who included
Sir Walter Citrine, of the Trades Union Congress' 05 . The
Vienna Legation was closed after the Anschluss, leaving only
a Consulate-General, run from early April by Donald St Clair
Gainer, who had been transferred from Munich. Gainer pointed
to the pressure under which his staff were operating, but
conceded that there was some foundation in accusations of
favouritism. All his staff had some "pet Jew" whom they made
extra efforts to help106.
102 Jewish Chronicle, 29 Apr 1938, p. 18; Such an
incident took place on 25 April: Donald St Clair Gainer,
(Consul-General, Vienna) to Under Secretary, 26 Apr 1938,
PRO FO 371/21635, C3944/1667/62, f.170.
103 Ibid.
104 Arthur D Morse, While Six Million Died, London
1968, p. 224.
105 Sherman, op. cit., pp. 133-134.
106 Gainer to Hutcheon, 9 Aug 1938, PRO FO 372/3284,
T10774/3272/378, f.258; see correspondence regarding Vienna,
May to August 1938, PRO FO 372/3283, T6515/3272/378, f.287
and PRO FO 372/3284, T7388/9533/9715/10728/3272/378, f.47.
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Administrative rob1ems
The addition of visas to the system created new problems for
the Home Office as well as new frustrations for refugees.
The problem of marshalling adequate manpower to deal with
aliens work worsened. It was undoubtedly true that the
changeover to visas had succeeded in preventing a large-
scale problem at the ports. Immigration officers had been
spared the pressurised duty of conducting many lengthy
quayside investigations in refugee cases. Nor would they be
obliged to perform the unpleasant task of issuing refusals
of leave to land to large numbers of refugees, and then
forcing them to return to the Continent. The new policy had
shifted the burden of initial face-to-face contact with
applicants from immigration officers, who were a Home Office
responsibility, to passport control and consular officials,
who came under the Foreign Office. Consular posts throughout
Germany and Austria were confronted by a deluge of visa
applications and by crowds of worried people seeking advice
and information.
Nevertheless, the visa system generated new work for the
Home Office. The task of making decisions 'on the numerous
visa applications referred from Vienna, Berlin and elsewhere
back to London under the new regulations was added to the
burdens of the handful of Aliens Department officials, who
already had their hands full. With files on some 10,000
refugees in the UK, the Home Office had not only to deal
with all these cases but with queries in connection with
persons still abroad. The Home Office's A Division was
snowed under and badly behind with naturalisation
applications, which now included refugee applicants with
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five years residence in the UK 107 . The Rome Office was also
in receipt of queries on refugee cases from other Whitehall
departments, as refugees and their friends scoured their
connections in search of someone to intercede with the
immigration authorities. Foreign Office files alone show how
many officials received letters from half-remembered
acquaintances, drawing attention to the plight of some
would-be emigrant or refugee.
The case of German architect Peter Moro, for example, was
brought to the attention of a Foreign Office contact by
fellow-architect Denys Lasdun in December 1938. Moro had
been admitted to the UK in 1936 and had worked for the
architectural partnership, Tecton, his permit being renewed
at six-monthly intervals. He had intended to go to the US,
but when this proved difficult he left Tecton, and, without
obtaining Home office approval, accepted a partnership in
the UK. He was currently working on a job of considerable
size and his financial position was good. The Home Office
objected to Moro's unauthorised step and ordered him to
leave the UK by 31 December. Lasdun's letter on Moro's
behalf was passed to the Treaty Department, where an
official contacted the Home Office, which agreed to
reconsider the case on the basis that Moro had found a new
sponsor' 08 . In later years Moro became known for buildings
which included the Royal Festival Hall on London's South
Bank; Lasdun's National Theatre stands nearby. The Foreign
107 For references to understaffing and arrears in
naturalisation applications, see Home Office establishment
correspondence, Aug 1937 - Nov 1938. PRO T 162/582/E4080/2.
108 See Foreign Office correspondence and minutes,
December 1938, PRO FO 372/3286, T16178/3272/378, f.628.
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Office acted as a channel for many other representations
which ultimately required a Home Office decision.
The Aliens Department could not make inroads into its
casework burden, which had assumed unmanageable proportions,
without enlisting help from outside. The Home Office turned
to the refugee organisations, conveniently brought together
under the umbrella of the recently-formed Co-ordinating
Committee'° 9 . The voluntary organisations agreed to help,
both by dealing with incoming correspondence and by
investigating visa applications. If persons wrote in to the
Foreign Office appealing for assistance or advice on entry
to Britain, they were generally sent answers referring them
to the German Jewish Aid Committee(GJAC), as the JRC was now
known; in other cases the correspondence itself was
forwarded to the GJAC. One consequence of getting the
voluntary organisations to deal with letters was that the
government itself had no systematic record of individuals
who approached one of its departments for help. Government
departments were thus partly insulated from the impact of
the plight of Jews seeking escape from Nazi Europe.
The Co-ordinating Committee provided a new vehicle for the
articulation by the refugee committees of grievances and the
airing of suggestions for more generosity and imagination in
the treatment of refugees 1 °. Activists emerged who were
109 See Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem, London
1939, pp. 338-9; for Home Office liaison with the Co-
ordinating Committee, see PRO HO 213/268. Minutes of Co-
ordinating Committee meetings on 1 May and 6 June 1939 show
that Cooper attended both, and spoke at the earlier meeting,
ibid.
110 See. e.g. Co-ordinating Committee, memorandum,
'Treatment of Refugees in the United Kingdom' 3 May 1938,
PRO FO 371/22527/104/98, f.19.
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prepared to adopt a more forceful tone in dealing with the
authorities than the soft-spoken Schiff. One abrasive
representative was Mary Ormerod, a Quaker, secretary of the
Co-ordinating Committee 111 . One of Ormerod's interventions
was a complaint about the conduct of a clerk engaged on
passport control work in Vienna. Among the allegations made
against this woman, a certain Miss Stamper, were that she
had been rude, had told applicants that no more Jews were
wanted in England, had voiced antisemitic views, and had
torn up the Ministry of Labour permit authorising a visa for
a young Jewish woman in front of her face: the applicant in
question was refused a visa" 2 . Stamper defended her
conduct, and claimed to have helped Jews as much as
possible, but resigned soon after the complaint. The Consul-
General concluded that many of the acts complained of arose
from Stamper's conscientious performance of her job. Thus,
it was appropriate to ask if applicants were Jewish, as
different considerations applied to such cases. He said that
Stamper had been very overworked, and all staff were
operating under great strain. He added that the majority of
Jewish applicants left the consulate disappointed in their
hopes of leaving the country, which produced a sense of
grievance which was "inclined to vent itself upon persons
rather than upon the regulations"113.
See Ormerod to Makins, 10 Jun 1938, PRO FO
371/22527, W7582/104/98, f.82, explaining the Co-ordinating
Committee's aims.
112 Ormerod to Under Secretary, 13 May 1938, PRO FO
372/3283, T6515/3272/378, f.287.
113 Gainer to Under Secretary, 31 May 1938, PRO FO
372/3284, T7657/3272/378, f.61.
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Ormerod also raised questions about the antiquated
communications between London and Vienna. Communications
with Vienna were much slower since the Anschluss, because
Vienna, downgraded from a Legation to a Consulate, was now
reduced to a fortnightly bag via Berlin, of which it was now
an outpost. Although slow, the diplomatic bag was secure,
and Ormerod asked for it to be made available for urgent and
confidential communications about refugee matters, as a more
reliable channel than the ordinary post. She emphasised that
delays in conveying the results of cases were leading to
great distress, citing a case which had ended in suicide.
Her suggestion was rejected by the Foreign Office"4.
The voluntary organisations expanded to meet the pressure of
this demanding casework, but their funds were running short.
The government upheld its principle of not providing
financial help for refugees of refugee organisations. These
voluntary committees, for all their virtues of experience,
commitment and patience, suffered from not only from under-
funding, but from amateurism and a lack of systematic
administration or effective financial controls. The
weaknesses which resulted from relying mainly on volunteers
were referred to in May 1939 by Sir Henry Bunbury, (a
retired senior civil servant and authority on public
expenditure), who had been enlisted by the GJAC a few months
previously to provide desperately needed administrative
expertise. Bunbury, now advising on the future organisation
of the Czech Refugee Trust Fund in the capacity of its
Director-designate, insisted that experience had shown the
unavoidable need in such work for "the type of trained
114 See correspondence, June-July 1938, PRO FO
371/21751, C5809/2311/18, f.190.
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ability which can usually only be obtained on a salaried
basis, and for an office-trained and disciplined clerical
staff" 5 . Qualified staff were particularly necessary in
key management posts, he stressed: "Mediocrity, however well
meaning, is always costly in the long run, and especially so
when it is organising and directing the work of others".
Bunbury conceded that there was room for sensible and
experienced voluntary workers in welfare, training and
employment matters: he was not prepared to extend this to
matters involving immigration and emigration.
The inadequate arrangements within both the private and
public sectors for coping with casework meant that the
process of making decisions and notifying the results to
refugees was plagued by long delays. A casework backlog
developed and grew steadily. The entry even of the
restricted categories of refugee for whom the Home Office
was now prepared to authorise visas was now limited by a de
facto quota, determined by the practical restrictions on
accepting new applications, and the slow and meandering
passage of individual cases through the system'6.
Much of the argument for reintroducing visas had been that
they would provide a reliable method of identifying
potential refugees and selecting those who might be
admitted. Yet many undetected refugees were still getting
through. The problem of distinguishing between the genuine
visitor and intending emigrant claiming to be a visitor had
115 Bunbury, memorandum, 'Liabilities in respect of
refugees from Czechoslovakia', 15 May 1939, PRO HO 294/39.
116 See Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem, London
1939, p. 339.
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not been solved. Desperate for any document which would
enable them to escape to the safety of British soil, many
people applied for visitors' visas, signing the requisite
form of undertaking that they would not seek to extend their
stay in Britain. The immigration authorities soon became
aware that once the object of gaining admission to the
United Kingdom had been achieved, many of these people would
-	 plead that they could not go back to Germany or Austria. In
the hope of making it easier to catch such persons,
preferably before they were given leave to land, PCOs
issuing visas were told in June 1938 to mark the passports
of persons who signed these undertakings with a secret
signal which would be picked up by officials in the United
Kingdom. However, the futility of demanding such
undertakings, in the absence of the will to enforce them
subsequently, was finally acknowledged in August, when the
Home Office decided to abandon the utilisation of this type
of undertaking in refugee cases"7.
The scale of the unsatisfied demand for admission to the UK
may be conveyed by the statement of the Director of Passport
Control in early July that a "very large number of
unclassified persons" had applied in Austria since the
Anschluss for advice and taken away forms, but had not so
far put in applications; 2,740 visas had been granted to
Austrian subjects, approximately 420 refused, and 545 cases,
including some of those already disposed of, had been
117 See correspondence about signals, Kay-June 1938,
PRO HO 213/96; Passport Control Department circulars, tVisas
for Holders of German and Austrian Passports entering the
UK', 10 Jun and 30 Aug 1938, PRO FO 372/3284,
T7056/3272/378, f.1; Holderness to Jeffes, 19 Jul 1938,
Parkin to PCOs Berlin and Vienna, 20 Jul 1938, PRO HO
213/98.
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referred for decision in London" 8 . By July 1938 the number
of staff dealing with visas in Vienna, had been increased
from four to fifteen" 9 . By September 1938 staff at the
Passport Control Office in Vienna were dealing with 200
enquiries a day about emigration to various parts of the
British Empire, plus a little over 100 applications for
visas daily. These were being dealt with by the Assistant
Passport Control Officer and six examiners, two of whom had
been appointed in May and June after visas had been
introduced. Locally engaged staff were engaged as reception
clerks to manage the crowd. During the past four months they
had also given information and forms in connection with
possible emigration to Australia to in excess of 16,000
enquirers20.
The Home Office resoonse to international pressure in the
summer of 1938
The Home Office came under increasing pressure to re-examine
its admissions policy. Activists in the domestic lobby for
more generous admissions pressed the government privately
and in Parliament. It also became necessary to provide a
British contribution to discussions at Evian in July
regarding the admission policies of countries of refuge and
settlement. In the month before the conference the Home
Office responded with what was in essence a restatement of
118 Jeffes, minute, 9 Jul 1938, PRO FO 372/3284,
T9255/3272/378, f.167.
119 AW Urquhart, minute, (n.d., mid-Jul 1938), PRO FO
372/3284, T9423/3272/378, f.171.
120 Paymaster-Commander P Stanley Sykes to Rance, 5
Oct 1938, attaching memorandum by Berry, Asst PCO Vienna to
Inspector General of Passport Control, London, 26 Sept 1938,
PRO FO 366/1036, X9278/84/50, f.52.
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existing policy. There were nevertheless signs of movement
towards a more enthusiastic approach towards refugee
admissions. The Home Office stated that numbers "depended
largely on the opportunities and rate of absorption, and, as
regards artisans, on the attitude of the Trade Unions", but
that it was prepared to admit several classes of refugee:
those prepared to start businesses; young people for
training or education; professional persons; those with
academic qualifications, and between 2,000 and 3,000
artisans per year'21.
The fact that the Home Office was making any detailed
statement of the scope for admissions was in itself a new
departure, in view of the previous reluctance to spell out
policy in detail. The British position was presented at the
Evian conference, in the form of a written submission to a
Technical Sub-committee. The existing categories for
admission were reiterated, but with greater emphasis on
training for re-emigration. A specific reference was made to
extending arrangements with the voluntary organisations for
the admission of a pool of refugees to be trained in the UK
with a view to emigration. It was asserted that the numbers
who could be admitted would be subject to no absolute
limitation, other than the amount of hospitality,
maintenance and employment the voluntary organisations could
arrange. However, it was stressed that there would have to
be strict limitations on the numbers of doctors and dentists
who could be admitted. In line with previous statements, no
121 Record of inter-departmental meeting,
t lntergovernmental meeting at Evian', 8 Jun 1938, PRO FO
371/22527, W8127/104/98, f.150; the final draft of the Home
Office position was sent by Cooper to Makin g , 2 Jul 1938,
PRO FO 371/22528, W8853/104/98, f.60.
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commitment was made to the admission of specific numbers.
Nor was there any direct allusion to the extent to which
discretionary powers were in practice being utilised to make
exceptions for meritorious cases'22.
What was novel about this statement was that it adopted an
expansive tone. It referred to adopting "a liberal attitude
in the matter of admissions", and it offered greater
flexibility and generosity in the interpretation of
employment regulations. It also gave encouragement to the
voluntary organisations to seek out suitable jobs for
refugees and to make an initial selection of suitable
individuals to fill them. In addition, it contained a hint
that selected refugees would be allowed to settle in
Britain, because it said that, although refugees were
admitted for education or training on conditions requiring
them to re-emigrate eventually, prospects of ultimate
absorption in Britain nevertheless existed for a certain
proportion of the refugees, especially younger people.
In reality, no substantial change had taken place in
admissions policy, but the pressure to appear more liberal
was being felt within British government. The statement was
prefaced by some high-sounding words, claiming that, Britain
122 'Contribution which His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom is able to make to the Problem of
Emigration from Germany and Austria', 11 Jul 1938,
'Intergovernmental Committee, Evian - July 1938, Technical
Sub-Committee, CIE/CT/15', PRO FO 919/9; an expanded version
of this statement of policy was subsequently circulated by
the Home Office. 'Memorandum', Cooper to Under Secretary,
PRO FO 371/22534, W12713/104/98, 9 Sept 1938, f.1; a
separate statement on UK immigration procedures was given to
the Technical Subcommittee: 'Memorandum on UK Immigration
Law and Practices and the Present Policy of His Majesty's
Government regarding the Reception of Immigrants', 8 Jul
1938, 'Intergovernmental Committee, Evian - July 1938,
Technical Sub-Committee, CIE/CT/15', PRO FO 919/9.
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was now prepared "on the ground of humanity to adopt an even
more liberal policy in the matter of admission and
employment", but always within the narrow limits occasioned
by the UK's domestic, demographic and economic problems, and
the fact that it was "not a country of immigration". These
vague words had a largely exhortatory function and were
aimed at stimulating the assembled representatives of other
nations to greater generosity. They did not reflect any
significantly increased liberality in the substance of
admissions policy. The statement made by Lord Winterton at
the opening of the Conference had also emphasised the UK's
continuing readiness to absorb a certain proportion of the
refugees, and urged other countries of refuge to follow this
example123.
The failure of restriction
Introductory
Pre-selection remained a principle of Home Office policy.
Yet, while the Home Office's commitment to maintaining
control over refugee admissions through pre-selection was
stronger than ever in the summer and autumn of 1938, control
over the administration of the immigration system itself was
slipping, while pressures for change were building up. These
tendencies will be illustrated by examples of the management
of refugee immigration in this period. Intense anxiety
within the Home Office over the short-term admission of
persons who might seek permanent settlement, is shown in the
Aliens Department's insistence on thorough investigation by
123 Speech of Lord Winterton, 6 Jul 1938,
'Intergovernmental Committee, Evian - July 1938, Verbatim
Report of the First Meeting, Cl/E/CRI', PRO FO 919/8.
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passport control officers. This was considered essential
even before such desired immigrants as refugee
industrialists could be allowed on brief visits to discuss
investing in the UK. From the end of September new pressure
for refugee admissions came from Czechoslovakia after the
Munich crisis, and led to new visa restrictions, and a new
crop of port refusals. The Home Office policy of admitting
large numbers of refugee domestics produced voluminous
casework: here the Home Office delegated pre-selection to
refugee organisations and reduced UK controls in order to
save administrative effort; however, there was no question
of surrendering the principle of pre-selection itself, and
in certain respects it was intensified. The stringently-
maintained policy of pre-selection also gave refugees a
motive to try to evade immigration controls: if caught, they
were sent back to the Continent. By October 1938 it was
apparent that restriction could only be said to be working,
in the sense that it was keeping out the majority of
refugees who wished to enter the UK. Admissions were running
at the rate of something between 75 and 100 a day. Neither
the Home Office nor the refugee organisations could cope
with the ever-increasing pressure of casework, despite
efforts to spread the burden to other departments, such as
the police. The system had become a vast bottleneck, holding
up all the cases that passed through it and excluding many
persons the Home Office was prepared to admit'24.
Pre-selection and refugee industrialists.
The policy of limited absorption was being implemented, and
a minority of refugees had been permitted to settle in
124 See Sherman, op. cit., pp. 124-5, 131-2, 155-8.
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Britain. For example, out of 142 refugee medical
practitioners who had been allowed to work in private
practice, 66 had their conditions revoked by September
1937 125
. As the pressure for more generous refugee
admissions intensified in the course of 1938 the Home Office
insisted that the cases of persons who might seek permission
to remain permanently must be scrutinised with the utmost
care before they were permitted to set foot in Britain.
Thus, pre-selection was linked to absorption.
The policy of eleborate prior scrutinty was applied to the
immigration of refugee industrialists in the summer of 1938.
Government policy of encouraging investment and job-creation
in the depressed areas of the UK, had led to a policy of
fostering the immigration of refugee industrialists. This
topic has been the subject of extensive research by Herbert
Loebi, himself a refugee industrialist from Germany. The
background to the episode under consideration here will be
outlined in this and the following paragraphs by summarising
relevant points in Loebi's recent article on the subject'26.
Analysis of statistics collected by Aliens Tribunals in
1939-1940 shows that one third of adult male refugees from
Germany and Austria, perhaps 4,000 persons, had been
manufacturers prior to emigration. Although by no means all
continued as manufacturers in the UK, nevertheless, by 1947
refugees were recorded as having established 1,000 firms,
125 TB Williamson(Home Office) to R Derenburg(JRC) 2
Sept 1937, PRO HO 213/255.
126 Herbert Loebl, 'Refugees from the Third Reich and
Industry in the Depressed Areas of Britain, in WE Mosse,
ed., op. cit., pp. 379-403; See also Herbert Loebl, 'Refugee
Industries in the Special Areas of Britain', in Gerhard
Hirschfeld, ed., Exile in Great Britain, London 1984, pp.
219-249.
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the majority of which are thought to have been started by
emigrants from the Reich' 27 . Refugee manufacturers entered
the UK from the early days of the exodus from Germany and
111 persons described as manufacturers were recorded as
having arrived in 1933128. From 1935 they received official
encouragement. The Ministry of Labour claimed in September
1936 that refugees had established industries which had
given employment to more British subjects than the total
number of refugees from Germany then living in the UK'29.
Loebi dates the first invitation from the government to
refugee manufacturers to a statement made by a minister in
the House of Lords in March 1935, that no obstacles would be
placed in the way of individuals who might wish to set up
factories in areas of high unemployment'30.
At the end of the previous year, the first Special Areas Act
had been passed, setting up Commissioners for the Special
Areas of England and Wales and for Scotland, to attract new
industries to designated parts of depressed areas, where
unemployment figures compared even more unfavourably with
the national average than before 1929. Domestic
manufacturers were slow to respond. In October 1935 the
government agreed, for electoral reasons, that the Special
Areas Fund could be used for factory construction in three
specified industrial estates, and in March 1936 the
127 Ibid., pp. 379-80, (citing figures collected by
Austin Stevens, in The Dispossessed. German Refugees in
Britain, London 1975).
128 Neiderland, op. cit., p. 59.
129 Sherman, op. cit., p. 73.
130 Loebi, 'Refugees from the Third Reich', op. cit.
p. 381; Lord Londonderry (Lord Privy Seal), Hansard, House
of Lords, vol. 98, cal. 999, 31 Mar 1935.
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government agreed to encourage new industries to locate in
the Special Areas. In the same month, Cooper not only
accepted a Ministry of Labour suggestion that prospective
foreign investors should be led to believe that their
applications might be refused unless they agreed to go to
the Special Areas, but went further, and planned to bring
pressure to bear in some cases. Board of Trade
representatives, however, argued for caution, and it was
decided merely to inform applicants that location was a
factor taken into consideration. The Home Office
nevertheless contrived to let it be known in Germany, and
later in Austria, that delays could be minimised for
applicants willing to go to areas of high unemployment.
Cooper also told the Commissioners that permission would be
granted more readily in such cases, thereby becoming, as
Loebi points out "the first government department to attempt
to implement a location of industry policy" 131 . In February
1937 the Home Office decided to put foreign manufacturers in
direct contact with the Commissioners, who could offer them
advice and assistance, and encouraged the Commissioners to
provide finance in cases where the applicant's capital was
inadequate. An official recruitment drive among refugees
developed, conducted in conditions of extreme
confidentiality which were designed to deceive the German
authorities, who wished to prevent industry going abroad.
Jews in central Europe who had not thought of becoming
manufacturers previously began to work up such applications
in their search for refuge. By February 1939 the Home
Secretary reported that 200 out of 300 firms established by
refugee manufacturers were located in the depressed areas.
131 Loebi, t Refugees from the Third Reich', op. cit.,
pp. 384-385.
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Correspondence in the papers of Anthony de Rothschild shows
that Jewish leaders expressed discreet support for the
policy of encouraging refugees to go to the Special Areas,
and agreed to provide financial assistance for individual
cases on their merits. In late 1936, a confidential meeting
took place at New Court, between Anthony de Rothschild,
several of his friends, and a businessman called H Powys
Greenwood. Greenwood had made an unofficial approach which
led to this meeting, at the suggestion of Sir Frederick
Leith-Ross of the Treasury, with the aim of exploring
whether the participants would give encouragement,
financially or otherwise, to the settlement of Jewish
refugees in the depressed areas. De Rothschild and his
friends not only promised financial support but endorsed a
policy of discreetly publicising British liberality in the
issue of permits for refugees going to the depressed areas,
and planned to assist in furthering and disseminating
information about the idea, taking care not to alert the
German authorities. The meeting's outcome was subsequently
reported by Greenwood to the Assistant Secretary at the
Ministry of Labour dealing with the issue of permits'32.
Greenwood had said that he would report back to Leith-Ross,
but de Rothschild was embarrassed to learn that a report of
the confidential meeting had circulated between several
Whitehall departments, including the Home Office, one of
132 Greenwood to de Rothschild, 29 Nov 1936, Greenwood
to RG Somervell(Ministry of Labour), 9 Dec 1936, RA
XI/35/46. Also present were Stephany(non-Zionist co-
secretary of the CBF), Paul Lindenberg, Lord Bearsted, Sir
Robert Waley-Cohen, Max Warburg the Hamburg banker and Mr
Lucas of The New Trading Co.
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which was arranging a discussion about it' 33 . Schiff, who
had not known about the meeting, sent a letter of
reassurance to Cooper on de Rothschild's behalf, playing
down the significance of the meeting, reassuring him that no
challenge was intended to the policy of considering all
cases on their merits, and telling him that de Rothschild
had only agreed to talk to Greenwood at the suggestion of
Sir Neill Malcolm, High Commissioner for Refugees' 34 . The
Ministry of Labour official who had circulated Greenwood's
report wrote reassuring de Rothschild that his purpose had
been to obtain a decision on whether the meeting called for
any alteration in government policy on the issue of
permits 135 . More research would be required to establish a
causal link between this offer of Jewish support and the
Home Office's sudden change to a policy of active
recruitment of German manufacturers, but it seems highly
probable. German restrictions and depredations greatly
reduced the capital which emigrating Jews could take out,
while financial support from Anglo-Jewish leaders for
refugee manufacturers would appeal to the Home Office, even
if expressed more informally than in the guarantee of 1933.
In the course of negotiations with numerous potential
refugee investors, many of whom were still in Greater
Germany, the Commissioners invited some of the more
promising prospects to come over to the UK for exploratory
interviews. In July 1938 the Home Office refused to grant a
133 De Rothschild to Greenwood, 6 Jan 1937, Greenwood
to de Rothschild, 10 Jan 1937, ibid.
134 Schiff to Cooper, 8 Jan 1937, ibid.
135 Somervell to de Rothschild, 13 Jan 1937, ibid. See
also de Rothschild, note of telephone call from Greenwood,
18 Jan 1937, Greenwood to de Rothschild, 26 Jan 1937, ibid.
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visa to a refugee who had been invited over by the
Commissioners for England and Wales with a view to setting
up a factory on the Treforest Trading Estate in Wales. This
rebuff was followed up in August by Cooper, who cited the
case of another refugee who had been allowed to land for
four weeks on the basis of such an invitation, and now
wished to stay for at least another six months "which I am
afraid means for keeps" 36 . Cooper told the Commissioners
that they would embarrass the Home Office if they invited
foreign persons over for interviews without preliminary
investigation of their cases abroad, and it subsequently
turned out that either applicant or proposal were
unsatisfactory. He asked for applications of this nature to
be referred in the first instance to the Home Office.
Referring to unhappy experiences in a recent case, he warned
that, having once gained entry, such persons were likely to
claim that they were refugees:
These unfortunate German Jews get up to all sorts of dodges
in order to gain a footing in this country, and as I have
already said, once theJ 3 re here they become refugees who
cannot be got rid of."
The Commissioners had already altered their practice in
response to Home Office pressure and were referring refugee
applicants abroad to the PC0 138 . Cooper's disillusioned
reflections on the lengths to which Jews would go in the
quest for refuge underline the desperation of Jews in the
Reich: unsuitable candidates were bound to be attracted to
the limited number of categories for entry which remained.
136 Cooper to Roberts, 23 Aug 1938, PRO HO 213/270.
137 Ibid.
138 See correspondence between Home Office and
Commissioners for the Special Areas (England and Wales),
Jul-Aug 1938, PRO HO 213/270.
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The Czech crisis
The Home Office remained fully committed to the visa system,
notwithstanding the impossibility of handling visa
applications expeditiously with the resources available. The
Czech crisis of September 1938 produced a new crop of
refugees, who had fled into what remained of Czechoslovakia
after the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany under the Munich
Agreement. People from Czechoslovakia started to seek refuge
in the UK, but only a small number arrived at the ports, so
demand for entry did not create a large-scale problem for
port controls. The Home Office had been told that the GJAC
was very hard pressed and could not accept responsibility
for refugees from Czechoslovakia. Holderness considered it
inevitable that visas would be reintroduced for holders of
Czechoslovak passports. It was not, however, possible to
bring this change into force immediately, as denunciation of
the existing visa abolition agreement required three months'
notice from a quarter day. Accordingly, on the first
possible date, the Czech government was notified that visas
would be required from 1 April 1939. In the interim,
Holderness warned that Czech nationals risked being closely
interrogated and quite likely refused admission at the
ports139.
The plight of refugees from Czechoslovakia, for which
British policy was acknowledged to be partly responsible,
raised new issues. A burst of new voluntary initiatives to
aid refugees in Czechoslovakia were launched in the UK. The
139 Holderness to Mallet, 2 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21586, C13325/11896/12, f.253.
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Treasury and Foreign Office became embroiled in the
provision of financial, political and logistical support for
Czech government efforts to arrange refugee resettlement.
This episode is dealt with in chapter five. Here, it should
merely be emphasised that the new Czech refugee problem did
not have an immediate impact on policy towards refugee
admissions in general. The Home Office was not prepared to
admit large numbers of refugees from Czechoslovakia. Makins
agreed that no departure from "normal policy" on refugees
should be made in the case of Czechs'40.
New procedures for domestics
While the Home Office remained wedded to the visa system and
the principle of pre-selection, it was prepared to ease
procedures to allow large scale entry of refugees, in order
to meet the apparently inexhaustible demand for women to
work as resident domestics in private households. Tony
Kushner, in an important recent article, has pointed out
that in fostering the immigration of refugee domestics, the
government was acceding to middle-class pressure for more
domestic servants, and overriding trade union objections to
foreign labour' 41 . Domestic service became the main avenue
for the admission of adult refugee women for employment. As
Kushner has emphasised, over one third of all refugees who
came to the UK in the 1930s came as domestic servants, the
vast majority being women. Of an estimated total of 20,000
refugee domestic servants, 14,000 entered in the last year
140 Makins, minute, 27 Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/21585,
C12940/11896/12, f. 47.
141 Tony Kushner, 'An Alien Occupation - Jewish
Refugees and Domestic Service in Britain, 1933-1948', Mosse
op. cit., pp. 553-577, esp. p. 561. The statistics in this
paragraph are drawn from Kushner.
218
before the war'42 . This category of immigration accounts for
the fact that the majority of refugees who came to the UK
from Germany and Austria - some 55% - were women. Most
refugee women were admitted for basic domestic work; a small
number had permission to work in private homes as
housekeepers, companions, nursemaids and governesses.
In 1938 the Home Office decided that admissions of refugees
for domestic service should be expanded, and that year
the numbers increased dramatically 143 . The expansion was
linked to the development of special procedures. Changes
were introduced to the conditions imposed on foreign
domestics, both on entry and after entry. The essential
alteration was that domestic servants would not in future be
placed on time conditions, but on occupational conditions
restricting them to domestic service, a change designed to
reduce the administrative burden of casework, while
maintaining sufficient control over refugees. Procedures
for selection of refugee domestics abroad were also modified
to give refugee organisations greater control over
admissions.
Changes in entry conditions were discussed in April 1938,
and detailed planning commenced in July. The alterations
142 This author's mother and maternal grandmother
entered the UK by the avenue of domestic service from Vienna
in 1939.
143 For a statement of Home Office policy see
Holderness to Reilly, 27 Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/22535,
W14096/104/98, f.415; this was incorporated in the statement
of British policy to the IGC. Winterton, tDisposal of
refugees coming from Germany and Austria. Statement by the
United Kingdom representative', L.I.C.14., 1 Nov 1938,
'Intergovernmental Committee to develop and continue the
work of the Evian meeting', PRO FO 371/22536, W15029/04/98,
f.236, para. 4.
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came into effect in two stages. September saw a change,
aimed principally at refugees from Germany or Austria, but
also covering non-refugees, including many domestics. It
affected aliens already admitted for temporary purposes, who
would originally have been admitted on time conditions and
also possibly conditions against employment. In future,
should they apply for permission to take paid employment or
engage in business, if there was no objection to their
remaining to work, the time limit would be cancelled. At the
same time a new "occupational" condition would be imposed,
restricting the taking of any employment or engaging in any
business, profession or occupation without Home Office
authorisation' 44 . In mid-November the same underlying
principle was extended to persons authorised to take paid
domestic employment, both on entry and when applying for
extensions. Passengers who established on arrival that they
were authorised to take domestic employment, would in future
not be subject to a time condition, but only the
"occupational" condition not to enter any employment other
than as a resident in service in a private household145.
Similarly, foreign domestics who applied for prolongation of
their stay, if they had been in the country less than three
years, would have their time conditions cancelled and be
144 Home Office circular to Chief Constables, 21 Sept
1938, PRO HO 213/4.
145 They established authorisation by producing either
Ministry of Labour permits or visas authorised for domestic
employment and marked "Instructions R". They were also of
course required to register with the police.
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made subject to the identical occupational condition' 46 . The
new procedures also achieved a saving of clerical labour,
since immigration officers had to furnish reports when
landing aliens on time conditions, but not in cases where
only a "no employment" condition was imposed.
The legality of the practice of introducing conditions of a
type not imposed on entry, in the process of variation of
landing conditions, was queried in 1944 by the Home Office
legal adviser, making specific reference to the pre-war
modification of conditions applied to domestics. Officials
concluded that the Home Secretary had purported to exercise
powers beyond those contained in the Aliens Order, and that
the imposition of new conditions had therefore in many cases
been ultra vires, and was thus unenforceable. The weakness
was not disclosed to refugees. A correcting amendment to the
Aliens Order proposed by a Home Office official in October
1946 did not progress beyond a draft'47.
Domestics whose time limit was removed were told that their
stay was conditional on good behaviour, and that the
Secretary of State reserved the power to require them to
146 The form of words was as follows: "The condition
attached to the grant of leave to land is hereby varied and
in so far as it limits the holder's stay in the United
Kingdom is cancelled. The holder is not permitted to enter
any employment other than as a resident in a private
household." Home Office circular to Chief Constables, 9 Nov
1938, W Jagelman to JE Duff, 11 Nov 1938, Ralfe (Chief
Inspector of Immigration) to HM Ports, 15 Nov 1938. Passport
Control Department, circular No S.5606, 'Domestic servants',
26 Nov 1938, PRO HO 213/4.
147 Parkinson, 'Memorandum on the subject of the
variation by the Secretary of State of conditional landing,
imposed by the Immigration Officer', 5 Oct 1946, PRO HO
213/601. A minute on the subject was produced by the Legal
Adviser in Jul 1944; this issue is discussed at more length
in this author's unpublished, 'British attitudes towards
Jews in the Post-War Period', February 1988.
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leave the country at any time if he thought fit. They were
also warned against making unduly frequent changes of
employment. The police were instructed to make regular
checks, as opportunity presented itself, and, in any event,
at least once a year, to ensure by discreet interrogation
that employment conditions were being complied with148.
The Home Office planned that the police should reduce the
pressure of refugee work on the Aliens Department by taking
on the task of dealing with the cancellation of time
conditions of refugee domestics. For reasons of speed, the
Home Office asked the police not to wait for refugees to
present themselves, but to write to all those registered in
their districts. Chief Constables outside London agreed to
co-operate, but opposition came from the Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, Sir Philip Game, who objected to the scale of
the work involved, and claimed that it risked "further
slowing up a machine which already rivals the mills of God
for slowness". Introduction of the proposed police
involvement was held back, and the plan finally abandoned in
August 1939149. Game had also raised political objections,
warning of likely adverse publicity, if it became known that
large numbers of refugees were having their time conditions
cancelled, without the decision having gone through
Parliament. The Home Office had no wish to draw public
attention to the changes in conditions. Economic competition
with Germany, over a scarce form of labour in this instance,
provided an additional reason for avoiding publicity, since
148 Ibid.
149 Game to Maxwell, 6 Dec 1938, PRO HO 213/5; Home
Office correspondence with chief constables and the
Metropolitan Police, Nov 1938 to Aug 1939, ibid.
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it was not thought desirable to draw the German government's
attention to the easing of conditions for alien domestics
generally, which would diminish the effectiveness of German
steps to recall Reich nationals from domestic service
abroad'50.
The underlying principle behind these changes, according to
W Jagelman of the Home Office, was that
in the case of a foreigner to whose indefinite stay in this
country there is no objection, there is no real purpose in
reviewing his case at intervals as hitherto under a time
condition, an	 11 that is really necessary is to control
his activity.
He added that in refugee cases, apart from persons in
transit, the removal of time conditions would normally take
place at a much earlier date than in other cases,
for once it is definitely established that the foreigner is
in fact a refugee and that plans for his future have been
made to which the Home Office can agree, it follows that
there is no objection to his indefinite stay.
If the foreigner had already been in the UK more than four
years, the time condition should simply be cancelled without
imposing an occupational condition. However, as regards
those who had been in the country less than three years, and
who would now be subject to an occupational condition,
cancellation would not be granted in future' 52 . The changes
meant that more recent refugees would gain exemption from
time conditions earlier than most aliens who had permission
to work, who had to wait four years; however, their
prospects of being granted unconditional leave would be
150 Ibid.; Holderness to Maxwell, 16 Dec 1938, PRO HO
213/5.
151 Jagelman to JE Duff, 11 Nov 1938, PRO HO 213/4.
152 Ibid.
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postponed indefinitely. They were thus chained to domestic
service by the occupational condition. Few women remained in
domestic service if they had an alternative: most refugees
entered it only to escape from the Nazis. Home Office
officials were aware that it would not be possible to keep
refugees indefinitely in such posts, but they hoped to tie
them to such work for a few years at least'53.
The reasoning behind the changes shows that the Home Office
was planning absorption of refugee domestics into the labour
force, and expected that many refugees would remain
permanently. By moving to imposition of occupational
conditions only, while not removing time limits in future,
they were, however, treating more recent arrivals as migrant
labour, rather than as prospective permanent residents who
would become free of all conditions after four years. The
contradictions in the Home Office approach flowed from
simultaneously aiming to expand sources of domestic labour
and to avoid public admission that refugee domestics would
constitute a permanent addition to the population. Thus the
largest single category of Jewish refugees admitted to the
UK were made subject to conditions which were not expected
to last, in an occupation in which they were not expected to
remain; further, the conditions themselves were in some
cases probably invalid.
The exodus from domestic labour was rapid. It was greatly
accelerated by job losses at the outbreak of war, internment
and new war-time employment opportunities. By the war's end
few refugees remained in domestic service; it became one of
153 See Holderness to Martelli, (Governor of Jersey) 4
Jul 1938, PRO HO 213/281.
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the rare avenues by which Jewish survivors in Europe might
enter the UK154 . As Kushner points out, British enthusiasm
for this form of immigration did not prevent a significant
rate of pre-war refusals, estimated at 15%, partly accounted
for by applicants who fell outside the age limits. The story
of the admission of refugee domestics, as Kushner also
emphasises, strikingly embodies both the humanitarian
elements and the deeply self-interested side of British
policy.
The role of refugee committees in selecting domestics
The refugee organisations became heavily involved in
investigating applicants for domestic service at the request
of the Home Office. It was agreed in principle in August
1938 that the Co-ordinating Committee should establish an
office in Vienna to investigate visa applications from
refugees, including domestic servants. The decision followed
complaints about the entry of unsuitable refugee domestics,
whom refugee committees were having to maintain if their
employment arrangements failed for any reason. The change
was designed to give refugee committees control over the
suitability of entrants: there had been continuing pressure
from the refugee organisations for such powers. The problem
was reflected in complaints from the Co-ordinating Committee
in October that the Home Office was admitting refugees
without the approval of its constituent members'55.
When the new arrangements for domestic service cases were
finalised in October 1938, it was decided to move processing
154 Kushner, An Alien Occupation', op. cit., p. 575.
155 Sherman, op. cit., pp. 99, 155-7.
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of all applications from refugees to be admitted for
employment from the Ministry of Labour to the Home Office.
The Ministry would refer prospective employers of refugee
domestic servants to the Co-ordinating Committee, whose
Domestic Bureau would make recommendations. Approvals from
the Domestic Bureau would now be the basis for Home Office
visa authorisations. The projected Vienna office of the Co-
ordinating Committee had not been set up (it never was set
up), and so the suitability of domestic applicants in
Austria would be investigated either by the Kultusgemeinde
(the Jewish communal organisation in Vienna) or by the
Society of Friends. If they reported favourably, a visa
would be authorised, subject to the usual requirements.
Married women might be allowed in if the Co-ordinating
Committee in London accepted responsibility for making
suitable arrangements for the future needs of their
families. If the refugee organisations refused to support a
case, the application would be referred. In addition, the
issue of visas to applicants whose employment had already
been approved by the Ministry of Labour under the old
system, and a permit granted, would be subject to another
level of checks. Such applicants should be "closely
interrogated" by the PCO to ascertain whether or not they
were potential refugees. If there was "any ground whatsoever
for believing that the person was a potential refugee", the
case would be held up until investigated and approved by the
Domestic Bureau' 56 . The new system gave the refugee bodies
156 Jagelman to Ormerod, Neden and Jeffes, 21 Oct
1938, PRO HO 213/99; for the Ministry of Labour side of
these arrangements see PRO LAB 8/82 and LAB 8/83; for Co-
ordinating Committee policy on the selection of domestics in
1939, see, 'Report by Mrs Beer on her recent visit to
Germany', Minutes of Co-Ordinating Committee meeting, 1 May
1939, PRO 213/268.
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more control over admissions. The Home Office thought the
Domestic Bureau did a better job of investigating refugee
applications than the Ministry of Labour. Home Office
officials took a tolerant view of the evident unsuitability
and lack of enthusiasm for domestic work demonstrated by
many entrants. The quality of domestic applicants was,
however, a source of controversy. Jeffes, returning from a
tour of European passport control offices, complained to
Cooper in June 1939 about the "bad type of refugee" he had
met in Vienna, in possession of authorisations from refugee
committees and of Ministry of Labour permits (which had
still not been entirely phased out). He had interviewed
several women with domestic service permits "who were so
filthily dirty both in their person and their clothing that
they were utterly unfit to go inside a decent British home".
Jeffes also passed on a query from Berry, the PCO in Vienna,
asking how to deal with applicants who clearly had no
intention of remaining in domestic work. The Home Office
was, however, well aware that the refugees were "not
domestic types"157.
Advisory committees
Several expert advisory committees were set up to advise the
Home Office on the admission of refugees in professional
occupations. The admission of refugee doctors from Austria
produced a difference of opinion: a Medical Advisory
Committee ) comPosed of British doctors and representatives of
refugee organisations, insisted that the numbers allowed in
157 Jeffes to Cooper, 5 Jun 1939, with marginal notes
by Home Office official, Cooper to Jeffes, 15 Aug 1939, PRO
HO 213/107; See also Parkin, memorandum, 'Visas for United
Kingdom granted to refugees', 8 May 1939, PRO FO 371/24100,
W7740/3231/48, f.63; for admission of refugee domestics in
1939 see Kushner, 'An Alien Occupation', pp. 563-565.
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should not exceed 50 (selected from about a thousand
applicants), who would be admitted for two years' study and
subsequent admission to practice; Hoare, the Home Secretary,
wished to admit 500158. Hoare did not feel able to override
the opposition, but retained enough of a sense of grievance
to refer to the dispute in his memoirs' 59 . From August 1939
advice about the admission of foreign psychoanalysts and
other practitioners of psychological medicine, was obtained
through informal arrangements with the Tavistock Clinic in
London'60.
An objection was received from a Jewish professional
organisation in early 1939, when the Jewish Medical and
Dental Association opposed the training of refugee doctors
at the British School of Osteopathy, which, they claimed had
been the subject of adverse criticism by a House of Lords
select committee; they said they feared losing the sympathy
of official medical opinion. Existing Home Office policy was
to allow in small numbers of practitioners from America, to
raise the low standard of osteopathy in the UK, and although
a few refugee applicants were refused, the policy was
modified in principle in August 1939, to allow a maximum of
20 refugee students to train at the school, with a view to
establishing themselves in the UK when qualified'61.
158 MG Russell, memorandum, 15 Mar 1939, PRO HO
213/261.
159 Hoare, Nine Troubled Years, London 1954, p 240.
160 See Dr HV Dicks, (Assistant Medical Director,
Tavistock Clinic) to Jagelman, 9 Aug 1938, MG Russell,
memorandum, 6 Nov 1938, PRO HO 213/342.
161 Russell, minute, 10 Mar 1939, "SB", minute, PRO HO
213/260.
228
Illegal entry and pressure for change
The vast majority of refugees felt they had no alternative
but to pursue efforts to emigrate through the normal
channels. Nevertheless, a few attempted to evade immigration
controls. If caught, they were dealt with sternly. Three
Austrian Jewish refugees who had fled in March 1938, and
reached Bristol as stowaways in July, were sent back to
France, despite support from Members of Parliament and
offers by a Bristol Jewish congregation to pay their passage
to South America' 62 . In August 1938, three refugees who had
entered without were imprisoned by a London magistrate who
also recommended them for deportation' 63 . In August 1939
five Jewish stowaways off a ship from Antwerp were
prosecuted, remanded in custody, recommended for deportation
and deported; a German and an Austrian refugee, having
crossed the channel in a ten-foot dinghy which had capsized,
were deported to Belgium following their rescue' 64 . Refugees
also attempted to enter the UK with false documents, which
were being manufactured in large quantities in Europe'65.
People who broke the law to help refugees included a British
woman who, having come by air from Rotterdam in the summer
of 1938 was arrested and prosecuted by Customs for attempted
smuggling into Britain of jewellery belonging to Jewish
friends in Vienna. The prosecution was intended to deter
162 Jewish Chronicle, 22 Jul 1938, p. 20, 29 Jul 1938,
p. 22.
163 Sherman, op. cit., pp. 125-127.
164 Hansard, op. cit., vol. 350, col. 1979, 31 Jul
1939; ibid., col. 2808, 4th Aug 1939.; Jewish Chronicle, 4
Aug 1939, p. 8.
165 A German refugee was caught attempting to enter at
Folkestone on a Czech passport. US Consul, Alexandria, to
State Department, 8 Sept 1938, US National Archives,
Washington, RG 59, 040.48 Refugees 830.
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smuggling by and on behalf of refugees from Germany, which
was said to be prevalent. Schiff, however, made
representations on behalf of the woman, a worker with the
GJAC, claiming that publication of her name would prejudice
negotiations for the establishment of an emigration office
in Vienna: he offered guaranteed payment of any compromise
fine which might be imposed. Support for leniency came from
both the Home Office and Foreign Office, and Customs agreed
to have the prosecution withdrawn'66.
The demand for refuge in Britain was running at a very high
level, increased by the refugee problem in Czechoslovakia.
In mid-October 1938 representatives of the refugee
organisations told the Home Office that the system was at
breaking point. Although refugee organisations were
acquiring a greater measure of control over admissions
through such measures as processing would-be domestics, they
still lacked the administrative capacity to cope with the
caseload, nor would the government give them the extra funds
they needed' 67 . The Co-ordinating Committee claimed, in a
letter to the Home Office, that there was "a complete
breakdown on the official side, of the policy of selected
immigration through the voluntary organisations". When a
complaint that the government was admitting persons not
previously authorised by the voluntary committees was aired
by a Co-ordinating Committee deputation on 20 October,
166 JS Sutton to Chancellor, 1 Sept 1938, Wardle to
Makins, Hayter to Cooper, 2 Sept 1938, Cooper to Hayter, 3
Sept 1938, PRO FO 371/22573, W11929/11929/98, f.198.
167 See Jewish Chronicle, 9 Dec 1938, pp. 7, 21;
Bentwich, They Found Refuge, pp. 54-55.
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Winterton found himself defending the Home Office's right to
admit aliens not approved by the refugee bodies168.
The government's waning ability to deal with the volume of
work since the Anschluss is indicated by figures of pending
visa applications, which by the third week of November 1938
showed a backlog of 10,000 cases' 69 . The volume of
admissions had increased from 200 per week in September to
100 per day in October' 70 . The Home Office tried to enlarge
its staff in order to deal with the greatly expanded work-
load. The Home Office establishment officer requested
Treasury sanction for additional staff in order to avoid
delays, stating that in the second quarter of that year the
work of B Division showed an increase of 25 per cent over
the first quarter, and an even greater increase during the
third quarter' 71 . The request - for the loan of a mere five
experienced immigration officers from the ports for up to
two years - was promptly granted, and further small-scale
additions to the Home Office establishment were sanctioned,
but the problems remained' 72 . In October Winterton told
Malcolm MacDonald of the tremendous pressure at the Home
Office: "hundreds and thousands of applications" had been
received for entry, but it was "impossible to grant more
than a proportion of them"73.
168 Sherman, op. cit., pp. 155-158.
169 Ibid., pp. 213-214.
170 Roche, op. cit., p. 27.
171 Whitley to Secretary, 1 Sept 1938, PRO T
162/847/E20500/3.
172 See correspondence between Home Office and
Treasury, Sept 1938 - May 1939, ibid.
173 Winterton to MacDonald, 18 Oct 1938, PRO FO
371/22535, W13882/104/98, f.366.
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CHAPTER 4:
FROM KRISTALLNACHT TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, NOVEMBER 1938 TO
SEPTEMBER 1939
Policy
It was only after Kristallnacht in November 1938 that means
were found of making major inroads into the delays caused by
selection of refugees abroad. The Cabinet had at last
considered the question of entry to the UK and a decision
was made to expand the UK's role as a temporary refuge. The
Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, played a crucial part
in bringing the Cabinet to recognise that this step should
be taken, notwithstanding the various other initiatives
which were being pursued on the refugee problem. Hitherto,
Chamberlain has not received sufficient credit for his
insistence that the search for long-term solutions should
not preclude urgent relief to refugees.
Kr.istallnacht
These changes were preceded by a further expansion of the
scale and urgency of the refugee problem. In late October
the German government resorted to mass expulsions to the
Polish border, as a means to get rid of resident Jews of
Polish nationality who would shortly be rendered stateless,
as a result of recent moves by the Polish government. In
March, the Poles had brought in a new decree, aimed in
particular at Jews of Polish nationality living in Germany,
which it interpreted in such as way as to denaturalise
Polish Jews who had lived abroad for more than five years
with effect from the end of October 1938. On 28 October, the
German government launched a counter-offensive, with a
round-up of some 10,000 Polish Jews, who were transported to
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the Polish border. They could not proceed into Poland and
were obliged to stay, in inhuman conditions, in a no-man's
land on Polish soil at a place called Zbonszyn, where Polish
border guards barred the way forward and the Germans the way
back. Some of the expellees died, others lost their reason,
the fate of the rest remaining uncertain. Later, most were
admitted to Poland'.
This crisis remained unresolved when events in the second
week of November provided a yet more dramatic illustration
of the plight of Jews in Germany. On 7 November 1938, a
caller at the German embassy in Paris had fired a pistol at
Third Secretary, Ernst vom Rath. Vom Rath's assailant was
Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish Jew living in France. At this
time Grynszpan's own position in France was illegal, and an
expulsion order had been issued against him. Grynszpan was
aged 17. His parents, who had lived in Germany since 1914,
had been caught up in the expulsions to the Polish border;
he had known this information at the time of the shooting2.
On 8 November, vom Rath died of his wounds. The
assassination was denounced in Germany with torrents of
menacing abuse against Jews, and wild allegations that
British politicians were implicated in the attack. Fearful
that a pogrom was about to start, Jewish leaders in Germany
sent an eleventh-hour plea to the British government to try
to prevent the impending violence, by selecting "some
prominent non-Jewish Englishman to go to Berlin
1 See Dawidowicz, op. cit., pp. 135-136; Wilfred
Israel had predicted some such action. See Makins, minute,
14 Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/22535, W3823/104/98, f.348.
2 Dawidowicz, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
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immediately" 3 . The cry for help was delivered by no less a
person than Weizmann, but officials in London and Berlin
agreed that to attempt action on these lines would achieve
nothing, that it would, if anything, make matters worse for
Jews in Germany, and that to meddle in "a wasps nest" could
only detract from British prestige4.
The murder of vom Rath provided the pretext for an outburst
of violence against Jews in German territory on the night of
9 November. This date became known as Kristallnacht (night
of broken glass), from the great quantities of glass broken
in violent attacks on Jewish homes and businesses. These
incidents, which erupted simultaneously throughout Germany
and Austria, were orchestrated by the German authorities5.
Thousands of male Jews were arrested and taken to
concentration camps. A certain number had subsequently been
released, so the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, George
Ogilvie-Forbes, reported, "if they can prove that they are
in a position to leave the country forthwith" 6 . The Foreign
Office received a stream of telegrams and reports from
Ogilvie-Forbes and British consular officials with details
Strang to Ogilvie-Forbes, no. 521, 9 Nov 1938, PRO
FO 371/21636, C13660/1667/62, f.234.
Ibid., Ogilvie-Forbes to Strang, no. 662, Cadogan,
minute, 10 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/21236, C13661/1667/62,
f.236.
For the distribution of responsibility among Nazi
leaders, see Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide.
Himmler and the Final Solution, London 1991, pp. 46-55.
6 Ogilvie-Forbes to FO, no. 679, 12 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21637, C13815/1667/62, f.15.
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of the way Jews had been ill-treated 7 . From Vienna, Gainer
reported three waves of arrests of Jews trying to visit the
British consulate8 . The official instructions for action
against the Jews issued by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the
SS(Schutzstaffel - Defence Corps), shortly after 1 a.m. on
10 November, stated that Jews ordered to be arrested and
taken to concentration camps should not be ill-treated9.
Subsequently the German government issued denials that Jews
had been harmed: these were contradicted by reports of
physical violence against thousands of Jews. Nearly 100 Jews
were murdered, and many committed suicide. About 30,000 male
Jews were taken to concentration camps'°.
The persecution in Germany, so Ogilvie-Forbes observed, was
"on a scale and of a severity unprecedented in modern
times". Within hours of the start of the violence, the
head of the Foreign Office's Central Department, William
Strang, was convinced that the pogrom in Berlin had been
" Ogilvie-Forbes to FO, nos. 663, 661, 10 Nov 1938,
PRO FO 371/21636, C13657/13706/13729/1667/62, f.232;
Ogilvie-Forbes to FO, no. 666, 11 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21636, C13729/1667/62, f.255; Ogilvie-Forbes to FO, nos.
670, 671, 673, 11 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/21637,
C13775/13792/13841/1667/62, f.1;Ogilvie-Forbes to FO, nos.
676 and 679, 12 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/21637,
C13814/13815/1667/62, f.13;
8 Gainer to FO, no. 43., 10 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21636, C13723/1667/62, f.253.
For Heydrich's instructions to the State Police and
SD(Sicherheitsdienst - Security Service), under the heading
'Measures against the Jews tonight', issued at 1.20 am, on
10 Nov 1938, see ed. Y Arad et al., Documents on the
Holocaust, Jerusalem 1981, pp. 102-4.
10 Dawidowicz, op. cit., pp. 136-138.
11 Ogilvie-Forbes to Halifax, 16 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21637, C14108/1667/62, f.144.
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planned by the German authorities' 2 . The Foreign Office
concluded that the violence was the work of the government,
but uncertainty was felt about the distribution of
culpability between different elements within the German
leadership. Makins, for example, saw no reason to disbelieve
a report that Goering and the Ministry of Economics wished
for milder policies towards the Jews and wished to negotiate
with Rublee, director of the IGC, but had decided to
acquiesce in violence for which Goebbels was responsible13.
By 13 November the British government was informed of
several measures of official punishment faced by the Jews of
Germany in the aftermath of the violence, including the
imposition of a fine of 13 million marks for destruction and
damage which they were alleged to have provoked 14 . Ogilvie-
Forbes considered that these events had "only accelerated
the process of elimination of the Jews which has for long
been planned". He was sure the pogrom had been "instigated
and ordered" by the German government. He also suggested
that the proceeds of the fine should be used to assist
Jewish emigration15.
12 Strang, minute of telephone conversation with
Kirkpatrick(Berlin) at 7 pm on Nov 10, PRO FO 371/21636,
C13728/1667/62, f.257.
13 Makin g , minute, 16 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/21637,
C13836/1667/62, f.18.
14 Ogilvie-Forbes to FO, nos. 532, 533, 13 Nov 1938,
PRO FO 371/21637, C13836/13837/1667/62, f.18; Ogilvie-Forbes
to FO, no. 534, 14 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/21637,
C14014/1667/62, f.88, dealing with decrees punishing Jews;
Ogilvie-Forbes to FO, no. 537, 16 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21637, C14049/1667/62, f.98, reporting plans to
eliminate Jews from the economic life of the nation.
15 Ogilvie-Forbes to FO, no. 681, 13 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21637, C13833/1667/62, f.23.
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Reports of the violence in Germany led to outraged protests
in the UK. One example of the letters of protest received at
the Foreign Office was a resolution passed on 11 November
1938 by the Board of Studies in History of the University of
London, recording "shame and horror at the unexampled
barbarity of the concerted attack upon the Jews within the
German Empire", and expressing "profound sympathy" with the
victims' 6 . On 14 November, the Prime Minister said in answer
to a parliamentary question that the government would be
"taking into consideration any possible way by which we can
assist these people"7.
The British Cabinet's resoonse
First reactions
In the course of the next week, Cabinet ministers decided on
significant alterations in the approach to refugee
admissions. The records of their discussions show the
importance of the part played by Neville Chamberlain in
these decisions. Chamberlain became convinced that some
effective action should be taken to alleviate the fate of
Jews in Germany, and he had the necessary authority and
support to obtain the assent of his colleagues. The Home
Secretary proved to be the main obstacle. Chamberlain had
seen the warning in a memorandum by Makins on 10 November
that "it is very doubtful whether an increase in the number
of Jewish immigrants into the United Kingdom would be
16 w Morrell, Secretary, University of London, Board
of Studies in History, to Secretary of State, 11 Nov 1938,
PRO FO 371/21637, C13827/1667/62, f.21.
17 Chamberlain, Hansard, op. cit., vol 341, col ?, 14
Nov 1938.
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welcomed by the Home Office" 8 . Records of Hoare's
contributions to meetings of a Cabinet committee on 14
November and of the full Cabinet on 16 November confirm that
such doubts were justified. Hoare expressed opposition to a
more generous admissions policy. Chamberlain, however,
persisted in the claim that the country was demanding
action. At the meeting of the full Cabinet he favoured the
expansion of the UK's role as a temporary refuge, and this
became government policy.
The question of providing short-term refuge in the UK was
one of several issues discussed by Cabinet ministers as a
result of intensified persecution of Jews in Germany. The
possibility of settlement in the colonial Empire, especially
British Guiana, was also debated. Chamberlain insisted on
maintaining the distinction between the immediate need for
temporary refuge and long-term colonial settlement projects,
which might provide permanent refuge for limited numbers
only at an uncertain future date. As for the prospect of a
useful outcome to the work of the IGC, Chamberlain had read
advice from Makins, the expert on the IGC, that this now
looked more dubious than ever' 9 . Chamberlain recognised the
shortcomings of the IGC in his remarks to a Jewish
deputation on 15 November, adhe did not treat the IGC's
programme as a substitute for immediate action. He rejected
demands for denunciation of German internal policies, but
would sound a disapproving note when he spoke on the subject
in public. He also rejected proposals by certain ministers
18 Makins, copy memorandum, 'Anti-Semitic Measures in
Germany', 10 Nov 1938, PRO PREM 1/326. This is marked "PM
has seen"; see also minutes on this memorandum by Cadogan
(10 Nov) and Sir Horace Wilson (14 Nov).
19 Ibid.
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that Britain should treat the demand that German modify her
harsh internal policies as a bargaining-counter for
readiness to discuss Germany's claims to her former
colonies.
The admissions question came up on 14 November at the first
meeting since June of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign
Policy. The meeting had been called to discuss Anglo-German
relations. The Foreign Secretary, Halifax, had wanted an
urgent meeting, to review the worsening relationship with
Germany, and the possibility of war 20 . Ministers debated the
unhappy state of diplomatic relations with Germany since
Munich, discussing prospects of improvement and how the
moderate element in Germany might be encouraged21.
The speaker who raised the question of whether the
government contemplated any specific response to Germany's
persecution of the Jews was the Home Secretary. Hoare said
he did not know how the question could best be dealt with
but "unless something was done there were signs that the
House of Commons and the country might get out of hand".
Hoare indicated that he did not place hopes on the post-
Evian initiative, noting that Germany had responded to the
suggestion that she allow Jews to emigrate "by confiscating
20 Ministers present were the Prime Minister(in the
chair); Halifax, Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer; the
Home Secretary; Malcolm MacDonald, Colonial and Dominions
Secretary; Viscount Runciman, Lord President of the Council;
Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-Ordination of Defence,
and Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of Trade.
Conclusions, Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, FP(36)32nd
Mtg, 14 Nov 1938, PRO CAB 27/624.
21 The account of the meeting in Andrew Roberts, The
Holy Fox: A biography of Lord Halifax, London 1991, pp. 128-
130, stresses Halifax's conversion to an anti-appeasement
stance.
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their money". A brief debate ensued on whether British
protests over recent outrages in Germany would alleviate the
situation there, or produce a favourable effect on American
public opinion. Hoare turned to the question of refuge, and
raised the issue of the contribution which the USA could
make to providing homes for refugees. It was known that the
Americans' German immigration quota was fully earmarked for
the next five years and could not be increased without
legislation. It might, however, be possible to arrange for a
transfer of part of the undersubscribed quota of 60,000 a
year for British immigrants to the USA, of which only about
15,000 was being used, in aid of German Jewish immigration.
Later in the meeting, at Hoare's urging, it was agreed that
the idea be raised in Washington. The British Ambassador to
the United States, Sir Ronald Lindsay, as instructed, put
the idea to an unreceptive State Department official, and
relayed back a negative response he had clearly expected. By
18 November the proposal had been labelled "not feasible"22.
Settlement prospects in the colonies and in Australia were
also canvassed at the Cabinet Committee meeting. Another
idea - to put pressure on Germany by refusing to discuss her
colonial claims - was rejected. Hoare thought that if any
issue should be tied to British readiness to negotiate on
the ex-colonies, "it should not be the Jewish question but
the settlement of the armament question". There was general
agreement that no purpose would be served by convoking the
Evian conference again, but Hoare's contributions on this
22 FO to Lindsay, no. 823, 16 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21637, C13994/1667/62, f.82; Lindsay to FO, no. 423, 18
Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/21637, C14092/1667/62, f.112; the idea
of the retrospective and anticipatory use of unused British
quotas was suggested by Wilfrid Israel. Makins, minute, 14
Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/22535, W3823/104/98, f.348.
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issue were inconsistent. Early in the meeting he said that
he had been advised that reconvening the conference would
serve "no useful purpose". Later, in the course of a
discussion on imposing economic sanctions on Germany, he
proposed a summoning of the Evian conference, "on the
initiative of the United States". This found no support.
Chamberlain said he saw no purpose in re-convening the
conference, if the only substantial proposal was the
surrender of part of Britain's immigration quota.
Chamberlain said he had been surprised by the mildness of
domestic pressure for the government to make protests or
threats. To make empty threats, he argued, was futile, and
at present the UK was "not in a position to frighten
Germany". He preferred to emphasise another aspect of public
opinion:
On the other hand there was a very general and strong desire
that something effective should be done to alleviate the
terrible fate of the Jews in Germany. Some such action,
taken in collaboration with America, would ease the public
conscience.
As regards Germany's colonial claims, Chamberlain was
against laying down conditions. The most he would say was
that it might become necessary to state that, in view of
what was happening in Germany, the UK could not contemplate
entering upon the conversations as had been intended.
Hoare's response was to revert to his suggestion of the
quota transfer and to deplore American claims that they were
admitting many Jewish refugees while Britain was "doing
nothing". This, he said, was
very far from the truth. A powerful and responsible Jewish
organisation in London was dealing with individual cases at
a cost of £5,000 a week and about 75 refugees were being
daily admitted to this country. The organisation was anxious
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that these figures should not be disclosed as they would be
criticised both by those who would think them inadequate and
by those who would regard them as excessive.
Halifax agreed that anti-Jewish prejudice might be easily
aroused, and pointed to signs of antisemitic feeling in
France. Stanley said he thought it a mistake to press the
USA for a quota transfer, "unless we could say that we were
taking some comparable action to admit German Jews into the
United Kingdom". He also reported a conversation with
Winston Churchill, who thought British policy should not be
one of threats towards Germany but of assistance to the
Jews, and favoured Jewish settlement in some British colony
such as British Guiana. Chamberlain said he agreed, but that
the opening up of an undeveloped tropical country was "a
long and very expensive business". The settlement of 250,000
Jews in British Guiana had been proposed, "but it was quite
clear that under the most favourable conditions the
settlement of anything like this number must take a very
long time". He added that the most suitable places for
settlement of European Jews within the Empire were in the
dominions. The meeting then turned to other matters, after
arranging to follow up Hoare's quota transfer proposal23.
The following day Chamberlain heard submissions from Anglo-
Jewish leaders on several aspects of the refugee problem,
including Jewish emigration from Germany to the British
Empire, when he received a deputation led by Viscount
23 Conclusions, Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy,
FP(36)32nd Mtg, 14 Nov 1938, PRO CAB 27/624.
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Samuel 24 . Samuel, who had written earlier that day to ask
Chamberlain for the meeting, came accompanied by the Chief
Rabbi Dr JH Hertz, Viscount Bearsted, Lionel de Rothschild,
Neville Laski and Chaim Weizmann 25 . The deputation estimated
that there were still 500,000 Jews left in Germany, of whom
300,000 might emigrate if given the opportunity. They made
several suggestions for increasing the rate of entry of
Jewish refugees to the UK. Chamberlain was asked to
facilitate the urgent temporary admission of children and
young people aged up to 17 years for education and training,
with a view to ultimate re-emigration. Jewish organisations
in the UK would give a new collective guarantee in support
of the entry of these young people and would take full
responsibility. The deputation announced that the CGJ had
launched an immediate appeal for funds, which for the first
time would also be directed to non-Jews. Samuel also pressed
Chamberlain to authorise the deployment of extra staff to
deal with the emergency and reduce the "extreme congestion"
in administration of refugee casework at home and abroad.
Chamberlain responded by expressing deep concern and
sympathy. On the question of extra staff, he said he assumed
24 Samuel had recently rejected Chamberlain's
invitation to join his Cabinet. For Chamberlain's offer, on
25 Oct 1938, see Chamberlain to Ida, 22 Oct 1938, Neville
Chamberlain Papers (hereafter NC), 18/1/1074; Samuel refused
the next day. Samuel, Memoirs, London 1945, pp. 276-9; for
Samuel on his work for refugees, see ibid. pp. 254-256.
25 Samuel to Chamberlain, 15 Nov 1938, Record of
meeting, 15 Nov 1938, PRO PREM 1/326; the deputation's visit
was reported in the Jewish Chronicle, 18 Nov 1939, p. 16; it
was also discussed by the Executive Committee of the CGJ.
Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting on 17 Nov 1938,
Archives of the Central British Fund for World Jewish
Relief, (henceforth CBF), Reel 1, file 20; on this date the
CGJ appointed a sub-committee to promote the migration of
children on a large scale: this became the Movement for the
Care of Children from Germany Ltd. See Movement for the Care
of Children from Germany, First Annual Report, 1938-1939,
PRO HO 213/302, p. 3.
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that Samuel would take this up with the departments
concerned. He said he felt any necessary steps would have
been considered already, but he would gladly give his
"benevolent interest" to any request for consideration of
the point. He made no firm promises, however, and gave no
specific response on the issue of the admission of young
people. Weizmann made a separate request for a promise of
eventual admission to Palestine for 6,000 young men at
present in concentration camps in Germany, who might go to
refugee camps in Holland in the interim, and for the
immediate evacuation to Palestine of 1,500 children.
Chamberlain said he would consider this sympathetically if
the Colonial Secretary raised it with him. The next day, the
record of this meeting was circulated by Chamberlain's
private secretary, asking departments whose responsibilities
were principally affected to consider points coming within
their province26.
The policy of temporary refuge
On 16 November, a full Cabinet discussion of "The Jewish
Problem" took place. Halifax opened with the claim that
Britain's reputation was suffering, especially in the United
States, because it was thought that the government was not
taking sufficient action in response to Germany' persecution
of the Jews. He thought that
the position could be restored if this country would give a
lead which would force the United States in turn to take
some positive action. He hoped that it might be possible on
the course of the next day or so for us to nd our support
to fairly wide promises of help to the Jews
26 Syers to Brooks, Creasy, Pimlott, Bridges, Makins,
16 Nov 1938, PRO PREM 1/326
27 Cab. 55(38)5, 16 Nov 1938, PRO CAB 23/96.
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Halifax emphasised the political advantage Britain would
gain by undertaking to make land in the Empire available for
Jewish settlement. Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial
Secretary, agreed, but warned against exaggerating the
possibilities of settlement in the mainly agricultural
colonies, saying rapid absorption of immigrants required
centres of industrial activity. During MacDonald's survey of
possibilities in Northern Rhodesia, Chamberlain interrupted
to underline the distinction between past estimates of the
numbers who might be offered temporary refuge in the colony,
and the smaller numbers who might be admitted for
settlement. MacDonald appeared to place most hopes on
British Guiana, despite the limited possibilities it
offered. Those present agreed that it was desirable to make
an offer of some territory. This need not be unconditional:
Chamberlain suggested retaining a measure of control by
means of a long lease at a nominal rent. The hoped-for
political gains which would accrue from any such offer were
clearly in the forefront of ministers' thoughts. Hoare,
perhaps prompted by doubt as to how substantial such an
offer might turn out to be, said that he thought it
important to make it "as concrete as possible".
Chamberlain then said that the day before he had indicated
to a deputation of Jews the possibility that the government
would take some action on colonial settlement, on the lines
now envisaged. They had, however, reacted by pointing out
that time was the essence of the matter. It followed that
anything which we could do in regard to a permanent
settlement must also be accompanied by some effort to find a
temporary resting-place for refugees while arrangements were
made for their permanent reception.
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This was the first mention of the issue of temporary refuge
in the discussion. The minutes do not disclose whether
Chamberlain was at this juncture stating the opinion that
temporary refuge should be provided, or merely recording
that this was the view of the Jewish deputation. The
immediate reactions of the two ministers most concerned with
refugee questions showed little enthusiasm for exploring the
question of increased entry to Britain. Winterton spoke of
the difficulties encountered by the IGC. He rejected
American criticisms that Britain was not doing enough, and
touched on the contributions of dominion governments. He
expressed the view that certain countries in South America
would act "if we could show them a good example", without
saying of what such an example might consist. Yet,
notwithstanding his recent admission that the IGC had made
little headway to date, Winterton insisted that unless IGC
efforts succeeded in enabling Jews to take money out of
Germany, no large-scale emigration could be effected.
Hoare still saw the USA as "the key to the problem". On this
occasion, he did not mention his quota transfer proposal,
but said he thought that action in British colonies was the
only way to open the door into the USA, as it would
influence American opinion and be important "on the
financial side". As regards entry to Britain, Hoare said
that 1,000 letters a day were being received in the UK. The
applications were sent to the Co-ordinating Committee:
"Broadly speaking, only cases which were recommended by the
Jewish representatives were admitted". He said that Jewish
representatives opposed large scale admissions, or the entry
of Jews they had not approved, "since they were afraid of an
246
anti-Jew agitation in this country". He then spoke, as he
had done two days earlier, of Jewish fears of the
consequences of publishing admission figures. Those present
agreed on the danger of such a step, but the desire to get
credit for what Britain was doing was also expressed: later,
in reply to Halifax, Hoare agreed to consider communicating
a figure privately to the Americans.
Regarding future admissions to the UK, Hoare said he thought
that we were going as far at present as public opinion would
allow, and it was important to retain a check on individual
immigrants. He thought, however, that we might agree to
admit a number of young Jews for the purpose of agricultural
training, with a view to their ultimate settlement
elsewhere. He was also in favour of admitting a number of
Jewish maidservants. These girls might replace the German
domestics who had left at the time of the [Munich] crisis.
Hoare was offering nothing new. He was merely setting out
existing policy. The two categories of refugee whose
admission Hoare supported were already being admitted. It
had been Home Office policy since before the Evian
conference to admit agricultural trainees and domestic
servants. Since Evian, the availability of job opportunities
had been stated to be the only brake on numbers. On the
procedural side, Hoare merely re-affirmed the need for pre-
selection, without offering any ideas on how this might be
done more efficiently. Generally, he was opposing an
extension of admissions, claiming that both public opinion
generally and Jewish representatives were against it. While
Hoare cited the fears of Jewish refugee organisations in
support of his position, Chamberlain had evidence of Jewish
pressure for more open admissions from representatives with
impeccable credentials: the deputation of the previous day
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was the most distinguished yet mobilised by Anglo-Jewry to
approach the government on the refugee issue.
Chamberlain's final contribution to the discussion was to
say he thought that "if, in addition to offering a territory
overseas, we undertook to allow Jews to come here as a
temporary refuge this would constitute a considerable
contribution towards the problem". Hoare's reaction,
according to the minutes, was that he "undertook to consider
this point". Before the next item on the agenda came up,
ministers gave signs of realising that the climate had
changed and that the way was open for more generous
admissions. Hoare spoke of "the older men and women who
presented an almost insoluble problem". In contrast to his
earlier endorsement of the policy of Jewish representatives,
he referred to one of its limitations, saying, "The Jewish
Committee was not attempting to deal with the older people.
It was concentrating on the younger people." The plight of
the elderly was taken up by Halifax, who proposed that
people in the UK might be asked to sponsor "individual
elderly Jews who would otherwise be left to an appalling
fate in Germany". Chamberlain thought that this might be
considered later. The meeting had already accepted his
suggestion that a statement of what action was proposed
should be drafted by the five ministers whose
responsibilities were most affected, "for issue at the
earliest opportunity".
A meeting of top civil servants took place immediately after
the Cabinet meeting, to discuss the planned public
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statement 28 . The contributions of Sir Alexander Maxwell,
Home Office Permanent Under Secretary, provided further
evidence of his department's emphasis on admissions being
linked to suitable jobs or re-emigration. Maxwell said
nothing about relaxing pre-selection procedures or speeding
up entry, and indeed there had been no time to react to the
developments in Cabinet. On the next day, 17 November, in
answer to a Commons question about the problem of delay,
Hoare replied that additions had been made to staff, more
additions had been decided upon, and that he and his
department would do everything possible to eliminate delay,
most of which he blamed on difficulties in obtaining the
necessary information about applicants' cases 29 . The
announcement of a major effort to streamline admissions was
not made until the next week, when Hoare spoke for the
government in a debate on refugee policy.
On the second working day after the Cabinet meeting, Monday
21 November 1938, the announcement of British policy was
presented in two stages in the House of Commons. During the
afternoon, the Prime Minister made a statement largely
devoted to itemising the government's steps to survey the
possibilities of settlement in the colonial Empire, with
particular emphasis on plans to lease large areas of British
Guiana, subject to satisfactory surveys. He also mentioned
the contribution of Palestine, saying 40 per cent of
immigrants entering the country in the past year had come
from Germany. On the question of further admissions to the
28 Record of interdepartmental meeting, 16 Nov 1938,
PRO FO 371/22537, W15119/104/98, f.295.
29 Hoare, Hansard, op. cit., vol. 341, cols. 1037-8,
17 Nov 1938.
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UK, Chamberlain confined himself to the general and far from
novel point that numbers, whether for temporary or permanent
stay, were "limited by the capacity of the voluntary
organisations dealing with the refugee problem to undertake
the responsibility for selecting, receiving and maintaining"
refugees. He gave figures of past refugee admissions, saying
that since 1933, the government had permitted about 11,000
to land, in addition to some 4,000 to 5,000 who had since
emigrated. He described Eleanor Rathbone's suggestion of a
loan for the maintenance of refugees as "a little premature
at this stage". Other questioners were told to await the
Home Secretary's speech in that evening's debate30.
Chamberlain's statement was given much attention by the
North American press; Hoare's speech concerned domestic
policy, and-aroused much less interest abroad. It will be
dealt with later in this chapter.
Chamberlain and Hoare
The record of the Cabinet meeting of 16 November shows that
at at least one and possibly two points in the discussion
Chamberlain expressed support for urgent action by the
government to provide temporary refuge. He firmly underlined
the distinction between the need for temporary refuge and
any offers of permanent settlement overseas. The arguments
Hoare put forward did not, it appears, alter Chamberlain's
views. Such fixity is consistent with the findings of Ian
Colvin, who could discover no example, in two and a half
years of Cabinet meetings, in which Cabinet discussion had
30 Chamberlain, Hansard, op. cit., vol. 341, cols.
1313-1317, 21 Nov 1938.
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altered Chamberlain's mind on a subject 31 . Any explanation
of the position which Chamberlain took on the refugee issue
must take account of the fact that he was strongly affected
both by the impact of the violence of the pogrom itself and
by the shock it delivered to his Anglo-German policy. His
references to his meeting with Jewish leaders the previous
day show that this too may have influenced him. Colvin says
that Chamberlain was known to alter his mind between
Cabinets: perhaps in this case he did not so much change his
mind on the question of Jewish refugee immigration to
Britain - not an issue in which he had previously indicated
interest - as show that he had, possibly for the first time,
given it attention in the absence of his Cabinet colleagues.
Chamberlain was not unsympathetic to the plight of Jews in
Germany. After the Anschluss, Fritz Kreisler, the celebrated
violinist, who was an Austrian with a strain of Jewish blood
in his veins, saw Chamberlain, who was an old personal
friend, and obtained his support in dealing with the German
authorities. Kreisler had been living in Germany, where he
considered he had been well-treated, but feared that he
might not obtain a German passport. He asked Chamberlain to
write recommending him to Ribbentrop. As a result,
Chamberlain's interest in the case and his request that it
be dealt with sympathetically was made known to the German
Chargé d' Affaires in London. Kreisler was returning to
Germany, so no other action seemed necessary at that
31 Ian Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet, London 1971,
p. 265.
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stage 32 . This intervention was of course designed to prevent
Kreisler from becoming a refugee.
The Kristallnacht pogrom was a blow to Chamberlain's hopes
of better relations with Germany. A letter to his sister Ida
on the following day, shows how closely his genuine horror
was tied to his concern about the political implications of
the pogrom for Anglo-German relations. His prime concern was
with the dilemma in which he found himself, obliged to
ensure that his public statements on the latest developments
neither put his policy in peril nor endangered the Jews
still further. He wrote,
I am horrified by the German behaviour to the Jews. There
does seem to be some fatality about Anglo-German relations
which invariably blocks every effort to improve them. I
suppose I shall have to say something on the subject
tomorrow as there will certainly be a private notice
question & it will be problem[?not legible] how to avoid
condonation on the one side or on the other such criticism
as may bring even worse things on the heads of those
unhappy victims. It is clear that Nazi hatred wl stick at
nothing to find a pretext for their barbarities
Chamberlain had been conscious before the pogrom of the
difficulty of making progress with Hitler. He wrote to his
sister Hilda on 6 November 1938 that he planned a trip to
Rome, which he saw as "the end of the axis on which it is
easiest to make an impression". Writing to Ida on 4
December, he referred to "the Jews in Germany" as an
instance of the foolishness of dictators, presumably having
in mind the effect of the pogrom on international attitudes
32 Syers to Chamberlain, memorandum, 28 Mar 1938, NC
7/11/31/160; Kreisler to Chamberlain, 28 Mar 1938,
NC/7/11/31/161; Syers, note, 29 Mar 1938, NC 7/11/31/162.
NC to Ida, 10 Nov 1938, NC/18/1/1076; for Ida's
reaction see Ida to NC, 11 Nov 1938, NC/18/2/1099.
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to Germany34 . Shortly afterwards he deplored the "continued
venomous attacks by the German press [which had attacked a
nationwide broadcast appeal for refugees made by Earl
Baldwin on 8 December], and the failure of Hitler to make
the slightest gesture of friendliness". He felt, it appears,
that recent events in Germany had made impossible
discussions concerning colonies or anything else for the
moment, but nonetheless maintained an interest in discreet
informal contacts with various German intermediaries35.
Chamberlain showed that he was still trying to make sense of
the pogrom when he essayed an analysis of German anti-Jewish
persecution, in a letter to Hilda at the end of July 1939
which expressed something of his own attitude to Jews. Hilda
had sent him documents showing that in some cases Jews were
still being given posts in Germany. Chamberlain replied,
Your enclosure from Mrs Sichel is very interesting. I had no
idea that Jews were still allowed to work or join such
organisations as the Hitler Youth in Germany. It shows,
doesn't it, how much sincerity there is in the talk of
racial purity. I believe that the persecution arose out of
two motives, a desire to rob the Jews of their money and a
jealousy of their superior cleverness. No doubt Jews arent a
lovable people; I don't care about them myself; but that is
not sufficient to explain the pogrom.
He then turned immediately to speculations about Hitler's
health, wondering whether his moods were characteristic of a
"paranoid", but aware that the moods were not proof of any
organic disease36.
NC to Ida, 4 Dec 1938, NC 18/1/1078.
NC to Hilda, Dec 11 1938, NC 18/1/1079; See e.g. NC
to Ida, 23 Jul 1939, NC 18/1/1108; NC to Hilda 30 Jul 1939,
NC 18/1/1110.
36 Ibid.
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These reactions on Chamberlain's part underline his active
and practical nature. He tended to respond to events by
trying to decide on his next step. Thus he could not dwell
on an issue for long, without turning to its implications
for him, whether it involved action or trying to improve his
understanding of something which concerned him 37 . His focus
on Anglo-German relations was thus the filter through which
he viewed the persecution of the Jews. He was not opposed to
showing the Germans that their policies were isolating them,
but he wished to maintain and develop appropriate relations
with amenable elements in Germany. His dislike of anti-
Jewish persecution existed alongside this policy, and he was
prepared to express it from time to time. Keith Feiling
records how, in the winter of 1938-9, Chamberlain told an
intermediary from the Deutsche Shakespeare Genossenschaft
that his real reason for refusing to accept an honorary
presidency they wished to confer on him was that the society
had expelled their Jewish members38.
After his fall in 1940, Chamberlain, then Lord President of
the Council, expressed concern in Cabinet about the handling
of internment. He was sensitive about the fact that a
Committee which he chaired was responsible for the decision
to deport alien internees to the dominions 39 . Following an
approach from the Birmingham Council for Refugees, his
intervention over the deportation of two sixteen year-old
For insights into these aspects of Chamberlain's
character, see Stephen Stacey, 'The Ministry of Health 1919-
1929: ideas and practice in a government department', Oxford
D.Phil. 1984.
38 K Felling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, London
1946, p. 390.
Correspondence with Osbert Peake, 22-24 Jul 1940,
NC! 8/34/36-37.
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Jewish refugee boys to Canada apparently helped to keep one
of them in the UK40 . However, it is not pos1ble to discover
what Chamberlain thought about Jewish refugee immigration,
because he said so little on the subject. Hoare, on the
other hand, was obliged to speak on the subject frequently
because he was Home Secretary, but his public utterances did
not necessarily reveal his views. Decisions which were
forced on him had to be carried out with as much enthusiasm
as those which he favoured. Hoare has been accorded
considerable credit for the generous aspects of British
policy, but this is largely based on the fact that he
presided over the admission of Jewish refugees, and did so
sympathetically, rather than that there is evidence that he
fought for it. Hoare's concern to find places outside the UK
for Jewish refugees remained marked in the remainder of the
pre-war period: it was in evidence, for example, at a
meeting he had on 15 November with Wiriterton, at which
Makins was present, when it was agreed to push for a policy
of putting pressure on the Colonial Office to find room in
the colonial Empire, especially British Guiana41.
The role of public opinion in the decision to alter British
policy on refugee admissions is hard to establish. In the
latter two-thirds of November intense public interest was
shown in the British response to persecution of Jews in
Germany. Cabinet ministers were conscious of this interest,
but, as is shown by the diverse conclusions put forward by
40 See correspondence with Mrs Rogers, 16 Jul 1940 to
23 Aug 1940, NC 8/34/53-56.	 -
41 Makins, minute, 15 Nov 1928, and memorandum of same
date, (draft Cabinet paper) t Emigration from Germany and
other Central European Countries. Possible action by His
Majesty's Government, PRO FO 371/22536, W15095/104/98,
f.287.
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Hoare and Chamberlain over whether or not public opinion
favoured further admissions, its implications for policy
could be interpreted in opposing ways. Home Office policy
statements on admissions, on 21 November and subsequently,
aimed to placate both ends of the spectrum of opinion,
offering both concessions to the views of people who thought
the government's policies should be more generous, and
reassurance to those who feared a loss of control.
British tolicv and the Inter governmental Committee
What had changed? Certain tendencies had been reinforced in
the course of the past two weeks. Ministers were now more
hopeful that offers of settlement in the colonies might be a
means of obtaining political benefits. If the British
government made at least one such offer, this would set an
example which reflected well on the UK and which other
countries, America in particular, might feel obliged to
follow. Nevertheless, ministers knew the danger of sounding
too optimistic about British Guiana, and Cadogan reminded an
interdepartmental meeting on 16 November of the unfavourable
report made by a League Committee on British Guiana as a
place of settlement for the Assyrians 42 . Makins and
MacDonald now believed that the government should be
prepared to make a loan to finance a colonial settlement
scheme, but nothing was to be said to suggest that this was
even contemplated43.
42 Record of interdepartmental meeting, 16 Nov 1938,
PRO FO 371/22537, W15119/104/98, f.295.
Ibid.
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In a memorandum of 15 November which discussed possible
action by the UK government, Makins had raised pragmatic
objections to aiding emigration through support for
settlement projects. One objection was the expense; another
was the opposition which could be expected from the
dominions. Financial support would also tempt the Polish and
other European governments to further persecution of Jews:
the force of this objection was illustrated at a meeting
between the Polish Ambassador and Winterton three days
later, when Winterton faced Polish pressure for the IGC to
deal both with Poland's Jews and the 10,000 Polish Jews
recently expelled from Germany 44 . Makins also raised
objections of principle to the government's funding refugee
settlement overseas. He argued that no advantage to the UK
would follow, and little benefit for the UK would be derived
from promoting such development, except perhaps in
Australia, but he dismissed prospects in Australia as
"probably chimerical"; he still regarded Northern Rhodesia
as a possible place for large-scale settlement. Makins
concluded that Evian and the subsequent discussions had
shown that no country was at present prepared to consider
proposals for group settlement and that emigration was only
feasible by the process of "infiltration". He pointed out
that this had been the policy of the Jewish organisations
who had effected the largest quantity of emigration.
Reviewing prospects around the world, he noted that South
America and the dominions had a preference for agricultural
workers, while South Africa was prejudiced against Jews.
Makins, memorandum, 15 Nov, 'Emigration from
Germany(already cited); Makins, minutes, 18 and 19 Nov 1938,
PRO FO 371/22537, W15095/104/98, f.42; correspondence with
Balinski, 19 Nov 1938, Randall, minute, 20 Nov 1938, ibid.
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Little progress had been made within the colonial Empire,
except for a small-scale experimental CGJ scheme in Kenya45.
Pessimism about the prospects of the IGC reached new depths,
accompanied by renewed concern to prevent IGC initiatives
from creating extra difficulties in relations with Germany.
Makins, who knew most about the IGC, suggested in another
memorandum of 15 November that the proposed visit to Germany
by Rublee, the IGC's director, had been rendered both
useless and undesirable by the recent actions of the German
government. Destitute refugees were now unavoidable: the
continuing burden of the fine imposed after Kristallnacht,
plus the fall in the realisable value of their assets, had
reduced Jews in Germany to a condition where they were no
longer "desirable immigrants". In these circumstances, the
work of the IGC must be reviewed. While he claimed that
there was no question of dissolution of the IGC, Makins made
proposals whose object was to suspend the work of the
organisation indefinitely. He argued that, in view of the
absence of co-operation from the German government, the
Evian programme of schemes of orderly emigration was no
longer practicable. He said that there was little object in
having a full-time director, and suggested that Rublee
return to the US, leaving the IGC in the charge of his
deputy, Pell, (for whom Makins had much more respect) 46 , on
"a care and maintenance basis". He advised that the British
government should not itself put forward any proposal for
Makins, memorandum, 15 Nov, Emigration from German
(already cited); for the Colonial Office position see
MacDonald to Winterton, 4 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/22536,
W14805/104/98, f.141.
46 Lord Sherfield, interview with this author, already
cited.
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partial suspension, but keep it in reserve, hoping that the
US government, whose idea the IGC had been, would tire of
it. Once the IGC had been put to one side, two alternative
approaches to the problem remained, according to Makins:
either to take no action, or to try to solve the problem on
different lines, with or without German co-operation,
bearing in mind "the dilemma that the more emigration is
increased the greater is the temptation to increase pressure
on Jews in Central Europe"47.
Makins also pointed out, after a conversation with Pell on
15 November, that the Americans were re-examining the role
of the IGC, in view of the fact that the prospects of
Rublee's visit to Berlin were gravely impaired 48 . The future
of the IGC was thus in doubt, and Makins welcomed signs that
the US government was considering alternative proposals. He
warned, however, that if any failure of the IGC became
public, although it could be blamed on Germany, the British
government would not escape criticism. Randall agreed to
explore the US government's views, and thought it fortunate
that the German government had not yet invited Rublee to
visit in the state of strained relations following the
recent measures against the Jews49.
Nor was Makins, who was no supporter of the Munich
Agreement, optimistic about prospects of reaching agreement
Makins, memorandum, 'Effect on position of
Intergovernmental Committee and its Director of Anti-Semitic
measures in Germany', 15 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/22536,
W15069/104/98, f.269.
48 Makins, minute t Inter_Governmental Committee', 15
Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/22536, W15056/104/98, f. 266.
Randall, minute, PRO FO 371/22536, W15069/104/98,
f. 269.
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with Germany. Nevertheless, despite such well-founded
pessimism on the part of senior civil servants, the work of
the IGC dragged on. Makin g remained a key adviser to Lord
Winterton. In early December they worked together to try to
curtail the effectiveness of former Prime Minister Lord
Baldwin's forthcoming broadcast appeal for funds for
refugees, lest it cloud the prospects of the 1GC50.
Anglo-German relations and the refugee question
The decision to admit large numbers of destitute Jewish
refugees into the UK was a unilateral act by a sovereign
state. It reflected British lack of faith in what the IGC
could achieve for refugees. The new policy was not in
accordance with the principles agreed at Evian. It could be
seen as a capitulation to German robbery and persecution of
Jews. It reduced the pressure on Germany to co-operate with
the IGC if it wished to achieve Jewish emigration. Lastly,
it provided dangerous precedents in relation to Central
Europe, as Makins had warned repeatedly. Within the wider
context of Anglo-German relations, the decision can be seen
as reflecting a general disillusion with the prospects of
negotiation with Germany over refugees, along with most
other issues. No record has been seen of any Cabinet
discussion of how the change in refugee policy would be
received in Germany.
Chamberlain's efforts to make progress on the German
attitude to the refugee issue at the highest diplomatic
level appear to be confined to suggestions he made to
50 Makins to Fry, 5 Dec 1938, PRO FO 371/22539, W
16055/104/98, f120; see Sherman, op.cit., p. 185 (where the
paper is wrongly numbered W16100).
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Mussolini in Italy in mid-January. One of his aims at this
encounter was to secure the Italian leader's good offices in
Berlin. In late December, when discussing with his Cabinet
colleagues his plan to talk to Mussolini, Chamberlain said
that for some time it had been impossible for his government
"to take any useful action in Berlin and he preferred to
leave Berlin alone" 51 . The planned meeting took place in
Rome in mid-January 1939. Chamberlain raised the refugee
issue during his first conversation with Mussolini, who
responded by saying the problem was a general rather than
local one, for which the long-term solution would be the
creation of an independent sovereign Jewish state in a large
area of territory. Halifax asked if Germany might be
persuaded to allow departing Jews to take money out.
Mussolini expressed readiness to try to use his influence in
that direction, saying that the Germans were determined to
get rid of the Jews and would be ready to do anything to
expedite their departure. Chamberlain asked Mussolini what
he saw as the next step, and obtained his assent to the
suggestion of an approach by Rublee to the Germans52.
On that very day Rublee arrived in Berlin for talks with the
Germans. A revival in IGC activity had occurred. In mid-
December, Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, had come to
London, with Hitler's approval, bringing a plan, which
envisaged financing emigration by means of an international
refugee loan raised from Jewish sources. The plan also
51 Cab. 60(38)4, 21 Dec 38, CAB 23/?]
52 Mutilated copy of document from R434/1/22,'Record
of the first conversation with Signor Mussolini and Count
Ciano at the Palazzo Venezia on the afternoon of January
12th. Conversations between British and Italian Ministers,
Rome, January 11-14, 1939', PRO FO 371/22962, C1190/15/18,
f. 212.
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entailed increased exports of German goods. The Berlin talks
on this plan lasted until 2 February. Halfway through, the
sudden fall of Schacht on 20 January underlined the
uncertainties of dealing with the Germans. The plan itself
was cynical in the extreme, involving the confiscation
without compensation by Germany of the bulk of Jewish wealth
and a fillip for German exports. Seized Jewish assets would
be retained by the German authorities as a trust fund, a
quarter of which could be used by emigrants to purchase
supples and travel facilities from German companies. The
bulk of resettlement costs would be borne by outside
(Jewish) sources through a bond, for which the trust fund
was supposed to act as collateral 53 . The Foreign Office
regarded the plan as unsatisfactory, but nevertheless
continued to use it as a basis for negotiation, which would
at least provide further contacts with the Germans. The
contacts continued until shortly before war broke out, but
the plan and its subsequent variations produced no
arrangements which facilitated the emigration of refugees54.
Rublee handed in his resignation at the end of 1938, and was
replaced by Emerson55.
For British policy-makers concerned with Anglo-German
relations, an attraction of the effort to negotiate on
refugees with the Germans was that it provided intermittent
opportunities for contacts with the regime, including
chances to develop relations with its more moderate
elements, among whom Schacht was a valued member until his
See Breitman, Architect of Genocide, op. cit., pp.
59-60.
See Sherman, op. cit., pp. 194-203.
Ibid., p 221.
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fall 56 . In retrospect, the value of the contacts with
Germany was questionable. Foreign Office fears that the IGC
might damage Anglo-German relations remained, although they
diminished once Rublee was replaced by the tractable
Emerson. The Foreign Office was, however, delighted with its
success in exploiting the opportunities presented by the IGC
for closer contact with the Americans; these were
emphasised, for example, in a radio broadcast made by
Winterton on 22 November 1938. In themselves, the IGC
negotiations were not highly valued as a source of practical
solutions. The British government's attitude to the IGC was
thus to regard it as a means of deriving political benefits
for British foreign policy rather than as a potential source
of actual benefits for refugees.
The administration of admissions
The changes announced by the Home Secretary
On the evening of 21 November 1938 the House of Commons
passed the following motion, proposed by Philip Noel-Baker:
That this House notes with profound concern the deplorable
treatment suffered by certain racial religious and political
minorities in Europe, and in view of the growing gravity of
the refugee problem, would welcome an immediate concerted
effort amongst the nations, includg the United States of
America, to secure a common policy
In his contribution to this debate, Hoare re-affirmed the
need for careful selection, but showed that the Home Office
56 See Chamberlain's note of a private conversation
with Schacht on 15 Dec 1938, PRO PREM 1/326; for Schacht's
visit generally, see Sherman, op. cit., 195-200.
Reilly, minute, 17 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/22537,
W15370/104/98, f.146.
58 What follows is drawn from Hansard, vol. 341, cols.
1427-1483. For Hoare's speech see cols. 1463-1475.
263
had modified its approach to selection procedures, according
to whether refugees were coming on a temporary basis or for
permanent settlement. He claimed that because mass
immigration would encourage the growth of "a movement which
we would all wish to see suppressed", and in order to avoid
"an influx of the undesirable behind the cloak of refugee
immigration", the government needed to check in detail the
individual circumstances of adult refugees. This was bound
to involve "a measure of delay". Individual cases were
decided after investigation by voluntary organisations
represented on the Co-ordinating Conunittee, and the Home
Office accepted their recommendations, the main issue being
whether refugees could maintain themselves. The Home Office
worked closely with the Ministry of Labour: Hoare noted
that, during the period when "11,000 German refugees have
been settled in this country", they had provided jobs for
15,000 British workmen in industries they had set up,
without damage to British employment prospects. (His use of
the word "settled" was imprecise: most refugees remained
subject to conditions.) These benefits, he claimed, were due
to the process of "very careful selection" which he had
outlined; in reality the jobs in question had been created
largely as a result of admissions prior to the recent re-
introduction of mandatory pre-selection.
Hoare admitted that in the last ten days the admissions
machinery had been strained "to breaking point". This was
inevitable, with applications running into thousands per
day, but the machinery was been greatly expanded. Between 50
and 70 visas a day were being issued to persons on the
Continent, but many had not yet arrived. There were also
difficulties in communicating with refugees over their
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cases, sometimes because people to whom the Home Office was
prepared to give a visa had been put in concentration camps.
Hoare turned from individual cases "to a class of case which
we can deal with en masse....cases in which individual
inquiries will not be essential". He explained that, in
future, a procedural distinction would be made between two
types of cases. The Home Office would maintain its existing
system of careful selection for persons who might stay
permanently in Britain. On the other hand, a less detailed
scrutiny was permissible for persons admitted merely for
temporary refuge. The implication was therefore that
refugees who were expected to re-emigrate could be admitted
on an unprecedented scale, and more speedily. Transmigrants
might be provided with a temporary home, on the
understanding that "at some time in the future, they will go
elsewhere for their permanent home". The government would
also look kindly on proposals for refugees to remain in
Britain while training for eventual resettlement in the
colonial Empire, for example, an existing scheme to train
"Jewish boys for agriculture and Jewish girls for domestic
service". He claimed that several thousand older men had
been retrained in Britain and had left for overseas: other
such schemes would be facilitated. Large numbers of "non-
Aryan children" could be admitted without the kinds of
individual checks used for older refugees, provided they
could find responsible sponsors. The Home Office would give
the necessary visas and facilitate the entry of all children
whose maintenance could be guaranteed. He explained that
Jewish parents would accept separation from their children
to save them from danger in Germany, and he commended to his
fellow countrymen this "chance of taking the young
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generation of a great people". Hoare wound up by asserting
the British government's sympathy and anxiety to help,
paying a tribute to the voluntary organisations and
promising the utmost support for their work; he vowed to
show "that we will be in the forefront among the nations of
the world in giving relief to these suffering people".
Before Hoare could sit down, he was asked by Harold
Macmillan about Sudeten Germans in the areas of
Czechoslovakia handed over to Germany, who desperately
needed visas. Hoare replied that policy toward this group
would be the same as towards Germans generally. He claimed
that in these cases there had been no delay and denied that
British responsibility for urgent rescue was greater in such
cases, but asked Macmillan to raise specific cases with him.
Hoare's answer glossed over the reality that the question of
refugees from Czechoslovakia raised different issues of
policy and principle from the plight of refugees from
Germany and Austria. Refugees from Czechoslovakia are the
subject of chapter five: here it need merely be emphasised
that at this time it was British policy.to put political and
financial resources into keeping the Czechoslovak state in
being, and to oppose mass emigration of Jews from
Czechoslovakia. The policy on admissions from Czechoslovakia
was to allow in a small number of political refugees and
their families. Macmillan, who was intervening on behalf of
political refugees, was a member of British lobby on behalf
of refugees from Czechoslovakia, in which opponents of the
Munich Agreement were prominent. The lobby's concern was
primarily with political refugees, not with the plight of
Jews persecuted as Jews(although many "political refugees"
were Jews). Hoare was right in saying that refugees seeking
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to come to the UK from Czechoslovakia might enter if they
could fulfil the same conditions applicable to refugees from
Germany and Austria, but the potential for admissions of
Jews from Czechoslovakia was in reality much less, largely
because the main Anglo-Jewish organisations were not
prepared to become involved in financing or arranging them.
New orocedures and the ex pansion of immigration
The Home Office had not altered its opposition to mass
immigration of refugees. In early November, for example,
Holderness said "We are not prepared to be made the dumping
ground of Europe", when refuge was sought in Britain for
German refugees being turned out of Yugoslavia 59 . The
commitment to pre-selection remained unshaken, along with
opposition to mass immigration. At the meeting of top civil
servants on 16 November Maxwell indicated that the Home
Office was still stressing that admissions should be linked
to jobs or re-emigration. He said nothing about relaxing
procedures or speeding up entry 60 . When asked about the
problem of delay the next day in the Commons, Hoare had
merely reported that additions had been made to staff and
more were planned, and promised efforts to eliminate delay,
which he blamed largely on difficulty in obtaining necessary
information about applicants' cases61.
Holderness to Makins, 4 Nov 1938, Makins to
Holderness, 10 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/22536, W14633/104/98,
f.93.
60 Record of meeting, 16 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/22537,
W15119/101/98, f.295.
61 Hoare, Hansard, op. cit., vol 341. col. 1037-1038,
17 Nov 1938.
267
On 21 November, announcing Home Office agreement to
streamline the admission of children, Hoare referred to a
meeting he had had with Samuel and a group of Jewish and
other religious workers earlier that day. Samuel emphasises
this occasion in his memoirs in a way which indicates that
he regarded it as the crucial development making possible
the large-scale admission of children. He reports that Hoare
agreed to children entering "without the slow procedure of
passports and visas" 62 . He also says that a guarantee was
given, "that they should be emigrated as soon as they were
old enough and conditions allowed", which was consistent
with the earlier deputation's undertaking to Chamberlain on
15 November. Hoare's remarks on 21 November, however, give
the impression that he envisaged that Jewish children would
obtain permanent homes in the UK.
The question of whether children were expected to re-
emigrate remained contentious. The Home Office under Hoare
did not expect that all would re-emigrate. The Movement for
the Care of Children from Germany said in its first annual
report that the Home Office had announced that it was
prepared to envisage the permanent unofficial adoption and
residence of younger children, and of girls who entered
domestic service or married British citizens, and said that
in May 1939 it was estimated that it would be necessary to
arrange the emigration of 80 per cent of the boys and 20 per
cent of the girls63 . The subject caused deep divisions
within the Jewish community, where many people did not share
the Zionist aspiration that children should be able to
62 Samuel, op. cit., p. 255.
63 See Movement for the Care of Children from Germany,
Ltd, First Annual Report, 1938-1939, 1940, PRO HO 213/302.
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proceed to Palestine 64 . Many British people who took refugee
children into their homes believed that the arrangement
would be permanent. Thus refugee children in the UK were
suspended between the possibilities of transmigration and
settlement, a situation filled with uncertainty, which the
Home Office made no systematic attempt to clarify.
Samuel, notwithstanding his emphasis in his memoirs on the
significance of the later meeting with Hoare, had emerged in
a hopeful frame of mind from the 15 November meeting with
Chamberlain, as he reported to a meeting of the Executive
Committee of the CGJ two days later. He said he felt the
Prime Minister appreciated the difficulties of the situation
and wished to help, and that on the question of children,
Chamberlain would support any suggestion approved by the
Home Office. Mrs Rebecca Sieff, who had spoken to Cooper,
said she was convinced that the Home Secretary would be
prepared to waive formalities. In preparation for expanded
immigration, a new appeal, chaired by Lord Rothschild, was
being launched in the Jewish press. Plans were outlined to
bring 5,000 children from Germany. Schiff also suggested
approaching Trades Unions, adding that, if refugees could
not work, they might come for training for emigration. Thus
Jewish leaders' assessment of Chamberlain's response, made
four days before the deputation to Hoare, reinforces the
conclusions of this study regarding the significance of
Chamberlain's role in the expansion of immigration. Sieff's
report of her talk with Cooper suggests that Home Office
64 For Weizmann's efforts in relation to Jewish
children see: Blanche Dugdale, entries 15 and 17 Nov and
11,12, and 15 December 1938, in ed. Norman Rose, Baffy, the
Diaries of Blanche Dugdale, 1936-1947, London 1973; Malcolm
MacDonald, Conversation with Dr Weizmann on the 12th
December, PRO FO 371/21868, E7548/1/31, f.374.
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officials favoured a reduction in formalities, for children
at least, and expected Hoare to consent.
The change in policy which led to the expansion of
admissions may be ascribed to the combined impact of three
principal factors which generated strong pressure for change
on humanitarian grounds. These factors were the extreme
persecution of Jews in Germany, the concern the persecution
aroused in the UK, and the new proposals of Jewish leaders.
Anglo-American considerations added a political factor. A
policy of expanding temporary refuge was humanitarian, but
allowed scope for immigration considerations to be re-
asserted in the long term. Yet precedent and existing policy
were hostile to an acknowledged policy of humanitarian
admissions, even on a temporary basis, despite the powerful,
though largely unacknowledged, humanitarian element in
existing Home Office and Ministry of Labour practice.
The fact that the decision to introduce an expanded policy
of temporary refuge was brought about by Chamberlain is, it
is suggested, far from accidental. Rather, it reflects the
reality that policy had become so rigidly fixed that only an
intervention from the very top could change it. Chamberlain
possessed the decisiveness and personal authority to carry
such a policy change through, despite Hoare's opposition.
The Home Secretary was submerged in departmental priorities,
his horizons limited by the Home Office preoccupation with
maintaining existing controls and his concern to prevent his
department from foundering through overwork. He was thus
unable to propose such a radical departure. Once the
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decision was made, however, he played his part in carrying
it out, and earned much gratitude from refugees65.
Practical changes followed in the wake of the Cabinet
discussions. A round of procedural changes were set in
motion and extra staff resources were provided to speed up
refugee admissions. The crusading tones of Hoare's speech on
21 November gave encouragement to Home Office staff, who
worked beyond the call of duty on refugee cases for the next
few months. Top-level endorsement of private sponsorship for
refugees, both by Hoare and in a broadcast appeal by Lord
Baldwin, generated new sources of funds to underwrite
admissions. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the
revision of procedures after 21 November was a sudden
development, resulting solely from ministerial
deliberations. The change of emphasis also gave new impetus
to existing developments. The involvement of voluntary
organisations in pre-selection had been developing steadily,
especially in the changes already described in procedures
for domestics; from November 1938 the participation of
refugee committees in selection and in the mechanics of
admission expanded yet again.
Procedures for transmigrants were already in the course of
being modified in negotiations between Jewish refugee
organisations and the Home Office, although the evidence
examined does not disclose the date when these discussions
began. On 22 November Cooper reported that, in order to
lessen the volume of work at the Home Office, it had been
65 See e.g. Werner Rosenstock, (General Secretary,
Association of Jewish Refugees) to Hoare, 6 Dec 1951,
Templewood Papers, Box XVII/8.
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decided to give a wide discretion to PCOs to grant visas to
refugees seeking temporary admission prior to emigration.
The Home Office wished to be satisfied that proper
arrangements had been made for transit cases, especially on
the crucial matter of maintenance, and the GJAC had
accordingly arranged for the drafting by Counsel of a form
of bond, to cover the temporary residence of refugees in
Britain. A guarantor would enter into such a bond, agreeing
with the CBF to defray the costs of the refugee's
maintenance and re-emigration. Evidence of entry into such a
bond would have to be presented to the PCO by the refugee,
together with evidence that permission to enter the USA, or
some other country, for permanent residence, would
eventually be granted. Similar arrangements were designed to
cover the cases of young people of both sexes, coming for
training for emigration, who might be admitted on condition
that they would emigrate. In these cases, however, the visas
would have to be authorised by the Home Office, rather than
being granted on the discretion of the PC066.
Coloured cards were printed to provide a document which
could be endorsed with authorisation for the temporary entry
to Britain of three categories of transmigrant 67 . The first
category covered persons for whom a bond for maintenance and
emigration had been deposited with the GJAC, and who had
been allotted a US States quota number or had official
authority to enter another country(it was only later
realised that the possession of a quota number was not a
66 Cooper, minute, 22 Nov, Schiff to Holderness, 23
Nov 1938, enclosing copy draft agreement(n.d.) drafted by
Lionel Cohen QC., Jagelman to Davidson, 30 Nov 1938, PRO HO
213/100.
67 Jagelman to Davidson, 28 Nov 1938, ibid.
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guarantee of admission to the USA.) The second and third
categories covered admission "on condition of emigration",
or "for training with a view to emigration", of refugees
whose emigration, maintenance, and, where appropriate,
training, was guaranteed by the GJAC 68 . It does not appear
that this particular set of cards was made operational, but
the use of serially-numbered cards, colour-coded for the
particular category under which admission was being
authorised, was developed to cover several classes of
refugee. The card system covered emigrants in transit;
trainees admitted with a view to emigration; unaccompanied
children; domestic service cases; persons over sixty;
refugees from Czechoslovakia, and men bound for a new
refugee transit camp at Richborough 69 . The cards were
stamped at the Home Office and sent out to the refugees for
submission to the PCO.
British consular officials in Germany made efforts help
speed up the departure of refugees for the UK. The PCO in
Berlin, Captain Frank Foley, acting without instructions,
arranged with the American Consul in Berlin to grant visas
to persons to come to the UK in transit to the USA, but was
asked to await the introduction of new procedures developed
by the Home Office 70 . Foley's initiative reflected his
consciousness of the importance of granting visas quickly.
The information that a visa had been granted could cut down
periods spent in detention by refugees. Men detained in
68 Jagelman to Davidson, 28 and 30 Nov 1938, ibid.
69 Cooper to Brooks, 28 Mar 1939, PRO FO 371/24076,
W5248/45/48, f.210.
70 Jeffes to Holderness, 24 Nov 1938, Jagelman minute,
Jagelman to Jeffes. 28 Nov 1938, PRO HO 213/100.
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concentration camps were released on production of evidence
that a British visa had been authorised, and British
officials in Germany utilised contacts with the German
authorities to try to minimise the time-lag between visa-
authorisation and release. The consul in Frankfurt,
Smailbones, reported having an agreement with the local
secret police that they would release prisoners on being
informed that a visa had been granted 71 . Hoare showed
interest in ensuring that the German authorities were
notified of grants of visas to Germans under detention, but
Makins' efforts to interest Home Office officials in
developing the existing ad-hoc procedures into something
more systematic were unsuccessful. Cooper emphasised that if
a visa had been granted, this fact could be conveyed to the
German authorities by the prisoner's friends and family72.
He did not welcome suggestions that British representatives
in Germany should intervene in any other circumstances to
try to secure the release of prisoners in concentration
camps, advising that this would be unlikely to help the
prisoner, and would moreover produce delays in Germany while
the case file was removed from its normal place for
investigation. Nevertheless, the Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin
71 Berlin Chancery to Central Department 29 Dec 1938,
enclosing memorandum (n.d.) from Captain Foley on procedures
for obtaining release of persons detained in Germany,
Creswell, minute, 4 Jan 1939, Jeffes (PCD) minute, 12 Jan
1939, PRO FO 371/21753, C16070/2311/18, f.384.
72 See PRO HO 213/101 for the Home Office side of this
correspondence; for the Foreign Office side, see
correspondence from the Berlin Chancery and Foreign Office
minutes and correspondence with Cooper, 9 Nov to 23 December
1938, PRO FO 371/21757, C13766/15535/2412/18, f.349.
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was authorised to use his discretion to intervene in the
case of a son-in-law of an aunt of Lord Reading's73.
The voluntary committees were now allowed to select a wide
range of refugees for entry. Representatives sent to the
Continent by the British committees worked in conjunction
with German Jewish organisations, notably the
Reichsvertretung in Germany, selecting from among the
assembled candidates those suitable for admission to the UK.
Lists of approved names were then submitted to the Home
Office. These lists, or "nominal rolls", largely replaced
the elaborate process of individual visa applications,
especially in children's cases, and made possible the use of
block visas. The standard visa system remained in operation
for all other refugees, but here too, recommendations from
the voluntary organisations were often accepted in lieu of
investigations by the authorities. The Home Office accepted
such recommendations on the basis that the voluntary
organisations undertook that the refugees would be
maintained and were suitable cases for admission.
The crucial element for the majority of refugee applicants
was guaranteed finance. This had to be raised either through
private sponsorship, possession of funds or an offer of
employment. One exception to this rule was the arrangements
for many of the men who came to Richborough camp, a refugee
transit camp set up by the CGJ on the site of a disused army
camp at Richborough in Kent 74 . The CGJ had decided to make a
See correspondence, initiated by an appeal from
Lord Reading to Halifax, 18 Nov to 21 Dec 1938, PRO FO
371/21753, C14141/14718/2311/18, f.165.
275
special effort to save men from concentration camps in
Germany. Home Office approval was obtained in early January
1939. The CGJ established that men aged 18-45 who were bound
for the camp would be admitted on the basis that they were
transmigrants. Partial financial support for the venture was
promised to the CGJ by the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee, which shouldered some 20 per cent of
the upkeep costs 75 . The men were selected in Germany by
representatives, among them Julian Layton, who felt a strong
personal commitment to assisting the emigration of men who
did not have means but who would be suitable for re-
emigration from the UK 76 . The policy of releasing CGJ funds
to help men who had neither funds not relatives was proposed
by Layton and two other CJJ representatives on their return
from a visit to Vienna to select refugees for the camp77.
The passports of men allowed to enter the UK bound for
Richborough camp were endorsed to show that they had been
admitted "pending re-emigration", but the reality of these
re-emigration prospects was often questionable and in some
cases fictitious. Thus statements that refugees would re-
emigrate to Shanghai were often based on nothing more than
the fact that Shanghai did not require visas 78 . The camp
filled rapidly. It had been hoped to accommodate 5,000, but
a lower limit of 3,500 inmates was agreed: when war broke
See correspondence and memoranda, Jan-Nov 1939,
AJDC 592.
76 Layton, interview with this author, 20 Apr 1988.
CGJ, 'Report by Mr Layton, Mr Gentitli and Mr Baron
on the selection of refugees for the Richborough Camp',(n.d.
covering visit from 19 Feb-3 Mar), AJDC 592.
78 Werner Rosenstock, interview with this author, 19
Apr 1988 and 6 May 1989. Rosenstock worked for the
Reichsvertretung on such cases in 1939, and came to the UK
shortly before war broke out.
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out some 3,350 men and some 220 women and children were
temporarily accommodated there. By November 1939 only 100
had emigrated79.
There was no quota for children, but the aim of admitting
about 10,000 was regarded as an upper limit by the Movement
for the Care of Children from Gerinany(MCCG), which organised
the admission of slightly over 9,000 children before the
war80 . The MCCG records that numbers in England shot up from
1,544 in January 1939 to 9,354 by August 30 1939, classified
as 7,482 Jews, 1,123 Christians and 749 "undenominational".
The family tragedies involved in the children's emigration
are suggested by the fact that in July 1939, of the
unaccompanied children in England nearly half had parents
left behind in Greater Germany with no means of support: a
further quarter had parents in possession of some means
still in Germany. Just under 1,300 refugee children had
already started to pay their way in the UK, in jobs and
youth agriculture camps. Before the end of 1939, nearly 300
children had emigrated from the UK, and many more had plans
to re-emigrate. The UK was the country which played by far
the greatest part in succouring unaccompanied young people
from Germany. Figures from July 1939 show that 7,700 refugee
children had arrived in the UK unescorted by relatives:
Holland had 1,850, France 800, Belgium 700, and 250 had gone
to Sweden. A campaign to change American immigration laws to
CCJR, 'Note on the Kitchener Camp', 21 Nov 1939,
AJDC 592.
80 For the statistics in this paragraph see MCCG,
First Annual Report, already cited.
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facilitate the entry of refugee children in the aftermath of
Kristallnacht, had failed81.
Most children had to be financially sponsored. A limited
exception to the requirement for guaranteed finance was made
for urgent cases, known as "unguaranteed children". The vast
majority of children who entered had to be "guaranteed" by
cash deposits covering maintenance up to the age of 1882. In
the spring of 1939, as funds dwindled, new mandatory
deposits of £50 per guaranteed child were introduced by the
MCCG, to cover the cost of re-emigration, but this
requirement was later rescinded 83 . In June 1939 the CGJ
agreed to accept full responsibility for the emigration of
children then arriving 84 . A large part of the finance for
children's immigration came from the Lord Baldwin Appeal,
but the success of this appeal, which raised some £500,000,
turned out to be a source of difficulties for the other
fund-raising organisations: in May 1939 the Co-ordinating
Committee resolved that the Baldwin Appeal be closed down
and its funds distributed to the other organisations85.
The general rule was that refugee organisations would not
themselves undertake financial responsibility, although they
81 Wyman, Paper Walls. America and the Refugee Crisis,
New York 1985, pp. 75-98. (original publication: Amherst
1968).
82 See minutes of meeting of Co-ordinating Committee,
27 May 1939, PRO HO 213/268.
83 See MCCG, First Annual Report, already cited, pp.
6-7.
84 Minutes of meeting of Co-ordinating Committee, PRO
HO 213/268.
85 Co-ordjnating Committee resolution, 27 May 1939,
PRO HO 213/268.
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might expend funds on the basis of a guarantee. The refugee
committees worked to create opportunities for refugees, and
brought together refugees with persons who might support or
employ them. Once arrangements had been made, refugee
workers would submit the details to the authorities 86 . The
guarantees which were the pre-condition of entry in so many
cases were in many instances not honoured, or honoured only
in part. In 1940 the Refugee Children's Movement took over
responsibility for 109 children and partial responsibility
for 168 more87 . The refugee organisations spent much effort
in trying to hold defaulters to their promises. In 1941 the
Treasury Solicitor advised that the agreements signed by
guarantors were not legally enforceable: no consideration
moved from the refugee committee to the guarantor, so an
essential of a binding contract was lacking 88 . The author of
this advice thought that the guarantees had never been
intended to confer real rights enforceable either by a
refugee committee or by the government, but "in the nature
of credentials which the Home Office required before
refugees were permitted to land"89.
The supply of support fell far short of the demand. The
classified columns of the Jewish Chronicle contained many
advertisements from refugees seeking financial sponsorship,
often for a limited period prior to re-emigration. Large
numbers of prospective refugees never surmounted the hurdle
of sponsorship. The proportion of prospective applicants to
86 See GJAC monthly reports, Feb-Jun 1939, AJDC 587.
87 MCCG, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 6.
88 Speed to Ellefson, 28 Oct 1941, PRO TS 27/467.
89 Ibid.
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entrants is impossible to estimate precisely, but, since the
CBF has files on between 500,000 and 600,000 cases, while
the number of Jewish refugees present in the UK when war
broke out is estimated at between 60,000 and 70,000, it
seems perhaps one applicant in ten may have succeeded in
gaining entry90.
The Cabinet Committee on the Refu gee Problem and the rob1em
of re-emigration
Before the end of December 1938 Samuel told the CGJ of
unease within the Home Office about the establishment of
transit camps, "as they feared that a pool of refugees might
be formed in England" 91 . By January 1939, although Home
Office permission had been given for Richborough Camp, the
accumulation of transmigrants in the UK was already regarded
by Hoare as a problem for the Home Office. A new Cabinet
Committee on the Refugee Problem was set up on his
suggestion and under his chairmanship, although the proposal
originated with Lord Winterton. The committee's brief was,
"to keep under review questions arising out of the refugee
problem and to report when necessary to the Cabinet". It met
six times in all before the outbreak of war, and twice more
90 This estimate, based on the archives of the CBF,
now deposited at the Greater London Record Office, was given
by the Director of the CBF in July 1990.
91 Minutes, CGJ Executive meeting, 29 Dec 1938, CBF
Reel 1, file 2.
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before the end of the year 92 . At the start of the
committee's first meeting, on 24 January, Hoare described
the delay in arriving at a detailed scheme for the permanent
settlement of refugees from Germany, whom the Home Office
had allowed in on a temporary basis, as "very embarrassing".
He expressed concern that a "stagnant pool of refugees"
remained in the country, making specific reference to the
training camp at Richborough 93 . In the ensuing months Hoare
tried to ensure that the committee promoted the reduction of
refugee numbers in the UK. In March he expressed concern
that if settlement prospects overseas did not materialise,
the continued retention of large numbers of German refugees
might give rise to "an awkward political situation"; in May,
he suggested earmarking some of the men training at
Richborough for settlement in British Guiana94.
In July 1939, in an interim report to the Cabinet on behalf
of the committee, Hoare reported that it was clear that the
refugee organisations were in no position to finance
colonial settlement schemes such as the British Guiana
project. Moreover, there was a danger that their funds would
be inadequate to meet existing commitments. There were some
40,000 refugees in the country, the majority transmigrants
92 Cab. 1(39)5, 18 Jan 1939, PRO CAB 23/97. Other
members were the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and
the Colonies; the President of the Board of Trade; the
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster(Lord Winterton); the
Financial Secretary to the Treasury; the Parliamentary
Secretaries at the Foreign Office and Ministry of Labour.
The Committee's proceedings are in PRO CAB 98/1; after the
outbreak of war the Colonial Secretary became chairman.
CP(39)1A, 22 Sept 1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
CRP(39)lst mtg, 24 Jan 1939, PRO CAB 98/1; the camp
was not at this date ready to accept inmates.
CRP(39)3rd mtg, 1 Mar 1939, PRO CAB 98/1;
CRP(39)4th mtg, 9 May 1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
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admitted on the strength of guarantees that the cost of
their maintenance would not fall on public funds. The funds
of the refugee organisations which had undertaken
responsibility for these guarantees had been strained to the
utmost, principally by delays in re-emigration. Unless a
large number emigrated soon, refugees in the UK were likely
to fall on public assistance, an outcome the Home Office was
most anxious to avoid.
The report concluded that in the circumstances the
government should no longer refuse to offer finance for
refugee settlement and emigration. It advised agreeing in
principle to make funds available on a basis proportional to
amounts subscribed privately, provided other governments
would also contribute, although the only country whose co-
operation should be regarded as essential was the USA. The
UK should give a lead on these lines at the forthcoming
meeting of the IGC "in view of the gravity of the situation
in this country" 95 . The support of Hoare's committee for a
major reversal of previous policy resulted from the view
that the UK now had a refugee problem, which should be
solved urgently through the provision of settlement
opportunities abroad, and that this should be at government
expense, because no other source was available. The new
position, while it represented a reversal of policy
regarding public funds, was in part aimed at saving future
expenditure on public assistance, and was consistent with
Home Office policy that the UK should remain a country of
transit. Thus the proposed injection of finance from the
British government was aimed at increasing emigration
Hoare, Interim Report, Cabinet Committee on the
Refugee Problem, CP 151(39), 7 Jul 1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
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opportunities from the UK, not from Germany. The suggested
new policy was agreed in principle by the Cabinet in mid-
July96 . The offer of finance was communicated to the
Americans, but never proceeded with. In September, war broke
out, putting British contributions for colonial settlement
projects out of the question for the time being 97 . The
following month the offer was formally withdrawn by British
representatives, at a meeting with the Americans in
Washington98.
New restrictions
In the absence of either colonial resettlement possibilities
or of any practical outcome to the work of the IGC, re-
emigration remained the only means of reducing refugee
numbers in the UK. Yet re-emigration remained at a low
level: a few hundred refugees were leaving monthly, but
several thousand were arriving 99 . A major factor blocking
re-emigration was the refusal of the US government to relax
entry procedures in order to speed up the admission of
refugees who had entered the UK in transit to the USA: many
might not be able to depart for years, if ever, because of
the delaying effect of the American quota system in European
countries, where the demand for visas far exceeded the
supply. A person registered after July 1938 on the
German/Austrian quota, for example, would not be in line for
96 Cab 37(39)11, 12 Jul 1939, PRO CAB 23/100; Sherman,
op. cit., pp. 242-250.
CRP(39)6th mtg, 25 Sept 1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
98 See chapter six.
Hope Simpson, Refugees, a Review of the Situation
Since September 1938, London 1939, p. 71; Cooper to Brooks,
28 Mar 1939, PRO FO 371/24076, W5248/45/48, f.210.
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an American visa until March 1940. During the first two
months of 1939 American consular representatives in London,
Berlin and Vienna impressed on the British authorities the
fact that the quota system was producing delays of this
order'°°. The US State Department insisted that delays must
be expected and no exceptions could be made for persons in
danger'°. Home Office officials responded with more
stringent controls for the authorisation of entry for
applicants in transit to the USA, who, from April 1939,
needed both to have a reasonable chance of admission to the
USA at a date that was not too distant, and to have backing
from a voluntary organisation'°2.
As well as trying to ensure that refugees would re-emigrate
reasonably soon, the Home Office took steps to establish
more careful control over admissions in certain cases. In
June 1939, for example, use of the streamlined card
procedure was discontinued for applicants residing in
France, who were not thought to be in danger. More rigorous
selection procedures were introduced for refugees applying
in France to come to the UK for domestic service, after the
British PCO in Paris, GW Courtney doubted the suitability of
many refugee applicants. He gave the example of the case of
100 Foley(Berlin) to Jeffes, 17 Jan 1939, Cooper to
Reilly, 26 Jan 1939, PRO HO 213/115; Jenkins (US Consul-
General, London) to Cooper, 13 Feb 1939, PRO HO 213/116;
Theodore Hohenthal(US Vice-Consul in charge of visas,
Vienna) to GW Berry(PCO, Vienna), 2 Mar 1939, Berry to
Jeffes, 7 Mar 1939, PRO HO 213/118.
101 US Department of State to Lady Reading, 16 Feb
1939, Schiff to Cooper, 22 Mar 1939, PRO HO 213/117.
102 MG Russell, minute, 31 Mar 1939, W Jagelman,
minute, 3 April 1939, Home Office, Aliens Department,
circular, 'Refugees desiring to come to the United Kingdom
temporarily while waiting for US visas', Apr 1939, PRO HO
213/117; Home Office to refugee committees, 21 Apr 1939, PRO
HO 213/118.
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an upper middle class doctor, who, on being told that his
proposal to work as a tutor did not constitute domestic
service, stated that he would work as a butler: "This",
Courtney declared, "is absurd, as butlering requires a
lifelong experience"03.
The concerns of Passoort Control Officers
The Passport Control Department was a source of continual
complaints that the Home Office was undermining the basis of
control and allowing Britain to be swamped by refugees. In
February 1939, the Home Secretary received a memorandum
detailing the grievances of PCOs. One major complaint
concerned persistent overwork. Despite large reinforcements
of staff at Berlin, Vienna, Prague and Budapest, officers
were "being daily submerged by crowds of excited and
insistent refugees". Visas were being issued on a large
scale: between May 1938 and the end of January 1939, some
50,000 visas had been granted to refugees, many covering
more than one person. Refugee visas included 13,500 out of a
total of 15,000 visas granted in Vienna, and 34,000 out of
40,000 granted in Berlin. In January alone some 4,000 Home
Office authorisations had been sent out to PCOs abroad, not
including other authorisations such as Ministry of Labour
permits. The PCOs also expressed concern at the "poor type
of refugee", including individuals previously refused visas,
whose admission was being authorised under the new
procedures. They also protested at the way in which their
objections to issuing visas to refugees were being overruled
by the Home Office. Hoare's first response had been to say
103 Courtney to Jeffes, 8 Mar 1939, 'Instructions to
Passport Control for Paris', 2 Jun 1939, Russell to Schiff,
5 Jun 1939, PRO HO 213/105.
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"that we could not possibly stop immigration", but he asked
whether the safeguards could be improved'04.
Home Office officials responded to such complaints by
rejecting most demands for extra safeguards, while
reassuring PCOs that the new selection procedures were
reliable, and that their discretion to refuse visas was
respected. For example, they rejected a suggestion from
Foley, the PCO in Berlin, of demanding medical certificates
and police certificates as a condition of granting visas.
The Director of Passport Control, Captain Maurice Jeffes,
had agreed that this would be wrong but he still had many
reservations' 05 . In June Jeffes sent Cooper a report of his
recent tour of European Passport Control offices, in which
he included complaints about the quality of refugees
authorised for entry under the revised admission
procedures 106 . Individual PCOs also took up problems of
control. In mid-June, Hindle, PCO in Budapest, warned
against "the swamping of the UK with Hungarian and other
refugees", and sought authority for PCOs to limit the
validity of visas to one month in doubtful cases, to stop
Jewish businessmen from acquiring visas and keeping them in
reserve as "a key to the back door out of Hungary", but by
the outbreak of war no action had been taken on his
104 Memorandum from PCOs (handwritten comments by
Hoare), 14 Feb 1939, PRO HO 213/103.
105 PCO to Jeffes, 1 Feb 1939, Jagelman and Cooper,
minutes, 20 Feb 1939, Jagelman, minute, 1 Mar 1939, and
subsequent correspondence, PRO HO 213/104.
106 Jeffes to Cooper, 5 Jun 1939, Cooper to Jeffes, 15
Aug 1939, PRO HO 213/107.
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suggestion' 07 . The PCO in Prague, Captain VC Farrell,
complained:
The tendency appears to be to get refugees into the United
Kingdom under any pretext whatsoever, so long as the Home
Office and the Ministry of Labour are prepared to issue some
sort of authorisation which provides a cover for refugees to
"dig" themselves in in British territory".
Immigrants, he claimed, were usually ignorant of the
conditions attached to their stay, which resulted from
"plausible assurances given by bankrupt Refugee
organisations and guarantors who are unable to accept
financial liability for their proteges". Farrell, like
Hindle, saw Jewish business visa applicants as potential
emigrants, since antisemitic measures would soon exclude
Jews from earning a living, and was refusing applicants
unless they provided "incontestable proof" of bona fide
purposes and facilities to return to Czechoslovakia: he
warned that complaints about his approach might be
received' 08 . It was decided to tell Farrell that if
authorisation was under "Instructions R", (the special
refugee guide-lines), a PCO need not concern himself with
the alien's plans to leave the UK or seek employment109.
Jeffes reported satisfactory improvements in managing
refugee cases at the posts he had visited. In Vienna, 100
visas were being granted daily and 200 people a day being
interviewed; the queue nuisance and the majority of
107 WH Hindle to Director PCD, memorandum, 'Limitation
of visas', 15 Jun 1939, Home Office minutes, 25 and 26 Sept
1939, PRO HO 213/107; for Hindle, see also Jeffes' report to
Cooper previously cited.
108 Farrell, memorandum, 'Witholding of visas by
examiners', PCO Prague to Director of Passport Control, 7
Jun 1939, PRO HO 213/111.
109 Clayton, minute, 14 Aug 1939, ibid.
287
complaints had been eliminated. In Budapest, refugees from
Germany and Austria were being dealt with efficiently and
speedily. There was a small new office at Bratislava.
Farrell had efficiently reorganised the Prague office, which
now had a day set aside for at least 100 cases of the
British Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia, and 15
to 20 refugee cases were dealt with on other days110.
Pre-selecti gn and the limits of chan ge: the St Louis affair
The Home Office refused to dispense with pre-selection.
Thus, Home Office ministers steadfastly resisted suggestions
that Britain should set up a facility similar to Ellis
Island in the USA, where persons whose entry had not been
approved could have their cases investigated. In April 1939
Hoare, defending this position, said it was undesirable to
allow a "stagnant pool" of refugees to develop in the UK'11.
In June, the Home Office reluctantly made an exception to
the pre-selection rule for refugees on board the SS St
Louis. This ship left Hamburg in mid-May with over 930
passengers, bound for Cuba. Most were Jewish refugees,
planning to wait in Cuba to enter the USA under the German
quota: the majority still had a long wait ahead. On arrival
in Havana the passengers' permits to land were not honoured
and the ship was refused permission to dock. A forewarning
of this reception had been sent by the Cuban authorities
before the ship's departure: Sir Herbert Emerson too had
warned the ship's owners not to let her sail. As the ship
110 Jeffes to Cooper, 5 Jun 1939, PRO HO 213/107.
Hoare, Hansard vol. 342. col, 3082, 22 Dec 1938;
Hoare, Hansard, vol. 345, cols. 2455-2457, 3 Apr 1939.
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and its passengers sought a haven, the Cubans constantly
raised their financial demands for allowing the refugees to
enter Cuba. The US government would not make an exception to
its procedures to permit any refugees to land, and sent
coastguard vessels to stop anyone swimming ashore. The ship,
unable to discharge its human cargo, began the return voyage
to Hamburg in a glare of publicity, amid frantic appeals to
Western governments to offer refuge to the passengers112.
Cooper told Schiff that no admissions were possible without
examination of the refugees by a British representative in
Germany113 . If the refugees were returned to Germany,
examination of their cases would be expedited: it was
possible that Sir Herbert Emerson would go to Germany to
supervise this process 1 ' 4 . Cooper saw the episode as an
attempt by the Germans to unload refugees on other
countries, thus upsetting IGC plans of orderly emigration,
and feared that there might be undesirable persons among the
passengers. He clung to the view that the refugees should be
required to return to Germany, saying that a proportion
would be undesirable, and it would be easier to refuse them
admission while on German soil, than to admit them and then
enforce their return. Although Cooper recorded the
impression that Schiff agreed with the firm line he was
taking, Schiff told representatives of the American Jewish
Joint Distribution Committee(AJDC) of his optimism that the
Home Office would agree to temporary admission of refugees
112 See Breitman and Kraut, op. cit, pp. 70-73, 232.
113 Cooper, minute, 9 Jun 1939, PRO FO 371/24101,
W9189/9189/48, f.11.
114 Hyman, Minutes of meeting of AJDC Executive
Committee, 8 Jun, ADJC London to AJDC New York 9 June, AJDC
378.
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who had documents for re-emigration to the USA, on the basis
of a guarantee from the AJDC to maintain them in the
interim' 15 . At a meeting at the Home Office on 12 June, at
which AJDC officials offered such a guarantee, the admission
to the UK of between 300 and 350 passengers was finally
agreed, on the basis that the concession was not a purely
British initiative, and that confirmation was obtained of
offers by other governments to admit the remaining two-
thirds of the refugees. The Belgian government had promised
to admit 250; Holland would admit 194 who had no affidavits
for entry to America; France agreed that day to admit 250.
The Home Office representatives at the meeting had been
Maxwell and Cooper: Hoare was not present, but his sanction
was obtained afterwards116.
It was suggested at the meeting that a number of the
refugees should be returned to Germany, where it was thought
nothing would happen to them, in order to demonstrate to the
German government that such pressure to take refugees would
not work. During the meeting, and in a parliamentary
statement the next day, Home Office spokesmen insisted that
arrangements for emigration must proceed in accordance with
an orderly programme, and that this extraordinary case was
not a precedent for admitting refugees who had not made
definite arrangements for their reception before setting
out. The fact that the passengers already had visas was
seized on as the special factor which explained the British
115 Cooper minute, 9 Jun 1939, PRO FO 371/24101,
W9189/9189/48, f.11; 'Record of discussions re St Louis', 9
Jun 1939, AJDC 378.
116 Randall, minute, 12 Jun 1938, PRO FO 371/24101,
W9189/9189/48, f.11; 'Memorandum of Discussions and meetings
re S/S St Louis', 12 Jun 1939, Baerwald to Joseph Hyman, 13
June 1939, AJDC 378.
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agreement to make an exception in this case 117 . To avoid
creating a precedent, British representatives asked all
governments concerned to make it clear to the Germans that
this was the last time that such a concession would be made;
the AJDC soon afterwards made a widely publicised
announcement that it would abstain from staging a rescue
should similar circumstances arise in future"8.
The case of the St Louis had been exceptional. It was not a
clear-cut case of illegal dumping of refugees, because of
the existence of the Cuban landing permits 19 . During the
first phase of the affair, the AJDC decided to offer the
Cubans a ransom of up to $500,000 to let the refugees land,
despite the danger of encouraging similar demands from
greedy Latin American governments in future. The AJDC also
made unsuccessful efforts to move the US government to
intervene with the Cubans or to modify immigration
procedures' 20 . Most of the credit for achieving the
admission of the passengers to the four European countries
was due to the AJDC, which provided the essential finance,
and whose representatives conducted energetic negotiations
in several European capitals 121 . President Roosevelt was
117 Peake, Hansard, vol. 348, cols. 1111-1112, 13 Jun
1939.
118 Baerwald to Joseph Hyman, 13 Jun 1939, AJDC 378;
Hansard 13 Jun, see n. above.
119 AJDC to Baerwald, 10 Jun 1939, AJDC 378.
120 For AJDC policy see Yehuda Bauer, My Brother's
Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee, 1929-1939, Philadelphia 1974, pp. 278-80, 281,
288, 289.
121 The senior AJDC representatives who participated
in the negotiations in London happened to be there on other
refugee business, having come for discussions on the Co-
ordinating Foundation, which was linked to the Wohlthat-
Rublee plan.
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not prepared to risk setting a precedent by making an
exception, which he had the power to do 122 . Although the US
government maintained its unbending stance, it was
embarrassed by the St Louis crisis, in which American public
opinion had become highly interested, and the State
Department pressed Pell to use IGC resources to achieve
admissions to western Europe 123 ; the IGC subsequently
received more credit for the offers from the four
governments than its secondary role seems to justify. In
reality, the Home Office had been induced to make an
exception to its policy by the AJDC's offer of a generous
guarantee, the GJAC being in no position to make a financial
commitment of this magnitude. Once the decision was made,
the Home Office did its best to prevent the exception from
becoming a precedent. The British acceptance of the
remainder of the passengers saved the US government from
some of the embarrassing consequences of its own reluctance
to risk making an exception; it also demonstrated the UK's
commitment to Anglo-American co-operation on refugee policy.
Ultimately, 287 or 288 St Louis refugees landed in Britain,
181 in Holland, 214 in Belgium and 224 in France. The Home
Office suggested that each of the four receiving countries
take a family off the passenger list in turn, to avoid any
particular country being saddled with those whose American
visas would take longest to secure, a consideration which
remained important even when it emerged that 250 passengers
had relatives in the UK who were anxious to maintain
122 Breitman and Kraut, op. cit., p. 232.
123 AJDC to Baerwald, 9 Jun 1939, AJDC 378.
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them124 . The AJDC allocated $500,000 to cover foreseeable
expenses on the passengers: later a AJDC representative
maintained that the terms of the guarantee given to the
British government were limited to a maximum of $500.00 in
each case' 25 . Most of the passengers in the UK could not
expect admission to the USA for several years, and many were
too old to work, so their expenses were substantial. The
ADJC was held to the performance of its full financial
responsibility for the British cases: by 1941 this had cost
$72,000 126
. The GJAC had also promised to maintain a
proportion of the St Louis passengers, but from 1940 it
received government financial assistance in honouring all
its maintenance obligations.
The end of Dre-war immigration.
From early 1939, British officials and refugee organisations
became increasingly involved in efforts to stop illegal
refugee boats and transports. The German authorities were
known to be implicated in hastening the departure from
German territory of Jews who had no certainty of admission
elsewhere. The St Louis was the most celebrated of a number
of havenless refugee ships. Illegal migration overland was
also seen as a serious problem. The growing influx of
refugees into Shanghai, where they did not require visas,
was an increasing source of concern to the British
government. Cooper, for example, had referred to the need to
124 Randall to Wright, 14 Jun 1939, Wright to Randall
15 Jun 1939, PRO FO 371/24101, W9470/9189/48, f.27.
125 Troper to Morrissey, 17 March 1942, AJDC 381.
126 See correspondence between the AJDC and CCJR on
this question April-Jun 1941, AJDC 379.
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discourage the Germans from sending refugees to Shanghai, to
justify his firm line on the St Louis passengers; he
expressed concern at the readiness of American organisations
to maintain refugees in Shanghai, which he saw as consent to
German blackmail'27.
Increasingly, the destination of illegal migration was
Palestine. A new and restrictive policy, announced in the
controversial White Paper of May 1939, restricted Jewish
immigration to 75,000 over the next five years, after which
no immigration would be permitted without Arab consent. The
government rode out the storm of protest which greeted this
policy. The Colonial Office imposed additional restrictions,
announcing a six-month suspension of admissions to Palestine
as a punishment for illegal immigration. The Home Office was
unsuccessful in efforts to get the ban lifted in the case of
refugees in transit to Palestine now stranded in the UK128.
Emerson, in his capacity as director of the IGC, worked to
gain the co-operation of foreign governments and refugee
organisations in curbing illegal emigration, always
underlining the need to channel emigration into orderly
arrangements in line with IGC policy. The government's
favourable report on settlement prospects in British Guiana
had been published one week before the Palestine White
Paper, in a vain hope of countering the despair Jews would
127 Cooper minute, 9 Jun 1939, PRO FO 371/24101,
W9189/9189/48, f. 11; for Shanghai, see David Kranzler,
Japanese, Nazis and Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of
Shanghai, 1939-1945, New York 1976.
128 Sherman, op. cit. pp. 242-243; Wasserstein, Jews
of Europe, op. cit., pp. 1-39.
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feel at this blow to hopes for emigration to Palestine'29.
Yet neither British Guiana, nor IGC negotiations and plans
produced actual avenues of escape. The reality remained that
the way out of Europe for Jews, if not by emigration either
to Palestine or to Shanghai, much of it illegal, was through
infiltration into developed countries. The finance for this
emigration continued to come from such means as the refugees
managed to preserve; the rest from private charity. The one
exception was an anomalous advance of British funds in the
case of Czechoslovakia, discussed in the next chapter.
Several thousand refugees entered the UK every month until
the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, although entry procedures
had been streamlined, the admission system still presented
many obstacles to refugees and kept down the numbers of
entrants. Delays of all kinds persisted, and mistakes and
inefficiency could not be eliminated. Many refugees could
not fulfil the conditions for entry, and, as war approached,
the availability of sponsorship diminished. The long-
predicted exhaustion of the funds of refugee organisations
was also imminent. Cooper, foreseeing this development in
March 1939, summarised the policy of the refugee
organisations as being to transfer to Britain "as many
refugees as they feel able to deal with"130.
A report dating from mid-August 1939, by Norman Bentwich of
the CGJ, on a recent meeting with Adolf Eichmann in Vienna,
demonstrates that the voluntary organisations felt obliged
to resist pressure for co-operation with the German
129 Sherman, op. cit., pp. 230-235.
130 Cooper to Brooks, 28 Mar 1939, PRO FO 371 24076,
W5248/45/48, f.203.
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timetable for Jewish emigration' 31 . In Vienna, the
population of confessional Jews had been reduced from
165,000 in April 1938 to 67,000 in August 1939; numbers in
the Austrian provinces had dropped from 15,000 to only 370.
The Jewish death rate of 3,500 was four times that in 1937:
of this, one eighth was due to suicide. The authorities now
planned to eliminate the Jewish population of Vienna by the
end of 1939 or early 1940. Bentwich, together with Dr
Löwenherz of the Vienna Jewish Kultusgemeinde, discussed the
timetable for emigration with Eichmann, who was in charge of
Jewish emigration there, and had recently acquired a similar
responsibility in Bohemia and Moravia. Bentwich told
Eichmann that the CGJ could not continue to provide funds to
assist the Kultusgerneinde on the scale of recent months. He
said his organisation was unwilling to help carry out a
policy "which was only multiplying the problems of the
countries to which the refugees were forced out". It could
only help if there was "an ordered emigration over a longer
period", which required German co-operation. Eichmann, on
the other hand, required complete evacuation of Jews in
"Ostmark" (as the Nazis described Austria) in the shortest
possible time. He dismissed the possibility of ordered
emigration. His only concession was that, of 67,000
remaining Jews in Vienna, between 20,000 and 25,000 -
persons over 65 who could not emigrate, pensioners and the
very poor - might stay: the remaining 45,000 should be
cleared out over the next six months.
Bentwich explained in his report that emigration
opportunities were not available on the scale required by
131 Bentwich, 'Report on a visit to Vienna', 17 Aug
1939, CBF Reel 4, File 25.
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Eichmann's timetable. By this time, Shanghai and Italy were
regarded as closed to Jewish immigration, and future
admissions to both the USA and the UK were estimated at the
rate of only 1,000 persons per month each. Admissions to
England were currently divided between women for domestic
service, private guarantee cases, children, and Richborough
Camp, but the latter two categories were nearly filled. The
addition of the estimated monthly places contributed by
overseas countries(700), Palestine(500) and European
countries(500), gave a total of 3,700 per month - only half
the rate of Eichmann's proposed exodus. Meanwhile, the
problem of providing relief for Jews remaining in Austria
would be a heavy tax on Jewish resources.
The unresolved conflict over Jewish emigration is
graphically illustrated by the confrontation between the
Jewish representatives and Eichmann. Bentwich's report shows
that the programme of the IGC - of which efforts to persuade
Eichmann to moderate his demands and talk of orderly
emigration were a melancholy echo - had achieved nothing for
refugees. The CGJ faced an agonising choice between trying
to comply with pressure for Jewish emigration on the Nazis'
terms while pleading for time, or calling a halt. Several
weeks before war finally broke out, the Jewish refugee
organisations decided they could not deal with any more
cases, and asked the British government to halt new
admissions'32.
132 Sherman, op. cit. p. 255; Wasserstein, Jews of
Europe, op. cit., pp. 81-2; Cooper to Randall, 18 Sept 1939,
PRO FO 371 24100, W13792/3231/48, f.120.
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CHAPTER 5:
REFUGEES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AFTER MUNICH
Policy
The refugee crisis in Czechoslovakia differed in important
respects from the plight of refugees in Germany and Austria,
not least, because it was a direct outcome of British
foreign policy, which had culminated in the Munich
Agreement. The British response to the crisis reflected
these differences. This chapter examines the way in which
such differences affected the admission of refugees from
Czechoslovakia to the UK. The nature of the refugee crisis
and British attitudes to various categories of refugee are
dealt with first. Then the political factors in the British
response to the refugees are outlined, together with the
consequences of the government's financial involvement in
aid to refugees from Czechoslovakia. The final section of
the chapter is concerned with the administration of
admissions and the selection of refugees.
The refugee crisis
The Munich crisis produced a refugee crisis in
Czechoslovakia, which began before the actual signing of the
Munich Agreement 1 . During September 1938 thousands of people
fled from the Sudetenland into other parts of
Czechoslovakia, fearing that the government would soon be
forced to give way to German pressure for the surrender of
the Sudeten areas. These fears were realised at the end of
1 For the background to the crisis, see JW Brueghel,
Czechoslovakia before Munich, Cambridge 1973; for the
refugee crisis, see Sherman, op. cit., pp. 137-159.
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the month, when the Munich Agreement was signed 2 . Under the
agreement, the Sudeten areas were ceded to Germany and were
occupied by German troops from 1 October. The exodus
continued during October, with refugees leaving the newly
ceded areas for the reduced area of territory which now
belonged to the state of Czechoslovakia. Estimates of the
numbers of refugees varied greatly. Thousands were forcibly
returned by the Czechs into the German areas. Others
returned home of their own accord. As a result the numbers
of refugees who remained in the Czech areas were drastically
diminished3.
The Munich Agreement left a specific mark on the refugee
crisis through the distinctions it created between various
groups within the population of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia.
These distinctions were expressed in provisions aimed at
exchanges and transfers of population between the territory
of "new" Czechoslovakia(the areas remaining under Czech rule
after Munich), and the German areas. Under the agreement
such population movements were to be achieved largely
through the exercise of rights to opt for Czech nationality.
Such rights were given to some groups, but not to others.
The right of option was bestowed on some 800,000 persons in
the Sudetenland, mostly of Czech origin. If, as was
expected, most of this group opted to become part of "new"
Czechoslovakia, they would require resettlement there. Such
an influx would create additional economic and social
2 For Chamberlain's report on the Munich Agreement,
see Cab. 47(38), 30 Sept 1938, PRO CAB 23/95.
See Sir Walter Layton to Halifax, enclosing
memorandum, Emigration of refugees from Czechoslovakia', 28
Oct 1938, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/1.
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pressures and burdens for the Czech state, which had emerged
smaller, weaker and poorer from the Munich crisis. The
Czechs soon showed that they did not intend to give equal
weight to the rights of all persons from the Sudetenland to
opt for Czech nationality. In particular, they were
disinclined to accept Czech Jews as full citizens. Thus, the
fact that a person possessed the right to Czech nationality
on paper, was far from conclusive as to whether those rights
would be respected in practice.
Other groups were denied even a notional right of option.
Many ethnic Germans from the Sudeten areas were denied the
right to opt for Czech nationality. Such persons might fear
to remain in or return to the German areas, but in "new"
Czechoslovakia they faced effective statelessness. They
faced further danger from provisions which would enable the
Czech government to send back non-citizens into the German
areas before July 1939.
During the early weeks of the Czech refugee crisis, the
distinctions made in the Munich Agreement between the rights
of different groups of persons in or from the Sudetenland
were given considerable weight by the British Foreign
Office, because they appeared to guarantee the long-term
future in the new Czechoslovakia of certain groups,
including Czech Jews. Increasingly, however, rights to Czech
nationality became less relevant. It became obvious that
such provisions gave no effective protection to people whom
the Czechs did not want. Rights of option bore little
relation either to the immediate dangers and difficulties
people faced, or to the urgent necessity of adjudicating
between their claims for assistance.
300
People who became refugees, or who sought refuge, as a
result of developments in Czechoslovakia, were repeatedly
classified by British officials and representatives of
refugee organisations into several distinct categories. By
no means all the refugees fitted neatly into one or other of
these categories, but the main classifications reflected the
broad outlines of the refugee crisis, and were crucial in
determining eligibility for British financial aid, and for
admission to the UK. They are outlined below.
Sudeten Germans. Refugees and potential refugees were
initially divided into three main groups. The first group
was the Sudeten German refugees. Most of these were
supporters of the anti-Nazi German Social Democratic party,
whose homes had been in the Sudetenland and were of German
ethnic origin. Their opposition to the Munich Agreement, and
their German origins, endeared them neither to the Czech
government, nor to large sections of the population,
smarting from the country's unwilling capitulation to German
pressure. The Sudeten Germans had no right to opt for Czech
nationality under the Munich agreement. Members of this
group were often designated by British representatives as
"political refugees". Selected members received high
priority for British rescue efforts, on account of the risk
that they might be forcibly returned by the Czechs to the
German areas and face persecution there, a fate many
suffered in the early weeks of the crisis. Some Communists
and Jews belonged to, or were associated with, this group,
as well as some persons of Czech origin. The Sudeten Germans
were regarded as the principal casualties of the Munich
settlement. The numbers estimated to need resettlement
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abroad fluctuated greatly in the weeks after the crisis,
because many were forced back into to the Sudeten areas, or
returned without physical compulsion 4 . Estimated refugee
numbers dropped from 40,000 to 15,000 during the second half
of October, of whom less than one third were calculated by
certain observers to require resettlement abroad5.
"Old Reich" refu gees. Refugees from Germany and Austria
were also regarded as political casualties of Munich. They
were sometimes spoken of as "old Reich" refugees, a term
which will be used here. By October 1938 some 5,000 to 6,000
refugees from Germany and Austria were present in new
Czechoslovakia. The majority had previously found refuge in
areas of what was now new Czechoslovakia, mainly in Moravia
and Bohemia, particularly in Prague. Most had arrived in the
course of the first nine months of 1938, in the wake of the
annexation of Austria. A minority of old Reich refugees had
previously found asylum in the Sudetenland, but joined the
mass exodus from the Sudetenland into the Czech areas at the
time of the Munich crisis. The greater part of the old Reich
refugees were Jews; among the non-Jews were many political
exiles. Old Reich refugees were often divided by British
representatives into "political refugees" and "Jewish
refugees", but it was also recognised that these categories
overlapped, for example, because some Jewish refugees had
been implicated in political opposition to the Nazis 6 . The
See copy Malcolm, 'Report by Sir Neill Malcolm on
his visit to Czechoslovakia, October lOth-l2th, 1939', 13
Oct 1938, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/1.
Layton to Halifax, 28 Oct 1938, cited in n. before
last.
6 See Emerson, memorandum, 'Report on Visit to
Prague', 17 Jan 1939, PRO T 160/1324/F13577105/3.
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size of the old Reich group was moderate and its numbers
reasonably certain, in contrast to the oscillating estimates
of the numbers of Sudeten Germans who would need resettling.
The Czechs showed in a variety of ways that they saw the
presence of this group of foreigners as problematic. One
reason for Czech reluctance to offer continued hospitality
to old Reich refugees was that the government was under
pressure from its powerful German neighbour not to harbour
Reich nationals. In addition, anti-German and anti-Jewish
feelings were widespread in new Czechoslovakia. Czech
difficulties over harbouring old Reich refugees elicited
sympathy within the British government, which agreed to
support efforts to resettle them outside Czechoslovakia and
to try to prevent expulsions meanwhile.
Jews from the Sudetenland. A third and much larger group of
refugees consisted of the Jews from the Sudetenland. Some
22,000 Jews had lived in the Sudetenland before Munich. The
majority fled into Bohemia and Moravia during September and
October 1938. The national status of the members of this
group was mixed, but most had rights under the Munich
Agreement to opt for Czech citizenship and live in new
Czechoslovakia. Soon, however, the Czech government showed
that it did not respect these rights. In addition, a pattern
of bureaucratic discrimination against Czech Jews from the
Sudetenland emerged, in a Czechoslovakia which became
increasingly antisemitic.
One important instance of this discrimination was that many
Czech Jews from the Sudetenland were being systematically
denied access to funds they had brought with them. British
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officials acknowledged the difficulties faced by this group.
They nevertheless expressed considerable sympathy for the
Czechs' reluctance to accept Sudetenland Jews in the reduced
and overcrowded territories of post-Munich Czechoslovakia, a
sympathy which could extend to apparent acceptance of the
position that Czech Jews were not "real" Czechs 7 . Official
British policy was to press the Czech government not to
discriminate against Sudetenland Jews, but to accept them in
accordance with the Munich Agreement. British acquiescence
in the expulsion or exclusion of Sudetenland Jews from Czech
territory would not only have undermined the Munich
Agreement, but risked fostering the growth of a large group
of potential refugees, who would face problems in finding
refuge similar to those facing Jews from Germany and
Austria.
The Dosition of Czech Jews There were fluctuations in the
overall numbers of persons in the three categories set out
above, who constituted the main body of refugees believed in
the autumn of 1938 to need resettlement outside
Czechoslovakia. The total was not greatly in excess of
40,000 persons, well over half of whom were Jews.
Nevertheless, the position of a much larger group, who were
not, at this stage, refugees, was also exciting concern.
Some 300,000 Czech Jews were normally resident in the areas
which now constituted the new Czechoslovakia: Bohemia,
Moravia and Slovakia. Their position looked increasingly
uncertain. The Czechs were providing daily demonstrations of
their readiness to discriminate against Jews with rights to,
or even in possession of, Czech nationality, through their
FO to Henderson, Nos. 512 and 513, 26 Oct 1938, PRO
T 160/1324/F13577/05/1.
304
mis-treatment of Jews from the ceded areas. To the mis-
treatment of Sudeten Jews who had succeeded in entering new
Czechoslovakia, was added the Czech authorities' refusal
even to admit many Jews of Czech nationality, who were being
expelled from newly surrendered territories into the Czech
areas. Some of the expellees were confined to no man's land
areas on the new frontiers, whose lines had not yet been
finally drawn.
The indications that the future for Jews in new
Czechoslovakia was likely to be problematic were recognised
in Britain. The Foreign Secretary, in a summary of the
internal situation in Czechoslovakia in late October,
reported to the Cabinet that, "A certain tendency to anti-
"8Jewish action had been observed.	 The Czech government
made it increasingly clear that Jews of Czech nationality
were not regarded as real Czechs, and found a variety of
ways of putting pressure on them to emigrate. Later, after
the takeover of Czechoslovakia by the Germans in March 1939,
pressure on all Czech Jews to emigrate intensified.
Czechoslovakia's new German masters openly pursued a policy
of pressing Jews to leave. On the other hand, the Germans
tried to prevent the departure of political opponents, most
of whom were non-Jews, who were therefore generally only
able to emigrate by illegal channels. The majority of Jews
could have departed openly. Their difficulty was not so much
in leaving the country, as in finding a refuge abroad. The
account of British policy which follows will show that Jews
whose need for a haven abroad was based merely on the fact
that, as Jews, they faced persecution, were not treated as
8 Cab. 50(38)1, 26 Oct 1938, PRO CAB 23/96.
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having a strong claim to priority in British efforts to
provide refuge.
Visas for the UK and the British Committee for Refu gees from
Czechoslovakia
In October 1938 a new refugee organisation, the British
Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia(BCRC) was formed
in response to the Czech crisis. The initial intention of
British fund-raisers was to provide relief for refugees
within Czechoslovakia, but the demand for refuge abroad led
to a decision that a UK-based organisation should be set up
to allocate funds raised in Britain for refugees from
Czechoslovakia, and to arrange their entry to the UK and re-
emigration. The BCRC was a non-sectarian voluntary
organisation. Its supporters had a particular interest in
rescuing endangered "political refugees", among whom the
Sudeten Germans were prominent. The BCRC was also seriously
concerned with the plight of old Reich refugees.
British concern for Sudeten Germans was shown at an early
stage in the preference this group received in the
allocation of visas. From the sole quota of 350 special
British visas for endangered refugees from Czechoslovakia
which was made available prior to the end of October 1938,
250 were allocated to Sudeten Germans. These visas
authorised admission to the UK on a temporary basis only,
and the refugees were also required to have guaranteed
maintenance during their stay. Their families would be
admitted on similar conditions. The small quota of visas met
only a fraction of the demand for refuge. The British
government was under pressure from the leader of the Sudeten
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German Social Democrats, Wenzel Jaksch, to help secure
refuge abroad for many more members of this group, whose
estimated numbers were as high as 15,000 in late October
1938 g . Such pleas were backed by pressure groups in the UK,
and the BCRC negotiated the detailed arrangements for the
authorisation of the 350 visas. It was decided to allocate
100 of the 350 special visas to old Reich refugees10.
Jews were not treated as having a strong claim to priority
in the allocation of British visas, if they could only claim
that they faced persecution as Jews. The plight of the
majority of Jews of Czech nationality did not therefore gain
them entitlement to priority for rescue, either before or
after the German takeover in March 1939. The majority of
Jews were categorised, by British officials and by
representatives of refugee organisations, as "racial" or
"economic refugees", rather than "political refugees": in
allocating its special visas the BCRC gave priority to
upolitical refugees". This order of priorities generated a
two-tier system, under which Jews who sought to escape from
Czechoslovakia might enter the UK if they could fit into the
categories of admission available for refugees from Germany
and Austria - by obtaining guarantees, for example - but
were otherwise not normally granted exceptional treatment or
special visas, unless they were also regarded as
"political". The British government remained opposed to any
large-scale forced emigration of Jews of Czech nationality
from Czechoslovakia, and British representatives, strongly
backed by Sir Herbert Emerson in the name of the IGC, made
See Sherman, op. cit., pp. 140-148.
10 Layton to Halifax, 28 Oct 1938, already cited.
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efforts to prevent and discourage such mass emigration. The
British response was, however, far from monolithic: it will
be seen that certain individuals, acting in both official
and unofficial capacities, were able to influence the way in
which refugees were selected for rescue.
The British response: political and financial
From Munich to the German occupation
The Czech refugee crisis gave birth to exceptional
arrangements, by which the British government became
financially involved in trying to mitigate refugee problems.
British financial involvement later played an important part
in shaping policies for the selection of refugees for entry
to the UK. The origins of the decision to provide funds to
help the Czech government to cope with refugees lay in
British responsibility for the Munich Agreement. The crucial
distinguishing feature of the Czech refugee crisis in the
eyes of many people in the UK, including many politicians
and officials, was British responsibility for its creation;
this responsibility, so it was widely believed, imposed an
obligation to make an effort to mitigate some of the more
oppressive consequences of the Munich settlement.
British obligations included legal, humanitarian, political
and military elements. Legal aspects arose from British
responsibility for the implementation of the Munich
Agreement. This entailed, among other things, a commitment
to uphold the rights of residents of territories which had
now come under German control, including rights to opt for
Czech nationality, to reside in Czech areas and to
protection of personal and property rights. Second, British
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policy also had a humanitarian element, which was manifested
in a willingness to rescue selected refugees who were
thought to be in danger, especially if these dangers had
been incurred as a result of political opposition to German
encroachment in Czechoslovakia. Third, the political and
military considerations which had led the British government
to support the making of the Munich Agreement, also dictated
a policy of giving support to the Czech government to help
it survive in the aftermath of Munich. British policy-makers
worked to help the Czechs resist Nazi political pressure
emanating from Germany and from elements within the country.
The British government also tried to mitigate the economic
and financial pressures the Czechs faced after Munich, and
gave aid to help them handle the results of a big influx of
refugees.
In early October, the British government agreed to advance
funds totalling £10 million to the Czechs". This was a big
sum for the British government, representing 1.25 per cent
of total tax revenue in 1938/9, or 8.25 per cent of
expenditure by the War Office in the same year. A £4 million
portion of the advance was designated as a gift for the
relief and resettlement of refugees within Czechoslovakia
and overseas 12 . In negotiations over the terms of this
portion of the advance, British representatives laboured the
point that the funds should be used to meet the needs of
refugees on a non-discriminatory basis and that refugees
were not to be expelled into the German areas. Further
Cab. 48(38)1, 3 Oct 1939, PRO CAB 23/95; See also
Cab 49(38)2, 19 Oct 1938, Cab 52(38)9, 2 Nov 1938, PRO CAB
23/96.
12 Cab. 55(38)7, 16 Nov 1938, PRO CAB 23/96; Cab.
57(38)3, 30 Nov 1938, PRO CAB 23/96.
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financial assistance would be tied to British satisfaction
on these points 13 . Yet there were, disturbing signs that the
Czechs were only waiting to be assured of the British funds
before launching anti-Jewish measures'4.
The British funds were not intended to finance the entry of
refugees to the UK. However, the original aim that the money
should be used to resettle refugees within Czechoslovakia
became increasingly impossible of realisation, while the
prospects of immediate resettlement overseas remained small.
In time, many people concerned with the rescue of refugees
came to view the unspent moneys in the fund as a potential
source of finance for bringing refugees to the UK.
The government, which wished to monitor the expenditure of
the British moneys, announced in October the appointment of
Robert Stopford, as British Liaison Officer in Prague.
Stopford was not a career civil servant, but a banker, and
related to Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whom he
had served in a secretarial capacity in the past. Stopford
had been a member of the Runciman Mission, which had
unsuccessfully tried to resolve the Czech crisis during the
summer, so had recent experience of Czechoslovakia' 5 . On
appointment to his new duties, he was asked particularly to
make sure that there was no discrimination on political or
13 See e.g. 'Note of a meeting between the Czecho-
Slovak Financial Mission and representatives of HM Treasury,
held on Saturday, 15th October 1938', 15 Oct 1938, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/1.
14 Waley to Leith-Ross, 19 Nov 1938, PRO FO 371/21576,
C14393/2320/12, f.204; Waley to Makins, 23 Nov 1938, PRO FO
371/21576, C14421/2320/12, f.210; Cab. 57(38)3, 30 Nov 1938,
PRO CAB 23/96.
15 For Stopford's career, see Appendix 1.
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racial grounds, and to collect information on the refugee
problem in Czechoslovakia. He was to report to the Treasury
and send copies to the Foreign Office' 6 . Stopford became a
well-informed and effective advocate for the rights of
refugees. He displayed a remarkable ability to inspire trust
and win friends in both official and unofficial circles in
Czechoslovakia.
The terms of the Czech advance were finally incorporated in
January 1939 in a formal agreement with the Czech
government, to which the French government was a party,
under which the sum of £4 million from the UK government was
converted into a free gift to be used entirely for the
emigration of refugees' 7 . Provisions for giving effect to
the agreement were embodied in legislation passed in late
February 193918. Extra provisions included in the agreement,
but kept secret, extended refugee benefits to persons from
one part of "new" Czechoslovakia who had sought refuge in
another part of "new" Czechoslovakia. These measures were
designed to cover the plight of Jews from Slovakia who had
fled to Bohemia and Moravia, and showed the serious scale
which the problem of persecution of Jews had attained within
the borders of new Czechoslovakia by this date. The need for
such a provision constituted embarrassing evidence of the
16 Phillips to Stopford, 31 Oct 1938, PRO FO
371/21576, C13311/2320/12, f.56.
17 'Agreements between His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom the Government of the French Republic and the
Government of the Czechoslovak Republic regarding FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE TO CZECHO-SLOVAKIA' (with exchange of letters
with the Plenipotentiary of Czecho-slovakia in London), 27
Jan 1939, Cmd. 5933. A copy of this document is in PRO HO
294/68.
18 Czechoslovakia (Financial Assistance) Act 1939, 28
Feb 1939.
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apparent impossibility of preventing persecution of Jews in
the Slovak areas of Czechoslovakia'9.
For the purposes of the agreement refugees were defined as
follows: first, ordinary residents of the ceded territories
prior to 21 May 1938, who had or might seek refuge in post-
Munich Czechoslovakia and were either not qualified to opt
for Czech nationality, or, though qualified, were unable to
support themselves in Czechoslovakia, whether or not the
option had been exercised; second, "old Reich" refugees, who
had obtained temporary refuge in pre-Munich Czechoslovakia.
Provision was also made in the agreement for another
possible category, which was not defined: the agreement
merely left it open for the French or British governments to
agree to include other persons later 20 . In accordance with
the agreement, the funds were placed in an account opened by
the National Bank of Czechoslovakia in the Bank of England.
15 Harch 1939 and after: the establishment of the Czech
Refugee Trust Fund
The Czechs had drawn about one tenth of the money in the
Bank of England account in the period up to 15 March 1939,
when the German invasion of Czechoslovakia put an end to
future compliance with the agreement. To prevent the moneys
from falling into the hands of Czechoslovakia's new masters,
the funds were frozen, and included in a new Act prohibiting
19 See exchange of letters between Stopford and Dr
Zavrel, 27 Jan 1939, Trend to Cooper, 1 Feb 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/3.
20 Annex I of Agreement of 27 Jan 1939, referred to
above.
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payment out of funds connected with the former government
without the authority of the Treasury21.
The British government then decided that the approximate
£3.25 million unexpended balance of the original £4 million
for refugees should still be available for the purpose of
enabling refugees to emigrate from Czechoslovakia. A British
agency was to be set up to administer the fund 22 . The agency
eventually formed was the Czech Refugee Trust Fund(CRTF) but
this was not formally created until July 193923. However, in
April 1939, the BCRC, its funds already exhausted, offered
to continue its work if funds could be assured from the
remaining balance of the Gift moneys, to cover liabilities
and administrative expenses. It was therefore decided that,
pending the setting up of the CRTF, the Treasury would
advance to the BCRC moneys, which would later be repaid out
of the Fund 24 . This arrangement enabled the BCRC to continue
to bring refugees to the UK, until the CRTF was set up by
the Home Office in July, absorbing the BCRC's casework
functions. In the interim, these casework functions were
carried out under increasing direction from the British
government. On 21 July 1939, the date the Trust Deed was
21 Czechoslovakia (Restrictions on Banking Accounts
etc.) Act, 1939, 27 Mar 1939; the approximate unexpended
balance on the Refugee Account amounted to £3.25 million,
and £3.5 million on the Reconstruction Account. Waley, Czech
Claims, 11 Sept 1940, PRO T 210/20.
22 Simon (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Hansard, op.
cit., vol. 345, cols. 1299-1303, 22 Mar 1939.
23 Papers on the history of the CRTF are in PRO HO
294/5.
24 Layton to Simon, 25 Mar 1939, PRO HO 294/50.
313
signed, formal directions to the trustees were issued by
Maxwell, Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office25.
The categories of refugee eligible for help under the terms
of the agreement with the Czechs remained relevant after
March 1939, although the agreement itself had been relegated
to history by the demise of the Czech government. The
provisions of the agreement now constituted the terms of a
trust, under which the remaining funds were held in British
hands. Subsequent decisions as to how the money should be
spent had to take account of whether the funds were being
expended on the objects originally intended, who had mostly
been persons with German or Austrian origins or
affiliations. A new difficulty was whether these funds could
be expended to help Czech Jews and other persons of Czech
nationality who had not been included in the terms of the
original agreement, because they were not then refugees.
Moreover the Gift Fund had been designed to assist only
emigrants from Czechoslovakia who were bound for a
destination where they could settle permanently, but the
most urgent need was to evacuate persons who could only find
temporary refuge. It was decided to enlarge the purposes of
the Gift Fund to cover such refugees. It would now therefore
be possible for the BCRC to recover the cost of maintenance
of refugees up to the extent of £100,000 from the
Treasury26.
25 Home Office, 'Czech Refugee Trust Fund and
Directions to the Trustees', 21 Jul 1939, Cmd. 6076. A copy
of this document is in PRO HO 294/68.
26 Copy Hailey(Co-ordinating Committee) to Hoare, 6
Apr 1939, sent Jagelman to Waley, 12 Apr 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/8.
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Czechs and Jews were now to be included as refugees 27 . The
new terms of reference included two new categories in
addition to the two original groups in the January
agreement. The first new category comprised residents of
Bohemia and Moravia immediately before 15 March 1939 in
respect of whom there existed "special circumstances" which,
in the opinion of the Trustees rendered them suitable for
assistance in accordance with the purposes of the Trust. The
second new category was defined as, "such other persons or
classes of persons from New Czechoslovakia as the trustees
may subject to the approval of the Secretary of State
prescribe as being suitable for assistance in accordance
with the purposes of the trust" 28 . The inclusion of these
categories had been requested by the BCRC on the basis that
persons of Czech or Jewish nationality now forced to leave
for political, religious or racial reasons could be included
in the third category of the original agreement 29 . The fund
itself was kept down to its original level, despite
representations to the government that it should make
additional funds available, over and above the original £4
million, in order to expand the possibilities of rescue.
A consequence of British financial involvement was that
Treasury officials found themselves involved not only in
control over finance, but in refugee policy and procedures.
The original arrangements with the Czechs for the British
advance had been the concern of the Treasury, working in
27 See Waley, drafts of telegrams to Stopford, 13 Apr
1939, FO to Troutbeck, No. 123, 17 Apr 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/8.
28 Trust Deed, 21 Jul 1939, para 1, PRO HO 213/297.
29 Margaret Layton(BCRC) to Simon, 25 Mar 1939, PRO HO
294/50.
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conjunction with the Foreign Office. Stopford had himself
been instrumental in bringing about the British decision to
offer the Czechs the funds whose expenditure he was now
supervising. After Stopford left for Prague in the second
half of October, he maintained regular contact with Makins
at the Foreign Office, but his prime responsibility as
British Liaison Officer was to the Treasury. He sent
particularly detailed reports to SD Waley of the Treasury,
who was an old friend. One result of these communications
was that Waley was particularly well-informed about
developments in the persecution of Jews in Czechoslovakia.
By November 1938, for example, Stopford was already
predicting that most Czech Jews would be forced to emigrate
and that a wholesale expulsion of between 150,000 and
250,000 Jews was possible30.
Waley chose to make use of this information to alert Anthony
de Rothschild to the need for British Jews to make provision
for guarantees to support the emigration of their co-
religionists in Czechoslovakia 31 . Stopford had many Jews
among his numerous contacts in Prague, and maintained
concern about persecution of Jews. After the German
takeover, he became the acknowledged authority on the
interpretation of the provisions of the Gift Fund, and
supported assistance from the Fund to help some, but not
all, Czech Jews to emigrate. He also worked hard to get
emigration to the UK re-started following the occupation.
30 Dominion Office memorandum (n.d.), Position of
Sudeten German Social Democrat Refugees and other Refugees
in Czechoslovakia', sent Devonshire to High Commissioners,
21 Nov 1938, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/2.
31 Waley to de Rothschild, 25 Nov 1938, Waley to
Stopford, 29 Nov 1938, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/2.
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Treasury officials 1 who had the benefit of Stopford's
reports and expertise as well as their own experience of
dealing with the Czechs, were well placed to mount informed
criticisms of Home Office positions on refugee policy.
The Home Office and the Czech Refugee Trust Fund
The Home Office had no reason to be involved with the Gift
Fund until after the German occupation; thereafter it was
closely concerned in the creation and subsequent history of
the CRTF. In consequence, Home Office officials exercised an
unprecedented degree of control over the British voluntary
effort for Czech refugees. The general outlines of the trust
were agreed in mid-April 1939 32 . The Fund's aims were
primarily to secure the emigration and settlement of
refugees from Czechoslovakia, and, secondly, to maintain
them33 . Before the end of April three trustees were
nominated by the Home Office to supervise the general
administration of the Trust. Two represented the voluntary
sector: Eward G Culpin, a trustee of the Lord Mayor's fund,
and Erich Turk, of the BCRC, whose role was "to represent
Jewry". The third trustee was the Home Office representative
Sir Malcolm Delevigne, a retired Home Office official 34 . A
director nominated by the Home Office was to carry out the
day-to-day functions of the CRTF, which included running a
32 See item, 'Report on Czech Situation', Minutes of
Co-ordinating Committee meeting, 3 Apr 1939, PRO HO 213/268;
Maxwell to Hailey, 6 Apr 1939, Halley to Maxwell, 14 Apr
1939, PRO HO 294/39; Waley to Sir F Phillips, 15 Apr 1939,
PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/8; 'Note of Meeting in Sir A
Maxwell's room on 18th April 1939, to discuss the setting up
of a Trust to administer the Czech Refugee Fund', ibid.
See preamble of Trust Deed, 21 Jul 1939, PRO HO
213/297.
See note of meeting in Maxwell's room on 18 Apr
1939 cited in n. before last; for details of Culpin, Turk
and Delevigne, see Appendix 1.
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case-working body. It was hoped to find someone who would
not require a salary, perhaps a retired Indian civil
servant, but if necessary a proper salary could be offered.
Maxwell wanted a "really efficient" director who would "have
real control over the voluntary workers" 35 . Stopford's
candidature was mooted in BCRC circles, but Sir Henry
Bunbury was the final choice for the post, to which he
brought several months' experience of trying to impose order
on the chaotic administration and finances of the GJAC36.
In the four months which elapsed between the fall of the
Czech state in March 1939 and the constitution of the Trust
in July, the Home Office became more involved than
previously in questions of which cases the BCRC should take
up. The Fund would ultimately take over direct
responsibility for such cases: meanwhile, they were being
covered by moneys advanced to the BCRC. In the changed
situation new BCRC cases had to satisfy several
requirements: to comply with immigration policy; to be
eligible for help within the expanded terms of reference of
the Fund; and to justify the expenditure of a portion of the
finite sum available from the Fund. As well as having become
financially dependent on the Free Gift funds, the BCRC
continued, of course, to require Home Office agreement to
admissions. Since 1 April 1939, moreover, all refugees of
Czech nationality required visas.
Minutes, BCRC General Council meeting, 15 May 1939;
t Czech Refugees', minutes of meeting on 23 May, PRO
T160/1324/F13577/05/9; minutes, BCRC, Executive and Finance
Committees meeting, 24 May 1939, PRO HO 294/50;
36 Ibid.; for Bunbury, see Appendix 1.
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The BCRC leadership frequently found Home Office delays and
failures of communication irritating, and often felt that
officials were unduly restrictive or downright unhelpful in
granting visas for BCRC-supported cases 37 . They were,
nevertheless, in agreement with Home Office policies which
limited the overall scope of emigration, particularly
emigration of Jews categorised as "economic refugees".
Waley, on behalf of the Treasury, had told Stopford in April
that "Czechs and Jews are to be included as refugees" 38 . Yet
in July questions of whether a commitment had been made on
behalf of the government to help Czech Jews to emigrate, and
whether this came within the terms of the re-defined trust,
became matters of dispute between Bunbury, newly-appointed
Director of the CRTF, and Stopford. Stopford emphasised his
accountability to the aims of the original gift and to the
Treasury, and opposed the BCRC, the Trustees and the Home
Office.
The question of whether the Trust funds should be increased
became a Home Office concern in early August 1939, when
Eleanor Rathbone was leading a campaign for at least part of
the remaining £6 million of the Czech loan to be used for
further emigration. Cooper strongly opposed making available
additional funds for this purpose. His arguments were given
short shrift in the Treasury, where Waley rejected as
"untrue" Cooper's claim that more funds would "embarrass"
the trustees 39 . Cooper also claimed that,
See, e.g., Layton to Cooper, 8 Jun 1939; Layton to
Bunbury, 26 Jun 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
38 FO to Troutbeck, No. 123, 17 Apr 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/8.
Cooper, memorandum, 'Czech Refugees', 2 Aug 1939,
with marginal notes by Waley, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/16.
319
It would be little short of a catastrophe if £6,000,000 or
any lesser sum were made available by the British Government
for assisting Jewish emigration from Czecho-Slovakia (and/or
Poland) at the present time.
"This is surely rubbish", wrote Waley, moderating his
language to tell a colleague that he found the position
"unconvincing" 40 . Yet Cooper's position reflected a
consensus reached at a meeting on 29 July, between himself,
Bunbury, Margaret Layton, secretary of the BCRC, and
Farrell, the PCO from Prague, which discussed the question
of further emigration both from the Protectorate (as Bohemia
and Moravia were now known) and from Poland 41 . Concern was
voiced about the arrangements announced by "the new head of
the Gestapo for refugee business"(a reference to Eichmann)
for carrying out his plan to speed Jewish emigration from
Czechoslovakia, through a planned reduction of 60,000 over
the next 12 months. Since there was no effective agreement
with the German authorities, such emigration would be
conducted in a disorganised way, using the oppressive
methods Eichmann had employed in Austria. The meeting agreed
that, in these circumstances,
any suggestion of substantial financial assistance from
Great Britain to Jewish emigration from the Protectorate
would play straight into the hands of the Gestapo and would
be far more likely to encourage persecution and terror than
avoid it.
Those present accordingly deplored Rathbone's campaign for
additional finance as "a grave mistake in strategy", and
resolved to advise against further financial assistance,
40 Ibid.; Waley to M Wilson Smith, 2 Aug 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/16.
41 Memorandum of meeting on 29 Jul 1939, 30 Jul 1939,
PRO HO 294/7.
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except under binding arrangements satisfactory to the
government and the Trustees. In early August the government
rejected all proposals for extending the fund, including one
put forward by an all-party deputation of MPs42.
The participants in the 29 July meeting, having agreed to
oppose further financial commitment, then addressed the
question of how to respond to the plight of various groups
of refugees. They accepted the need to raise with the German
authorities the question of allowing the departure from the
Protectorate of some 130 wives and children of refugees who
had escaped illegally, but thought this might be included in
any general negotiations. However, the meeting decided that
the Trust should not recognise or help political refugees
who would continue to trickle illegally into Poland, since
this would provoke reprisals against persons still in the
Protectorate. A negative approach should also be adopted
towards the escape of large numbers of "non-political Jews"
across the Polish frontier with at least the connivance of
the German authorities. To do otherwise
would obviously create a intolerable situation for the
Jewish people in general in Eastern Europe - for unless
Great Britain were prepared to receive and maintain them
freely (and this would give rise to a corresponding claim
from Jewish people still in the Reich) an influx of Jews
from Czechoslovakia would prove the last straw to the Polish
Government and might well lead to persecution of Jews
generally in Poland. Obviously there is no solution of the
Jewish problem along these lines.
They therefore decided to close down the Trust's operations
in Poland. The meeting made a feeble reference to hopes of
extending the Rublee-Wohithat scheme of orderly emigration
to Czechoslovakia, but recognised that the Germans might
42 See Sherman, op. cit., p. 250; Hansard, vol. 350,
col. 2906, 4 Aug 1939.
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seek to deprive Jews of the greater part of their wealth
before agreeing such a scheme, if indeed they were prepared
to agree anything at all43.
The Trust continued its work following the outbreak of war.
It went through a troubled and factional period in the early
part of the war, including serious allegations of bias and
mismanagement, which Bunbury had the task of resolving44.
Other benefits for Czech refugees from British funds
Czech refugees received various other benefits through the
application of the residue of the funds made over to the
Czechs in October 1938. The Trust had a separate
responsibility for authorising the release of sums of £200
landing money, to which many refugees were entitled from the
Fund. Home Office and Trust officials were inclined to
conserve the fund and avoid release of the moneys, a course
whose legality was vigorously questioned by Treasury
officials45 . On the other hand, the Trust provided generous
benefits for certain refugees, such as finance to pursue
medical studies46.
Individual refugees from Czechoslovakia also received
financial benefits from a scheme authorised by statute in
Memorandum of meeting on 29 Jul 1939, 30 Jul 1939,
PRO HO 294/7.
For difficulties in 1939, see PRO T 161/1001; for
1940 see PRO HO 294/25 and Treasury memoranda in February
1940, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/18.
See e.g. critical memorandum by Sir Stanley Wyatt,
27 Aug 1940, PRO HO 294/225.
46 Dr Josephine Breughel, a Jewish refugee from the
Sudetenland, completed her medical studies with the help of
the CRTF. Dr Breughel, interview with this author, 13 Apr
1988.
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January 1940, which used the residue of the British loan to
pay compensation for assets left behind 47 . The sums were
paid from confiscated moneys amounting to approximately £3.5
million, which remained in the Czech government's
Reconstruction Account in the Bank of England. Refugees
became entitled to benefit by the device of defining them as
"British holders" - persons with claims on these moneys
based on coupons due on the Czech External Debt or on cash
claims, such as those in respect of bank balances; they were
entitled to receive a 50% dividend, with a £50,000 maximum
in respect of cash claims. In September 1940 Waley reported
that under the scheme a handful of Czech refugees would get
most of the money - one family would get £753,000 and
another £537,000, a result likely to cause public scandal,
if known. An alternative scheme, supported by the existing
scheme's administrator, Sir Stanley Wyatt, would limit the
sum paid out to any one individual, allowing a surplus of
about £930,000 to be placed at the disposal of the Czech
National Committee, which was now recognised by the British
government. Waley conceded that the existing scheme was very
difficult to defend, but successfully argued that a change
would cause fresh trouble, with the need for complicated,
probably controversial legislation, and objections of
hardship to persons who had relied on the scheme48.
In 1941 the provisional Czech government in exile obtained
funds from the Refugee Account in the form of a grant of
£100,000 from the Trust, to assist Czech refugees on the
Czecho-slovakia (Financial Claims and Refugees)
Act, 1940, 31 Jan 1940.
48 Waley, 'Czech Claims', 11 Sept 1940, Waley to
Makins, 25 Sept 1940, PRO T 210/20.
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Continent. The funds were intended to help loyal Czechs who
found themselves in countries in danger of German occupation
or influence, but had clear prospects of admission to
territory of greater safety, and permission to stay there
for the duration of the war49 . A person's selection by the
Provisional Government for benefits under the scheme would
not of itself carry entitlement to a visa for territory in
the British Empire, but the Czechs were told that having
maintenance secured by these funds would assist people to
get visas, and that many were expected to emigrate to
British territory. RTE Latham in the Foreign Office Refugee
Section, who wished to expand the scheme, found himself at
loggerheads with Cooper, whose fears about the scheme
included the possibility that some of the refugees might
come to the UK50 . The scheme itself, although highly
restricted, constituted a rare exception to British policy
of not funding refugee rescue during the war.
The foregoing discussion has shown how the history of the
Gift Fund led the Home Office to become responsible for
directing the policy of an organisation originally formed to
rescue refugees and bring them to the UK. Yet the priorities
of the Home Office meant that its influence on BCRC and
Trust activities was largely aimed at limiting new
commitments. The tensions this produced are further explored
in the last section of this chapter.
Eden to Jan Masaryk, 15 Apr 1941, PRO T
160/1324/F13 57 7/0 5/19
50 See Latham to Cooper, 24 May 1941, Cooper to Latham
3 Jun 1941, Latham to Cooper, 8 Jun 1941, Cook to Latham, 10
Jun 1941, Latham to Cook, 13 Jun 1941, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/19.
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Selection Policy
The administration of British aid to refugees from
Czechoslovakia required guide-lines for the selection of
individuals from among thousands who sought help and refuge.
The whole process was complicated by enormous difficulties
in estimating the numbers and needs of constantly shifting
groups of refugees. It was often far from clear which
refugees stood in the most serious danger or difficulty.
Such uncertainties were particularly acute in the six months
between the Munich Agreement and the fall of the Czech
government in March 1939, because the Czechs were expelling
some refugees and refusing others entry, and neither their
assurances nor their threats regarding what they might do in
future could be relied on51 . The remainder of this chapter
is concerned with the selection policies evolved by British
government representatives and the BCRC for refugees from
Czechoslovakia. It examines the principal policy trends, and
the procedures by which refugees were chosen.
Priorities from Munich to the German Occutation
The British government was reluctant to undertake
responsibility for mitigating the refugee crisis in
Czechoslovakia by admissions to the UK, but internal and
external pressures dictated that some admissions would have
to be permitted 52 . The priorities of the British government
in choosing whom to help reflected a sense of political
obligation towards Sudeten Germans and old Reich refugees,
51 See Eleanor Rathbone, 'Note on Situation in
Prague', 20 Jan 1939, detailing the Czechs' susceptibility
to pressure to surrender refugees, and urging their
evacuation without further delay, PRO HO 294/39.
52 For the government's response in the autumn of
1938, see Sherman, op. cit., esp. pp. 142-155.
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whose position was severely threatened by the Munich
Agreement and its aftermath. The British felt an obligation
to help the Czechs to resettle these two groups abroad,
because of the embarrassment caused by their presence within
the borders of new Czechoslovakia. The welfare of Sudeten
and old Reich refugees was also a particular concern of
opponents of the Munich Agreement, who were active in the
BCRC and in lobbying for refugee admissions.
In early October, several funds were launched for refugees
from Czechoslovakia. The Lord Mayor of London, Sir Harry
Twyford, started a fund in his name, although Cabinet
ministers planned to discourage him 53 . He went out to Prague
to investigate, as did representatives of other UK
organisations, including the Trades Union Congress and
Labour Party. In Prague, the British visitors arranged for
the expenditure of funds raised in the UK and decided to set
up a British committee, which became the BCRC, to handle
arrangements for refugees who might come to the UK 54 . The
BCRC did not raise large sums itself, but obtained funds
from other organisations, including a total of £80,000 from
the Lord Mayor's Fund 55 . The BCRC put forward to the
authorities cases of endangered individuals for admission,
and undertook responsibility for the maintenance of refugees
in the UK, and to arrange and pay for their emigration
overseas as soon as possible. The Committee was
Cab. 48(38)2 and 48(38)3, 3 Oct 1938, PRO CAB
23/95.
Papers on the BCRC's origins are in PRO HO 294/39.
Its first meeting was held on 26 Oct 1938; a constitution
was adopted in February 1939. Minutes of meeting, 13 Feb
1939, PRO HO 294/50.
Lord Hailey, 'Note of discussion with Sir Harry
Twyford on 16th January 1939', 17 Jan 1939, PRO HO 294/50.
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theoretically limited in the liabilities it could undertake
by the funds at its disposal. Nevertheless, by January 1939
it had undertaken liabilities to 1,100 people which were
£41,000 in excess of its resources, and was exploring other
sources of income56.
The leader of the non-Nazi Sudeten Germans, Wenzel Jaksch,
mounted effective pressure on behalf of endangered followers
of his German Social Democratic party. He arrived in the UK
in early October, seeking a haven for up to 20,000
adherents, and his proposals for refuge in the dominions
were urgently taken up with dominion governments. Canada.
which sought new immigrants, especially skilled craftsmen
and agricultural workers, eventually accepted several
thousand Sudeten refugees, many of whom entered the UK as a
temporary refuge en route. They departed again for Canada,
in some cases within weeks: the traffic aroused intense
interest among British shipping lines 57 . The Canadian
government extracted from the British government, as a
condition for accepting refugees into Canada, an agreement
to allocate landing money of $1,500 per family: a huge
increase over the standard landing money from the British
Gift for Czech refugees on resettlement, which was only
£20058.
Very few of those accepted in Canada were Jews. The Canadian
government accepted the advice of its High Commissioner in
56 Ormerod, 22 Jan 1939, PRO HO 294/39.
57 Hynard(Board of Trade) to Playfair, 18 Apr 1939,
PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/8.
58 Copy SB Pearson (Office of High Commissioner for
Canada) to Maxwell, 17 Apr 1939, sent Williams (Ho) to
Waley, 18 Apr 1939, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/8.
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London, Vincent Massey, that if it accepted substantial
numbers of "Aryan Sudeten German" refugees, this would make
it easier to refuse to admit more Jews 59 . The British
government was aware that the Canadian government wished its
share of the emigration to be confined to Social Democrats
of the Sudeten German community. The Canadians had, however,
agreed to the inclusion of Jews, so Waley informed Maxwell,
"provided that they are of a 'non-ritualistic' type, but
look very much askance at Communists"60.
The response to the Sudeten Germans and the arrangements for
their re-emigration to Canada show that, even for a group of
largely non-Jewish refugees, the BCRC policy was very
similar to that evolved by Jewish organisations and the Home
Office for the influx from Germany and Austria. Emigration
prospects were similarly important. Thus Sudeten Germans
came to the UK as a temporary refuge, and subject to
guarantees for maintenance and emigration.
The crucial distinguishing feature of BCRC policy for the
allocation of its special visas, was its emphasis on the
degree of danger faced, as the main criterion for rescue. A
leading figure in the BCRC, Mary Ormerod, stated in January
1939 that the Committee, in its choice of Sudeten and old
Reich refugees, had been guided "solely by the degree of
See Abella and Troper, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
60 Waley to Maxwell, 29 Apr 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/8; For British fears of Communists, see
Sherman, op. cit., pp. 152-153; the Home Office reconsidered
its rejection of one group of Communists. Gillies to Layton,
24 Nov 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
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danger in which they stood of being deported to Germany"61.
The priority the BCRC gave to trades union and political
figures was derived from this principle. The dangers such
people faced, which arose from political causes, were seen
as more severe and more personalised than the dangers
arising from persecution of Jews, who were also being forced
back into the German areas.
Several factors combined to produce a low priority for
Jewish emigration. First, far more Jews were persecuted
because they were Jews than on political grounds. It was
therefore difficult to argue that a particular Jew was
threatened on grounds specific to the individual concerned,
unless there was a political dimension to the case. Second,
the Germans did not attempt to force the return of Jews to
their newly-acquired territories, but were, on the contrary,
expelling them or persecuting them with the aim of forcing
their emigration. Third, the Czech government had no grounds
under the Munich Agreement for complaining about the
presence of Czech Jews on its territory. Fourth, it was the
policy of both the IGC and the British government that
forced emigration of Jews should be resisted.
To these factors, which concerned the need and desirability
of Jewish emigration, were added questions of its
practicability. Emigration prospects for Jews were poor,
and, as the Canadian response had shown, were worse for Jews
than for non-Jews from Czechoslovakia. Makin g , concerned
about the consequences of increasing commitments to Czech
61 Ormerod, 'Notes on the liabilities of the British
Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia', 22 Jan 1939,
PRO HO 294/39.
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refugees, objected to the singling out of refugees from
Czechoslovakia generally, and Sudeten Germans in particular,
for special privileges 62 . As CR Price of the Dominions
Office wrote to Makins, this view was inconsistent with the
government's action in assisting members of this group to
emigrate to the dominions and admitting urgent cases to the
UK63 . Conflict arose within the IGC over whether Sudeten
German refugees should be given special privileges because
of their better emigration prospects. Winterton proposed
that since non-Jews would be more attractive immigrants to
possible countries of settlement, the availability of the
Sudeten Germans should be advertised; Rublee objected that
this was discriminatory and contrary to IGC principles64.
Stopford suggested that the likelihood that it would be
easier to settle non-Jews abroad would justify the release a
lump sum of perhaps £250,000 from the new British loan to
finance temporary asylum in the UK and subsequent settlement
for endangered Sudeten Germans65.
Another factor was the refusal of Jewish organisations in
Britain to take responsibility for refugees from
Czechoslovakia. The CGJ adhered tenaciously to the position
that its funds had been collected for German Jewry 66 . This
62 See Makins, memorandum, 27 Oct 1938, PRO FO
371/21585, C12940/11896/12, f.47; Sherman, op. cit., pp.
153-154.
63 Price to Makins, 31 Oct 1938, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/1.
64 Rublee to Winterton, 26 Oct 1938, PRO FO 371/22535,
W13882/104/98, f.24.
65 Newton to FO (for Waley from Stopford), 26 Nov
1938, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/2.
66 Bunbury, 'The problem of Jewish Refugees from
Czechoslovakia', 5 Apr 1939, PRO HO 294/39.
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did not prevent close co-operation between the GJAC and the
BCRC. Representatives of the Jewish body sat on BCRC
committees; staff moved from the older organisation to the
younger; advice and expertise were shared, so that, for
example, BCRC workers discussed with members of the BCRC's
visa committee how to avoid problems the more experienced
body faced over the legal enforceability of guarantees67.
Pressures for greater generosity towards Jews came from
other sources. Jewish leaders in Czechoslovakia provided the
British government with evidence of the persecution of Czech
Jews, and asked for various forms of help. Many of their
requests concerned to the defence of Jewish rights in
Czechoslovakia. Requests for help in organising Jewish
emigration were directed more towards Palestine than the UK.
Leo Herrmann, of the Jewish Agency in Czechoslovakia, who
came with Rabbi Perlzweig of the World Jewish Congress to
see Makins at the Foreign Office in the third week of
October, suggested that part of the Czech loan be used for
Jewish emigration to Palestine 68 . In January 1939 it was
agreed that the Czechs would set aside a sum of £500,000 for
this purpose, to finance the emigration of 2,500 Jews, only
half the number the Czechs had originally hoped to cover69.
67 See Layton to S Dixon, (BCRC Immigration
Department, Bloomsbury House), 9 May 1939, Dixon to Layton,
10 May 1939, 'List of questions of principle on which
decisions must be taken', [n.d.], PRO HO 294/52.
68 Makins, memorandum of visit, 21 Oct 1938, Herrmann,
'Memorandum on the position of Jews in and from the Sudeten
areas', nd., PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/02.
69 Herrmann to Bunbury, 11 Aug 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/16.
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Erich Turk of the BCRC, later a CRTF trustee, took up the
question of allocating more of the Committee's special visas
to Jews. In January 1939 he circulated fellow-members on the
BCRC's Finance Committee with a reminder that the original
mandate of the BCRC required aid to be given to persons
whose lives were endangered, "regardless of race or creed".
He expressed fears that the Jewish position in
Czechoslovakia was not fully understood. He claimed that the
danger faced by members of the democratic and anti-Nazi
Jewish Party, which opposed antisemitism and had supported
the old government, was at least as great as that faced by
Communists and Social Democrats, saying that as Jews they
were more likely than other citizens to be expelled. He had
received lists of urgent cases from Jewish organisations in
Czechoslovakia and urged that they be considered for some of
the 200 visas the Committee was currently allocating. Turk
added that the Home Office would be aware that
Communists(who had competing claims for visas) would find it
extremely hard to re-emigrate 70 . In February, he produced a
memorandum on the position of Jews in Czechoslovakia, and
asked the BRCR Committee if,- since most political refugees
in special danger would soon be evacuated, special
consideration be given in future to the position of Jews,
and the danger that if there were no indications that other
countries might accept them, there might be a wave of
antisemitism in Czechoslovakia. The minutes of the meeting
at which this was raised record agreement that "full
consideration should be given to this point of view";
nevertheless, while "political" Jews were accepted for
70 Turk to Gillies, 12 Jan 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
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special visas, non-political Jews remained a subsidiary
concern for the BCRC71.
Sir Herbert Emerson, who returned from a visit to Prague in
mid-January, regarded the order of priority for rescue as
being headed by political refugees from Germany and Austria,
followed by German refugees from the Sudetenland. He gave
lower priority to Jews from Germany and Austria, unless they
were political cases, saying that their political reasons
were less strong than their economic reasons, but noted that
their presence was giving the Czechs an excuse for
antisemitic feeling, and that the Czech government wished to
get rid of them. Emerson also recognised that Czech non-
Jewish refugees from the Sudetenland were more welcome in
Czechoslovakia than Czech Jews from the Sudeten areas, and
that the Czech government also wished to get rid of non-
Czech Jews who had come from the Sudetenland 72 . Czech Jews
from the rest of the country did not yet figure on this list
of refugees, but they were a group to whose mass emigration
Emerson was later, in accordance with IGC and British
policy, strongly opposed. After the German occupation
Emerson took the view that assistance to help Jews emigrate
from Czechoslovakia would increase the difficulties of the
Rublee plan73 . By late July 1939, Stopford, who had few
illusions about the prospects of the Rublee plan, put on
record his disagreement with Emerson's approach. He stressed
that as long as Emerson's mandate as High Commissioner for
71 Minutes of meeting, 6 Feb 1939, PRO HO 294/50.
72 Emerson, memorandum, 'Report on visit to Prague',
17 Jan 1939, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/3.
See Emerson's report of his conversation with
Wohithat on 19 Jul 1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
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Refugees and as IGC director did not cover Czechoslovakia,
he could not regard himself "as bound to support him to the
detriment of Jews in Czechoslovakia". Stopford did not rule
out negotiations to press Germany to contribute to
arrangements for mass Jewish emigration, but was concerned
that "a blank refusal to help any Jews would lead to a
breakdown of negotiations and increased persecution of the
Jews themselves74.
Selection of refugees fol1owin the German Occuoation.
The impact of the occupation and the refugees in Poland
The German occupation brought in its train an important
change. Emigration was now split into legal and illegal
departures, with legal emigration confined to persons whom
the Germans were prepared to allow to leave 75 . Increasingly,
this privilege was restricted to Jews.
Some people were able to graduate from illegal to legal
status. Persons in this category included a group with whom
the BCRC was concerned who were in hiding, almost all of
them wives or children who hoped to join their Sudeten
German menfolk in England. Stopford and the local BCRC
workers reluctantly agreed to disclose the families'
whereabouts, having concluded that, to enable these families
to leave at all, it was necessary to co-operate with the
Gestapo, who wished to address them first about the
Stopford to Bunbury, 31 Jul 1939, PRO HO 294/70.
For the problems facing persons who tried to help
refugees leave, see 'Report on the Czechoslovakian Refugee
Problem', Odo Nansen, 31 Mar 1939, PRO HO 213/268.
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advantages of remaining 76 . The procedure enabled some 200
people, whose cases were submitted to the Gestapo, to leave
for England by early May. Others were either awaiting
British visas or exit permits. There were disappearances,
arrests and deaths among members of this group, but BCRC
workers in Prague insisted that their new approach was
justified, emphasising that the recent departures had
depended on co-operation with the Gestapo, as would those in
future 77 . This compromise was, however, not acceptable to
William Gillies of the Labour Party, who submitted on behalf
of the Czech Committee a document, which received short
shrift from Stopford, listing high-sounding objections to
such co-operation with agents of the detested Nazi regime78.
The position of British government representatives in Prague
was made more complicated at the time of the German
occupation by several people who took refuge in the Legation
building. Stopford helped the fugitives, and recalled later
that a Jewish dentist, summoned to the building to treat the
toothache of one of the asylum-seekers, made use of the
opportunity to demand a visa 79 . The Legation cases were
resolved within a matter of days, but pressure from the
German authorities hampered refugee work. Communications
76 Stopford to Ormerod, 16 Apr 1939, Stopford to
Waley, 17 Apr 1939, PRO T160/1324/F13577/05/8.
'DW' 'The Numbers now Remaining in the
Protectorate: Wives and Children of Refugees now in
England', [n.d.], written 29 Apr-4 May 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
78 Stopford emphasised that the Gestapo could prevent
people who did not co-operate from leaving. He also
questioned Gillies' objections to British assistance to help
Czech Jews emigrate, Stopford to Trend, 1 May 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/9.
Stopford, Final Draft of t Prague 38-39', Part II,
p. 28, Stopford papers, Box RJS/2, Imperial War Museum;
Sherman, op. cit., p. 222.
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were monitored by the Gestapo, so limited access to the
diplomatic bag was agreed in April for BCRC communications
with representatives in Prague 80 . The German authorities
regarded British refugee workers with deep suspicion8 . In
mid-April Beatrice Wellington of the BCRC was interrogated
twice by the Gestapo, who suspected that other BCRC workers
were assisting illegal emigration, but told she could go on
with her work; in June, Ormerod, the BCRC's deputy Chairman,
was refused an entry permit82.
The Gestapo were justified in their suspicions that BCRC
workers were helping people to depart illegally. Most of
those who got out went to Poland, the only north-westerly
route out of Czechoslovakia not across Nazi territory, and
left from the port of Gdynia. At the time of the occupation,
illegal emigration to Poland quickly developed: soon
hundreds of refugees from Czechoslovakia had arrived in
Poland, the majority in Krakow and Katowice. BCRC
representatives went out to Poland and tried to decide which
cases merited British visas. The Polish cases were
complicated by the Polish government's reluctance to harbour
large numbers of refugees. The Poles turned back many Jews
who sought to enter the country illegally, but were not
expelling refugees sponsored by the BCRC, and were
responsive to requests from the British Vice-Consulate in
80 Stopford to Waley, 13 Apr 1939, Foreign Office
Communications Department to Stopford, 26 Apr 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/8.
81 Waley to Randall, 12 Apr 1939, on talk with
Ormerod, back from Prague, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/8.
82 Troutbeck to FO, no. 233, 14 Apr 1939, Stopford to
Ormerod, 16 Apr 1939, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/8; see
memorandum by "DW", 4 May 1939, PRO HO 294/52; Berlin
Embassy to Foreign Office, 31 May 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/12.
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Katowice 83 . AWG Randall of the Foreign Office, who reported
this situation to Emerson in late April, said:
most of these refugees appear to be Jews who are not in any
real danger, and some of them are certainly undesirables
whom the Poles would be justified in refusing. Their illegal
exodus prejudices the position of refugees who •e in real
danger, and if they stayed it should be possible to emigrate
them legally later. In all the circumstances we doubt
whether we can fairly ask the Polish Government not to turn
back refugees who have no proof that they are ,n danger or
that they are on the British or other lists."8'
On 28 April, leaders of the BCRC and the Jewish refugee
organisation, Emerson and Bunbury agreed that a further 700
refugees from Poland would be selected from among the
following, listed in what appears to be a descending order
of priority: (a) Sudetenland refugees; (b) old Reich
refugees; (c) refugees because of post-Munich boundary
adjustments; (d) other political refugees (e) "By selection,
having regard to suitability for emigration or other means
of livelihood or support in England" 85 . This last category
offered the only chance for non-political Jews not included
in the previous categories. Julian Layton and Maurice Baron,
representing Anglo-Jewry, visited Poland, to select refugees
to recommend for visas, and reportedly agreed that Jewish
economic refugees should not be encouraged to enter Poland
from Czechoslovakia 86 . BCRC workers co-operated with Jewish
representatives over refugee selection in Poland, and
83 Kenriard to Halifax, 25 Apr 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/9.
84 Randall to Emerson, 28 Apr 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/9.
85 'Revised memorandum of decisions of meeting held on
28th April', 1 May 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
86 Kennard to Halifax, 25 Apr, already cited; Randall
to Emerson, 28 Apr 1939, already cited; see also Ormerod to
Hailey, 5 May 1939, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/9.
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investigation of applicants involved consultations with
Czech political groups, leading to the removal of some names
from visa lists, for political and personal reasons87.
Refugees not accepted for UK visas faced expulsion by the
Poles. Randall reported to Waley in mid-June that Ormerod
said that the BCRC could not object to these expulsions. She
claimed that many the BCRC had rejected were neither
refugees "in the proper sense of the word", nor covered by
the January agreement. Despite opposition to this view from
a local BCRC representative, the Consul in Katowice and the
Ambassador, Randall's view was that the government should
not oppose Ormerod, but that she might be asked to make some
additions to her selection and that the situation should be
explained to the Poles88 . Waley replied that the government
should not let the BCRC determine what course of action to
adopt with the balance of the Fund, but that it was also
necessary to remember that the Committee had many friends in
Parliament. He stressed the need to establish facts, saying
that the Jews in Poland whom the BCRC did not wish to help
appeared to dispute the Committee's view that they were
economically motivated and in no danger89.
The urgency of the plight of refugees in Poland and the
British government's wish to maintain good relations with
the Polish government produced Foreign Office pressure to
87 See e.g. "CM"(BCRC) to Clare Hollingworth in
Katowice, 17 Jul 1939, Layton to Ormerod, Bracey and
Gillies, 3 Aug 1939, PRO HO 294/57.
88 Randall to Waley, 15 Jun 1939, enclosing copy
Kennard to Halifax, 8 Jun 1939, PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/12.
89 Waley to Randall, 16 Jun 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/12.
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prioritise Polish cases over those in Czechoslovakia90.
Emerson had given an undertaking to the Polish authorities
that the BCRC would undertake responsibility for a large
number of families in Poland. The dilemma over how to
balance aid to refugees who had fled abroad against aid to
those who remained in Czechoslovakia was complicated by the
fact that visas issued to refugees in Poland went largely to
illegal emigrants, while visas for refugees in Prague were
issued in a process of lawful emigration. The German
authorities had threatened to stop BCRC work in Prague if
its representatives did not desist from support to refugees
who left illegally91.
At a meeting on 13 June 1939, an effort was made to resolve
controversy over whether Trust funds should be used to
support illegal emigration networks. Maxwell made a proposal
designed to make concessions to Committee pressure for
continuing help to the "illegals", a concern he shared 92 . He
suggested that the Fund be reserved for legal emigration, as
regards future commitments, but would cover all existing
commitments to both "illegal" and "legal" emigrants. He also
offered £100,000 from the Fund, to set up a new committee to
take on new "illegal" cases, but this was rejected as
90 Mounsey to Maxwell, 24 May 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/10.
91 Stopford, memorandum, 20 Jun 1939, PRO T 160
1324/F13577/05/12.
92 Minutes of meeting on 13 Jun 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/12; BCRC, minutes of meeting, 21 Jun
1939, PRO HO 294/50; in April Stopford had suggested that
the BCRC use its own funds for "illegals" and the balance of
the Gift Fund for legal emigrants. Waley to Maxwell, 12 Apr
1939, enclosing note 'Negotiations in Prague', PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/8.
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inadequate by the BCRC93 . Stopford rejected BCRC
prioritisation of Czech political cases as an appropriate
policy for the Trust. His view was that the Fund should not
be used directly to help a small number of Czech politicals,
who could only leave illegally, if this endangered work for
the original refugees and other persons whom the Trust had
already pledged to help, including Jews 94 . The whole
question was left in an ill-defined state, which in practice
enabled some assistance to t illegals to continue. Stopford
managed to help both legal and illegal emigrants: he
maintained good enough relations with the Germans to work
with them on legal emigration, while providing discreet
support for British workers and others involved with illegal
emigration networks.
Home Office priorities
Both legal and illegal emigrants were subject to Home Office
willingness to issue immigration visas. Prior to the
invasion, arrangements were made for the Home Office to
authorise visas by telephoning the PCO in Prague, and for
the PCO to grant block visas on lists of names supplied by a
local BCRC representative 95 . The German occupation and the
installation of the new regime temporarily halted legal
emigration. BCRC representatives managed to get a group of
450 people on a train out of Prague on the eve of the
93 BCRC, minutes of meeting on 21 Jun 1939, PRO HO
294/50.
Waley, draft memorandum sent to Sir R Hopkins, 29
Jun 1939, Stopford, memorandum, 20 Jun 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/12; qualms were felt in the Treasury over
whether Trust money should be used for such unlawful
purposes as bribery, Trend to Cooper, 19 Jun 1939, ibid.
BCRC, Report of the Executive Committee meeting
held on 15 Mar 1939, PRO HO 294/50.
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occupation, but after this the resumption of regular
emigration took two months. Visas became obligatory from 1
April, the earliest date on which the Home Office could re-
introduce them. The change delayed a group of refugees who
had no visas at Oldenzaal on the Dutch frontier, until a
BCRC representative arrived and arranged their admission in
transit 96 . After the occupation, the Home Office suspended
the issue of authorisations, pending release of the Trust
Fund. Stopford played an important part in negotiating over
restarting emigration with Czech officials and the country's
new German masters, and participated in British discussions
on the future of the Trust Fund97.
Guide-lines for refugee selection in future were agreed
between the voluntary organisations and the Home Office at a
meeting on 13 April. In a letter confirming the agreement,
Lord Hailey of the Co-ordinating Committee said efforts
would be made to avoid bringing Czech refugees to the UK and
to arrange direct emigration overseas instead98.
Arrangements for the "systematic selection" of refugees in
Prague and adequate arrangements for the settlement of those
already in Poland were needed. It had been agreed that,
first preference should be given to persons who,
either for political or other reasons, were in immediate
danger from action taken by the German Government, or of
being sent back to Germany by Poland. In the selection of
others, and in particular in the selection of Jews,
preference should be given to those who might be considered
96 General Council meeting minutes, 5 Apr 1939, PRO HO
294/50.
See Stopford to Waley, 14 Apr 1939, enclosing
memorandum of 13 Apr on negotiations in Prague, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/8.
98 Hailey to Maxwell, 14 Apr 1939, PRO HO 294/39.
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suitable for emigration or for whose maintenance in Great
Britain satisfactory guarantees were forthcoming.
At subsequent meetings between BCRC representatives and
Maxwell and Cooper, it was agreed that the BCRC should be
slow to accept fresh responsibilities, but might make a
commitment to a limited number of new refugees, mostly
political cases 99 . Further admissions of political cases
from Poland were agreed in June00.
Home Office policy was not to encourage mass emigration of
Czech Jews, and to ensure careful selection of Jewish
entrants. In late April Cooper reviewed the exceptional
circumstances which had led the government to depart in the
Czech case from the policy of not assuming any financial
obligation to assist refugees, and discussed future
priorities. He conceded that the only emigration which the
Germans were likely to allow in future would consist almost
entirely of Jews. He thought, however, that it would be an
ironic conclusion to the history of the Free Gift if it were
diverted from its original purpose, to finance Jewish
emigration from Czechoslovakia "and nothing else", and it
would be "entirely incongruous and anomalous" to give
preference to Jews from only one part of Greater Germany. He
thought any remaining balance in the fund should be used
first to finance emigration, including transport expenses
and landing money, and second, for the administrative
expenses of voluntary organisations in Britain, in respect
of refugees coming from all parts of Greater Germany - a
Layton to Cooper, 18 May 1939, PRO HO 294/52;
'Czech Refugees', minutes of meeting, 23 May 1939, PRO
T160/1324/f13577/05/9.
100 Maxwell to Layton, 7 Jun 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
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suggestion reflecting concern over the voluntary sector's
ability to carry on its work unaided'°.
Maxwell discussed future policy with the Home Secretary, and
sent a sketch of his ideas to Waley in mid-May'° 2 . He
opposed entrusting selection of refugees to the Refugee
Institute in Prague (set up with funds from the Czech loan
but now under Nazi authority), since the persons permitted
to leave, "would be mainly Jews or undesirables whom the
police wish to get rid of", although he expected that the
Committee could weed out undesirables. He wished to use the
greater part of the money to help refugees who left
illegally, "because refugees of the political type for whom
the money was originally intended are unlikely to get out at
all unless they get out illegally." He intended that the
bulk of cases selected would be political opponents of the
Nazi regime liable to persecution because of their past
political record. Although concerned that Communists would
be included in this group, he acknowledged that, while the
British authorities wished to avoid the admission of people
"prepared to compass their political ends by lawless
methods", they could not, by refusing to accept Communists,
force the Poles to send them back to persecution in
Czechoslovakia. A certain number should therefore be
accepted, but not persons guilty of crimes of violence. The
BCRC should also be asked to "limit their selection so far
as is practicable to persons who are suitable for
emigration". As regards persons who wished to leave
101 Cooper to Maxwell, 29 Apr 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/9.
102 Maxwell to Waley, 15 May 1939, enclosing
memorandum 'Czech refugees', PRO T 160/1324/F13577/05/9.
343
Czechoslovakia, because they were destitute there and wished
to make a living elsewhere, a consideration which he claimed
would apply largely to Jews, Maxwell said:
Jewish organisations here agree that it would be a bad
policy to encourage a general Jewish emigration from
Czechoslovakia, and while we cannot entirely exclude Jews,
we ought, I think, to say that those who have left
Czechoslovakia merely for economic reasons should not be
selected for assistance.
Waley accepted the principles in Maxwell's draft, and agreed
to Maxwell's request that the Trustees could now start to
function°3.
The achievements of the BCRC, the transition to the CRTF,
and the last days of peace
Home Office figures for admissions to the UK show that 1,103
persons holding Czech passports were given leave to land
between 1 October and 12 November 1938104. Nearly all the
350 special visas agreed in October 1938 were authorised by
early November. The BCRC continued to apply for visas for
Sudeten and a smaller number of German and Austrian heads of
families' 05 . It took on a further 200 cases in January 1939;
in February, 1,200 more visas were sanctioned by the Home
Office, partly as a result of provisions in the Anglo-Czech
agreement, which reduced pressure on voluntary funds by
providing emigration expenses and £200 resettlement grants.
Sanction had been obtained for the admission of some 2,900
persons in all by the date of the German takeover in March
1939. By 1 May some 2,146 of these persons had arrived in
the UK: roughly one fifth had left for Canada by early May.
103 Waley to Maxwell, 16 May 1939, ibid.
104 Hoare, Hansard, op. cit, vol. 341, cols. 1037-
1038, 17 Nov 1938.
105 Layton to Jagelman, 11 Jul 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
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The BCRC also took responsibilit y for a total of 1,200
persons who became refugees as a result of the occupation.
These included persons already in the UK and people who
arrived soon afterwards with inadequate or no guarantees,
but limited responsibility only was accepted in many cases.
As a result of discussions with the authorities in April and
May 1939, the Committee applied for 2,300 additional visas
for persons whose immigration would be financed by the Fund,
including 700 to be taken from Poland, 300 from elsewhere,
mostly head of families, and a total of some 1,300 family
members still in Slovakia or the Protectorate'°6.
The numbers of visas were limited by the amount of money
available for the support of Czech refugees. Before 15 March
1939, the limit had been largely determined by the number of
guarantees the BCRC was able to obtain. Afterwards, the
quantity of money remaining in the Trust fund was the main
limiting factor for BCRC-sponsored cases. By 15 May the BCRC
had undertaken liability for an estimated 7,100 persons(or
3,400 families) plus some 1,500-2,000 who had taken refuge
in other countries. The liabilities amounted to
approximately £2 million. A further £500,000 had been set
aside for the emigration of Jews to Palestine. In addition,
allowance had to be made for claims for the £200
resettlement grant to which refugees who re-emigrated would
106 See correspondence between BCRC and Home Office,
PRO HO 294/7 and Visa Committee papers, PRO HO 294/52.
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be entitled 107 . The estimation of such liabilities was an
inexact art, charged with great significance, since existing
commitments, to the extent that they consumed the funds
available, precluded future activity 108 . The Home Office was
holding up decisions on new applications pending
clarification of existing liabilities' 09 . Bunbury emphasised
that to bring expenditure down, the new organisation should
put resources into training, employment and emigration, and
made a heartfelt plea for employment of staff who would
ensure efficiency110.
The two-tier system of priority for cases was reflected in
the organisation of casework. Overwhelmed by the flood of
applicants after the German occupation, when the BCRC office
was instructed to open its doors to refugees from
Czechoslovakia who were in England, many of them Jews,
members of the BCRC's casework committee suggested in early
April that the work of the case department be split into two
separate operations. This would facilitate a possible
handing over of cases of the "racial refugees" to the GJAC,
if and when it was able to take responsibility for them1'.
107 See Bunbury, memorandum, Liabilities in respect of
Refugees from Czechoslovakia, 15 May 1939, PRO HO 294/39.
Bunbury suggested that, in view of the difficulties of
immigration by infiltration, especially for Jews, and the
smallness of the Czech quota to the USA, liabilities for
maintenance might have been underestimated. He suggested
adding a £100,000 "reserve against non-einigratability", and
other provisions totalling £70,000.
108 Waley to Maxwell, 16 May 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/9.
109 Layton to Cooper, 8 Jun 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
110 Bunbury memorandum, 'Liabilities in respect of
Refugees from Czechoslovakia', 15 May 1939, PRO HO 294/39.
Minutes of Case Committee meeting, 5 Apr 1939, PRO
HO 294/52.
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However, the GJAC maintained its refusal to undertake this
role, leading the Co-ordinating Committee to suggest that,
as neither the GJAC nor the BCRC was prepared to take
responsibility for Jewish refugees from Czechoslovakia, a
separate organisation be created for them" 2 . No new
organisation was ever set up, but the Committee's work was
split into casework on BCRC-sponsored visa cases, and on
Jewish immigration, carried out at different locations.
A memorandum on the work of the late BCRC, prepared for the
trustees at the beginning of August 1939, explained how the
Committee's paid staff of 100 had handled immigration
cases" 3 . Cases sponsored for "Committee visas", which were
"practically confined to the cases of refugees who are in
danger on political grounds", were selected by a Visa
Committee after consultation with Czech leaders of the
various political groups, and sent to the Home Office"4.
The numbers of these visas was controlled by numerical
limitation by the Home Office, who gave block authorities to
the Committee from time to time, subject to the subsequent
submission of individual names.
"Ordinary visas", on the other hand, which were not financed
from the Fund, were obtained from the Home Office after
examination by the BCRC's Immigration Department, based at
Bloomsbury House alongside the other refugee committees.
112 Bunbury, 'The Problem of Jewish Refugees from
Czechoslovakia', 5 Apr 1939, PRO HO 294/39.
113 CRTF, memorandum, 'Short account of the work to be
taken over from the late British Committee for Refugees from
Czechoslovakia', 1 Aug 1939, PRO HO 294/5.
114 The Visa Committee started to function in May
1939. Circular to members of the Visa Committee, Layton, 4
May 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
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Such cases were covered by Home Office conditions "which
apply generally to persons seeking refuge in this
country" 5 . The BCRC produced a leaflet for such cases
listing categories similar to those for refugees from
Germany and Austria 116 . Children were applied for by the
Children's Movement, the Committee taking financial
responsibility: the general pattern of division into
guaranteed and non-guaranteed cases was followed' 17 . The
BCRC also set up an expert advisory panel of businessmen to
advise on guarantees 118 . In addition the Committee made
arrangements for emigration119.
Selection of Jewish refugees from Czechoslovakia thus
proceeded along similar lines as for Jews from Germany and
Austria, and they were also regarded as temporary
residents' 20 . The BCRC performed similar functions to the
larger GJAC, and encountered many of the same problems, such
as domestic entrants who proved unsuitable' 21 . Many Jewish
refugees failed to comply with Home Office guide-lines. In
115 Ibid.
116 BCRC, 'Conditions for entering Great Britain',
[n.d.], PRO HO 294/39.
117 Finance Committee minutes, 4 May 1939, PRO HO
294/50.
118 Layton to members of visa committee, 4 May 1939;
Layton to Col SF Newcombe, 11 May 1939, Newcombe to Layton,
14 May 1939, PRO HO 294/52; See Cooper to Layton, 23 Jun
1939, for decision-making on BCRC-sponsored cases and
privately guaranteed cases, PRO HO 294/52.
119 The BCRC Emigration Committee did not meet for two
months after the German occupation, Layton to Newcombe, 11
May 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
120 Cooper to Waley, 9 May 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/9.
121 Case Committee minutes, 19 Jul 1939, PRO HO
294/52.
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June, for example, Elizabeth Acland Allen, secretary of the
BCRC's Visa Committee, criticised the inclusion of Jewish
professional men in a list of visa candidates forwarded by
the Lord Mayor's Fund, saying that the Home Off ie had
"already written to us about the undesirability of applying
for professional people, as they are very difficult to
emigrate". The majority of the cases would have to wait for
submission to the visa committee when it next met, as "most
of the refugees were really all economic" and not any more
in danger than thousands of others. Since the Home Office
had not granted the BCRC any visas for Czechoslovakia for
the past two months, there was no point in submitting the
cases until the whole question of new visas had been cleared
up'22.
A survey of BCRC visa allocation policy in a memorandum by
Allen in late August 1939, offers further insights into
Committee priorities and attitudes to Jews; it also conveys
something of the plight of refugees in Western Europe as war
approached123 . Allen divided refugees into "POLITICAL and
RACIAL/Jewish", explaining that the term "political" covered
members of a wide range of bodies, including trades unions,
women's, peace, and youth organisations, in fact, any
refugee "who was organised, and - or - in consequence of his
public activities - is in danger"; she included writers,
artists and actors whose work was considered obnoxious by
the German authorities. Naturally, a large number of Jews
122 Allen, memorandum, 'Candidates for Visas,
forwarded by the Lord Mayor's Fund', 6 Jun 1939, PRO HO
294/52.
123 Allen, 'Memorandum on emigration to the United
Kingdom pending final settlement of persons coming from
Czechoslovakia', 20 Aug 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
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were included under these headings: Allen estimated that
among political refugees coming from Poland at least three
quarters were Jews "according to the Nurnberg laws". The
term "racial refugee", on the other hand, was used, "to
cover purely Jewish refugees": it did not include those
endangered through their activities in Jewish organisations
or in the Jewish communities, who were included among
political refugees.
Allen concluded that there was now little chance of "getting
any real political refugees out of the Protectorate"124.
Permission to emigrate was now no longer obtainable except
for Jews who had taken no part in public life. Most of the
political Sudetens, Germans or Austrians had either come to
the UK, or were in prison in Czechoslovakia, or awaiting
visas in Poland or other countries. Some visas should be
kept for people who escaped from the Protectorate or were
released from prison, or managed to leave illegally. The
BCRC had received applications for visas for a group of 100
assorted Sudetens, German, Austrian and Czech political
refugees, all of them Jews, but they would only be allowed
to leave "if their political activities are not considered
of sufficient importance to outweigh the desire that all
Jews should leave" 125 . Allen claimed that in Slovakia the
demand for visas for persons who had been active politically
was very low, as most had left after the September crisis.
Some 5,000 Jewish refugees of various nationalities were
124 Ibid.; Willi Wanka, London representative of the
Sudeten Germans, agreed in June that few cases remained in
Bohemia, but submitted a new list of cases in Poland. He
objected to suggestions that old Reich refugees might be
given priority over Sudeten Germans. Correspondence between
Wanka and Layton, mid-June 1939, PRO HO 294/15.
125 Allen, 'Memorandum on emigration', already cited.
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registered there, but their political status was not known
and would be difficult to investigate; some 200,000
Slovakian Jews. now under similar threat to those in the
Reich, would have to emigrate - the Committee was collecting
information about leading figures in Jewish communities
there.
Refugees currently in other countries were also seeking UK
visas. These included people recently arrived in Latvia,
many of whom had previously registered with the BCRC in
Poland, but after investigation "were considered unsuitable
either for moral or physical reasons or because there was
better material already there". More Czechs were expected to
escape to Yugoslavia. Czech refugees had entered eight other
named European countries, all of which had expelled
refugees. In the south of France some 800 persons who had
fought in Spain, and were unable to return after the March
occupation, were housed in camps, in appalling conditions.
Allen put forward this group as "really good material for
emigration": Eleanor Rathbone was willing to help find
hospitality for them in Britain'26.
The Committee had obtained visas at the request of a wide
range of British and international organisations, including
church associations, Co-operative movement groups and trades
unions, and groups interested in education, world peace and
friendship. The BCRC's selection procedure involved
preliminary investigation by the Arbeitskreis (the General
Council of the Refugees from Czechoslovakia). Applicants not
recommended by organisations were carefully investigated.
126 Ibid.
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The visa committee then selected cases, "on the basis of a.
endangerment, b. contribution to public life, c. suitability
for further emigration, i.e. age, profession etc." From time
to time, it also decided in what proportions to allocate
visas to refugees in Poland, the Protectorate and elsewhere.
Most wives and children of men brought to Britain by the
Committee, if still abroad, either had visas or were
expected to obtain them shortly, but there was still a need
to apply for visas for some 60 families in Germany and
Austria. Allen concluded that the categories for whom the
government's grant had been originally and primarily
intended had been very largely dealt with. Two classes
remained: Czechs(in other words, Czech Jews), whose
requirements she said it was not possible to estimate owing
to the uncertain situation in the Protectorate, and the men
in the camps in France, who had had no help at all'27.
Thus, when the BCRC was dissolved at the end of July, the
main task of rescue it had set itself had been largely
completed. The Committee was formally wound up on 27 July,
and its liabilities and assets transferred to the Trustees
of the CRTF, which had been created when the Trust Deed was
signed on 21 July' 28 . The establishment of the Trust
generated a new effort to get a grip on commitments,
including attempts by Bunbury to restrict the definition of
127 The BCRC's Visa Committee decided in June to apply
for a block of visas for people in the French camps. Minutes
of Visa Committee meeting, 23 Jun 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
128 General Council minutes, 27 Jul 1939, PRO HO
294/50; for the Trust Deed, see PRO HO 213/297.
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eligible refugees 129 . Interpretation of the terms of the
Trust turned out to be a contentious area. Stopford had
pressed for inclusion of Czechs, Jews and stateless persons
in the definition of refugees covered by the Fund. In April,
the new German authorities in Prague had told him that they
were anxious for the work of the Fund to continue, but one
of their conditions for allowing this was that Czech Jews
were included in the definition of eligible refugees. On his
return from a visit to London, Stopford had told the German
authorities, on the instructions of the Treasury, that his
government was prepared to include Czechs and Czech Jews
within the scope of the Trust, but added that the original
refugees were the principal concern of the British
government. It became necessary for Stopford to remind
Bunbury in late July 1939 that the government "is committed
to the principle of including Czech Jews" 30 . When he
returned to London, leaving behind an "understudy" to
approve cases in Prague, Stopford told Waley of his concern
that the trustees might not wish to assist Czech Jews "whom
we have agreed to assist in limited numbers at Creighton's
discretion"31.
129 Bunbury claimed that the trustees had no authority
to act as yet under Category (iv) of the Trust Deed, (which
covered such groups as the Home Secretary might prescribe),
but that Creighton, Stopford's deputy in Prague, was
nevertheless admitting up to 20% Czech Jews. He was
concerned that this would require retrospective sanction.
Bunbury to Stopford, 11 Aug 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/05/16; Stopford replied that Creighton acted
as the Treasury's representative, not the Trustees', and
that the Jews were covered by category (iii) in the Trust
Deed, Stopford to Bunbury, 14 Aug 1939, ibid.
130 Bunbury to Culpin, 7 Jul 1939, PRO HO 294/7;
Stopford to Bunbury, 31 Jul 1939, PRO HO 294/70.
131 Stopford to Waley, 3 Aug 1939, PRO T
160/1324/F13577/16.
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In the last days of peace, relations between certain refugee
workers in Prague and the BCRC leadership and Trustees in
London deteriorated, as workers in the field made
commitments to help more persons than was thought proper in
London. Allegations were made by refugee workers that events
which obliged several of their number to leave Prague were
the result of machinations by the British authorities;
certain individuals who wished to return to Prague to
continue their work were prevented from doing 	 132.
The work of rescue continued up to, and in some cases well
after the start of the war' 33 . BCRC workers remained in
central Europe, and in late 1939 and the first half of 1940
Home Office agreement was obtained to the admission of
further refugees. They were mostly people who had fled
eastwards to avoid the German advance through Poland, in
many cases ending up in Vilna, a Polish town which became
part of Lithuania. For example, the Trust obtained visas for
some 35 persons from Lithuania in early January 1940, on the
basis that they had made contact with Committee or Trust
representatives before the outbreak of war134.
132 Rathbone to Bunbury, 9 Aug 1939, PRO HO 294/7; see
also unsigned memorandum by a BCRC worker, suggesting the
Gestapo was prepared to continue working with BCRC workers
in Prague but that British representatives had engineered
their removal, ibid.
133 See correspondence between Allen and Visa
Committee members, Jul-Aug 1939, PRO HO 294/52.
134 See correspondence between Trust and Home Office,
Nov 1939-Jan 1940, PRO HO 294/46.
354
CHAPTER 6:
WAR-TIME POLICY: 1939-1942
This chapter examines refugee policy from the outbreak of
war in September 1939 until late 1942. It looks at the way
in which the British government balanced the needs of
refugees in Britain, or seeking entry to Britain, against
the goal of victory. The chapter shows how the impact of the
war changed refugee policy and procedures; more generally,
it establishes that by the time the government faced
pressure to take action to rescue Jews menaced by the Nazi
programme of mass murder, British refugee policy had already
been cast in a negative mould.
The war led to important changes in the government's conduct
of policy on refugee matters. Tightly-defined Cabinet
policies left the Home Office with much less discretion than
before and diminished the scope for decision-making by
officials. Humanitarian aid to refugees was continually
limited by reference to the changed conditions of war-time
and the paramount importance of the war effort, which
provided the criterion of national interest against which
possible aid to refugees was judged, as immigration policy
had done before the war. The refugee committees also
underwent changes, becoming increasingly linked to the Home
Office through financial subsidies and supervision. The
horizons of both the Home Office and the refugee
organisations became more limited: their attention was
directed inwards, towards the management of refugees in
Britain, rather than at possible further immigration from
abroad. For refugees, the outbreak of war meant that their
nationality, or the lack of it, took on new significance.
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Aliens were now additionally classified by the government as
enemy, friendly or neutral, and were subject to special war-
time restrictions.
The chapter shows that the consequence for refugee policy of
the transition to war-time priorities was to rule out
further alien refugee immigration to the UK, other than for
purposes connected with the war. No more help would be given
to potential refugees to leave enemy-controlled territory.
Furthermore, refugee emigration from the UK would be
maximised. In war-time, aliens in the UK, especially enemy
aliens, posed security problems. Initially these were dealt
with by classification by aliens tribunals. Internment was
used only in a very few cases, but, in May 1940, mass
internment was introduced, followed by mass deportations of
internees to the dominions. The government was also
confronted in late 1939 by the financial collapse of the
Jewish refugee organisation, and finally decided to
subsidise its administrative expenses, and refugee
maintenance and emigration. The Home Office fostered refugee
emigration, while debating whether to let refugees remain
after the war. Refugee admissions to the UK, which are dealt
with in the latter part of the chapter, were subject to the
general ban on humanitarian admissions, to which there were
limited exceptions. However, in 1940 "war refugees" were
admitted in large numbers. The Foreign Office secured
certain categories of "political" admissions, in many cases
at the instance of governments-in-exile. Admissions for
employment were also posssible in principle, if they
furthered the war effort. The government affirmed its
restrictive policy when it was confronted by new pressure
for admissions during the Holocaust period.
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The transition to war-time Driorities
The outbreak of war ended the large-scale entry of Jewish
refugees. All unused visas granted to enemy nationals
immediately became invalid. Henceforth, alien admissions
were evaluated with reference to the requirements of a
country at war. Purely humanitarian admissions of civilian
refugees, whether of British or alien nationality, were
rejected as a luxury which a nation fighting for its
survival could not afford. Even before war broke out, the
refugee organisations, their resources stretched to the
limit, felt unable to undertake financial responsibility for
new refugees and decided that they would no longer approve
fresh admissions'.
The considerations of immigration policy which had
determined Home Office restrictions on refugees in peace-
time were still present, but the overriding necessity, as
laid down by the Cabinet, was to win the war. The Home
Office was obliged to concede considerable authority over
admissions policy to other departments of state, which had
their own war-time reasons both for bringing aliens to the
UK, and for excluding them. The administration of admissions
remained the province of the Home Office, but there was far
greater involvement of the security services in casework.
Possible refugee movements over land borders or sea also had
implications for military and economic warfare. The
possibility of refugee admissions to the UK affected
departments concerned with the home front, such as the
Ministries of Health and Labour.
1 Cooper, memorandum, 20 Sept 1939, PRO FO 371/24078,
W14035/45/48, f.230.
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On 25 September 1939, the Cabinet Committee on the Refugee
Problem met2 . It was necessary to review policy on the IGC,
in preparation for an IGC conference in Washington, planned
before the outbreak of war and still taking place, since the
USA did not share British expectations that the IGC would be
put "in cold storage" once the war began 3 . The forthcoming
conference largely dictated the agenda and the terms of the
Committee's discussion. Emerson, the IGC's director was
present4.
Within the Cabinet there was a consensus that British
resources could no longer be spent in helping refugees. The
immediate task was therefore to dispose of various remnants
of pre-war policy. The Treasury had recently rejected any
new financial commitments not directly related to the
prosecution of the war, and, in deciding how to deal with
refugee questions, British policy-makers aimed to avoid
adding to the UK's burdens, and to lighten existing
burdens 5 . Refugees in the UK were regarded as a financial
burden on the economy, but participants in the meeting
2 Summary of Conclusions and Conclusions, War Cabinet,
Committee on the Refugee Problem, CRP(39) 6th mtg, 25 Sept
1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
See B Trend (Treasury), minute of conversation with
Mr Harsch (US Govt) and Lord Winterton, FO to Lothian, No.
468, 2 Sept 1939, Randall, minute of conversation with Lord
Winterton, 4 Sept 1939, PRO FO 371/24078, W13064/45/48,
f.92; Lothian to FO, No. 421, 4 Sept 1939, PRO FO 371/24078,
W13077/45/48, f.98.
Emerson had written two of the briefing papers for
the meeting, 'The Present Position of the Refugee Problem',
CRP(39)15, 'The Objects of the Intergovernmental Committee',
CRP(39) 16, ibid.; see also 'Foreign Office Note on the
present position of the Refugee Problem', CRP(39)17, ibid.
See E Hale(Treasury) to Randall, 16 Sept 1939, PRO
FO 371/24708, W13740/45/48, f.171.
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expected that the burden would be reduced in countries at
war with Germany, such as Britain and France, by a
combination of internment, employment and settlement
overseas.
No suggestion of further refugee admissions to the UK was
made at the meeting, in which Home Office representatives
played a minimal role. Home Office policy of seeking to
maximise refugee emigration from the UK had been reiterated
by Cooper in a memorandum circulated towards the end of
August 6 . Emerson, in a memorandum dealing with the refugee
problem as it stood since the outbreak of war, gave re-
emigration of Jewish refugees from countries of first refuge
far higher priority than assisting Jews to depart from
German territory, an approach in which his loyalty to the
British government was more evident than his mandate as
Director of the IGC. He proposed that the first duty of the
European countries of first refuge, including the UK, was to
deal with the estimated 150,000 refugees within their
borders. The two immediate priorities were to ensure the
maintenance and support of the refugees and to secure
emigration from countries of refuge to permanent homes. He
surveyed possible refugee emigration from enemy territory.
He estimated that a total of 250,000 confessional Jews
remained in Germany and 63,000 in Austria: he concluded that
of these perhaps 167,000 would have wished to emigrate
before the war, plus some 127,000 of the remaining 190,000
non-Aryan Christians in both countries. He claimed that the
persons most suitable for emigration had already gone, and
6 Cooper, 'Refugee Conference in Washington', [n.d.],
mid-Aug 1939, sent to Randall by Grant, 23 Aug 1939, PRO FO
371/24078, W12458/45/48, f.75.
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that those left were "poorer in material resources and
weaker in personal qualifications". In addition, an
estimated 215,000 Jews and non-Aryans were present in the
Protectorate and Slovakia, the majority Czech nationals; the
IGC's mandate, however, did still not include Czech Jews, so
Emerson could only take a formal interest in non-Czechs of
whom there were 15,000 to 20,000. He assumed it unlikely
that the UK would be able to admit any more refugees of
enemy origin, and therefore left this question on one side.
He also assumed that the UK would not become involved in
helping refugees to leave German-occupied territory for
other destinations, and furthermore that there could be no
such role for the IGC while the UK remained a member7.
Emerson's assumptions were in keeping with the views of
ministers, and were reflected in the decisions of the
Cabinet Committee. Ministers agreed that the government
would withdraw its recent offer to take a lead in financing
schemes of settlement overseas, communicated to the IGC in
July. Winterton would explain in Washington that the
outbreak of war with Germany meant that this offer could no
longer be fulfilled. The conference would be told that the
energies of the British government
were now concentrated upon the eradication of the root cause
of the refugee problem, namely, the existing regime in
Germany, and that must be regarded as now being thei
contribution to the solution of the refugee problem"
British policy was that, having become a belligerent, the UK
could not be expected to make a new effort for refugees, but
Emerson, 'The Present Position of the Refugee
Problem', CRP(39)15, PRO CAB 98/1.
8 Summary of Conclusions and Conclusions, CRP(39) 6th
mtg, 25 Sept 1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
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that countries not caught up in the war could still assist
refugees, and should do so. The pre-war emigration scheme
itself could not, in any event, be implemented as originally
planned, because the refugee organisations were unable to
make their financial contribution to developing the
project 9 . The UK would, however, express its preparedness to
provide facilities for an experimental settlement in British
Guiana, provided finance came from other sources.
The Committee meeting agreed that, for the purposes of
British policy, refugees were now divided into two
categories. These were "potential refugees", who were still
in territory under German control, and "actual refugees",
who had left German-controlled territory, and were now in
countries of first refuge, including the UK. "Potential"
refugees were thought to pose a threat to the war effort:
It was felt generally that any refugees who might be
permitted by the German Government to leave Germany would be
persons whose entry into other countries was desired for
reasons connected with the war.
Persons from territory under German control could therefore
no longer be given assistance to depart. The UK could not
"assist in any way the exodus of the nationals of a country
with which it was at war", nor could it differentiate
between refugees and other German nationals. These rulings
applied to enemy-controlled territories, as well as to
Germany proper. Furthermore, German and Austrian Jews could
no longer be accepted for entry to the UK if they had been
in German-controlled territory subsequent to the outbreak of
war, even if they later reached neutral or friendly
territory. The meeting also resolved that the UK would
See record of a meeting at Colonial Office on 14
Sept, Hibbert (CO) to Randall, 20 Sept 1939, PRO FO
371/24078, W12458/45/48, f.173.
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withdraw from the IGC if it should propose to help potential
refugees, and would only remain a member if the
organisation confined itself "to assisting the settlement
of refugees who had reached countries of refuge at the
outbreak of war". Any negotiations with Germany over
refugees were, it was agreed, out of the question.
British policy was thus that IGC assistance for refugee
emigration should henceforth be confined to the
encouragement of emigration from neutral countries and
countries of refuge, and that this should not involve the UK
in new burdens. Generally, the Foreign Office view of the
IGC's war-time role was that the USA might develop the IGC
if it wished, and that Britain would continue to use the IGC
as a means of nurturing Anglo-American relations' 0 . The IGC
itself would be left in a state of semi-suspension: it was
not expected to achieve anything spectacular 11 . Henceforth,
when British representatives faced unwelcome demands for
relief or refuge, they would say that the UK had done much
for refugees, but now the commitment to victory came first.
Exceptions were made, however, particularly for cases which
could be viewed as contributions to the war effort'2.
The UK, both as a belligerent, and as a country of first
refuge, expected to be a net exporter of refugees to
countries of permanent settlement, and for this reason
retained an interest in possible emigration prospects
10 'Foreign Office Note', cited n. 3 above.
11 Conclusions, CRP(39) 6th mtg, PRO CAB 98/1.
12 The Foreign Office note for the meeting (see n. 10
above) envisaged the possibility of admitting selected
refugees from neutral territory.
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overseas. The objective of reducing the numbers of Jewish
refugees in the UK was achieved. During the war the number
of refugees in the country more than doubled, but only a
small proportion of the new entrants were Jews. According to
a Home Office estimate of March 1945, the numbers of Jewish
refugees had been reduced by at least 13,00013. The
government contributed greatly to this reduction, by
pressing refugees to re-emigrate, by financial support for
re-emigration of refugees to countries of settlement such as
the USA, Palestine and the Dominican Republic, and by
deporting internees to the dominions.
At the Washington conference in October 1939, Holland,
Belgium and France were promised help from IGC member
nations in reducing the numbers of refugees in their
countries, but the UK delegation did not request such
priority. In December Winterton deplored the fact that he
was not instructed to do so, on hearing the Home Office's
advice that, notwithstanding past precautions, public funds
would after all have to be spent on refugees in the UK 14 . On
8 December the Cabinet Committee's eighth (and last) meeting
accepted that the long-predicted exhaustion of the British
Jewish refugee organisation's resources necessitated Cabinet
consent to allocation of public funds for refugees' 5 . The
decision to inject government funds - subsidising the costs
13 Robinson, 'Alien Refugees', 30 Mar 1945, PRO HO
213/1009.
14 CRP(39) 7th mtg, 8 Dec 1939, PRO CAB 98/1; for Home
Office fore-knowledge of the straits of the refugee
organisations, see: Cooper, memorandum, 20 Sept 1939, n. 1
above; Cooper, 'Refugee Conference in Washington', n. 6
above; his remarks to the CID Sub-committee on the Treatment
of Aliens in Time of War, 25 Aug 1939, PRO CAB 16/211.
15 CRP 7th mtg, 8 Dec 1939, PRO CAB 98/1; Sherman, op.
cit, p. 258.
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of maintenance and emigration of refugees and the
administrative expenses of the Jewish refugee organisation -
provided a new incentive to seek countries to receive
refugees from the UK' 6 . The decision is dealt with in more
detail later in this chapter.
Some of the consequences of the failure of the IGC to
mitigate the conditions of refugee emigration were foreseen
by Cooper in August 1939. He warned that, instead of orderly
emigration from German territory there would be
more Gestapo pressure of the worst type, resulting in mass
flight, forced voyages to Shanghai, attempts to land
illegally in Palestine, etc. with the result that the
receiving countries might almost be driven to abandon the
whole problem if they saw all their plans thrown out of gear
by both th1 open and subversive activities of the German
Government 1'
Much as Cooper had predicted, a chaotic Jewish exodus, urged
on by German pressure, continued during the early part of
the war, accompanied by strenuous British efforts to curb
illegal emigration from Europe' 8 . The scope for legal
emigration was extremely restricted. British action to help
Jews leave Nazi Europe had been ruled out. Furthermore, if
other countries accommodated such emigrants, Jews from
enemy-controlled territory would use up opportunities of
permanent settlement which could otherwise be taken up by
persons temporarily in countries of refuge such as the UK,
where their presence was seen as burdensome. Jews in
European countries of first refuge were thus in competition
16 E.g. Winterton's suggestion of using conditions in
any War Trade Agreements to press South American states to
accept refugees. CRP 7th intg, 8 Dec 1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
17 Cooper, memorandum, Refugee Conference in
Washington', cited n. 6 above.
18 Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., pp. 40-80.
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for emigration opportunities with Jews remaining in enemy
territory. This was illustrated when the Americans re-
allocated part of the USA's German immigration quota to the
UK, denying escape to desperate Jewish applicants in
Germany, but enabling thousands of German Jews in the UK to
depart for the USA'9.
No active consideration took place of the need for refuge
for Jews in Europe, nor did any department have
responsibility for raising this issue. Even existing
responsibilities risked neglect, because of the absence of a
coherent inter-departmental division of responsibility for
refugee policy and its execution. Cooper had pointed to this
danger shortly before the outbreak of war, warning that
"Departments may be disinclined to shoulder as much
responsibility as perhaps they should, with the result that
work which ought to be done may be left undone" 20 . The
Cabinet Committee on the Refugee Problem had done little to
make up for the lack of a systematic approach to refugee
policy, and after 8 December 1939 it never met again. A gap
of over three years went by before another Cabinet Committee
concerned with refugees was set up, in response to new
demands for rescue and refuge. Meanwhile, individual
government departments worked on refugee matters according
to their own priorities. Co-ordinating functions were
performed by Foreign Office officials in the Refugee Section
within the General Department, who received requests
concerning individuals and dealt with foreign governments-
19 Wyman, Paper Walls, op. cit., pp. 170-171.
20 Cooper, 'Refugee Conference in Washington', already
cited; see also DP Reilly, minute, 29 Aug 1939, PRO FO
371/24078, W12458/45/48, f.75.
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in-exile, and who had their own political objectives 21 . It
was not the duty of any government department to help
refugees, yet limited scope for humanitarian activity on
behalf of refugees still existed.
Control of aliens in war-time Britain
On the outbreak of war all unused visas and authorisations
were invalidated. The tide of refugee arrivals stopped,
although a small number of Jewish refugees who had been
granted permission to come to the UK before the war were
still admitted22 . The immediate question, however, was the
security headache posed by large numbers of refugees in the
UK who were now enemy aliens.
PreDarations for controllin g aliens in war-time
When war broke out, a comprehensive set of regulations for
the control of aliens in war-time was ready for immediate
introduction23 . Soon after the First World War a sub-
committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence(CID) had
discussed the form such controls would take 24 . During the
Czech crisis of September 1938, when war seemed imminent, a
draft amended Aliens Order containing additional war-time
powers, and circulars to police and immigration officers,
21 See Latham, 'The Foreign Office interest in aliens
policy', PRO FO 371/29180, W962/3/48, 21 Jan 1941.
22 Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., p. 81.
23 Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 21-31.
24 Report, Proceedings and Memoranda of CID Standing
Sub-Committee on the Treatment of Aliens in Time of War, Apr
1920-Jul 1924, PRO CAB 15/10.
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were prepared 25 . The arrangements were finalised under the
direction of a new inter-departmental Sub-committee on
Control of Aliens in Wartime (CAW), set up by the CID in
January 1939, under Cooper's chairmanship 26 . The main
functions of CAW were to ensure adequate co-ordination, to
review the Home Office War Book, in which special var-time
instructions were set out, and to finalise the new aliens
regulations contained in the draft Order in Council, which
was approved in April 193927.
A reduced number of ports would be approved for immigration
purposes, each with a security control officer, and a
contingent of military police, to assist immigration and
customs officers. A CAW sub-committee planned the
establishment of several Passport and Permit Offices, whose
duties included the grant or refusal of permission to leave
the country28 . An outward flow of aliens before war broke
out would avoid the problems of feeding them and of
interning male enemy aliens, and limited measures designed
to encourage aliens to depart were authorised by the last
CAW meeting before the war; on the outbreak of war aliens,
25 Circular, FJ Ralfe (HM Chief Inspector of
Immigration) to Officer in Charge, 20 Sept 1938, and
enclosures, Maxwell, Circular to Chief Constables, 20 Sept
1938, PRO HO 144/21254/700450/13.
26 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 30.
27 For proceedings and memoranda of CAW see PRO CAB
16/211; see CAW first report, (also CID paper number 1543-
B), 1 Apr 1939, CAW 21, ibid.; see extract from 352nd
meeting of CID on 6 Apr 1939, PRO HO 144/21262/700470/2.
These events are wrongly described as taking place in 1938
instead of 1939 in Peter and Leni Giliman, 'Collar the
Lot!'. How Britain Interned and Expelled its Wartime
Refugees', London 1980, p. 25.
28 
'First Report of the Advisory Committee on the
Passport and Permit Office', (as amended by CAW on 14 Mar
1939), Appendix II to first report of CAW (see previous n.)
CAW 21, PRO CAB 16/211.
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including enemy aliens, would be encouraged to embark,
without the need for exit permits29 . Detention would be
necessary in certain cases, but there was no intention of
preventing the departure of enemy aliens who were unlikely
to be of particular value to the enemy. Once the initial
exodus of aliens had taken place, all travel abroad would be
restricted, and require exit permits. To conserve manpower,
departures would as far as possible be restricted to people
regarded as a drain on war-time resources30.
It was intended that the entry of aliens would be greatly
restricted31 . Enemy aliens arriving at the ports would be
refused leave tQ land unless the Home Office had approved
their visas. They could be detained, examined, and disposed
of, by internment or otherwise 32 . The authorities wished to
avoid the burdens which would result from the admission of
"war refugees", but, since the UK might be forced to admit
some, the Ministry of Health was asked to make contingency
plans for their accommodation33 . The aliens registration
regulations were made more stringent, including a
29 Hinsley, op. cit. pp. 22-23, 29; LW Clayton, Home
Office Circular to Chief Constables, 'Control of Aliens and
Passenger Traffic', Police War Instructions, Sect. 6, Home
Office War Book.,IX.9, 3 Sept 1939, PRO FO 612/217.
30 'First report of the Advisory Committee on the
Passport and Permit Office', already cited, para 7.
31 See 'War Instructions to Immigration Officers', Apr
1939, CAW 26, PRO CAB 16/211.
32 Jeffes, Passport Control Department, 'Special
Instructions regarding the Grant of Visas for the United
Kingdom in the Event of an Outbreak of War', 12 Apr 1939,
CAW 24, PRO CAB 16/211.
First Report of CAW, 1 Apr 1939, CAW 21, PRO CAB
16/211, para. 14.
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requirement that all aliens aged 16 or over register
immediately with the police34.
The definition of "enemy alien" was a source of confusion,
since many refugees who had been German and Austrian
nationals were now stateless, either legally or effectively.
The UK authorities required strict proof of statelessness,
which was not often obtainable; yet, even if such proof was
accepted and the person registered as stateless, the police
could still apply to the Home Secretary for authorisation to
subject the individual to any of the restrictions applicable
to enemy aliens 35 . The problem of refugee statelessness was
posed more sharply after the German government passed a new
law in November 1941, removing German nationality from
certain classes of person, including Jews who resided abroad
or were going to reside abroad 36 . The Home Office sought
advice from the Law Officers of the Crown as to the legality
of the internment - past, present and future - of German
Jews who could now claim to be stateless. They were
reassured that it would be contrary to public policy to
recognise the power of enemy legislation to rescue persons
who were enemy subjects at the outbreak of war from a
Hinsley, op. cit., p. 23.
See e.g. Prestige to Lathain, 12 Dec 1940, PRO FO
371/25244, W8040/7848/48, f.326.
36 See correspondence, minutes and legal advice, Dec
1941-May 1942, PRO HO 213/160; the German law was the
Eleventh Ordinance of the Reich Nationality Law, of 25 Nov
1941, made by virtue of article 3 of the Reich Citizenship
Law of 15 Sept 1935, Reichgesetzblatt part I, p. 1146;
paras. 1 and 2 deprived Jews (as defined in the Nuremberg
laws) of nationality.
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disability such as internment, but the advice came with the
proviso that it was not certain37.
Arrangements for internment and internment camps had been
proceeding since 1938. In April 1939, approval was granted
for the War Office to earmark accommodation for 18,000
internees. Immediate mass internment was not envisaged, but
it was accepted that the step would probably become
inevitable at an early date 38 . In August 1939, a Home Office
official suggested that certain of the internment camps be
set aside for refugees, and administered by the Home Office,
rather than the War Office, which would only be responsible
for camps for hostile aliens; detailed discussion of these
plans left the War Office with responsibility for the
initial stages of refugee internment camps 39 . However, on 29
August, in a major policy change, the Home Office decided to
try to avoid mass internment of refugees. Plans to intern
the 3,000 male refugee occupants of Richborough transit camp
were therefore suspended and the Home Office told the War
Office that there would be no cause to place inmates of the
camp under restraint unless a general order for the
internment of male enemy aliens was made, although
arrangements should be kept in readiness for such an
Advice, DP Maxwell Fyfe and DB Somervell, 4 May
1942, PRO HO 213/160; this question was considered in R v
the Home Secretary, ex parte L, and others, [1945] 1 KB 7.
38 CAW First Report, 1 Apr 1939, CAW 21, PRO CAB
16/211, paras 6-9, see n. 27 above.
The plans were raised by Russell at the CAW meeting
of 25 Aug, CAW, 6th mtg, 25 Aug 1939, PRO CAB 16/211; see
Giliman, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
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eventuality40 . Maxwell wrote to Sir Vernon Kell, head of
M15, setting out the new Home Office plan of avoiding mass
internment by setting up tribunals to evaluate refugees,
both for labour and security purposes. Maxwell said that
Hoare "had always wished to avoid any general measures of
internment", and had that morning decided that it would be
better, on the outbreak of war, to set up tribunals to
review all cases of male enemy aliens over 16. The proposed
tribunals would be chaired by barristers, assisted by
Ministry of Labour and Home Office representatives, and
would consider whether aliens prohibited from taking
employment could be allowed to do so, and whether any ought
to be interned or subjected to general restrictions. The
Home Secretary would thus be able to say that he was not
leaving dangerous enemy aliens at large, and was only
letting German refugees take employment if the Ministry of
Labour agreed. The scheme would not interfere with
arrangements for interning at once enemy aliens regarded as
dangerous; it also offered the extra advantage of providing
an immediate general review of the cases of enemy aliens,
which would have been delayed by the tvery expensive and
troublesome" alternative of wholesale internment, with
release after review.41.
Only four days earlier, on 25 August, Maxwell and Cooper had
discussed the position of the Richborough camp refugees on
the outbreak of war with Bentwich and Sir Robert Waley-
40 Clayton to Lucas, 29 Aug 1939, Lucas, copy telegram
of 31 Aug, sent to HO, Clayton to Lucas, 1 Sept 1939, PRO HO
144/21258/700463/39.
41 Maxwell to Kell, 29 Aug 1939, PRO HO
144/21258/700463/41. See Giliman, op. cit. pp. 28-30, where
the labour aspect of the scheme is not mentioned.
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Cohen, former managing director of the Shell company, who
was chairman of the camp's organising committee 42 . A
memorandum from the Couch for German Jewry, probably by
Waley-Cohen, proposed the use of the camp as a "controlled
centre", from which refugees could be drafted out daily in
work parties, returning at night 43 . When Waley-Cohen
suggested that the camp could be taken over as an internment
camp, with the refugees in it, Maxwell agreed that this was
possible, but said he hoped there would not be any
internment. At the meeting the Jewish representatives
pointed to the range of skills within the camp, including
medical doctors who were not even allowed to treat fellow
inmates, and stressed the refugees' anxiety to put their
expertise at the service of the nation44 . Any connection
between this meeting and the change of policy four days
later remains a matter of inference. The Gilimans might be
right to suggest that the new plan owed more to Home Office
officials than to Hoare, but there is no evidence of this in
the files they cite45 . Maxwell had offered to talk with Kell
about the proposed tribunals; Hinsley records that "M15
expressed general agreement" with the policy 46 . Less than a
week later, war broke out.
42 Cooper memorandum, 26 Aug 1939, PRO HO
144/21258/700463/40.
CGJ memorandum, 'The Kitchener Refugee Camp in War
Conditions', 25 Aug 1939, ibid.
Ibid. and see Beritwich note (on CGJ notepaper),
'Kitchener Refugee Camp', 25 Aug 1939, ibid.
The author has seen the closed files relating to
this period cited by the Gillmans. These authors also refer
to an open file, stating (op. cit., p. 301) that Hoare "is
minuted" in (open) file PRO HO 45/20206, yet the file in
question contains no such reference, nor does it "contain
the history of Regulation 18B"(p. 308).
46 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 31, citing a closed file not
shown to this author: PRO HO 144/21258/700463/4.
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Controls followin g the outbreak of war: Aliens Tribunals and
emolovment
Sir John Anderson, who became Home Secretary on 4 September,
announced that he was instituting an immediate review of all
Austrians and Germans in Britain, and that a special
tribunal would conduct a similar review of all
Czechoslovaks 47 . When details of the Aliens Tribunals were
announced, they consisted of nearly 100 lawyers, sitting in
various parts of the country, but, for reasons which this
study has failed to discover, lacked any element of
classification for labour purposes: they were concerned only
with the decision of who could be left at large, and who
should be interned or subject to other restrictions48.
Refugee organisations co-operated with the Home Office over
the tribunal arrangements, providing liaison officers to
assist49 . The voluntary organisations even supplied a list
of names of certain refugees they considered to be
undesirable characters; a suggestion made by Lord Reading
that the Home Office should intern such persons without
waiting for tribunals met with a non-committal response from
Maxwell at a meeting on 14 September50.
Home Office instructions to tribunals stated that the onus
lay on the alien to show that he could be properly exempted
from internment, that good character in itself was not a
Anderson, Hansard, op. cit., vol. 351, col. 367, 4
Sept 1939.
48 Anderson, written answer, Hansard, op. cit., vol.
351, col, 969, 20 Sept 1939.
Ibid.
50 Home Office memorandum of meeting on 14 Sept 1939,
PRO HO 213/452. Peake was present; Reading was accompanied
by Schiff and Emerson.
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reason for exemption from internment, and that doubts should
be resolved in favour of national security 51 . Refugee
representatives later congratulated Home Office officials
and tribunals on the sympathetic manner in which the
tribunals had been conducted 52 . The tribunals determined
whether enemy alien5 should be interned (Category A), be left
at liberty but subject to the new restrictions in the
amended Aliens Order (Category B), or be exempted from both
internment and special restrictions (Category C). Some 569
persons were placed in Category A, and interned; 6,782
persons were placed in Category B; 64,244 persons in
Category C. Of 73,353 persons examined by tribunals 75%,
were classified as refugees53.
Restrictions on refugees placed in the intermediate Category
B made it almost impossible for them to get employment 54 . In
December 1939 Ralph Assheton MP, Parliamentary Secretary to
the Ministry of Labour, complained to the Cabinet Committee
on the Refugee Problem that Category B refugees "against
whom nothing was known", were subjected to restrictions, for
example, on travelling, which hampered them in finding
work55 . A relatively large number of domestics were put in
category B: Kushner reports that out of a sample of 9,642
51 Anderson, memorandum, 'Control of Aliens', WP
(G)(40) 115, 29 Apr 1940, PRO CAB 67/6.
52 Emerson(COR) to Cooper, 28 Dec 1939, PRO HO
213/455; Cecil Weir (Chairman, Scottish National Council for
refugees) to Under Secretary, 28 Dec 1939, ibid.
Anderson, memorandum, 'Control of Aliens', WP
(G)(40)115, 29 Apr 1940, PRO CAB 67/6.
Francois Lafitte, The Internment of Aliens,
(original publication 1940), London 1988, pp. 62-65.
cPR(39)7th mtg, 8 Dec 1939, PRO CAB 98/1.
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domestics only 6,132, or 64%, were in Category C, a much
lower proportion than among refugees generally56.
New regulations facilitated the entry into the armed forces
and into employment of refugees who were not restricted by
the tribunals; had Home Office plans to classify aliens for
labour purposes been implemented, the process might perhaps
have been faster. Refugees were allowed to register for
employment, but were advised not to accept employment until
their cases had been considered by tribunals 57 . Cooper had
warned CAW in late August that refugee organisations
expected unemployment among domestics once war started, and
that it appeared inevitable that some government provision
should be made for them 58 . A large proportion of refugee
women working as resident domestics had lost their jobs, and
thus also their accommodation, because of the war. In mid-
September Emerson estimated the numbers of out-of-work
domestics at 8,000: between one third and one quarter of the
job losses were apparently due to "the not unnatural
prejudice against retaining enemy aliens in service 59 . The
Jewish refugee organisations were maintaining some 3,000
unemployed domestics, as well as many people whose
sponsorship arrangements had collapsed. On 14 September
Reading requested government help to find accommodation for
newly homeless former resident domestics; Peake opposed
56 Kushner, 'An Alien Occupation', op. cit., p. 573.
Home Office memorandum of meeting on 14 Sept 1939,
PRO HO 213/452. Maxwell afterwards explored the possibility
of finding accommodation for dismissed servants.
58 CAW 6th mtg, 25 Aug 1939, PRO CAB 16/211.
Emerson, memorandum, 'The Present Position of the
Refugee problem', [n.d.], mid-Sept 1939, CRP(39)15, PRO CAB
98/1.
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taking immediate action, saying the job market was expected
to revive, and that, after classification by tribunals,
people would get new jobs60.
The financial Dliht of the refugee oranisations and
emi g ration tolicv
The new situation did not meet the previous expectation of
the refugee organisations that, once the war started, the
pressure on their resources would lessen as most refugees
would be interned, absorbed by war-time employment, or re-
emigrate. Instead, the Jewish refugee organisations found
themselves maintaining large numbers of unemployed,
destitute refugees, who were still at liberty, at a cost
aprroaching some £15,000 per week. They had come to the end
of their resources and finally admitted that they could no
longer honour the guarantee. Kept afloat temporarily by
their bankers, and with prospects of fund-raising greatly
reduced by the war, the Jewish organisations approached the
government for funds to cope with existing commitments61.
Home Office officials accepted that many refugees would
remain in Britain for the whole of the war, and that it was
inevitable that much of the burden of refugee maintenance
would fall on public funds. Overall, however, re-emigration
of refugees remained a priority: every transmigrant who left
for a permanent destination abroad diminished the scale of
the problem awaiting the authorities at the war's end. The
policy of the Home Office was to ensure the departure of as
60 Home Office memorandum, see n. 60 above.
61 For the negotiations, see PRO HO 213/294 and 295.
376
many aliens as possible, and its spokesmen refused to make
any commitment during the war regarding the ultimate
disposal of refugees who remained in the country. The need
to spend public funds on rescuing the refugee organisations
added an extra motive for boosting refugee re-emigration.
In December 1939 the Home Office, having rejected the
unpalatable alternative of having refugee relief on the
rates, proposed that the government should sustain the work
of the refugee organisations by giving them a grant to cover
a percentage of their expenses 62 . The Cabinet accepted the
plan. The government's contribution was paid monthly to a
new Central Committee for Refugees (CCR). The Home Office
was able to subsidise emigration, by including in the grant
an additional sum for emigration expenses. The Treasury
agreed to the scheme as a whole, on the basis that in the
long term it would lighten the burden on public funds, but
wished the emigration subsidy to be restricted to refugees
not required in the UK for the war effort 63 . State subsidy
of the costs of emigration was an especially sensitive issue
because the immigration laws of the USA, the destination of
most refugee transmigrants, prohibited payment of an
immigrant's passage by outside bodies, including foreign
governments. All references to the emigration subsidy were
62 Anderson, memorandum, 'Refugees in the United
Kingdom', 8 Dec 1939, CRP(39)18, annexed to report by Secy
of State for the Colonies 'Refugees in the United Kingdom',
9 Dec 1939, CPR(39)19, (also WP(G)(39) 138), PRO CAB 98/1;
WM 112(38)5, 12 Dec 1939, PRO CAB 65/2; see also Anthony de
Rothschild to Waley, 5 Dec 1939, de Rothschild, memorandum
of meeting at Home Office on 20 Dec 1939, de Rothschild to
Simon Marks, 22 Dec 1939, Rothschild Archive, XI/35/19.
63 For Treasury views, see memoranda and
correspondence, 6 Dec 1939-6 Jan 1940, PRO T
161/997/S45629/1; for the Home Office side of negotiations
with the Treasury, see PRO HO 213/295 and 296.
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therefore omitted from declarations submitted to the US
immigration authorities 64 . Maxwell, instead of including
details of the emigration component of the grant in his
official correspondence with the refugee organisations,
chose to put it in what he termed a "semi-official" letter
to Emerson, now director-designate of the new CCR65 . Cooper
included in a ministerial brief the warning that the
emigration aspect of the scheme "cannot be disclosed in the
House of Commons", explaining that the Americans appeared
ready to turn "a blind eye" to the subterfuge "so long as it
is not broadcast" 66 . Government financial support helped
emigration from the UK to reach record proportions in 1940:
the numbers would have been even higher, had the shipping
space been available 67 . The lengths to which Home Office
officials and ministers were prepared to go to achieve a
revival of emigration reflect their anxiety to reduce
refugee numbers, even at the price of not telling the House
of Commons about this item of public expenditure.
The new arrangements depended on the continued survival of
the refugee organisations and the machinery they offered for
channelling government funds into emigration. Thus, when the
finances of the Jewish refugee bodies became even shakier in
64 Maxwell to Tribe, 5 Jan 1940, (mis-dated 1939),
Tribe to Maxwell, 6 Jan 1940, Maxwell to Emerson, 11 Jan
1940, PRO T 161/997/S45629/1, Maxwell to Emerson, 2 Jul
1940, PRO HO 213/298.
65 Ibid.
66 Cooper, 'Brief for Supplementary Estimate. Grant-
in-Aid to Central Committee for Refugees', 5 Nov 1940, PRO
HO 213/299.
67 See correspondence and memoranda, 16 Feb-17 Oct
1940, PRO T 161/998/S45629/2; Cooper, memorandum, 18 Apr
1940, PRO HO 213/297; Cooper, memorandum, 29 Aug 1942, PRO
HO 213/1347, para. 14.
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1941, the Home Office loaned further funds to cover their
contribution to the expenses of emigration and
administration. Both loan and repayments were again made
through an intermediary body, to disguise the fact that the
government was lending money to the Jewish organisations68.
Maxwell derived ironic satisfaction from the fact that the
scheme would "reverse the historic practice by which
governments have borrowed money from the Jews
and...introduce a new procedure by which the Government will
lend some money to the Jews" 69 . Under the agreement, which
was secured on outstanding debts, mostly under covenants,
owed to the Jewish organisations, advances of about £38,500
were made between April 1941 and December 1942; it was
terminated in late 1944, all sums lent having been repaid70.
Before the war plans had been made to prevent the departure
in war-time of alien technicians whose skills might be
valuable 71 . The potential loss to manpower resources from
refugees who re-emigrated produced conflict between
ministries which wished to conserve manpower and the Home
Office, which wished to get rid of refugees. The Home Office
succeeded in surmounting initial Ministry of Labour
objections that subsidising emigration involved the risk of
68 The agreement was dated 12 Jul 1941 and was
prepared by the Treasury Solicitors, see PRO TS 27/500; see
PRO HO 213/298 and 299 for the Home Office side of the
negotiations.
69 Maxwell to Barnes, 8 Dec 1940, PRO TS 27/500; see
also Maxwell to Secretary of State, 11 Jul 1941, PRO HO
213/298.
70 See Whitley to Speed, 24 Oct 1944, Speed to
Whitley, 25 Oct 1944, PRO TS 27/500.
71 'First Report of the Advisory Committee on the
Passport and Permit Office', see n. 27 above.
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losing refugees who would be useful in industry72.
Nevertheless, disputes about the wisdom of exporting
potentially useful refugees were a source of recurrent
conflict, as Ministry of Labour officials exercised their
powers of objecting to the issue of individual exit
permits 73 . When officials failed to reach agreement over a
procedure for resolving such interdepartmental conflicts,
the Minister of Labour took the matter up with the Home
Secretary 74 . Conflict continued in 1944 over the emigration
of refugees admitted under the auspices of the refugee
children' s movement75.
The introduction of mass internment
After the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, the
possibility that the UK might be invaded became a pressing
concern. In the second week of May 1940, as the Germans
advanced into the Low Countries, the British government
resorted for the first time to mass internment, amid panic
about "fifth column" activity 76 . The Home Secretary and
leading Home Office officials soon found themselves obliged
72 See Morgan (Ministry of Labour) to Williams, 8 Jan
1940, Maxwell, memorandum of discussion on 10 Jan 1940 with
Peake, Emerson, and Assheton and Gould from the Ministry of
Labour, PRO HO 213/296.
For conflict over German nurses wishing to go to
the US, see correspondence between Ministry of Labour,
opposing their departure, and the Home Office, Dec 1942-Jun
1943, PRO LAB 8/86.
Bevin to Morrison, 16 Jul 1943, Morrison to Bevin,
17 Aug 1943, PRO LAB 8/86.
See correspondence, including case of Abraham
Gornicki, Mar-May 1844, PRO LAB 8/86.
76 Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 47-63.
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to authorise and implement internment 77 . The harsh view of
Anderson's role in Francois Lafitte's 1940 study, The
Internment of Aliens has since been modified by the release
of documents showing the efforts of Anderson and his
officials to oppose mass internment and to slow down its
implementation78.
The grounds for Home Office opposition to mass internment
were set out for the War Cabinet in a paper dated 29 April,
in which Anderson defended existing policy 79 . He resisted
pressure for stricter controls on aliens, rejecting a recent
suggestion from the Deputy Chiefs of Staff(DCOS) that this
would prevent sabotage: he argued that persons of German and
Austrian nationality were less likely than non-enemy aliens
to be enemy agents. He added that the government already
possessed comprehensive controls over aliens, and that the
numbers of dangerous enemy aliens at large in the UK had
been greatly reduced, partly through internment of known
Nazi adherents on the outbreak of war. Anderson reported
that both he and his predecessor had concluded that to
intern on the mere ground of enemy nationality either German
and Austrian refugees or long term residents who had thrown
in their lot with Britain, was "unnecessary on security
grounds and inexpedient on grounds of general policy".
Settlement of large and unknown numbers of Germans who might
wish to assist the enemy had been prevented since 1914 by
Giliman, op. cit., pp. 69-129.
78 See Lafitte, introduction, 'Afterthoughts Four
Decades Later' to The Internment of Aliens, London 1988
(original publication 1940), p. xiii; this author has not
been granted access to closed Home Office material on the
period Sept 1939-Jun 1940.
Anderson, Memorandum, 'Control of Aliens', WP (G)
(40) 115, 29 Apr 1940, PRO CAB 67/6.
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immigration controls. He defended the current policy of
individual examination of aliens, saying that the Aliens
Tribunals had done their work rigourously and with a bias
towards internment in doubtful cases, as they had been
instructed. Some decisions to intern had been based on
suspicions shown by subsequent reviews to be baseless, and
further reviews were in hand. Moreover, the Home Office
could, if necessary, use administrative action to intern an
enemy alien immediately. He concluded that a policy of mass
internment of Germans and Austrians had no justifiable
basis, was open to grave objections and should not be
adopted merely because they possessed enemy nationality and
without regard to what was known about them individually. If
enemy aliens could show that they could safely be left at
liberty, they should not be interned merely because there
was a large number of them. Internment would also be a waste
of manpower, and offend opinion in Britain and abroad80.
Anderson circulated his memorandum to the ministers for the
armed forces, asking if they wished for any material changes
in policy81 . On 8 May the First Lord of the Admiralty,
Winston Churchill, replied that the Admiralty did not
require wholesale internment. He confined his doubts
regarding existing policy to a complaint that Home Office
re-classification of aliens from Category B to C was unduly
lenient, but said that this criticism would be less
80 The Americans had made representations against mass
internment at the outbreak of war, and had been reassured on
this score. Ibid.
81 Anderson to Churchill, 29 Apr 1940, PRO ADM
1/18894.
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important if an Admiralty request for additional protected
areas was granted82.
Two days later, on 10 May, as Germany overran the Low
Countries, Chamberlain finally resigned 83 . Churchill became
Prime Minister. The same night, the Home Office lost the
battle with the Chiefs of Staff to prevent the start of mass
internment84 . Anderson reported to the first War Cabinet
meeting under Churchill's leadership the next day that if
this course was pressed "on military grounds" he would
agreed to it 85 . On the night of 10-11 May, Anderson
authorised the "temporary" internment of male enemy aliens
between 16 and 60, other than the infirm, in the east and
south east coastal areas. As a result some 2,000 men were
detained. Reporting and travel restrictions and a curfew
were imposed on other male aliens in the same age group who
chose to remain in those areas. Following a Cabinet meeting
on 15 May, in which Churchill said he wished for "a very
large round-up of aliens and suspected persons", Anderson
authorised the extension of internment to all remaining male
category B enemy aliens in the same age group 86 . Anderson
appears to have remained of the view that German and
Austrian refugees within the country were not a security
82 Churchill to Anderson, 8 May 1940, PRO ADM 1/18894,
Churchill was adopting the advice of Rear Admiral John
Godfrey, Director of Naval Intelligence.
83 WM 119(40)5, 10 May 1940, PRO CAB 65/7. In the
context of preparations for a possible invasion Anderson had
raised the need to move the German refugees in British
uniform from Richborough camp to a more suitable location.
WM 119(40)4, ibid.
84 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 49; Giliman, op. cit. pp. 91-
95.
85 WM 119A(40)4, 11 May 1940, PRO CAB 65/7.
86 WM 123(40)15, 15 May 1940, PRO CAB 65/7.
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risk87 . Yet on 19 May he opposed the entry of war refugees,
and warned that fifth column activists might enter in this
guise88.
The extension to include category B males and arrangements
to intern Italian males who were members of the Fascio or
had less than 20 years' residence in the country, should
Italy enter the war, did not end pressure for further
detentions from the Chiefs of Staff and within the War
Cabinet, led by Churchill 89 . On 22 May Mosley and 33 British
Union of Fascists(BU) leaders were detained, against
Anderson's advice, after amendment of the defence
regulations to cover the lack of evidence of links to fifth
column activities 90 . Although the Chiefs of Staff were
seeking general internment of enemy aliens, Anderson
succeeded on 24 May in gaining War Cabinet acceptance of his
lesser recommendation of interning all Category B German and
Austrian women, subject to similar exceptions to those for
previous round-ups of men; stricter controls were also
imposed on all other aliens 91 . Further pressure from Chiefs
of Staff and county Chief Constables led on 31 May to
authorisation of selective internment of Category C enemy
aliens, if the police felt they had good grounds for doubts.
87 See Anderson's down-playing of fifth column
activities, when advising on further measures in conjunction
with Attlee and Arthur Greenwood. WP(G)(40) 131, 17 May
1940, PRO CAB 67/6; Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 49-50; Gillman,
op. cit., pp. 112-113.
88 WP(G)(40) 132, 19 May 1940, PRO CAB 67/6.
89 Hinsley 49-51; for the Chiefs of Staffs' views, see
COS(40)359, 16 May 1940, PRO CAB 80/11.
90 Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
91 COS(40) 359, 16 May, COS(40) 366, 18 May 1940, PRO
CAB 80/11; Maxwell to Chief Constable, Circular, 24 May
1940, PRO FO 371/25244, W7848/7848/48, f.8.
June saw yet more extensions of mass internment. A new
committee, the Home Defence (Security) Executive (HD(S)E),
chaired by Lord Swinton, an ex-Cabinet minister, with
representatives from the Home Office, the security services,
and the Commander in Chief Home Forces, had been set up by
Chamberlain, now Lord President of the Council, to consider
all questions relating to defence against the fifth
column92 . On 10 June, the HD(S)E decided against further
steps to intern enemy aliens. However, Italy entered the war
on that day, and Churchill gave the signal to intern
Italians, over 5,000 of whom were detained. Internment of BU
members was also stepped up and other Fascists included. The
HD(S)E was concerned about internment camps as a threat to
security, and the Chiefs of Staff renewed demands for
internment of all enemy aliens and for most to be shipped
overseas. On 19 June the Home Office concluded that all
Category C Germans and Austrians must be interned:
instructions were issued for internment of all male German
and Austrians in three stages 93 . By the end of July, the
peak figure was reached of about 27,000 persons in
internment, including 4,000 Italians.
The possibility of sending internees and prisoners of war to
the dominions was raised in late May by the Chiefs of Staff,
concerned about the presence of enemy aliens, whether or not
in detention. The solution they favoured was for all enemy
aliens "about whose bona fides there was any doubt" to be
92 The records of this committee are closed:
references to its activities are drawn from Hinsley, op.
cit., p. 52 and post.
WM 174(40)13, 21 Jun 1940, PRO CAB 65/7.
removed abroad, perhaps to Canada where they might assist
with such work as the wheat harvest. Alternatively,
internment camps should be relocated in sparsely populated
areas in the west and north, or even the island of St
Helena94 . The latter having been rejected as impracticable,
Ministers chose the option of removal to the dominions95.
Canada agreed to accept internees, and efforts were made to
despatch as many as possible 96 . On 2 July the War Cabinet
received a report from Chamberlain on the progress of the
deportation policy, which he was keen to continue and
expand 97 . Two ships had already left for Canada, the first
leaving on 21 June carrying Category A Germans and German
prisoners of war. The Arandora Star had sailed on 30 June
carrying 734 "Italian Fascists" and 479 Category A Germans,
but it had just been learned that the ship had been
torpedoed: there were an estimated 599 dead, most of whom
were Italians 98 . Two further ships would take 858 category B
Germans and 1,000 Germans aged 16 to 40, mainly Category B
but also C cases. By the end of the week a total of 7,874
persons would have left for Canada and Newfoundland; with
sailings to Australia and New Zealand covering a further
9,500, a total of some 17,500 were included in current
arrangements. Future shipments would consist of Category B
or C Germans or Austrians: no more Italians would be
COS(40) 396, 24 May 1940, PRO CAB 80/11; COS(40)
154th mtg, 27 May 1940, PRO CAB 79/4.
Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
96 Massey to Caldecote, 11 Jun 1940, PRO FO 916/2580,
KW5/5.
'' Chamberlain, 'Internees and Prisoners of War',
WP(G)(40) 170, 2 Jul 1940, CAB 67/7.
98 Naturalised British subjects, illegally detained or
removed, were among the internees. See below.
deported to the dominions. Anderson wished to select only
suitable internees for deportation, excluding men needed for
war production, interned in error, or married with families
in the UK, and also to ensure Jews were not mixed with Nazis
and Fascists; however, Chamberlain advised against delaying
departures for Canada for such weeding out, which might make
it impossible to fill the ships, but he contemplated it as
possible for sailings to Australia.
Release from internment, and emigration
Public opposition to mass internment was mounting by mid-
July99 . The policy of mass deportation of internees came
under attack, fuelled by news of the Arandora Star
disaster'°°. On 17 July a small War Cabinet meeting chaired
by Chamberlain re-affirmed existing policy, which implied
that the release of many category C aliens was unlikely, as
it "could only be justified to the extent that the services
which they could render to the State outweighed the
potential danger of their being at large"°'. Yet the next
day the War Cabinet decided on a shift towards a policy of
releasing internees. Chamberlain and Anderson spoke of the
privations, distress and mistaken detentions caused by the
implementation of internment. Chamberlain advocated a change
of policy on release. The Cabinet agreed on the release of
enemy aliens known to be actively hostile to the enemy
regimes or whom it was undesirable "for other sufficient
reasons" to keep interned. It also launched an enquiry into
Hinsley, op. cit., p. 58.
100 Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., pp. 96-108.
101 WH 206(40)1, 17 Jul 1940, PRO CAB 65/8.
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the selection of the Arandora Star deportees and decided to
turn over the administration of internment camps to the Home
Office'° 2 . The change to a policy of more releases also
greatly reduced pressure to continue with the deportation
policy, whose disadvantages had been highlighted by the
Arandora Star disaster,
A White Paper published at the end of July set out new
grounds for freeing internees' 03 . It listed categories
eligible for release, subject to security objections. Among
the release categories were the aged and sick, and persons
engaged in work of national importance, many of whom had
been locked up, notwithstanding Home Office instructions to
the police not to detain them. Within three months over
5,500 aliens regained their liberty'04.
The internment process was suspended at the end of July, for
lack of accommodation, and mass internment was never
resumed. The War Cabinet set up an Advisory Committee
attached to the Home Office, to review internment policy and
individual cases; it also set up an Advisory Council
attached to the Foreign Office, to watch over the welfare of
102 WM 207(40)12, 18 Jul 1940, PRO CAB 65/8.
103 Home Office, German and Austrian Civilian
Internees: Categories of Persons Eligible for Release from
Internment and Procedure to be Followed in Applying for
Release, Cmd. 6127, Jul 1940; this was followed by Civilian
Internees of Enemy Nationality: Categories of Persons
Eligible for Release from Internment and Procedure to be
Followed in Applying for Release, Cmd. 6223, Aug 1940: a
revised version (Cmd. 6233) appeared in Oct 1940.
104 Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., pp. 107-8.
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aliens generally105 . Plans to utilise alien manpower for the
war effort were extended to include released internees and
non-interned aliens' 06 and recruitment plans extended to the
possible use of enemy aliens107.
Parliamentary criticism and the failure to uncover evidence
of fifth column activity - a danger the Prime Minister now
said had been exaggerated - are thought to have caused
ministers to press for a relaxation of policy,
notwithstanding the invasion threat and public fears'°8.
During August, criticism of internment continued, but
Anderson defended the policy in Parliament, and warned
Churchill of the political dangers in suddenly abandoning
the policy and releasing all Category C cases at once.
Opposition to sudden implementation of the policy of
relaxation also came from M15, concerned about the burden of
vetting people for release109.
The introduction of an additional ground for release in
November 1940 was calculated to increase enlistment. It
created pressure on internees of military age to apply to
join the army, by denying them eligibility for release
105 WM 206(40)1, 17 Jul 1940, PRO CAB 65/8; Attlee,
'Aliens', WP(G)(40) 195, 20 Jul 1940, CAB 67/7; See Latham,
memoranda: 'Attendance of Members of the Council on Aliens',
20 Jan(mis-dated Jun) 1941, 'The Foreign Office interest in
aliens policy', 21 Jan 1941, 'The Lytton Council', minutes,
21 and 24 Jan 1941, PRO FO 371/29180, W962/3/48.
106 WM 207(40)12, 18 Jul 1940, PRO CAB 65/8; WP(G)(40)
195, 20 Jul 1940, PRO CAB 67/7.
107 wp (G)(40) 192, 20 Jul 1940, PRO CAB 67/7; WM
211(40)1, 24 July 1940, PRO CAB 65/8.
108 Hinsley, op. cit., p. 59.
109 M15 objected to a new proposed category of
release, on grounds of sympathy to the Allied cause, for
this reason. Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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unless they did so and were rejected. It was also designed
for administrative convenience, since it prevented an
unmanageable flood of applicants for release and limited the
burden of vetting internees. The new category, which was
expected to produce some 2,000 applicants, had been proposed
by the Advisory Committee on Internment, and was introduced
in the face of opposition from M15, the Joint Intelligence
Committee and the Chiefs of Staff. It conferred eligibility
for release on aliens aged 18-50 who applied to enlist in
the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps (AMPC) and were
rejected on medical grounds, who could be released if.their
loyalty was not in doubt' 10 . Herbert Morrison, who became
Home Secretary in October, supported the policy of making
men of military age earn their release in this way, rather
than giving them a right to liberty merely because they did
not represent a security risk. There could, he argued, be
"little ground for complaint" about the continued detention
of aliens who did not offer themselves for enlistment; a
display of unconcern which suggests that his support for a
policy of "greater liberality", to which Jones and Donoughue
allude in their biography of Morrison, was highly
selective' 11 . The onus of applying for release was on
internees in nearly all cases. Not all of them understood
this. For example, an internee who was a former inmate of
Richborough camp, where he had been classified C, had
applied to join the Pioneer Corps in September 1941 and been
110 Morrison, Hansard, op. ci?jiNov	 vol.
367, cols. 79-8?r Home Office records see PRO HO 213/6.
Morrison, 'Internment of Aliens of Enemy
Nationality', WP(G)(40) 309, 20 Nov 1940, PRO CAB 67/8;
Morrison defended his record on alien internment in Herbert
Morrison: An Autobiography, London 1960, p. 219; George
Jones and Bernard Donoughue, Herbert Morrison. Portrait of a
Politician, London 1973, pp. 302-3, where the War Cabinet
paper cited above is referred to.
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rejected on medical grounds, but, when he approached Jewish
refugee organisations for help, it emerged that he had
failed to apply for release. Once this was done, his release
under the new ground was authorised in May 1942112.
The story of the introduction of the new ground illustrates
several broader aspects of the policy of internment and
release. For the Home Office, internment of the majority of
refugees had not been regarded as a necessity on security
grounds since late August 1939. By late 1940, the immediate
threat of invasion and the panic over spying and sabotage
which had led to mass internment were past, public opinion
had turned against large-scale internment, and Home Office
control had been largely re-asserted. It was thus possible
to proceed in practice on the basis that, if the presence of
enemy alien refugees had ever been a security issue, it was
so no longer. Yet the new situation did not produce a policy
of releasing persons whose continued detention appeared to
serve no security purpose. Instead, most internees had to
prove that furtherance of aims connected with the war effort
would flow from their release. As a result, persons who
presented no threat whatsoever to security remained in
internment because their release seemed to offer
insufficient advantage.
Internment receded as a security issue, but continued to be
an administrative problem. The manpower to investigate cases
of individual internees, and deal with the associated
welfare problems, was in scarce supply, so the Home Office
112 Correspondence from Joseph Friedensohn, Jul 1941-
Nay 1942, Chief Rabbi's Emergency Fund case files 1939-46,
section FR-FRI, Schonfeld papers, Parkes Library, University
of Southampton.
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enlisted the services of volunteers, refugee organisations,
and internees themselves - one internee found that a Jewish
refugee organisation had applied for his release on
condition that he continued to work in the camp" 3 . The Home
Office was in a position to control the timetable of the
process of classifying internees for release, as it had not
been during the earlier phase of hurried detentions. Release
from internment also provided opportunities for control of
alien entry into the armed services and the labour force.
The threat of continued internment became in part an
instrument of manpower control. Home Office policy on the
release of internees was, for example, designed to direct
internees to gaining release through joining the Pioneer
Corps, rather than by obtaining better paid civilian work,
for which the Ministry of Agriculture wished to recruit
them"4 . (Shortly before the introduction of mass
internment, the Jewish refugee organisations, anxious to
avoid the maintenance costs of refugees themselves,
sensitive to the suggestion that refugees were prepared to
remain idle or live in luxury while the nation fought a
struggle for its very existence, and concerned about failure
of refugees to enlist, had decided to put financial pressure
on refugees to join the Pioneer Corps)"5.
The internment episode was incorporated into Home Office
policy of reducing refugee numbers through emigration. Home
113 Leo Kahn, IWM Tape 004300/06; Kahn, interview with
this author, 12 Apr 1988.
114 See inter-departmental meetings and correspondence
for Nov 1940-Jan 1942, PRO MAF 47/76.
115 See 'Refugees and the Pioneer Corps', item 73,
Minutes of Executive Committee of the Jewish Refugees
Committee, May 7 1940, Rothschild Archive XI/35/19.
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Office instructions to the police when mass internment began
had included the categories they were not to detain,
including persons who could produce firm evidence that they
had permission to emigrate; this exemption was, however,
largely lost sight of during the hurried implementation of
internment, so that many refugees with advanced re-
emigration plans were placed in detention. Among the
categories now eligible for release under the July White
Paper and its successors were persons "about to embark for
emigration overseas" 6 . The regulations at first stated
that release was not authorised pending emigration, but that
facilities would be given for the attendance of internees
with US quota numbers at the US Consulate for visa
interviews, and that once both a visa had been granted and a
passage obtained the alien would be taken to the port of
departure; later, the October 1940 regulations stated that
once a visa and an exit permit had been obtained the alien
would as a rule be released to make final departure
arrangements" 7 . The Home Office provided continued support
for emigration by giving facilities within the internment
camps for emigration casework, much of it performed by
internees. At least 10,000 refugees emigrated in 1940118.
The departures were "voluntary", but the circumstances were
in many cases hard to distinguish from deportation. The
Jewish refugee organisations supported the policy of re-
emigration; the Overseas Settlement Committee of the JRC
116 The emigration ground was Category 17 in Cmd. 6217
and both its successors, Cmd. 6223 and 6233, already cited.
117 For policy on re-unification of children with
mothers coming from Isle of Man camps to London for visa
interviews at the US Embassy, see correspondence 5-27 Aug
1940, PRO HO 215/365.
118 Cooper, 'Memorandum on Post-War Problems', 29 Aug
1942, PRO HO 213/1347, para. 14.
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shared Emerson's view that refugees able to emigrate and not
doing so should not be supported" 9 . The literal deportation
to the dominions of some 8,000 interned refugees, some of
whom "volunteered" to go, further reduced the numbers in the
UK' 20 . Later in the war, some deportees were permitted to
return.
The inclusion of alien children in arrangements to evacuate
children to the USA encountered difficulties in the summer
of 1940, because of quota restrictions. The British
government therefore offered the Americans an undertaking
that a return visa would be granted if the application was
made within six months of the termination of hostilities and
the child was under 16 at the date of leaving the UK'21.
Frank Newsam of the Home Office said at an interdepartmental
meeting in August that it was government policy to get rid
of as many aliens as possible, and that if the US would
accept children over 16 they should be allowed to go' 22 . He
pointed out that a return visa only guaranteed the
children's return to the UK, and that they could
subsequently be sent back to their country of origin. In the
subsequent years of the war emigration continued at a lower
rate. The Home Office pressed children and adults to take up
119 Minutes of meeting of JRC, 11 Jun 1940, Rothschild
Archive , XI/35/19.
120 Jewish Refugees Committee, report for 1940, London
1941, pp. 9-10; Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., pp.
82-108; see Kushner, 'British Antisemitism in the Second
World War', Sheffield Ph.D 1986, pp. 487 and n. 122 on p.
509, on difficulty of finding accurate figures.
121 Swan, minute, 2 Aug, Dunlop to Snow, 5 Aug,
Foreign Office to Lothian, 18 Aug 1940, PRO FO 371/25251,
w9167/W9558/8261/48, f.321.
122 Minutes, 17th Mtg of Overseas Travel Committee, 16
Aug 1940, PRO FO 371/25251, W9558/8261/48, f.476.
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offers of re-emigration, stressing that there was no
certainty that they would be allowed to stay on in the UK at
the end of the war123.
The Home Office devoted substantial resources to the welfare
of refugees during the war. Home Office representatives had
shown their sympathy for refugees in the UK in their
opposition to mass internment, and, drawing on the knowledge
about refugee attitudes gained in the immigration process,
had argued that since so much was known about the refugees,
they did not present a security risk. However, Home Office
representatives did not feel a sense of responsibility
towards persons abroad who were seeking refuge, but whom
they did not already know, whose circumstances they had not
investigated, and who, because they were not in the country,
were not the problem of the Home Office. Home Office
spokesmen opposed any substantial increase in the numbers of
such persons in Britain, and in doing so, were prepared to
use security arguments. AfteCabinet policy changes of 18
July 1940 the Home Office began to regain control over
policy towards aliens already in the country from the
military establishment, the security services, and
Churchill, who, sharing their suspicions of refugees, had
pressed for more internment once he became Prime Minister,
only changing his position when the tide of opinion turned
against government policy.
123 For Home Office policy and practice on children
and young people, see minutes and correspondence, Feb-May
1944, esp. HHC Prestige (Cooper's successor) to Mrs DM
Hardisty (General Secretary, Refugee Children's Movement) 9
Mar and 21 Apr 1944, Prestige, circular, 'Emigration of
Refugee Children', 25 May 1944, PRO HO 213/994.
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ReDercussions of internment
The internment episode left an unhappy legacy. Alongside
publicly voiced criticisms of internment was a body of
highly critical opinion within the civil service, including
officials in positions which enabled them to work to
mitigate the impact of internment on refugees. RTE Lathani of
the Foreign Office Refugee Section, for example, proposed
new advisory committees to watch over aliens and internment,
and was energetic in the secretariat of the Lytton Council,
as the Advisory Council on Aliens was known, keeping a
critical eye on the adequacy of its machinery and its
members; he was particularly concerned that the excesses of
M15 should be curbed' 24 . In a private letter, the economist
John Maynard Keynes, who took up the cases of several
interned economists, called the government's behaviour
toward refugees, "disgraceful and humiliating....rather
disconcerting to find that we have such obvious fatheads
still in charge" 25 . Keynes reported that his sources
pointed to the War Office and not the Home Office as the
department which should be held mainly responsible, and
claimed that he had "not met a single soul, inside or
outside government departments, who is not furious at what
is going on". Individuals who worked directly or indirectly
for the government, including Bunbury of the CRTF, were
among supporters of the group Political and Economic
Planning(PEP) which commissioned Lafitte's denunciatory
124 See Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., p. 95;
Latham, minutes and memoranda, Jan 1941, PRO FO 371/29180,
W96 2/3/48.
125 Keynes to Francis C Scott, 23 Jul 1940, Donald
Moggridge, ed., The Collected Writings of John Maynard
Keynes, Vol XXII, Activities 1939-1945, Internal War
Finance, Cambridge 1978, p. 191. For Keynes' intervention on
behalf of interned economists, see ibid, p. 190.
396
study, The Internment of Aliens; Lafitte received help from
civil servants on the project126.
Compensation claims
Many areas were excluded from the scrutiny of the
multiplicity of committees set up to monitor internment. One
of these was policy towards potential claims for
compensation on behalf of men who had been wrongfully
detained and deported. Alongside thousands of deported enemy
aliens, including men who died in the Arandora Star
disaster, had been British subjects who had been illegally
deported. In certain cases their detention had itself been
illegal. Two such cases concerned naturalised British
subjects of Italian origin, Antonio Mancini and Gaetano
Pacitto, who both perished with the Arandora Star, both
having been mistakenly interned under the Royal Prerogative
(which authorised internment of aliens but not British
subjects), and then deported 127 . The question of what
compensation their families should receive arose. The issue
was complicated by the fact that the full extent of the
illegality was not known to the dead men's representatives.
Were the fact that the detention itself was illegal to be
revealed, the result would undoubtedly be an increase in the
sum claimed; a further complication was that, if
compensation was paid in these two cases, other claims would
follow, in respect of persons both living and dead. Three
126 Lafitte. The Internment of Aliens, new edition
with introduction by the author, London 1988, xvii-xxiv; for
Bunbury's links with PEP see J Pinder, ed., Fifty Years of
Political and Economic Planning: Looking Forward, 1931-1981,
London, 1981, pp. 86, 204.
127 Maxwell to Secretary, 20 Sept 1940, enclosing copy
Treasury Solicitor's minute, 29 Aug 1940, PRO T
161/1081/S47357.
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other men with potential claims had been drowned in the
Arandora Star, two of them naturalised British subjects. One
of the two deceased British subjects, a man of German origin
named Hildesheim, whose case Lady Halifax took up, had been
lawfully interned under regulation 18B, but illegally
deported, in contravention of a decision that 18B cases were
not to be sent overseas. His case was similar in this
respect to that of ten other men who had not gone down with
the ship; in further cases British subjects and at least one
friendly alien had been improperly interned under the
Prerogative; furthermore, between 20 and 25 persons from
other nations, plus one whose nationality was not yet
established, had been lawfully detained, but illegally
transported' 28 . The government was bringing back illegally
deported persons, and it was not intended to raise questions
of compensation until this had been done.
Pacitto, who left a widow and nine British-born children,
had previously been regarded as a Fascist sympathiser;
although naturalised in 1939, he was arrested in June 1940,
on the mistaken assumption that he was still an Italian
citizen (and thus subject to internment under the Royal
Prerogative). When his case was raised in parliament,
Morrison admitted that mistakes had been made, and stated
that the government was "prepared to pay proper
128 A decision not to deport 18B cases was taken on 17
Jun, ibid.; Newsam to HR Foyle, 7 Oct 1940, ibid.;
Rumbelow(HO) to Foyle, 30 Nov 1940, enclosing memorandum,
'Particulars of cases in which the question of payment of
compensation for illegal transportation has arisen, or may
conceivably arise' [n.d.], ibid. This referred to persons of
British or alien (friendly, neutral and enemy) nationality:
5 drowned on the Arandora Star; between 32 and 37 deported
and detained in the dominions, all but one of whom had been
deported twice, first in the Arandora Star; 11 sent to the
Isle of Man and two alleged Hungarians interned in England.
398
compensation 129 . The claim was settled, following the issue
of proceedings, for £2,000, plus agreed costs'30.
Mancini had come to the UK in 1893, aged 8. The security
services had known since 1936 that he was a contributor to
the funds of the Italian Fascist party, but had failed to
inform the Home Office, and he was naturalised in 1938. When
Italy entered the war in June 1940, he was arrested as an
enemy alien under the Prerogative, since his name had not
been deleted from M15's list of Italian Fascists. He left a
widow, also a British subject (by virtue of his
naturalisation), and six British-born children. No formal
claim had been submitted by his relatives. In December 1940
an inteiepartmental meeting agreed, following standard
practice, to make no offer in cases in which no claim was
put forward. Representatives of the Treasury and the
Treasury Solicitor also opposed offering compensation in
Mancini's case, pointing to the absence of a formal
compensation claim. Soon afterwards, Maxwell objected that
such a course would be discreditable since the death
resulted from "a series of administrative blunders", and he
pointed to the intention to pay compensation in the Pacitto
case' 31 . It then emerged that, within weeks of the disaster,
solicitors had written seeking particulars of Mancini's
death; a letter which mentioned compensation had also been
129 AF James to Robinson, 8 Oct 1940, ibid.; Morrison,
Hansard, op. cit., 8 Oct 1940, vol. 365, col. 237.
130 See correspondence between Treasury Solicitor and
Treasury, 6 Nov 1940-4 Apr 1942, PRO T 161/1081/S47357.
Earlier offers of £1,000 and £1,500 were refused; the
government had paid £2,500 into court.
131 Foyle, memorandum of inter-departmental meeting, 2
Dec 1940, Maxwell to Secretary, 21 Dec 1940, James to Foyle,
15 Jan 1941, ibid.
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received from a body named the Anglo-Italian Club, but the
letters had previously been overlooked as a result of
administrative blunders within the Home Office' 32 . AF James
of the Treasury said, however, that neither letter could be
regarded as being in the nature of a claim, and argued that
to offer compensation which had not been asked for would
cause a great deal of avoidable trouble' 33 . G Grey in the
Treasury Solicitor's department agreed, adding that,
in Mancini's case the real fault of the H.O lay not so much
in deporting a British subject, as in granting British
nationality to a Fist who would otherwise very properly
have been deported
The Treasury accordingly rejected any compensation in
respect of Mancini, justifying this course on "grounds of
expediency", because it risked other claims "which, even if
without foundation in law it might be embarrassing to
refuse", and also because of the circumstances in which
Mancini had obtained British nationality' 35 . James
subsequently concurred with GH Curtis of the Treasury
Solicitor's office in dismissing Lady Halifax's interest in
Hildesheim's case as a "fishing enquiry": Lady Halifax was
now in America with her husband; the Home Office was told
that the case did not call for further action' 36 . The
passage of the Isle of Man (Detention) Act in 1941, which
gave power to deport persons detained under the Defence
Regulations and the Aliens Order, threatened to highlight
the illegality of previous transportations of interned
132 A Tudor(HO) to Foyle, 1 Jan 1941, ibid.
133 James to Grey, 18 Feb 1941, ibid.
134 Grey to Barlow, 24 Feb 1941, ibid.
135 RV Hopkins(Treasury) to Under Secretary of State,
Home Office, 1 Mar 1941, ibid.
136 See correspondence between Treasury, Treasury
Solicitor and Home Office, 7-21 Apr 1941, ibid.
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British subjects to the Isle of Man. Richard Stokes MP, who
asked a parliamentary question on behalf of five such
persons in May 1941, did not appear to realise that in three
of the cases the arrests themselves were also illegal'37.
The Home Office proposed to indicate readiness to consider
cases where loss or damage had resulted, but after James had
expressed concern at any admission of breaches of the law,
the reply to Stokes was reworded to refer to the
authorities' "inadvertence" rather than to mistakes'38.
In the cases of illegal detention and transportation
discussed above, the majority of those affected were of
alien birth and origin. In several cases they were persons
who had links with foreign organisations, including Fascist
organisations, of which the authorities were suspicious. The
foreign origins and associations appear to have given them,
in the eyes of certain officials dealing with their cases,
something less than a full claim to the rights of the
subject. In consequence, their dependants, including
British-born children, were denied full compensation, or
received none at all. The plight of the victims of
administrative error was thus subordinated to the saving of
funds, and the limitation of possible claims: Home Office
officials showed some concern to compensate individuals who
had suffered for administrative mistakes, but gave way to
pressure from the Treasury and Treasury Solicitor. The cases
reveal the extent to which government agencies had acted on
wrong or out-of date information, and show how lack of co-
137 Newsam(HO) to FP Robinson (Treasury) enclosing
Home Office note on Stokes question with draft reply [n.d.],
with details attached of five cases, ibid.
138 James to Barlow, 13 May 1941, Barlow to James, 14
May 1941, ibid.
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ordination between the security services and the Home
Office, as well as within the Home Office itself, caused
mistakes with very serious consequences.
Enemy aliens interned under the prerogative had no legal
claims for redress, but administrative means were adopted to
resolve certain of the worst consequences of their
detention. The Home Office sent envoys to the dominions to
work on the problems of deported internees. Julian Layton
spent four years in Australia, ensuring that compensation
was paid to internees ill-treated and robbed in transit; he
also arranged their release, return to Britain, and, in a
few cases, re-emigration to Palestine' 39 . In July 1941,
Alexander Paterson, HM Commissioner of Prisons, reported on
the tribulations of internees sent to Canada, most of whom
were Jewish refugees; the report led to the easing of
conditions and the return of several hundred internees to
the UK during the war' 40 . Return, however, did not
necessarily mean release. A Jewish internee wrote to the
Chief Rabbi in December 1942 complaining bitterly at his
continuing imprisonment; he was one of a group which had
come from Australia for reconsideration of their cases; he
claimed that some fellow internees had not been given
reasons for their detention, and had not had a single
hearing, or only one in three years. He himself spent nearly
three years in detention prior to his release in 1943141.
139 Several appreciative internees adopted his
surname. Julian Layton, interview with this author, 20 May
1988.
140 Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., pp. 97-8.
141 Arnold Fraenkl to Chief Rabbi, 23 Dec 1942, Chief
Rabbi's Emergency Fund case files, section FR-FlU, Schonfeld
papers, Parkes Library, University of Southampton.
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The impact of internment on the re-emigration of refugees
was often catastrophic. The authorities in the UK, Australia
and Canada, who wished to deny refugees opportunities to
settle, were reluctant to allow internees to be at large,
even when their detention on security grounds was no longer
desired. This reluctance was well known to, and cynically
exploited by the Americans, under Secretary of State
Breckenridge Long, in order to exclude intending
immigrants142.
Would refu gees be allowed to sta y
 in the UK after the war?
Once the war began, Home Office officials and ministers
seemed to have forgotten that many refugees had been
admitted for eventual settlement. Indeed, the justification
put forward by the Home Secretary in November 1938 for the
policy of making refugees wait abroad for the completion of
cumbersome investigations had been the need to scrutinise
the applications of potential permanent residents with great
care. Even Cooper, in a memorandum written soon after the
outbreak of war, allowed the concept of temporary refuge to
blur the distinction between cases of people truly in
transit and cases of people who had been admitted subject to
immigration conditions, but in the expectation that they
would, if all went well, ultimately be allowed to stay'43.
Cooper claimed that the estimated 49,542 refugees in the UK
142 For the US authorities' response over the cases of
internees and deportees, and the case of Hermann Bondi in
particular, see Giliman, op. cit., pp. 269-73; for Canadian
policy, see ibid., pp. 275-76.
143 Cooper, memorandum, 20 Sept 1939, see n. 1 above;
Hoare, Hansard, op. cit., 21 Nov 1938, vol. 341, cols. 1463-
1475.
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had been "admitted on the assumption that they would
eventually re-emigrate". This conclusion was inconsistent
with the particulars he gave of the categories under which
the admission of the refugees had been authorised.
Particulars of nearly 30,000 refugees - nearly two thirds of
the total - showed that they had been admitted in the
expectation of eventual settlement: these were 28,685
persons whom Cooper described as "refugees for settlement in
the United Kingdom, e.g. doctors, dentists, architects,
businessmen, merchants, manufacturers, nurses, teachers,
independent persons, etc.", and 877 elderly persons
"admitted for permanent residence". Cooper put the numbers
of refugee domestic servants at only 4,461, (a gross under-
estimate) and did not categorise them either as temporary
admissions or as settlement cases, but since the Home Office
had for months been admitting refugee domestics without time
conditions, they were hardly birds of passage. The
categories of persons who were expected to emigrate
constituted less than a third of the 49,542 total: these
were 1,707 "persons awaiting emigration"; 9,028 children;
2,493 "young persons for agricultural and technical
training"; and 1,700 in Richborough Clearing Camp'44.
To categorise three fifths of the refugees as settlement
cases, and to say simultaneously that all had been admitted
on the assumption of eventual re-emigration, was confusing
and contradictory. Cooper's statement that the majority were
in all likelihood "marooned in this country for the duration
of the war", reflected the same assumption. Cooper would
later argue that most refugees should be allowed to stay,
144 Cooper was aware that his figures would need
revision.
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but no evidence has been seen that either he, or anyone else
in the Home Office, noticed that the emphasis they placed
during the war on the temporary nature of the admission of
all refugees stood in flat contradiction to the Home
Office's pre-war emphasis on the need to scrutinise
applicants to ensure their suitability for absorption; nor
did they appear to appreciate that it would be unfair to
disappoint the legitimate expectations which their pre-war
policy had created in the minds of many refugees.
The need for a Home Office policy on the question of the
disposal of refugees and other foreigners in Britain at the
end of the war was raised by the Home Secretary. Herbert
Morrison, in August 1941145. In February 1942, after
informal discussions between Morrison, Maxwell and his
deputy Frank Newsam, Newsam produced a memorandum on the
issue, putting the number of non-resident aliens (out of a
total of about 250,000 including long-established residents)
at 110,000. The figure included the influx of 15,000-20,000
refugees of all nationalities when Western Europe was
overrun in 1940: these he presumed would be repatriated. He
estimated German and Austrian refugees at 50,000-60,000,
saying the bulk had been admitted on the understanding that
they would re-emigrate, and proposed a policy of either
repatriating ex-enemy nationals or requesting them to
emigrate as soon as possible 146 . Persons previously accepted
as more or less permanent residents, however, should be
allowed to remain, subject to the powers of conducive
145 Morrison to Under Secretary of State, 2 Aug 1941,
PRO HO 213/1347.
146 Newsam, 'British attitude and policy in relation
to refugees and other foreigners after the war', 6 Feb 1942,
PRO HO 213/1347.
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deportation. It might be in the national interest to allow
the residence of other refugees, such as persons whose skill
Britain might advantageously use, "with a view to exploiting
the new industries which they have established". Peake
expressed agreement with Newsam's approach, and added that
temporarily admitted aliens who had volunteered and served
in the armed forces had claims for special consideration147.
Morrison's reaction to the proposals was terse:
Seen. 250,000 aliens is a bi.ggish figure. P1 see the matter
is again considered at an appropriate time. I am sure there
will be ouble if all possible refugees &c do not go after
the war'
The matter was due to be raised again in six months: in the
interval, Cooper collected statistics, and, in late August
1942, produced a lengthy memorandum on post-war refugee
problems 149 . The three main options for dealing with German,
Austrian, Czech and Polish refugees in the UK were
repatriation, absorption and migration. Cooper rejected
compulsory repatriation, arguing that, although the rights
of Jewish and other minorities would presumably be
guaranteed in the post-war European settlement, it "would,
humanly speaking, be out of the question" to repatriate to
Germany Jewish refugees whilst any uncertainty existed'50.
He thought that more Austrians than Germans would be willing
to return (he displayed extraordinary ignorance of
antisemitism in Austria), and that even more Czechs would
147 Peake, minute, 10 Feb 1942, PRO HO 213/1347.
148 Morrison to Peake and Maxwell, 6 Mar 1943, PRO HO
213/1347.
149 Cooper, 'Memorandum on Post-War Problems', 29 Aug
1942, PRO HO 213/1347, (copy in PRO FO 371/36695,
W8849/124/48).
150 Ibid., paras. 12 and 13.
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probably wish to do so, but argued that no pressure should
be brought on unwilling refugees to return until the
situation became clearer. He added a reminder that German
refugee families were scattered all over the world, and that
since the outbreak of war
the German Government has been pursuing the policy of
sending Jews from all parts of the Reich, and even from
occupied countries, to Poland where they are being forced
into ghettoes, which have been established by the Nazi
power, and there starved to death and subjected to mass
murder, no doubt with the deliberate intention of
exterminating that section of the Jewish 1 ce over whom the
German Government exercises any control.'
Cooper's arguments for generous treatment of refugees
included certain consequences of the Nazi policy of mass
murder. He said, for example, that many of the parents of
refugee children in the UK would be dead or untraceable, and
that they could not be returned to European countries with
no parents to receive them. He also opposed Home Office
interference with arrangements for refugee children to stay
permanently with foster-parents, so long as any natural
parents consented. Other groups of refugees whom Cooper
regarded as candidates for absorption were those in the
armed forces, civilian war workers, merchants and
industrialists allowed to establish enterprises before the
war, as well as refugees of independent means and the
elderly, for whom he said adequate financial provision
existed. Decisions would also be needed on cases of refugee
men who had married British women, many of whom would not
wish to live abroad 152 . The cases of the small number of
refugees in internment who were not being held for security
reasons should, he said, be dealt with in the same way as
151 Ibid., para. 13.
152 He said over 1,000 British women had married men
in the Polish forces.
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those of non-interned refugees. Some 10,000 German refugees
had emigrated in 1940, mostly to the USA, and, if shipping
problems had not intervened, perhaps double that number
would have left by the end of 1941, and the refugee problem,
"would then have been well on the way to a satisfactory
solution" 53 . However, emigration could not be expected to
revive speedily in the immediate post-war period, when
priorities like relief and reconstruction would come first.
Cooper's recommendation of a generous Home Office policy
towards refugees did not find favour with Morrison.
Discussing the question with Maxwell, Cooper and Peake in
November 1942, Morrison clung to the view that at the end of
the war the Home Office should require all persons admitted
as "refugees" to leave 154 . He hoped that those who could not
get to America or elsewhere could be required to return
whence they came, not even excepting refugees who had served
in the armed forces. Afterwards, Maxwell asked Newsam to
assemble figures on refugees, which Morrison had requested
in order to facilitate the enforcement of a general policy
of requiring refugees to leave the country; Maxwell also
requested figures showing the difficulty refugees would face
in gaining admission to their countries of origin, and notes
on those for whom exceptional treatment might be necessary,
such as children admitted without their parents. He asked
rhetorically,
Can we send back...a man of 19, who was admitted here as a
child aged 14, and has no parents, or whose parents cannot
be found, and wg may have been adopted more or less by an
English family?
153 Ibid., para. 14.
154 Maxwell to Newsam, 17 Nov 1942, PRO HO 213/1347.
155 Ibid.
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Maxwell's position was thus closer to Cooper's than to
Morrison's, and he was collecting ammunition to counter a
policy of compulsory repatriation. Figures assembled in
early 1943 indicated that in March 1942 there had been
113,502 refugees in the UK on temporary conditions, of whom
62,466 belonged to categories in which the "hard core" of
Jewish refugees was located; of these, some 40,000 might be
expected to apply to remain after the war' 56 . Some refugees
would emigrate: these would include persons who had
possessed US visas but been unable to depart because of
shipping shortages'57.
Morrison, having dismissed Cooper's suggestions in late
1942, continued to express his opposition to letting
refugees stay in Britain, repeatedly claiming that, if
Jewish refugees were allowed to remain after the war, this
would lead to outbursts of antisemitism and public
disorder158 . Cooper's private thoughts on these questions
remain obscure, but his actions in the following months
suggest that perhaps his profound differences with
156 Mathews, note and table, 26 Feb 1943., PRO HO
213/1347; Mathews thought certain categories should be
singled out for favourable treatment, and envisaged the
setting up of a tribunal to consider claims.
157 These had numbered 2,646 in 1940 alone. New US
government regulations made in 1941 had invalidated
previously granted visas, so by March 1943 there were only
250 persons in possession of valid visas, who were expected
to obtain passages shortly. use Haigh (Central Office for
Refugees Overseas Settlement Department) to Cooper, 23 Mar
1943, PRO HO 213/1347. By Jun 1943 most had left, a further
42 of the old visa cases had left, and there was now a
steady flow of new US visa approvals, as well as a small and
continuing flow to South American countries where people had
relatives. Movement to Palestine appeared to be at a
standstill. Haigh to Cooper, 18 Jun 1943, ibid.
158 See Kushner, Persistence of Prejudice, op. cit.,
pp . 152-162,
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Morrison's approach overcame any wish to remain longer in
the Home Office. In June 1943 Cooper circulated copies of
his nine-month old memorandum, sending one to Randall in the
Refugee Department, with the warning that the document
should be used with discretion, as it represented a personal
view, but asserting that his views had not changed in the
months since he had written it' 59 . Cooper met Randall's
enquiries about the extent to which the memorandum
represented official Home Office policy by saying that he
was retiring from the public service the following week, and
that this would now be a matter for his successor' 60 . Sir
Herbert Emerson, to whom Cooper also sent a copy of the
memorandum, expressed his appreciation of "the liberal view
you have taken about refugees in this country. I am
particularly glad that you share my view that compulsory
repatriation will not be feasible" 61 . Cooper retired, and
began to work for the Central Office for Refugees(COR)162.
In November 1944, he produced a lengthy memorandum,
containing a draft COR policy on the treatment of refugees
in the UK after the war, in which he presented the case
against a restrictive policy, echoing the opinions contained
in his memorandum written within Whitehall two years
159 Cooper to Randall, 11 Jun 1943, Randall to Cooper,
13 Jul 1943, PRO HO 213/1347.
160 Randall, minute, 6 Jul 1943, PRO FO 371/36695,
W8849/124/48; Randall to Cooper, 13 Jul 1943, Cooper to
Randall, 15 Jul 1943, PRO HO 213/1347.
161 Emerson to Cooper, 18 Jun 1943, PRO HO 213/1347.
162 Cooper, a widower, re-married at the age of 62, a
German refugee, Gertrud Eleanor Isabella Kallmann, aged 43,
at the Romford Register Office, on 5 Apr 1946. He died on 13
Nov 1948, in Hampstead. Certified copies of entries of
marriage and death, General Register Office, London.
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before 163 . The list of categories which he now put forward
for sympathetic consideration for absorption was more
extensive, including doctors and dentists who had been
allowed to practice pre-war, domestic servants, as well as
nurses and midwifes, whose applications for exit permits, he
pointed out, had been refused by the Ministry of Labour
during the war, and whose services it "would seem incredible
folly" to lose now, in view of known shortages. He also
argued the claims of agricultural workers, on grounds of
shortage, but, showing that he had not lost the instincts
acquired during a lifetime in the Home Office, he suggested
that both agricultural and domestic workers might be
subjected to an employment condition. His language was more
emotive than in 1942: he wrote, for example, of the
reluctance which Jews who survived Nazi persecution might
feel about remaining in the country "which has inflicted
such unspeakable and inhuman cruelties upon them", and
stated that if the Home Office uprooted refugee children and
required them to emigrate according to plan, this would be a
"cruel fate" 64 . He also suggested providing government
finance to help refugees emigrate.
Within the Home Office, memoranda produced by Cooper's
successor, Prestige, presented similar views, which were
shared within the department up to the Permanent Under
Secretary, Maxwell, but found no favour with Morrison 165 . In
163 Cooper, Central Office for Refugees, 'Proposals in
regard to refugees from Nazi Oppression in the United
Kingdom after the War', Nov 1944, Rothschild Archive
XIV/35/109.
164 Ibid, p. 2.
165 See records of inter-departmental and internal
discussions in PRO HO 213/1009(Aug 1944-Apr 1945) and PRO HO
213 1008(May-Oct 1945).
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the last months of the war Morrison insisted that not even
successful refugee industrialists, whose potential as
exporters the Department of Overseas Trade wished to retain,
could be offered formal assurances which might dissuade them
from leaving in search of more welcoming surroundings'66.
Morrison's two successors in office, Somervell and Chuter
Ede, also avoided making any general policy decision in 1945
about whether refugees could be permitted to settle 167 . The
need to formulate and announce Home Office policy on this
question and the arguments in favour of a generous policy,
were thus recognised and pressed by officials, but ministers
did not act on their recommendations.
The Home Office, anxious to reduce refugee numbers in the
UK, was unlikely to view further admissions with enthusiasm;
the extent to which refugee admissions were permitted in
war-time is the subject of the remainder of this chapter.
Refugee admissions
The government's policy of not admitting refugees to the UK
merely on humanitarian grounds was established at the war's
outset and faced no serious political challenge in the first
three years of the war, although events in 1940 led to the
arrival of unwanted numbers of war refugees. After mid-1942,
however, British policy-makers faced unprecedented pressure
166 See Lord Woolton, 'Refugee Industrialists',
R(I)(44) 12, 25 Jul 1944, Morrison, memorandum, 'Refugee
Industrialists', R(I)(44) 14, 11 Aug 1944; minutes of
meeting of Reconstruction Committee, Subcommittee on
Industrial Problems, 13 Dec 1944, PRO CAB 124/702.
167 See records cited in n. before last.
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to rescue Jews from planned mass murder in occupied Europe.
Notwithstanding the pressure, the policy of not allowing
humanitarian admissions remained substantially the same.
However, the need to deal with political pressure led
policy-makers to devote far greater effort to the defence of
existing policy.
The restrictive basis of admissions policy was repeatedly
confirmed at Cabinet level. Admission of Jews - or any other
class of aliens - purely for asylum or rescue, would have
been inconsistent with Cabinet rulings against humanitarian
admissions. Refugees could normally be admitted only in
cases fitting within the authorised categories of non-
humanitarian admissions, which generally meant admission for
purposes connected with the war effort. Jewish refugees were
admitted to contribute to the war effort: to enter civilian
employment or the armed forces, or for political reasons.
The admission of close relatives was seen both as a
humanitarian matter and as having the value of boosting the
morale of persons engaged in the war effort; certain Jewish
refugees were permitted to come to join relatives, but the
case generally had to fit within the Home Office's very
narrow conception of family unification. Small numbers of
Jews were also admitted as war refugees. The authorities
also made rare discretionary decisions to admit individuals
on an exceptional basis. Certain officials gave a generous
interpretation to the authorised categories of entry,
facilitating the entry of Jewish and other alien refugees;
other officials discouraged or rejected the entry of aliens
even if they came within the permitted categories. The
various avenues of admission are considered below.
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Humanitarian admissions
Persons from enemy territory.
The Cabinet Committee ruling of 25 September 1939 against
the admission of persons who had been in enemy-controlled
territory since the outbreak of war was subject to
exceptions. Within just over a week, an exception to the
rigid policy that potential refugees could not be helped was
made by the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, in a
decision which reflected readiness in principle to admit
Jews to Palestine. At the 25 September meeting further
admissions to Palestine had been envisaged: however, all
visas granted to enemy nationals were already invalidated,
and the meeting agreed not to assist the exodus of persons
from territory under Nazi control. The cases of people who
had immigration certificates for Palestine, but were still
in German-controlled territory when war broke out, were
explicitly included in the ban. Nevertheless, on 3 October,
MacDonald decided that persons holding Palestine immigration
certificates for the half-year ending September 1939 who had
been unable to leave Germany before war began would be
allowed to enter Palestine' 68 . The decision showed that - at
least where Palestine was concerned - the rule against
potential refugees could be broken by a minister.
The Colonial Secretary's decision was not merely a by-
product of the transition from peace to war: throughout the
war, entry to Palestine produced the most numerous
exceptions to the policy on potential refugees. In addition
many "actual" refugee Jews from neutral and Allied
168 Note of inter-departmental discussion at Colonial
Office, 3 Oct 1939, PRO FO 371/24079, W14378/45/48, f.272.
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territory, including the UK, Australia and Spain, were
admitted to Palestine with British support. In contrast,
authorisation for Jews to enter the UK was very rare if they
came from enemy territory, whether or not they had been
granted visas before the war; "actual" Jewish refugees were
hardly more welcome. The difference in policies for the UK
and Palestine suggest that the government's concern was less
over the nature of the refugees, than over their
destination. The exception made in October 1939 for pre-war
Palestine certificates was in part a transitional provision,
but it also reflected current provision for Jewish
admissions to Palestine in the White Paper immigration
quota. Subsequent agreement to the admission to Palestine of
persons coming from enemy territory were also justified -
and limited - by reference to the quota' 69 . On the other
hand, there were neither quotas nor any other policies
authorising new immigration to the IlK, which continued to
claim that it was not a country of immigration.
The British government, having decided to exclude all
inessential immigrants, had little incentive to make
exceptions to such rules as the ban on admissions of persons
coming from enemy territory. Persons who had reached neutral
territory were in a better position since ministers had
agreed on 25 September 1939 that persons who had reached
neutral territory before the war might be admitted. Persons
who reached neutral territory at a later date were included
by the Home Office in more generous arrangements operated
prior to the German invasion of Western Europe in May-June
1940 which allowed the grant of visas in neutral territory
169 See Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit.,
generally.
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to certain classes of enemy alien refugees, even if they had
left enemy territory after the start of the war; however,
from late 1939 this policy was not advertised. The position
therefore was that Jews seeking to leave Germany could not
obtain British visas while they remained there. If
applicants somehow reached neutral territory, they might
obtain a visa, but they were not told this by the Home
Office, and it was in practice impossible to obtain transit
visas in enemy territory in order to travel to neutral
territory to submit an application for a British visa.
The operation of the rule against persons in enemy territory
is illustrated by the fate of a request for temporary
admission pending re-emigration, made by a woman refugee in
the UK, on behalf of her 71 year-old German-Jewish father,
who was still in Germany. The daughter, a Miss Gertrud
Sekel, came to the UK before the war, seeking a guarantor
for her father's emigration to the USA. A guarantor was
found, but in February 1940 the British authorities told
Miss Sekel that, since her father was still in Germany, he
could not be granted a visa to join her in the UK, pending
completion of the emigration arrangements 170 . The daughter
feared that both her parents would be interned in Germany;
her father had been detained once in a concentration camp;
her mother, who was with him, although British-born and
regarded as a British subject, so that she did not require a
visa for the UK, did not wish to leave her husband to come
alone, nor did the Home Office wish to encourage her'71.
170 See correspondence and minutes, Feb-May 1940, PRO
FO 372/3358, T1520/T3878/1520/378, f.304.
171 See KG Davies (Home Office) to FH Cleobury(FO), 6
May 1940, PRO FO 372/3358, T3878/1520/378, f.312.
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Foreign Office officials and the Director of Passport
Control hoped the Sekel case might receive sympathetic
treatment on humanitarian grounds. However, the Home Office
was not prepared to make an exception: it had done so in
another case, but this was not treated as a precedent172.
Justifying refusal, an official reported that the Home
Office "recognised the case as a hard one but there are many
other refugees in this country who would like to get their
parents out of Germany"; she also pointed to the
unlikelihood that such old persons would be accepted as
immigrants to the USA 173 . The Home Office had previously
stated that the case could be considered if the parents were
in a neutral country, but the difficulty lay in getting
there. Neutral countries, as Miss Sekel found after applying
to Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, refused to grant
transit visas to persons with no visa for their ultimate
destination. The Foreign Office considered it had no
standing to intervene, even to help the mother obtain a
transit visa while resident in German territory, since she
was a German as well as a British national.
The Seke]. case shows the limited nature of the benefits
which flowed from such exceptions as the Home Office was
prepared to make. An important new exception to the rule had
been contemplated in December 1939, when Maxwell and Cooper
proposeta scheme for promising visas to deserving pre-war
applicants in enemy territory, who were wives or children of
refugees in Britain, if they could reach neutral
172 The case concerned a Dr Feygi. Latham, minute, 8
Apr 1940, ibid.
173 See Davies to Cleobury, cited in n. before last.
417
territory174 . (No concession was contemplated in relation to
adult males, whom it remained Home Office policy to
exclude)' 75 . To Maxwell's regret, Peake, who had initially
been sympathetic to the proposal, ruled against it, fearing
a flood of applicants once persons in Germany were admitted.
He argued that people in Germany should be helped by
neutrals: "the duty of playing the good Samaritan rests more
heavily on a neutral than a belligerent country"176.
Home Office policy remained that applicants might be
considered for visas if they reached neutral territory, but
the practice of stating this in letters to applicants was
discontinued. It was decided to grant visas in exceptional
cases, considering fresh applications as well as those made
pre-war, and treating as irrelevant the fact that a visa was
authorised or granted prior to the outbreak of war. The
existence of exceptional hardship unless a family was
reunited was one factor giving rise to special
consideration: family unity extended here only to the re-
union of spouses and minor children joining parents. The
second factor was the availability of private funds for
support: Cooper established that guarantees from third
parties would be acceptable' 77 . Total numbers would be kept
down. Less strict treatment could be given to cases in
France, which did not entail a drain on Allied resources,
since France was a co-belligerent. Letters refusing
applicants in Germany would have two alternative forms of
174 See Peake, memorandum, 11 Dec 1939, PRO HO
213/447.
175 Maxwell, memorandum, 18 Dec 1939, ibid.
176 Peake, memoranda, 18 and 19 Dec 1939, ibid.
177 Cooper to Maxwell, 19 Dec 1939, ibid.
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wording: in cases "of the refusal type" it would be said
that the Home Office was unable to authorise any facilities
for the applicant to proceed to the UK; in cases regarded
more favourably it was stated that visas could not be
granted to proceed to the UK from enemy territory178 . It
must be doubted whether these subtle distinctions can have
meant much to applicants.
New regulations in April 1940 formally ruled out the grant
of entry facilities to nationals of enemy countries or
stateless persons normally resident there if they were in
enemy territory, but nevertheless made provision for the
admission of such persons, if they were refugees in neutral
countries or France 179 . The regulations included persons who
might have come from enemy territory. Only three classes of
applicant were eligible: wives joining husbands in the UK;
minor children joining parents, or a sole surviving parent
or (in the case of orphans) next of kin or other close
relatives; lastly, in very exceptional cases, elderly
mothers without relatives abroad joining children in the UK.
There was also provision for male refugees in France, aged
60 or over, who were husbands or fathers of one or more
persons in the UK, and dependent on remittances from the UK,
and for whom adequate guarantees were given - a rare
exception to the general exclusion of males. In no case
would entry be permitted if there was a danger of a charge
178 Grant to Cooper, 1 Jan 1940, ibid.; Aliens
Department, Visa Instructions, t Refugees from Germany,
Austria and Czechoslovakia', 19 Feb 1940, ibid.
179 The regulations covered persons resident in
Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig or the Memeland.
Circular, VR 21, 'Admission to the United Kingdom of
Refugees from certain Central European countries', 25 Apr
1940, PRO FO 371/29158, W5467/3/48.
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on public funds, and prior authority for the grant of a visa
had to be obtained. The new regulations had only a short
life, however, because, as the German invasion spread
through Western Europe, further regulations in mid-June 1940
drastically restricted refugee admissions, confining them to
cases of children joining parents, and then only if the
application had been approved prior to the war, if the child
had succeeded in reaching neutral territory and the case had
been scrutinised by a PCO or Consul'80.
Jews seeking to leave Germany were thus generally unable to
gain admission to the UK. In this period the generality of
Jews were not prevented from departing by the German
authorities, who employed a variety of measures to support
the continuation of Jewish emigration, whether legal or
illegal. The Germans left the "J" off passports of Jews
attempting illegal emigration to Palestine in cases where it
might cause difficulties over transit visas. A belief held
within British government circles was that German agents had
been helped to emigrate in the guise of Jews, with the
Jewish "J" marked in their passports. Captain Liddell of
M15, who regarded all German Jews who were able to renew
their passports as being under some form of German control,
advised that such persons should be refused facilities to
travel through British territory. The Passport Control
Department, however, warned against regarding any German
with a "J" in his passport as an enemy agent. Accordingly, a
consular query from Shanghai, about the propriety of
affixing visas to passports of German Jews marked with a
180 Regulations dated 15 Jun 1940, ibid.
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was resolved by the Treaty Department in the
affirmative, subject to safeguards'81.
War refugees
In the early months of the war a small number of "war
refugees" entered the UK. A policy for the admission of
Poles in October-November 1939, was regarded as having
worked well and was later adopted for Finnish subjects when
Finland was attacked 182 . The policy was broadly against the
grant of visas for the UK, but the door was left "a little
open", giving scope to consider a limited number of special
cases in exceptional circumstances, subject to guarantees
and referral'83.
The main influx came with the fall of Western Europe to the
Germans in May-June 1940. Despite the government's pre-war
reluctance to admit war refugees, plans had been made for
the eventuality that some admissions might be unavoidable.
The preparations envisaged the reception of up to 300,000
war refugees: 100,000 direct from Holland and Belgium;
100,000 via France, plus a possible additional 100,000 from
181 See Greenway(Shanghai) to FO, No. 104, 31 Jan
1940, Foreign Office minutes, Jan-Mar 1940, RT Parkin,
memorandum, Jeffes to Dunbar, 22 Feb 1940, Liddell(M15) to
Jebb, 29 Feb 1940, FO to Greenway, No. 209, 11 Mar 1940, PRO
FO 372/3358, T2474/T3186/2474/378, f.319.
182 See Posnanski(Polish Consul General in London)
'Report on Polish war Refugees', Annex No 5 to report of
meeting of Central Committee for War Refugees for Holland
Belgium and France, 25 Feb 1941, PRO FO 371/29217,
W2659/464/48.
183 Grant, Minute, 20 Dec 1939, PRO HO 213/448.
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France' 84 . However, as the situation in Western Europe
worsened, these arrangements were suspended. Anderson, in a
memorandum of 19 May, advised the War Cabinet that
arrangements for examination of refugees, either on arrival,
or beforehand by the French authorities, who could also
regulate the flow, had largely broken down, since shipping
was needed for shuttle services to the Continent185.
Refugees were arriving in large numbers, causing congestion
at ports and reception centres. The French were seeking the
entry of more than the previously agreed 200,000 from French
territory, where refugees from Belgium were interfering with
military operations. However, to admit even 200,000 would
nearly double Britain's existing alien population of
240,000. Without machinery to vet entrants to exclude
undesirables or fifth columnists, it would be impossible to
guarantee the exclusion of ill-disposed persons. Anderson
commented that if the UK admitted persons about whom nothing
was known, this would be "somewhat of an anomaly" viewed
against the elaborate precautions being taken against enemy
aliens about whom so much was known. He proposed that if it
was decided still to accept the 200,000, this should be the
upper limit, and that entry should be limited to a maximum
rate of 10,000 a day, to avoid clogging the machinery for
examining and accommodating them. He planned to obtain
Belgian assistance for interrogation, to arrange reception
under escort and to subject refugees to the restrictions on
enemy aliens. Prior vetting by the French, though desirable,
seemed unrealistic. The burden might be mitigated by the
184 MacDonald to Hankey, 21 May 1940, PRO CAB 63/133;
Anderson, 'Dutch and Belgian War Refugees, WP(G)(40) 132, 19
May 1940, PRO CAB 67/6.
185 Ibid.
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agreement of the Eire government to take 1,000; there were
also plans to find out enough about the refugees to be able
to utilise their services in agriculture and elsewhere.
Anderson's views on the question coincided with the Service
chiefs' recommendations. On 20 May the War Cabinet decided
to suspend the existing plan for the admission of war
refugees and that further admissions were impossible for the
time being, although the French were to be told that the
British commitment had not been repudiated' 86 . Refugees were
massing in Belgium and northern France, evacuation from the
coast was under way; the government decided that British
ships would have to be used to evacuate the British
Expeditionary Force' 87 . Dunkirk could not be used for
refugee evacuation because of bombing, and the priority was
to get food ashore for the troops, so it was decided to
reject French requests for the removal of refugees who were
blocking troop movements. When the French Prime Minister,
Daladier, suggested using food ships on their return journey
to evacuate refugees, the British government maintained that
further admissions were impossible for the time being'88.
Further French requests for large-scale rescue were rejected
by both the UK government, pleading military necessity, and
by the Americans, citing quota restrictions189.
186 WM 131(40)12, 20 May 1940, PRO CAB 65/7.
187 Hankey to Burroughs, 22 May 1940, Burroughs to
Hankey, 22 May 1940, PRO CAB 63/133.
188 Campbell to Foreign Office, Foreign Office to
Campbell, 22 May 1940, PRO CAB 63/133.
189 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War, Vol. I, London 1970, p. 265. The Foreign
Office Departmental Records Officer has informed the author
by letter that the documents cited by Prof Woodward in this
passage have been destroyed.
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A substantial war refugee influx nevertheless took place in
May-June 1940. More people arrived without visas than with
them. Persons were refused leave to land, but no records
have been seen suggesting actual removal' 90 . The new
arrivals were largely of Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, French
and Polish nationality, and not many Jews were among
them191 . British consular officials who remained on the
Continent until late in the evacuation process were in a
position to authorise entry of civilian refugees to the
UK' 92 . The scattered anecdotes recording such decisions
include the recollections of General Sir Edward Spears, who
was in Bordeaux on 15 June as French resistance collapsed.
In his memoirs of the Fall of France, Spears recalled with
mixed sympathy and contempt, seeing "men turned to jellies
by fear"; he saw Jews
with every justification for apprehension as to their fate
at the hands of the Nazis...so transfigured by fear as to be
totally unrecognisable. I saw two large flabby white fellows
I knew whom I described to Campbell [Sir Ronald Campbell,
Ambassador to France] as looking like a couple of
blancmanges pursued by a Sunday-school treat. Some arrogant,
aggressive men I had never thought were Jews came to beg for
passages, proclaiming themselves as such, having ceased to
be either arrogant or aggressive. Everything was done to try
ensure the escape of those most justified in their fear of
190 See Home Office and Foreign Office correspondence,
Jun 1940, PRO HO 213/556; for a description of immigration
procedures on arrival of war refugees, see Roche, op. cit.,
pp. 133-136.
191 See statistics compiled by Cooper up to the end of
March 1942, PRO HO 213/1347; many of the Poles had escaped
from Poland to Romania and Hungary and thence to France.
192 See e.g, reports dated 15-24 May 1940 on the
recent evacuation of British and alien nationals from
Holland, PRO FO 371/24462, C6990/6990/29.
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falling into Nazi	 but the shipping space was far
short of the demand
The pleas of Jewish refugees to be allowed to board boats
taking people to the UK from French ports were often in
vain. In late June 1940 it was alleged that, while French,
Czech and Polish refugees had been given preference on
British vessels leaving French shores, Austrian and German
refugees had been refused entry on to British evacuation
boats. The issue was raised with Clement Attlee, the Lord
Privy Seal, by John Parker MP, who forwarded a list of
prominent refugees on French soil, including members of the
International Brigade, who it was feared might fall into
enemy hands' 94 . Attlee gave the curious reply that France
was "now completely in the hands of the Germans and there is
no way in which we can get these people out, especially as
there is no indication of where they are" 195 . Yet South-East
France remained unoccupied for the next two and a half
years, and until America entered the war US consular
representatives and refugee organisations functioned there,
enabling numerous refugees to leave France for destinations
abroad, but few came direct to the UK.
The recollections of refugees contain examples of cases
where British consular representatives authorised the escape
of Jewish refugees to the UK. Margaret Czellitzer, in a
memoir which vividly portrays the plight of refugees during
193 Major-General Sir Edward Spears, Assignment to
Catastrophe, Volume II. The Fall of France. June 1940,
London, 1954, pp. 260; for refugees at Bordeaux on 16 Jun
see ibid., pp. 280-281.
194 Parker to Attlee, 25 and 27 Jun 1940, PRO CAB
118/78.
195 Attlee to Parker, 28 Jun 1940, ibid.
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the fall of western Europe, reminded her two grandsons that
the family owed their lives to the forethought of the boys'
German-Jewish mother, who had flown to London from Berlin
shortly before each of them was born, to ensure that they
acquired British nationality by birth in the UK' 96 . (The
author has been told that numerous children of German-Jewish
parents acquired British nationality in this way; such
children were sometimes described as "Made in Germany")197.
Three generations of the family, the Jewish "J" marked on
their passports, had found refuge in Holland before the war;
in May 1940 they decided to flee from the German advance,
hoping to find refuge in England. They went first to
Belgium, where the children's father was detained in
Antwerp. The grandfather was arrested by the police in La
Panne and interned. His wife never saw him again; in 1943 he
was deported from Westerbork camp to the east. The women and
children continued to France, and made for the British
consulate in Dunkirk, where the consul was persuaded by the
boys' birth certificates to grant their mother a permit to
board an evacuation ship; eventually he agreed to include
the grandmother and two other female relatives. With bombs
and shells exploded around them, they left on the destroyer
HYS Keith, landing in Folkestone, where Mrs Czellitzer and
the boys' mother were interned. Mrs Czellitzer spent 15
weeks in Holloway prison, and was later moved during the
Blitz to join the boys and their mother on the Isle of Man.
Later in the war the family continued on to the USA where
they were reunited with the boys' father, who had escaped
196 Margaret Czellitzer, 'Story of your childhood',
(n.d.), written about 1948, ME 429, Leo Baeck Institute, New
York.
197 Werner Rosenstock, interview with this author,
already cited.
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from an internment camp in the South of France and had come
via Cuba. The experience of this family and other cases
suggest that a family tie with a British subject was treated
by consular officials as a significant factor in deciding
whether to include alien Jews in the evacuation process198.
By early 1941 transitional admissions had long ceased and
the mass influx of war refugees was past. Requests for
humanitarian admissions to the UK were now largely confined
to neutral territory, particularly Portugal. TM Snow, head
of the Foreign Office's Refugee Section) concluded that Home
Office policy ruled out the admission of "qua refugees, any
more foreigners, whether Allied or not": a comment made in
course of considering the suggested admission of Jews from
occupied Luxemburg, a possibility which, it seems, was not
even raised with the Home Office prior to refusal' 99 . By
this date British policy was that any approaches regarding
humanitarian admission of refugees to the Empire should be
made to the dominions and colonies, and not to the UK.
Political admissions
Political considerations favoured the admission of certain
individuals or categories of refugees. Most political
admissions were the province of the Foreign Office, which
had to take account not only of British interests, but of
requests by governments-in-exile for admission of their
198 A Jewish refugee of Polish nationality and his
British wife have recalled how they were permitted to leave
together on a British ship when Ostend was evacuated. Mr and
Mrs Bradshaw, interview with this author, 26 Jun 1988.
199 Snow, minute, 2 Jan 1941, PRO FO 371/25254,
W12667/12667/48, f.487; see also Snow, minute, 27 Jan 1941,
PRO FO 371/29158, W624/3/48.
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nationals. Foreign Office officials showed great solicitude
for the amour-propre of the impoverished governments-in-
exile, and regarded priority for friendly aliens as a matter
of principle and courtesy. Thus, in late May 1940 Makins
criticised Home Office slowness to co-operate over making
distinctions between Category C aliens and friendly and
Allied aliens, as
quite indefensible & likely to cause the maximum of
resentment, particularly among the French, the Belgians &
the Dutch. The tenderness of the 11.0. for the German and
Austrian refugee is inexplicable and excessively dangerous.
It would not matter how strict the regulations were,
provided the regulatio94or enemies were stricter than
regulations for friends
The Foreign Office wished not only to accord Allied
nationals the distinction of better treatment than enemy
aliens, but also to discriminate in favour of Allied
nationals, as against neutrals. Efforts to secure such
favourable treatment covered the spectrum of aliens
controls, including admissions, treatment on arrival, access
to protected areas and exemption from internment 201 . Foreign
Office officials were frustrated by the grudging responses
of the Home Office and M15 202 . Latham detected in the lower
reaches of M.I.5....some quite crude xenophobia", but
claimed that this could usually be overcome203.
200 Makins, Minute, 24 May 1940, PRO FO 371/25244,
W8028/7848/48, f.139.
201 For protected areas see 'Note of a meeting held at
the Home Office on the 8th June 1940' and subsequent
minutes, PRO FO 371/25245, W8350/7848/48, f.129; for
exemption from restrictions see Home Office agreement to
"tip the wink to the police not to interfere with French
nationals", Foreign Office minute, 11 May 1940, PRO FO
371/25244, W7848/7848/48, f.8; for treatment on arrival see
Norwegian complaint discussed below.
202 Making , minute, 10 Jun 1940, PRO FO 371/25245,
W8530/7848/48, f.129.
203 Latham, minute, 11 Jun 1940, ibid.
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Refugees in difficulties, whether in the UK or abroad,
enjoyed considerable advantages if they had an accredited
national representative able to use diplomatic channels to
deal with the British government. Officials in the Foreign
Office displayed concern over complaints from Allied
governments at harsh treatment of their nationals. In
September 1940 Laurence Collier of the Foreign Office
claimed in a letter to Desmond Morton of the Prime
Minister's Office that
the arbitrary proceedings of M.I.5. and the Home Office
against Allied nationals in this country have, for months
past, created a strong sense of grievance in the minds of
the Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian Governments, who have
bombarded the Foreign Office with protests and enquiries in
cases in which their nationals have been
	 led off to
prison and kept there without explanation
Morton was dealing with a Norwegian complaint which
concerned several torpedoed Norwegian seamen, rescued by a
British ship in June, and on arrival thrown into prison,
where they had been ever since. The diplomatic nexus with
the Norwegians benefited certain refugees of enemy
nationality, since the Norwegians also felt obliged to take
up the plight of some German and Austrian refugees,
evacuated in June with the Norwegian government, who had
suffered a similar fate to the seamen 205 . The cases were
investigated, and in October a meeting took place between
Norwegian representatives, the Home Office and the Foreign
204 Collier to Morton, 17 Sept 1940, PRO FO 371/25254,
W10775/10018/48, f.233.
205 See correspondence, Sept-October 1940, ibid.
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Office, which set up arrangements for future liaison and co-
operation206.
Refugees could also benefit from representations by neutral
governments. For example, the Romanian Legation in London
asked the Foreign Secretary to enquire into the internment
of a Jewish refugee of Romanian nationality. Latham could
not resist remarking, "Considering the way Rumanian Jews are
treated at home, this is cool!"; nevertheless, Foreign
Office officials dutifully processed the complaint and
looked for a plausible explanation 207 . The man in question
had come to Richborough camp, and was classified "C"; he was
interned in error along with other inmates of the camp; by
the time the Home Office was ready to order his release, he
had been illegally transported to Canada. It eventually
emerged that he was reluctant to return to the UK.
No such contacts were available to help the mass of refugees
of enemy nationality. They, however, unlike non-enemy
aliens, had the advantage of an appeal procedure to
challenge internment. This anomaly was soon corrected by the
establishment of the Lindley Committee, first as a secret
body, later as a formal tribunal, to investigate cases of
detained friendly aliens208.
206 Memorandum of meeting on 11 Oct 1940, 'Norwegian
citizens detained in Great Britain', PRO FO 371/25254,
W11204/10018/48, f.294.
207 Correspondence about Abraham Isaak Eltes with
Romanian Legation and Home Office, 13 Jun - 2 Jan 1941, PRO
FO 371/25245, W8381/7848/48, f.168; Latham, minute, 17 Jun
1940, ibid.
208 Foreign Office correspondence and memoranda, Sept-
Nov 1940, PRO FO 371/25254, W10466/W12195/7848/48. f.264.
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The Foreign Office found itself championing persons whose
entry was desired by exile governments against the
reluctance of the Home Office. Thus, in November 1940, the
Refugee Section responded sympathetically to a request for
asylum for 300 adult Poles in Romania and Yugoslavia who had
been involved in intelligence or political work, and some
180 Polish boy scouts. The feeling within the Foreign Office
was that political and humanitarian considerations made a
favourable response desirable, and that help from the
government would give a lead to the dominions and colonies.
Halifax and senior officials agreed that the UK was "the
most unsuitable of all places of refuge", apart from the
fortress colonies and actual scenes of land operations, but
argued that the government could not wash its hands of the
fate of this group. However, when Morrison at the Home
Office expressed full agreement with some presumably
ngative conclusions reached by the HD(S)E in early December
1940, Halifax turned to the Empire 209 The Colonial and
Dominions Offices and the governments of India and Burma
were asked to offer asylum for some 3,000 to 4,000 refugees;
he stressed the unsuitability for the reception of refugees
of the UK, as an advanced war area exposed to blockade,
bombardment and invasion, and needing housing for troops,
war evacuees and air-raid victims210.
The Home Office and the security services had by December
1940 established a policy of refusing to admit any more
refugees, making it all the harder for the Foreign Office to
209 Halifax to Morrison, 26 Nov 1940, PRO FO
371/25254, W11996/11996/48, f.433, Morrison to Halifax, 12
Dec 1940, ibid.
210 Halifax to Secretaries of State for the Dominions,
the Colonies, India and Burma, 24 Dec 1940, ibid.
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satisfy pressure from Allied governments for help for their
refugees 211 . The Foreign Office was not prepared to
challenge the policy when it considered a request to provide
refuge for some 700 members of the Jewish population of
Luxemburg, who had been expelled by the Germans. The
desperate plight of the Luxemburg Jews was raised with the
Foreign Office in December 1940 at the request of the
Luxemburg government-in-exile 212 . The Foreign Office did not
even mention the matter to the Home Office. In January 1941,
in accordance with existing policy, the British government
ruled out suggestions that the Luxemburg Jews might go to
Tanganyika, or be admitted to the UK on compassionate
grounds alone, and explained that, while possibilities of
admissions to the Empire were being explored, nothing had
yet been agreed.
Latham concluded that "next to nothing" could be done for
the Luxemburg Jews. Apart from the Home Office prejudice
against people from enemy territory, the government could
not admit any more people into the UK "merely on
humanitarian grounds". He recognised the "pitiable plight"
of the Luxemburg Jews, but categorised them as "hardly war
refugees in the sense that they are in danger because they
have fought against the Germans but simply racial refugees";
he did not think, therefore, that they qualified for
exceptional treatment from the Home Office or the Colonial
211 Snow, minute, 11 Dec 1940, PRO FO 371/25243,
W12102/7614/48, f.593.
212 AF Aveling(Belgian Embassy) to Halifax (enclosing
a letter from the Luxemburg Minister of Foreign Affairs), 17
Dec 1940, PRO FO 371/25254, W12667/12667/48, f.487; for the
episode see Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., pp. 108-
110, including quotation from Snow's minute cited above.
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Office 213 . Nevertheless, despite the negative ruling on
admissions, and despite Latham's reservations, once doubts
about Luxemburg's status as a full ally had been laid to
rest, Latham and his colleagues advocated making an
exception to the rule against refugees from enemy-occupied
territory for the Luxemburg Jews. The exception would permit
the admission to the UK of Luxemburg nationals, if they
could escape to Portugal, as some had already done, and were
otherwise eligible for a visa. Professor SJ Davies, a
Ministry of Labour expert, would shortly visit Lisbon in
connection with a labour recruitment scheme, which was
limited to nationals of Allied governments with their
headquarters in London. It was agreed that Allied nationals
among the Luxemburg group (but not Jews coming from
Luxemburg, but not of Allied nationality) might be eligible
for inclusion in the scheme. The PCO in Lisbon was
instructed to contact a man who had a dossier on Jewish
emigrants from Luxemburg, and to submit to Davies details of
any with high technical qualifications. Latham envisaged
that persons who seemed suitable to Davies would be
unofficially encouraged to go to Lisbon. The PCD decided to
dispense with Home Office and M15 concurrence, on the basis
that such refugees were not getting exceptional treatment
beyond the preference given to nationals of countries
overrun by the enemy 214 . These well-meaning efforts made no
difference to the fate of the majority of the Luxemburg
Jews.
213 Latham, minute, 24 Dec 1940, ibid.
214 Ibid; Jeffes, minute, 31 Dec 1940, Snow, minute, 2
Jan 1941, IY Mackenzie, minute, 3 Jan 1941, Parkin(PCD),
minute, 8 Jan 1941, FO to Campbell, 11 Jan 1941, Snow to
Aveling, 13 Jan 1941, ibid; the scheme is discussed again in
the employment section of this chapter.
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The response to the Luxemburg Jews illustrates the
advantages of having accredited representatives, but it also
shows the limits of what such representatives could achieve
for Jews seeking refuge. The decision that only Jews of
Luxemburg or other Allied nationality, but not Jews from
Luxemburg as such, were eligible for preferential treatment
as allies, shows the importance of Allied nationality in
admissions policy, whether or not an Allied government
supported the case215 . The episode also illustrates the
point that the ban on humanitarian admissions meant that
persons seeking entry needed to fit into a "war effort"
category, if they failed to qualify on political grounds. It
shows, moreover, that the policy was so firmly established
that Foreign Office officials did not think it worth raising
the plight of the Luxemburg Jews with the Home Office.
Another instance of favourable treatment for Allied
nationals demonstrates the particularly close relationship
between British and Czech representatives. The case for the
entry of Czechs in danger of being overtaken by German
influence in Europe was raised by Jan Masaryk in October
1940 and again in January 1941216. Masaryk sought in
particular the adoption of a benevolent attitude towards
cases of Czechs who had reached Lisbon. He received
assurances of British sympathy, and was told that, although
admission of Czech refugees to the UK was not possible, the
prospect of havens in the Empire was being explored. He was
also told of Professor Davies' labour recruitment
215 See Snow to Aveling, 13 Jan 1941, ibid.
216 Masaryk to Eden, 14 Jan 1941, PRO FO 371/29158,
W624/3/48.
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mission2 ' 7 . Subsequently, as chapter five has shown, the
government modified its policy towards Czechs, deciding in
1941 to make a grant from CRTF funds for a special scheme to
fund the rescue of Czech nationals in Europe. The
administrative instructions for this scheme, notified to
Lisbon in September 1941, presumed that Lisbon was "in
danger of German occupation or subject to German influence"
- a presumption which enabled the Czech government to
reclaim from the CRTF the cost of evacuating its nationals.
The existence of the scheme did not create an obligation to
grant British visas, but it was envisaged that a number
would be granted, in some cases for immediate evacuation218.
In May 1941 the Home Office agreed in principle to the
admission of potentially useful political refugees, in
appropriate cases, and their wives and children, but
generally not more remote relatives 219 . Refugees of enemy
nationality were expressly included in these arrangements.
All applications were to be referred to the Home Office,
Foreign Office and Security Services: the Home Office would
rely on Foreign Office assessment of the usefulness of the
persons concerned. This scheme was not viewed by the Home
Office as an exception, but as coming within the overall
policy of granting visas only in cases shown to be in the
national interest. Formal instructions for the
217 Snow minute, 27 Jan 1941, Eden to Masaryk, 29 Jan
1941, ibid.
218 Randall to Campbell, 5 Sept 1941, PRO FO
371/29193, W8548/112/48; for queries regarding the scope of
the Fund, see Delevigne to Cooper, 4 and 14 June 1941,
Cooper to Randall, 10 Jul, 13 and 19 Aug 1941, PRO FO
371/29193, W8696/W10009/112/48.
219 Newsam to Cadogan, 6 May 1941, PRO FO 371/29158,
W5467/3/48, (with reference to Cadogan to Newsam, 25 Apr
1941), PRO FO 371/29158, W4950/468/G.
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identification and processing of such cases, circulated in
July 1941, emphasised that the new scheme overruled previous
bans on the grant of visas to enemy nationals. In future all
apparently well founded applications "from persons who claim
or are believed to be political refugees of some importance
(whether their importance is due to their former public
eminence or to their ability in special activities, etc.)"
should be immediately referred to London220.
By the end of 1941 the Foreign Office had largely delegated
to Allied governments-in-exile the judgement of the
usefulness of the admission of their nationals, only
examining the merits of cases where the government concerned
did not make a strong favourable recommendation. Thus, in
December 1941, the Belgians asked for help in coping with an
embarrassing accumulation of Belgian refugees in Portugal,
claiming that in many cases they were of a type not
essential to the war effort; Makins made it clear that his
government would support a Belgian plan to let it be known
that only persons who would be admitted to the UK were those
eligible for the armed forces, government officials, persons
whose lives were in danger and civilian technicians. The
Foreign Office did not wish to become involved in such
details, but sent instructions to Passport Control in
Portugal and Spain to grant visas to persons strongly
supported by Allied governments on grounds that they were
active officials, or on war effort or personal danger
grounds. People not strongly supported, but stated by the
government in question to be of some value, would be
220 PCD, circular, VR 13853, 'Visas for Refugees of
Political Importance', 13 Jul 1941, PRO FO 371/29159,
W9549/3/48; Eden to HM Representatives, Circular,'Visas for
Refugees of Political Importance', 13 Aug 1941, ibid.
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assessed on war effort and humanitarian grounds; those
stated to be of no value were likely to be refused 221 . In
early 1942 a similar arrangement was made concerning Polish
nationals: it was agreed, with Home Office concurrence, that
when and if an emergency arose, UK visas might be granted to
Polish nationals in Portugal who were active officials or
persons in danger and of value to the war effort; those the
Poles did not accord priority status would be dealt with on
their merits222.
The Foreign Office also supported schemes for Polish Jews to
sail from Portugal to Jamaica. The reason for such support
was the desire to evacuate a "hard core" of some 200 Polish
Jews, whose continued presence in Portugal was an excuse for
the Portugese to refuse transit visas for Polish and Czech
technicians wanted in the UK 223 . The Home Office did not
object to the grant of visas for some of the Poles to go to
Jamaica, and in early 1942 refugees of several nationalities
were allowed to sail from Portugal to Jamaica. British
agreement to such schemes invariably involved insisting that
the Allied government whose nationals were concerned
undertook to take financial responsibility and to accept the
persons in question at the end of the war; special
guarantees were obtained for persons of doubtful
221 Making , minute, 5 Dec 1941, Randall and Jeffes,
minutes, 6 Dec 1941, PRO FO 371/29159, W14699/3/48.
222 Balinski to Randall, 6 Jan 1942, Randall, minute,
14 Jan 1942, Refugee Department to Chancery(Lisbon), 3 Mar
1942, PRO FO 371/32655, W568/205/48.
223 FO to Lisbon, No. 396, 6 Mar 1942, PRO FO
371/32655, W2580/205/48.
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nationality224 . The AJDC provided much of the necessary
financial assistance and organisational work, guaranteeing
12 months' maintenance in Jamaica for Polish refugees, and
in February 1942 extending this to cover up to 200 refugees
of Allied nationality who might receive Jamaican visas225.
Colonial Office agreement to admission to the colony was
necessary: it was withheld for a group of Austrians whom
Archduke Robert of Austria wished to include in the Jamaica
sailings226.
Foreign Office officials were intent on extracting from such
schemes a compensating benefit for Britain, especially an
improvement in escape opportunities for technicians and
others whose admission to the UK was desired: they were
ready to drop the schemes as soon as such benefits were
lacking227 . Alan Walker of the Foreign Office said that the
Colonial Office did not wish Jamaica to be used as a
"dumping ground":
224 Refugee Department to Chancery(Lisbon) 3 Mar 1942,
PRO FO 371/32655, W568/205/48; PCO Portugal to Director of
Passport Control, 'Visas for Jamaica to Polish refugees', 3
Feb 1942, Randall to M Budny (Polish legation), 10 Mar 1942,
Balinski to Randall, 17 Jun 1942, PRO FO 371/32655,
W2580/205/48.
225 See copy Schwartz(AJDC) to Garran, 11 Feb 1942,ibid.
226 See minutes and correspondence Feb-Mar 1942, PRO
FO 371/32655, W2092/W3225/205/48, PRO FO 371/32656,
W4992/205/48.
227 See e.g. Foreign Office correspondence between
Lisbon and London on removal of Polish Jews from Portugal to
Jamaica, and subsequent admission of Poles from unoccupied
France to Portugal, Jan to Mar 1942, PRO FO 371/32655,
W205/W2580/205/48; Randall to Peter Garran(Lisbon) 1 Jul
1942, PRO FO 371/32656, W8134/205/48; Emerson to Randall, 12
Nov 1942, PRO FO 371/32681, W15303/4555/48; Randall to
Rogers (Colonial Office), 4 Dec 1942, PRO FO 371/32682,
W16060/4555/48; Walker to Garran, 9 Apr 1942, PRO FO
371/32656, W4887/205/48.
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Neither do we - unless the Portugese will allow more Czechs
and Poles from unoccupied France who could be used either
here or in Canada for the war effort, and not merely Jews
for whom we appear to arrange a clean getaway to the States
without any compensating advantage - to enter Portugal.
Walker expressed irritation over the case of a group of
Luxemburg Jews who succeeded in sailing for Jamaica just
before the Foreign Office had planned to refuse them; he
demanded an explanation from the PCO at Lisbon228.
The rejection of British involvement in assisting people to
escape for purely humanitarian reasons was consistent with
Cabinet policy of expecting a return for the war effort on
any investment in help to refugees. The incentive for
British involvement in such schemes was often that the
removal of refugees from neutral countries, such as
Portugal, Spain and Turkey, appeared important to maintain
such countries' readiness to function as escape routes. The
punctilious emphasis by officials who arranged such schemes
on protecting Britain from financial, immigration and
security liabilities was the antithesis of mass rescue. It
was also a great source of delay: the elaborate checks
operated by British representatives before they would issue
visas to assist Jewish refugees to leave European territory
for other destinations were the war-time counterpart of the
Home Office emphasis on pre-selection for UK admission. A
system of priorities which required that the advantage to
Britain must be established first, however long this took,
dictated a corresponding lack of emphasis on the urgency of
the need to help people escape,
228 Walker, minute, 6 Apr, Jeffes, minute, 13 Apr
1942, PRO FO 371/32656, W4728/205/48, Walker to Garran, 9
Apr 1942, PRO FO 371/32656, W4887/205/48; Silvain Hayuin
helped to arrange the escape to Jamaica of Luxemburg Jews,
including his family. Hayum, interview with this author, 11
Jan 1990.
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Admissions for em'olovment
"Owing to its scarcity, manpower became the vital factor -
perhaps the most vital factor - in the planning of the war
effort", wrote Sir Godfrey Ince, former Permanent Secretary
to the Ministry of Labour and National Service in the years
1944_56 229
. Requirements for manpower during the war "always
outstripped the numbers available", and a succession of
measures were taken by the Ministry of Labour to maximise
labour mobilisation230 . Scarcities of skilled labour,
technicians and scientists were particularly acute;
shortages of medical manpower included doctors, and
increasingly nurses and midwifes.
Refugee admissions from abroad for employment during the war
were ostensibly decided by reference to a manpower policy
which aimed to make particularly good use of scarce skilled
labour. The official history of manpower during the war
devotes four pages to the topic of friendly alien manpower,
alongside Irish, Colonial, and prisoner of war manpower,
under the broad heading of manpower from "extraneous
sources" 231 . Irish and Colonial labour was recruited and
brought from abroad specifically for manpower purposes; the
presence in the UK of prisoners of war and friendly aliens
had different origins. The manpower study reflects the
differences in its discussion of the latter groups, by
concentrating on their utilisation on and after arrival; it
says little about recruitment of friendly alien manpower
229 Sir Godfrey Ince, The Ministry of Labour and
National Service, London. 1960, p. 46
230 Ibid. p. 42; see ibid., pp . 40-6 summarising
measures to maximise labour wobilisation in the 1939-45 war.
231 HMD Parker, Manpower. A Study of War-time Policy
and Administration, London, 1957, pp. 344-347.
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from abroad, except in relation to the armed forces. The
statistics provided of non-resident aliens registered after
aliens labour registration was introduced in 1941 do not
distinguish between persons who arrived before the war and
those who arrived later. Almost all the 23,320 women and
13,913 men of German, Austrian and Italian nationality
registered 5
 and many of the Czechs(4,259 women, and 5,948
men ,  would would have been pre-war arrivals. The remainder
would have been predominantly war-time arrivals: Belgians
(5,938 men, 4,907 women); Dutch (2,430 men, 1,507 women);
French (2,059 men, 2,361 women); Norwegians (1,247 men, 616
women) and Poles (5,998 men, 4,615 women) 232 . The approach
adopted, as is to be expected in a work of this type, is
mainly to provide a record what actually happened, focussing
on persons admitted, present, registered and utilised. There
is no discussion of policy-making on whether or not aliens
should be brought to the UK for manpower purposes.
This study, on the other hand, is concerned with policy on
alien entry to the UK for manpower objectives, and seeks to
look at what might have happened as well as what did happen.
The focus here is therefore on recruitment, processing of
applications and the response to offers of assistance,
looking at persons and groups who were not admitted to the
UK, as well as those who came. The picture that emerges
shows interdepartmental differences, omissions and missed
opportunities, which are not included in the official
history. Recruitment efforts from overrun western Europe in
1940 and from neutral Lisbon in 1941 will be discussed
first; then follows an examination of the response to offers
232 Ibid, p. 344.
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of help from abroad, and the role of the Committee for
Overseas Manpower.
Recruitment from overrun western Europe
The government had long been conscious of the resources of
skilled labour in western Europe. As early as September
1939, the prospect of recruiting skilled technicians if
Germany should overrun Holland and Belgium had been raised,
and in October 1939, Hankey, Minister without Portfolio in
the War Cabinet, was made responsible for planning for this
eventuality233 . Certain large employers in the engineering
industry were keen to recruit foreign workers immediately:
although he encouraged the Ministry of Labour to set up an
organisation to recruit refugees if the time came, this was
not Hankey's primary concern234 . His plans included saving
as much as possible of key industries, such as the machine
tool industry, and destroying the rest, in order to deny
them to the enemy235.
During the German advance in May 1940, Hankey tried to co-
ordinate efforts to recruit Belgian refugees before they
became too scattered 236 . Members of the Cabinet thought this
233 Chatfield, memorandum, WP (39) 72, 27 Sept 1939,
PRO CAB 63/129; WM 40(39)6, 7 Oct 1939, PRO CAB 65/1.
234 Seeorrespondence between MOLANS officials and
Hankey 28 Nov19 Jan 1940. Sir Charles Craven, of Vickers
Armstrong Ltd, was enthusiastic; a report obtained by the
government from Craven's brother showed that there were
thousands of skilled and semi-skilled unemployed engineering
workers in Belgium, PRO CAB 63/130.
235 WP(39) 95, 23 Oct 1939, PRO CAB 66/2.
236 Hankey to Bevin, 23 May 1940, Bevin to Hankey 24
Nay 1940, PRO CAB 63/130. Hankey had been given
responsibility for co-ordinating the work of different
departments in relation to the refugee problem, WM
132(40)14, 21 May 1940, CAB 65/7.
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measure was a sufficiently valuable contribution to supply
requirements, to outweigh fears about security and the risk
of opposition from anti-alien opinion, then running at a
high level 237 . On 13 June 1940, War Cabinet ministers
decided in favour of the admission of Belgian labour.
Herbert Morrison, then Minister of Supply, stressed the need
to convince British workers of the rightness of this course,
by showing that it was in the national interest for
shortages of skilled workers to be filled, and assuring them
that the Belgians would be sent back after the war. It was
agreed to bring over some 600 workers, and to make a similar
approach to the French; the French and Belgian authorities
were to be asked to sift the workers carefully before
despatch238.
Efforts to save both the products of industry and the
producers from the German advance met with some success. At
the last minute, British efforts helped to bring out a haul
which included machine tools, and diamonds from Belgium
whose value was estimated in millions, together with some
leading Belgian diamond merchants, as well as some French
and Belgian professors and technicians, with expertise in
237 See record of interdepartmental meeting on 11 June
1940, at which Newsam, representing the Home Office)
expressed anxieties about anti-alien opinion, and about
security, also a concern of the M15 representative. PRO CAB
63/130.
238 War Cabinet. Machine Tools: Employment of
Belgians, S.50/7/3, 13 Jun 1940, PRO CAB 63/130; See also WM
162(40)9(5), 12 Jun 1940, PRO CAB 65/8; Record of meeting
between Hankey, Dalton( Minister of Economic Warfare)Prof
Hall, Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) regarding thJ'
possible collapse of France, 12 Jun 1940, PRO CAB 63/132.
MEW asked Hankey to try to secure the evacuation of certain
skilled Belgian die-drillers urgently needed in the UK for
work in connection with the cable industry, who had been
evacuated from Brussels with the help of M16.
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fields such as explosives and tanks 239 . The government
encouraged the entry of diamond manufacturers and workers
into the UK in order to prevent stocks of diamonds falling
into the hands of the enemy, and in the hope of dollar
earnings from the export of cut diamonds to the USA240.
Plans made in June 1940 envisaged that officials would go
over to France to collect diamond merchants, taking
precautions against the inclusion of undesirables; the
merchants' families would have to be included, but it was
agreed that "the essential thing was that they should bring
the diamonds with them" 241 . In subsequent months, numerous
refugee diamond workers who had been working in Holland and
Belgium were admitted to Britain; among them were many Jews.
Penniless refugees, in possession of loose and partly cut
diamonds which they claimed were unsaleable, posed new
complications for Assistance Board officials seeking to
assess their resources 242 . The diamond manufacturers who
entered were all from Antwerp, according to Paul Brind of
the International Labour Branch(ILB) of the Ministry of
239 Stanley Irving, (Commercial Counsellor) to Sir R
Campbell (Tours), 13 Jun 1940, memorandum, 'Action taken to
secure evacuation of war material, skilled personnel, and
transfer of french contracts in USA', 26 Jun 1940, PRO CAB
63/130.
240 Brind to Marshall, 21 Oct 1941, PRO LAB 8/100.
241 Minutes of inter-departmental meeting at Board of
Trade on 17 Jun 1940, PRO BT 11/1322.
242 See Assistance Board correspondence and memoranda,
May-Oct 1940, esp. AC Burgess(Area Officer, Kingston),
memorandum, 'War Refugees Possessing Diamonds', 17 Jun 1940,
All Sheffield to Area Officer Hackney, 27 Jun 1940, PRO AST
11/75'; In early July the Board of Trade asked the
Assistance Board to continue payments to Dutch and Belgian
refugees pending settlement of "important questions"
regarding disposal of stocks of diamonds, Somervell(BOT) to
Mather, 5 Jul 1940, ibid.
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Labour and National Service(MOLANS), but the majority were
Dutch and Polish Jews243.
British enthusiasm for the admission of refugee diamond
workers was founded on a mixture of short and long-term
aims: not only did industrial diamonds have military
importance, but the UK scarcely possessed a diamond
industry, and there was a shortage of skilled diamond
workers. Thus the development of diamond cutting and
polishing in war-time Britain could lay the foundations for
a diamond industry after the war 244 . Diamond workers
therefore became an elite, who were reserved as essential
from call-up by Dutch and Belgian conscription; their wage
demands sometimes reflected awareness of their scarcity
value, and caused complaints from employers and concern to
the authorities245.
Diamond workers could obtain admission to Britain where
others could not. In September 1940, a Foreign Office
official stated that if 200 Dutch and a few hundred Belgian
diamond workers, mostly polishers, reported to be in
Toulouse could be brought to the UK "they would be welcomed
with open arms by the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the
243 Brind to Cartwright, 23 Dec 1941, PRO LAB 8/100.
244 HC Bull(MEW) to USS, 18 Jul 1940, PRO FO
371/24286, C8046/8046/4.
245 Board of Trade note, 23 Mar 1941, and CR Maddison
(Chief Conciliation Officer), report of joint conference
between employers' and workers' representatives on 9 Jul
1941, PRO LAB 8/100; for a Birmingham employer's complaint
to MEW about wage demands, see copy JC Ginder to Bull, 16
Jun 1941, ibid.
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diamond industry" 246 . In the summer of 1941, a Jewish
refugee from Belgium, employed as a diamond polisher, was
able to arrange the grant in Lisbon of UK visas to family
members from occupied France, including several children and
a brother who was also a diamond polisher. Sir Colville
Barclay explained the policy considerations involved:
From Refugee Dept's point of view the answer would be that
we don't want any more refugees here, but perhaps the
enhancement of Mr Niewiazki's morale by having his children
& the addition of a diamon 9utter may make it worth while
our pressing this request.
Home Office and Ministry of Labour agreement was obtained,
after over four months. The demand later diminished, and by
the end of January 1942 the Home Office was refusing visas
for diamond cleavers, but was granting them to diamond
polishers, although it appeared in April that cleavers were
still in demand248 . By May 1942 the Ministry of Labour was
no longer doing anything to encourage the importation of
additional diamond workers249.
Ministry of Labour recruitment from Portugal
Portugal remained neutral during the war, and from the
summer of 1940 the country became a focus for refugees. The
MOLANS-sponsored recruiting mission of Professor Davies to
Portugal in early 1941, which has already been mentioned,
led to the recruitment on his recommendation of a number of
246 Anthony Lambert, Foreign Office minute, 'Belgian
and Dutch Diamond Workers in France', 6 Sept 1940, JG Ward
to Pritchett, 19 Sept 1940, PRO FO 371/24286, C9629/9629/4.
247 Barclay, Minute, 1 Aug 1941, PRO FO 371/29159,
W9281/3/48.
248 Fitzgerald(Home Office) to Brind, 30 Jan 1942,
Henderson(Board of Trade) to Fitzgerald, April 1942,
enclosing memorandum(n.d.)'Aliens in the Diamond Trade', PRO
LAB 8/100.
249 Brind to Wieczorek(Polish Ministry of Labour and
Social Welfare), 12 May 1942, ibid.
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skilled refugees for the civilian war effort. Davies
interviewed 79 persons of various nationalities, of whom
roughly two thirds, including 47 professional engineers,
mostly Poles and Belgians, and a handful of Czechs and
French, were accepted250 . He also saw diamond workers and
other persons whose services might be used in the UK. The
scheme had a mixed reception from employers and civil
servants. In late January, during an interdepartmental
discussion of the report Davies made on his return, the Home
Office agreed that a recommendation from Davies would
establish the national interest of a case; yet a request
from the PCO in Lisbon for permission to grant visas without
reference to persons who seemed to meet Davies' criteria,
was rejected after M15 objections 251 . In response to
expressions of concern over delays in processing referred
cases, the Home Office representative claimed that, because
of improved communications, applications from Lisbon could
now be processed faster than previously estimated. Such
discussion of delays gave the M15 representative an opening
to oppose the whole scheme, suggesting that delays gave the
Germans time to "'get at'" applicants waiting in Lisbon; he
advocated sending them to Canada, where potential sabotage
would have less effect. He also proposed that persons
admitted to the UK under the scheme be subjected to a
condition not to change employment or residence without the
M15 concurrence: the Home Office representative raised
250 SJ Davies, 'Report on interviews at Lisbon between
30.12.40. and 16.1.41.', 16 Jan 1941, PRO FO 371/29194,
W1008/115/48.
251 'Minutes of meeting held on 29th January, 1941, to
discuss the Recruitment of Foreign Technical Personnel from
Portugal for employment in Industry in the United Kingdom',
PRO FO 371/29194, W2036/115/48.
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objections, but agreed to explore this idea, reporting later
that it was not feasible.
Refugee recruits were hindered in finding work after arrival
by restrictive endorsements in their passports, in some
cases of a severity which the Home Secretary later
acknowledged to be outdated 252 . Jews among this group
encountered prejudice from both employers and officials in
the UK. After complaints about the difficulties faced by
some of the Belgians, Lady Cheetham reported that TT Scott,
who had replaced Davies at the Ministry of Labour had
discovered that only two were "real Belgians", the rest were
Russian Jews naturalised Belgian. The two "real" Belgians
had refused good offers of employment, while the naturalised
Russian Jews faced the problem that employers did not want
to engage Jews: a Russian Jewess had been refused a job at
Bradford for this reason. Scott had said he thought that
it was a great mistake that Professor Davies had recommended
these people for visas and expressed th 5 pinion that there
was a great deal of "bunk" about it all
In August 1941, Randall, to whom Cooper had sent a newspaper
article about the Belgians' difficulties, acknowledged the
existence of prejudice against all foreigners, particularly
former Russian Jews, but was inclined to lay more blame for
employment difficulties on the Belgians' own "high falutin
ideas"254.
252 Hayman(HO) to Lawford(FO), 26 Jun 1941, Morrison
to Spaak(Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs), 26 Jun 1941,
Latham, minute, 3 Jul 1941, PRO FO 371/29194, W8050/115/48.
253 See e.g. Cheetham, minute, 21 Jul 1941, ibid.;
254 Cooper enclosed an extract from the Manchester
Guardian of 23 Jul 1941, along with a copy of a humorous
parody in the New Statesman, on difficulties German refugees
faced in gaining permits for work of national importance,
Cooper to Randall, 1 Aug 1941, Randall to Cooper, 20 Aug
1941, PRO FO 371/29194, W9573/115/48
448
Pre-selection now included security vetting, performed by
M15. Latham inveighed against M15's incompetence,
arbitrariness and lack of accountability in January 1941255.
Soon afterwards he pursued a complaint concerning the way in
which M15 had performed its vetting functions in the case of
a Rumanian Jewish electrical engineer in Lisbon 256 . The man,
whose name was Wewig, had previously applied to enlist, but
was rejected because he was a non-Allied national. He had
been recommended by Professor Davies, as an expert in the
distribution of gas and electricity in towns, who might be
useful in the Pioneer Corps. Wewig was again rejected at the
instance of M15, on grounds which turned out not to be
matters of security; the case came to light because he wrote
a letter of complaint to the Prime Minister. Latham urged
that this was a good case on which to argue that the
security services be disciplined, and required to confine
themselves to their brief, or be accountable if they strayed
beyond it. However, his colleagues were not enthusiastic,
and he dropped the matter after it became clear that the
Ministry of Labour neither wished to make use of the man's
services, nor to object to M15's encroachment on their
territory. Latham resigned himself to hoping that another
suitable case would present itself in which the Home Office
might make a joint complaint with Refugee Section.
255 Latham, minute, 21 Jan 1941, PRO FO 371/29180,
W962/63/48.
256 Latham, minute, 27 Mar 1941, Latham to
Turner(M15), 31 Mar 1941, Turner to Latham, 7 May 1941,
Latham, minutes, 10 and 13 May and 10 June 1941(two
minutes), PRO FO 371/29158, W3447/3/48.
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Offers from qualified refugees abroad, and the Committee for
Overseas Manpower
The poor reception for the fruits of Davies' mission show
that there was limited enthusiasm within MOLANS for
recruiting highly skilled foreigners from abroad. British
diplomatic representatives in the near and far east made
repeated efforts to interest the UK authorities in the
availability of local reserves of qualified refugees, but
with little success. Thus the entry of a group of Czech
technicians in Turkey, whose employment was recommended by
the British Ambassador on the grounds that they were too
valuable to be allowed to get away, was supported by the
Foreign Office, but rejected in May 1941, as the Ministry
did not wish to use them. It was suggested that they might
find employment in India; the Home Office refused to admit
them if they were not wanted in India257.
In October 1941, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr sent a pointed
reminder from Hong Kong that,
there is at Shanghai human material now lying idle and going
to waste of which we might make good use. I refer to the
German and Austrian refugees large numbers of whom are keen
anti-Nazi and eager to serve our cause. Among these sixteen
thousand people there are (a) some 1,000 to 1,200 men
between eighteen and 35 physically fit for military duties
(b) a number of doctors both male and female (c) nurses (d)
scores of engineers, eleccians, mechanics, wireless
experts, chauffeurs, etc.
He warned that it was "imprudent to ignore this valuable
material....If we make no use of it, it will fall into the
hands of, and be absorbed by, Japanese if they occupy
Shanghai". Clark Kerr offered to create unobtrusive
257 Correspondence with Knatchbull-Hughessen(Angora),
Home Office and MOLANS, 13 Mar - 20 May 1941, PRO FO
371/29194, W3784/W3785/W3786/W6199/115/48.
258 Clark Kerr to FO, 9 Oct 1941, PRO LAB 13/33.
450
machinery to vet recruits, reporting that his plan had the
agreement of the Governor of the Malay States and local
Commanders in Chief. The proposal aroused immediate interest
from the Government of India, which was experiencing great
shortages of all technicians, including doctors and nurses:
it adopted a more liberal policy in respect of Jews of enemy
origin who were believed to be anti-Nazi, and offered to
accept technically qualified persons recommended by Clark
Kerr259.
Clark Kerr's offer was referred to the new interdepartmental
Committee for Overseas Manpower(COM), responsible for co-
ordinating overseas manpower, which, however, decided not to
take up suggestions that refugees be brought to the UK, and
eventually reverted to considering only the services of
British subjects. The Committee, originally set up in the
autumn of 1941 to co-ordinate manpower from the overseas
Empire, got off to a very slow start 260 . By early 1942 it
had acquired a much wider brief, covering the transfer for
service or employment of persons from one country to
another, and the prioritisation of the requirements of UK
government departments 261 . The Committee was primarily the
concern of MOLANS and was chaired by the Ministry's
Parliamentary Secretary, Ralph Assheton.
A Foreign Office proposal to obtain manpower from Greece, by
assisting skilled men to escape, was put to COM in February
259 Pennell(India Office) to Randall, 23 Jan 1942,
enclosing Govt of India Defence Department to Secy of State
for India, 30 Oct 1941, PRO FO 371/32670, W2865/831/48.
260 Bridges, WP(G)(41) 108, 6 Oct 1941, PRO CAB 67/9.
261 Bridges, WP(42) 2, 2 Jan 1942, PRO CAB 66/20.
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1942. The proposal encountered opposition, which included
the doubts of the Chief Repatriation Officer Middle East, TH
Preston, whether sufficient skilled men were still
available. Numerous skilled aliens, including many Jewish
refugees, were already available for employment, in various
parts of the eastern Mediterranean, including Palestine,
Turkey, Egypt and Cyprus, without the uncertainty, effort
and expense of arranging their escape from enemy
territory262 . The population of occupied Greece were
suffering starvation conditions, and it was apparent that
there were humanitarian and political dimensions to the plan
from the Foreign Office memorandum in support of the
proposal, which argued that
the better Greek achievements for the Allied cause place us
under a moral obligation to think of the future of their
race and save th health of as many as we can by evacuating
them from Greece 6
The Committee accepted the suggestion in May, deciding that
assistance to escape should be given to a small number of
Greek mechanics, with preference to men under 40 with no
dependants. A middle eastern labour bureau would be re-
established, probably at Haifa, at which such alien labour
in the region would be recruited. It had been agreed that to
prevent escaping Greeks being turned back from Turkey, they
would be transhipped in British craft via Cyprus to
Haifa264.
262 TH Preston, of the British Embassy Repatriation
Office, Cairo, memorandum, 26 Mar 1942, sent to the British
Ambassador, Cairo, PRO FO 371/32670, W7452/831/48.
263 Foreign Office, memorandum, 'Manpower from
Greece', OMP(42)7, 31 Jan 1942, PRO FO 371/32670,
W1332/831/48.
264 Draft minutes of 3rd mtg of COM on 14 May 1942,
PRO FO 371/32670, w7452/831/48; Preston, memorandum cited
n. before last.
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These decisions show British policy-makers going to
considerable lengths to assist the Greek nation, to whom
they felt an obligation, both by promoting an escape scheme
which offered dubious manpower advantages, but had a strong
humanitarian element, and by saving Greek refugees from
being turned back from Turkey. During the same period, the
British government did not act to prevent Jewish refugees
from being turned away from Turkey, or deported back from
Turkey to Europe, because they lacked permission to proceed
to Palestine. The policy on Jews, which caused the Struma
disaster in February 1942, was still in force in May 1942,
when the Cabinet decided to take no steps to prevent Turkey
from turning back Jewish refugees. The policy was later
modified: from September 1942 the British government took
responsibility for finding refuge for Jews who reached
Turkey, but withdrew the concession in December 1944265.
In August 1942 the Refugee Department answered a query from
Anthony Lambert, who, along with colleagues on the staff of
the British diplomatic mission to Turkey, was tiring of
sending home details of qualified technicians, only to have
them rejected by MOLANS, and wished to know whether or not
to continue to forward particulars of any further cases.
Lambert was told that COM was now dealing only with British
subjects; his specific query as to whether COM had now
abandoned any interest in enemy alien technicians and
specialists in Turkey, was met by the statement that MOLANS
saw no grounds for bringing members of this group to the UK,
and that they should be referred to Mr Preston in Cairo, in
265 Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., pp. 143-
163, 340.
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connection with the planned Haifa bureau for overseas
manpower266.
It is noteworthy that Lambert felt it necessary in his
letter to distance himself and his colleagues from any
implication of humanitarian motives in making efforts on
behalf of refugees in Turkey. Such an implication had been
contained in a recent reply from the Foreign Office Refugee
Department, rejecting the services of a Hungarian Jew by the
name of Strauss, and suggesting reference to the Haifa
bureau as "the best means of helping Mr. Strauss and other
Jewish doctors, scientists, etc": Lambert was provoked into
insisting that he was not trying to assist these people but
to "try and recruit valuable talent for our own war-
effort" 267 . Thus, the fact that the war effort was the only
admissible justification for assisting refugees, meant that
it was invoked to the exclusion of humanitarian motives,
even though such motives can hardly have been absent.
The Ministry of Health, like MOLANS, showed a lack of
enthusiasm for refugee recruits from abroad, although from
1940 doctors were recruited from the USA. The ministry
refused offers of help from refugee doctors stranded in
neutral territory all over the globe, claiming that their
services could not be utilised. Medical applicants refused
on this basis included a group of eighty Polish doctors in
Romania, put forward by the British Ambassador, but rejected
266 Lambert (Angora) to General Department, 21 Jul
1942, Refugee Department to Lambert, 10 Aug 1942, PRO FO
371/32670, W10775/831/48.
267 Under Secy to Knatchbull-Hughesson, 23 Jun 1942,
Lambert to General Department, 21 Jul 1942, PRO FO
371/32670, W7948/W10775/831/48.
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in February 1941268. However, in October 1942, the
ministries of both Labour and Health agreed to the temporary
entry of a group of Polish medical students who intended to
proceed to Palestine and Persia269.
At this stage of the war, only Allied nationals could obtain
visas for the UK to join the armed forces. The means by
which persons were selected varied according to nationality
and place of recruitment. In some cases, people could be
selected without referral, for example Czechs applying in
Lisbon, if recommended by a local Czech representatives; the
Poles vetted all applicants in London or Jerusalem;
Norwegian cases went via Sweden to Canada, being vetted by
the PCO in Stockholm27°
Conclusion
From the Home Office point of view, the landing of numerous
refugees without authorisation in May-June 1940 had been
contrary to departmental policy and represented a loss of
control. British officials had authorised admissions during
the emergency without the usual guidance and referral.
Thereafter, the Home Office and M15 tried to prevent
admissions without visas and the grant of visas without
268 See Farrow (Ministry of Health) to Under Secy 1
Feb 1941, PRO FO 371/29194, W849/115/48; see also refusal of
case of Dr Dienemann, an ex-German Jew naturalised in
Palestine, now in Tangier, Bliss to USS, 29 May 1941, 21 Jun
1941, Barclay minutes, 9 and 25 Jun 1941, PRO FO 371/29159,
W6642/3/48; for refusal of visa for a well-recommended
German Jewish pathology expert in Turkey, see minutes and
correspondence Jun 1941, PRO FO 371/29159, W7094/3/48.
269 See correspondence, Sept-Oct 1942, PRO FO
371/32669, W13191/781/46.
270 Parkin to Latham, 9 May 1941, PRO FO 371/29159,
W9549/3/48.
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reference, but neither could be eliminated completely271.
Detention and interrogation on arrival partially compensated
for such failures of pre-selection. The Home Office, having
lost control of both admissions and internment policy in May
1940, had by the end of the year regained control over
internment. So far as admissions were concerned, Home office
authority was circumscribed, as much authority was
effectively delegated to governments-in-exile, and
admissions for the war effort were judged by the ministries
directly affected. Close relations with the security
services were essential, and it was necessary to contend
with M15 intrusions into areas of Home Office concern and
the tendencies of M15 officials to adopt a repressive and
anti-alien stance.
The interpretations of manpower requirements by MOLANS and
the Ministry of Health described above may be open to
criticism on manpower grounds because they excluded numerous
refugees qualified in fields in which the country was
experiencing serious shortages. Yet the departments in
question were not required to show great imagination or
flexibility in applying manpower criteria, and they were
entitled to reject options that appeared to involve
disproportionate effort, risk or cost. It should
nevertheless be said that MOLANS showed reluctance to take a
lead in combating anti-alien prejudice. For example, in late
1941, Home Office drafts of a parliamentary statement
designed to allay suspicions of aliens in employment were
watered down by MOLANS, which substituted a blander version,
271 See e.g. efforts in Feb 1941 to prevent the
arrival of passengers without visas from the Iberian
Peninsula, PRO FO 371/29217, W1616/464/48.
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from which even the acknowledgement that problems of
prejudice existed was lacking 272 . One may be able to find
fault with the way these ministries approached the
employment of refugees, but they were under no obligation to
take account of humanitarian considerations, and could
expect opposition if they were seen to be doing so. Failures
to utilise aliens in employment involved both a price in
lost manpower and the cost of maintaining unemployed persons
in idleness. The cost of maintaining Jewish detainees on the
island of Mauritius was a recurrent concern of the Treasury
and the Colonial Office, which in late 1941 sent MOLANS a
list of the qualifications of Jewish detainees on the
island273.
The government's - and especially the Home Office's -
outlawing of humanitarian motives as providing sufficient
reason for admission was criticised by Foreign Office
officials, especially when they had cases they wished to
support for entry. Their motives, however, were not simply
humanitarian. Foreign Office officials may perhaps be best
be described as engaged in a quest for some form of
"compensating advantage", to use Alan Walker's phrase, for
assistance to refugees. Such a compensating advantage would
in some cases be improved relations with a government-in-
exile, an ally or a neutral, or perhaps a contribution to
the war effort in services, improved morale, or better
escape opportunities for persons whose services were
desired. Humanitarian motives were cited in support of cases
272 See correspondence between Home Office, MOLANS and
Emerson, Sept-Nov 1941, PRO HO 213/517; Assheton,
statements, Hansard, op. cit., vol. 376, cols. 346-347, 19
Nov 1941.
273 Nicholson to Holloway, 5 Dec 1941, PRO LAB 13/34.
457
backed by the Foreign Office, but never as the primary
justification. For example, the Foreign Office put forward
the 1942 proposal to help Greek technicians escape primarily
on "war effort" grounds, yet these were weak; the scheme was
given secondary justification on political and humanitarian
grounds, but these appear to have provided the real motive.
Defending British olicv against pressure to rescue Jews
From June 1942 onwards, British policy towards Jews in
Europe was challenged by news of mass executions in Poland,
large numbers of Jewish dead, mass deportations of Jews to
the east, and fragments of information concerning Nazi
plans of systematic extermination and the methods employed.
The realisation that a Nazi programme of mass murder of Jews
was under way in German-dominated Europe raised the urgent
question of whether the Allied response would go beyond
condemnation of atrocities and promises of punishment, to
offer Jews rescue and refuge. By mid-May 1943 it was
apparent that the main thrust of Allied policy towards the
Jews of Europe had not altered; policy on humanitarian
admissions to the UK also remained essentially unchanged.
Knowledge - albeit incomplete and inaccurate - of the Nazi
extermination policy had reached Home Office policy-makers
by early September 1942. Herbert Morrison spoke at the UK's
first major rally in protest at the Nazi extermination
programme, held at Caxton Hall in London on 2 September,
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which was organised by the Labour Party274 . His vigorous
remarks were reported by The Times under the headline, "Mr
Morrison on Nazi Atrocities". He claimed that "never before
had the human record been so shamed and darkened by the
revelation of the unspeakable foulness of which desperate
men were capable"; he promised that the day of deliverance
was surely approaching, and that the United Nations would
ensure the punishment of those responsible "for ordering or
executing the infamous cruelties practised upon the men
women and children of Europe" 275 . The reference to Nazi
extermination policy in Cooper's memorandum of late August
1942, quoted earlier in this chapter, has illustrated his
considerable knowledge - presumably shared with colleagues -
even before Morrison's Caxton Hall speech276.
The decision not to alter admissions policy, despite
knowledge of continuing mass murder of Jews in Europe, was
proposed by Morrison and approved by the War Cabinet in
September 1942, when the Cabinet first discussed the
question of rescuing Jews faced with t/ treat.
Morrison, in a memorandum dated 23 September 1942, reminded
his colleagues that Home Office policy was,
not to admit during the war additional refugees to the
United Kingdom unless in some quite rare and exceptional
274 Morrison reportedly said, "the mounting tale of
atrocity and horror was no surprise to the people of this
country". Jan Masaryk and Szmul Zygielbojm also spoke.
Jewish Chronicle, 11 Sept 1942, p. 1. The author is grateful
to Richard Bolchover for drawing attention to this report.
275 The Times, 3 Sept 1942. p. 8.
276 Cooper, 'Memorandum on Post-War Problems', para
12, quoted above, pp. 405-406.
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cases it can be shown that the admission o jhe refugee will
be directly advantageous to our war effort
Morrison was seeking authorisation to make a lone exception
to this policy: he planned to agree to a scheme, put forward
by Schiff, and backed by a guarantee from the JRC, to admit
a limited number of Jewish refugees then in un-occupied
France, who faced danger and suffering as a result of the
Vichy government's decision to deport numbers of them to
Poland. He intended to authorise the grant of visas in
Lisbon for children and elderly persons, with close
relatives in Britain, who managed to escape there via Spain.
Morrison advised that agreement to the scheme should be the
last concession to the lobby for admissions: he insisted
that any general departure from the existing "rigid policy"
would only encourage fresh appeals 278 . The original scheme
had covered children and persons over 60, but the Cabinet
restricted it to children only 279 . The focus on Jews was
also diluted by including Allied children, at the insistence
of the Foreign Office, in order to avoid offending Allied
governments whose nationals were also suffering, and to
277 Morrison, memorandum to War Cabinet, 'Admission to
the United Kingdom of a Limited Number of Jewish Refugees
from Unoccupied France', WP(42) 427, 23 Sept 1942, PRO CAB
66/29, requested by the War Cabinet, WN 126(42)5, 21 sept
1942, PRO CAB 65/27. Martin Gilbert, in Auschwitz and the
Allies, London 1981, P. 77, omits subsequent developments.
278 Thus, he did not plan to agree to the temporary
entry of another 28 Jewish children in un-occupied France
who had guarantees for admission to Palestine, since it was
Home Office policy not to admit to the UK persons in transit
to Palestine and it would become impracticable to draw a
line of demarcation between these and other cases; he
intended to resist all appeals for the admission of adults
under the age of 60. WP (42)427, cited in previous n.
279 WM 130(42)4, 28 Sept 1942, PRO CAB 65/27;
WP(42)444, 2 Oct 1942, CAB 66/29; WM 131(42)9, 5 Oct 1942,
PRO CAB 65/28; Wasserstein, Jews of Europe, op. cit., pp.
113-4; Randall, minute, 21 Sept 1942, PRO FO 371/32680,
W12687/4555/48, minutes by Randall and Frank Roberts, 25 and
28 Sept 1942, PRO FO 371/32680, W12853/4555/48; Randall, 7
Oct 1942, PRO FO 371/32680, W13371/4555/48.
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avoid discriminating in favour of Jew8 or Jewish children,
although Morrison had claimed that such a distinction was
justified280 . The Cabinet initially decreed that only orphan
children would be eligible for admission to join close
relatives other than parents; this was modified after
Morrison sought authority to admit children whose parents
had been deported, saying they would become
in effect orphans as the result of the deportation of their
parents. The fate of their parents will often be uncertain
and as a result of the Cabinet decision it will be necessary
to refuse to admit such children unless evidence i
forthcoming that both of the parents have perished81.
The 183 children for whom visas were in the end authorised
could not come, as the Vichy government refused exit
permits282.
The rescue issue was never seriously regarded within the
Home Office as involving entry of Jews to the UK. No records
have been found of dissension within the Home Office over
admissions policy on Jewish refugees after August 1942
(although we have seen that divergent views on policy
towards refugees already in the UK were developing). A
campaign developed for a more generous British response to
the plight of Jews in Nazi Europe, greatly reinforced by the
United Nations Declaration on Nazi extermination policy of
17 December 1942, even though its promises were confined to
eventual punishment of atrocities. At the end of 1942 a new
280 WP(42)427, already cited.
281 WP(42)444, already cited.
282 Approximately 240 visas in all were authorised.
Some children got out via neutra1ritories and were
granted British visas th tTTher	 Mathews,	 December
1944,	 PRO HO 213/615; Bermuda
Conference report, already cited, para. 34.
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Cabinet Committee was set up, initially to discuss the
possible reception and accommodation of Jewish refugees283.
The Committee in fact discussed how the UK should respond to
the pressure for action. At its meetings Morrison maintained
his negative stance on UK admissions, and encountered no
recorded opposition from his ministerial colleagues. His
most generous offer, from which he subsequently retreated,
envisaged the entry of a maximum of 2,000 additional
refugees284 . Ministers and officials used the committee to
defeat the rescue campaigners, and to affirm British policy
of refusing to act to rescue Jews from occupied Europe285.
Admissions policy was not altered subsequently in response
to the call for rescue. Statements on admissions policy
prepared prior to the Bermuda conference of April 1943,
stated that 55,000 persons of German and Austrian
nationality, and an unknown number of children they had
brought with them, had been admitted prior to the war, and
were resident there when the war broke out, plus 10,000
Czechs, and 13,000 unaccompanied children from Greater
Germany286 . Maxwell estimated in mid-April 1943 that at the
283 WM 172(42)5, 23 Dec 1942, PRO CAB/65/28. A policy
decision to play down the plight of Jews as such led to the
dropping of the word "Jewish" from the Committee's name at
an early date. The proceedings of the Committee are in PRO
CAB 95/15.
284 See reports of the meetings on 31 Dec 1942, and 19
Feb 1943, PRO CAB 95/15; see also Morrison's remarks in the
War Cabinet on 22 Feb 1943, WM 33(43)4, PRO CAB 65/33.
285 See the limited aims agreed for the Bermuda
conference by the Cabinet, WM 48(43)7, 5 Apr 1943, PRO CAB
65/34.
286 
'Report to the Governments of the United States
and the United Kingdom from their Delegates to the
Conference on the Refugee Problem held at Bermuda, April 19-
29, 1943', 29 Apr 1943, para. 33, PRO FO 371/36725,
W6711/6711/48. The references are to a version of the report
corrected after the conference.
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outbreak of war there had been in the UK a total of about
70,000 refugees from Germany and Austria who were Jewish or
partly Jewish, but that their numbers were now nearer
60,000, and that of the refugees admitted in 1940, 1941 and
1942, nearly all of whom had been Allied nationals, the
proportion of Jews would be "quite small" 287 . Statements of
British policy atABermuda conference showed that the almost
total ban on humanitarian admissions since the outbreak of
war had been maintained288 . Further refugees of enemy
nationality were being admitted only "in exceptional
circumstances" involving family members. Since May 1940,
63,000 refugees of many nationalities had been admitted,
including the influx during the fall of France, and men
desiring to join the Allied forces, plus 30,000 British
refugees from the Channel Islands and 14,000 from Gibraltar.
The grant of a visa had to be shown to be in the national
interest - volunteers for the Allied forces and their wives
and children qualified under this heading 289 . A sole
exception had been made for the refugee children in Vichy
France 290 . The current rate of refugee entry was stated to
be approximately 800 a month - both authorised and
unauthorised, or an annual rate of 10,000. Citing housing
shortages in particular, it was stated that the British
authorities had not hitherto been prepared to relax the
present practice with regard to visas, and that to do so
more freely would raise false hopes in view of transport
287 Maxwell to Hill, 16 Apr 1943, PRO FO 371/36725,
W11797/6711/48.
288 f a.k)1iSee n. 286 above.
289 JbLt,
290 Ibid., para	 1940 date).
463
difficulties, and, even if these were overcome, would add to
the population of an already overcrowded island. It was
claimed that persons willing and able to render useful
service to the war effort experienced little difficulty in
securing visas. Beyond this, temporary refuge could be
offered to limited numbers of persons who could not conform
to the foregoing conditions291.
At the Anglo-American Bermuda conference on refugee policy
in late April 1943, British and US representatives agreed
that their governments would neither initiate nor support
projects of rescue, nor make any approach to Hitler for the
release of potential refugees in Germany or German-occupied
territory292 . The UK also agreed, reluctantly, to the
revival of the IGC, for the limited purpose of promoting
resettlement of actual refugees (who were already out of
danger) and encouraging neutral countries to admit potential
refugees from enemy territory. Allied policy of taking no
steps to rescue potential refugees was thus confirmed.
291 Ibid., para. 35.
292 Ibid., Recommendations, paras. 45-53.
464
CONCLUSIONS:
BRITISH REFUGEE POLICY - HUMANITARIAN OR SELF-INTERESTED?
In September 1942, when the Cabinet agreed not to lift the
ban on humanitarian admissions, British refugee policy was
already almost completely shorn of humanitarian
considerations. The one exception to the re-affirmation of
existing policy at this juncture was the government's
consent to the scheme for admission of children from
unoccupied France. Yet even this modest scheme made a far
smaller contribution to saving the lives of Jews menaced by
deportation than its Jewish initiators had hoped; it emerged
from the Whitehall policy process pruned of its original aim
of embracing old people as well as children, and watered
down to include Allied nationals, to satisfy the Foreign
Office Refugee Department. Such policy decisions, as this
study has shown, reflected continuity, rather than change in
British policy, as to both substance and procedures.
There was continuity in the substance of policy,
notwithstanding the fact that the priorities of the pre-war
era were now overlaid with war-time priorities. The policy
of not admitting Jews to save them from death in Europe in
the latter part of 1942 and afterwards, reflected the same
system of priorities which, before the war, had allowed the
admission of perhaps 70,000 Jewish refugees, but dictated
the exclusion of many times that number. Such decisions
manifested the prevailing tradition of non-humanitarian
refugee policy. This tradition, in which humanitarian
considerations were systematically and explicitly
subordinated to questions of national self-interest, was
well on the way to displacing the older, humane tradition of
asylum. Remnants of the older tradition lived on, both in
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the humanitarian aspects of government action, but mainly in
the minds of ministers and officials. Neither the extent to
which the older tradition had ever actually existed nor its
precise nature were at issue. Rather, its presumed existence
was a reference point against which current policy could be
measured. Home Office ministers repeatedly asserted the
tradition's continuing existence, despite the mass of
immigration restrictions and the absence of legal protection
for refugees. However, although government spokesmen
proclaimed loyalty to the older tradition, their insistence
that British policy must be shaped primarily by
considerations of national interest, and their construction
of formulae for calculating it, showed that for practical
purposes they had adopted a new position, one which was at
odds with the "tradition". In the face of the Holocaust, the
British government once more affirmed the dominance of the
new position, this time in the name of the country's
national survival. Yet the degree of inaction, and the
arguments used to defend it, show that the low priority
given to humanitarian action was also an important factor.
The humanitarian tradition was now the exception, and self-
interest the rule. Ministers' use of the term "humanitarian"
during the 1930s, to describe a policy of only tolerating
action to help refugees, so long as it did not offend
against any canon of self-interest, was a misnomer. The term
"opportunistic" seems a more appropriate description for a
policy which allowed for the admission of refugees in
peacetime only if they could comply with restrictionist
immigration policies, and tolerated their entry in war-time
only if some advantage to the war effort was expected.
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As well as continuity in policy content, this study has
shown continuity in the policy-making process. Officials'
response to the humanitarian challenge of the refugee
problem was to follow precedents and usually restrict
themselves to assigned tasks. Within Whitehall no official
was assigned the task of actively considering the needs of
refugees or giving such needs priority. This deficiency was
the target of outside critics such as Hope Simpson and
Rathbone, and the subject of critical memoranda by Cooper,
and later by Latham, suggesting alternative approaches, but
it was not remedied. Such critical observations reflected
the two men's particularly active concern with the welfare
of refugees. Neither Cooper, nearing the end of his career,
nor Latham, the hyper-critical temporary civil servant,
could expect advancement: they thus risked less in
supporting departures from precedent than Makins, for
example, who was destined for high office.
Excluded from the centre of the system by policy and by
administrative procedures, the humanitarian needs of
refugees were thus pushed to the margins of governmental
concern. This thesis has shown the extent to which
humanitarian exceptions were nevertheless made, alongside
the non-humanitarian stance of official policy. Many
refugees were admitted unintentionally, especially in the
early years, in the guise of visitors and students, but
allowed to remain; the majority were admitted deliberately,
either on humanitarian grounds, or through recruitment and
special schemes, in which self-interest was mixed with
humanitarian considerations. The response to the Anschluss
was to impose a restrictionist and discriminatory framework
of pre-selection, accompanied by renewed assertions by
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ministers that British policy was at the same time self-
interested and humanitarian.
The Home Office concealed the extent to which humanitarian
exceptions operated in practice, and refused to supply
statistics of Jewish admissions. When Hoare was Home
Secretary he saw himself as holding the balance between
restrictionist critics and pro-refugee lobbyists, but showed
far more sense of the need to appease the former. A
humanitarian policy of temporary refuge developed after
Kristallnacht, but it was soon beset by restrictions derived
from considerations of self-interest, particularly an
emphasis on re-emigration. The record of the British
response to refugees from Czechoslovakia is a particularly
graphic illustration of the absence of any commitment to
offering a haven to Jews, merely because they faced a
persecuting regime which was pressing them to emigrate.
The admissions which occurred were tolerated because they
appeared to involve the authorities in no financial risk.
Government vigilance to ensure that refugees would not be a
burden involved a wide range of safeguards: reliance on
guarantees and on private charity; pre-selection - first
informal and later formalised by visas; an emphasis on re-
emigration. The financial risks of the admission of Jewish
refugees were undertaken by Anglo-Jewry. When the government
finally decided that it should subsidise refugees, and keep
the bankrupt refugee organisations in being, this was only
because it saw no alternative, and expected that financial
support for emigration would reduce the number of refugees
in the country and produce savings in the long run.
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Control by means of immigration restrictions was a
substitute for a coherent and articulated policy for
refugees in the UK. Home Office discretion was used to
permit some humanitarian admissions under the cover of a
strict immigration policy which excluded the majority who
sought entry. Embarrassed by the comparatively small numbers
in the country, whom they saw as a refugee problem, Home
Secretaries deferred the making of policy on the disposal of
refugees present in the UK. Refugees remained in suspense as
to their fate, and many were put under pressure to depart.
The absorption of some 40,000 Jewish refugees in the UK was
partly deliberate, and partly unintended. The permas'ent
settlement in the UK of a relatively large proportion after
the war was not a desired outcome. By this time, however,
the combined consequences of previous administrations'
miscalculations over re-emigration prospects, the outbreak
of war, and previous failures to resolve policy, meant that
the pre-war refugees were now largely assimilated. The
Attlee government belatedly accepted this reality in
December 1946, when Cabinet ministers finally decided to
lift employment restrictions on refugees. Regulations
putting the decision into effect did not appear until the
following July. Even then, the impact of the change was
delayed, because Home Office officials chose to cling on to
control even longer, not telling refugees they no longer
needed permission to take employment.
The extent to which the process of control was governed by
unpublished discretion, rather than by regulations, has been
shown in the way officials and the voluntary sector handled
policy and casework. The exercise of discretion was refined
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in dealings between officials and a select group of
representatives from the voluntary organisations, who became
an indispensable part of the state's machinery. The concerns
of these representatives were far from identical with the
people on whose behalf they negotiated, but included refugee
organisations' anxieties about the impact of refugees on the
position of Jews in the UK, and about containing their
financial obligations and keeping undertakings to the Home
Office. The policy vacuum enabled an official like Cooper,
who had strong humanitarian impulses and was in a department
with a humane tradition, to humanise policy both in his
practice and by argument, but he too was constrained by
considerations of control, and by his own limited horizons,
which in turn reflected those of his department.
The history of British policy on the plight of Jews in
Europe in the Nazi era has been studied in the UK largely as
part of the history of the Jews. Yet it is also part of the
history of the UK, of British immigration and refugee
policy, and of the moral and humanitarian spirit of the
nation and the state. It is part of the history of British
government, both within Whitehall and in its relations with
the voluntary sector and representatives of sectional
interests. This study has shown how a topic which had low
priority was left largely to officials. It has shown that
the absence of specialised policy-making machinery was
tolerated until a crisis presented itself, and it has
demonstrated the reactiveness, pragmatism and opportunism of
Whitehall on this issue. It has also shown how, in the
absence of a commitment to a clearly stated policy,
departmental priorities were brokered and adjusted to
produce a consensus sufficient for action, which became
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policy by default. It has shown how precedent and inertia
ruled, until the co-incidence of a moment of crisis with the
personality of Chamberlain, who was willing and able to
redirect policy, led to a change. The thesis has also shown
distinctive attitudes to the refugee problem among Treasury
officials, whose pre-occupation with financial control did
not preclude them from supporting expenditure on refugees,
while Treasury-organised finance for Czechoslovakia led to
by far the best-funded refugee organisation in the UK. Yet,
although Treasury officials' distance from the pre-
occupations of other departments may have helped them to
consider alternative approaches, they rarely pressed
strongly for policy changes. The close links between non-
governmental agencies and the state have also been shown:
the voluntary sector provided ideas, finance, manpower, and
expertise not available within the government; the closeness
increased as the Home Office partially took over refugee
organisations from 1939. The story of refugee immigration
is also an example of how circumstances closed off options,
and led to the unintended settlement of some 40,000 Jewish
refugees in the UK.
The refusal of the British government to open up UK
admissions or to act to rescue Jews during the Holocaust
becomes more comprehensible in the light of previous limits
set on British action. On the eve of war, - British
officials, representatives of the British organisation for
refugees from Czechoslovakia, and Anglo-Jewish leaders
adopted positions which showed that they considered that the
limit of Jewish refugee immigration to the UK had been
reached. In July 1939, Cooper and other persons concerned
with refugees from Czechoslovakia resolved not to co-operate
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with Eichmann's programme of forced Jewish emigration from
the Protectorate. They regarded the deplorable methods
employed by Eichmann in Austria, which they assumed would be
used again, as an additional reason for opposing forced
emigration. They maintained the necessity of demonstrating
that Germany could not force the world to take its unwanted
Jews on its terms; yet the hopes they expressed for a less
intransigent German approach were hardly more than a
formality. In August 1939 Bentwich spoke of the possibility
of obtaining German co-operation, but with an equal lack of
conviction. The plight of the Jewish organisations at this
juncture is symbolised by Bentwich's rejection of Eichmann's
plan for reducing the number of Jews in Austria. The
adoption of such negative positions by both Jewish leaders
and British officials, at a time when emigration was being
so strenuously encouraged by the Nazis, makes the British
government's refusal to act in 1942-43 more comprehensible.
When the need for a humanitarian response was greatest, the
response was least. The British government, in its efforts
to deflect demands for greater generosity in 1942-1943
justified present niggardliness by reference to past
generosity. Indeed, in January 1943, when the British
government first put to the Americans the idea of holding a
conference on refugees, it was as a forum for showing that,
having done so much in admitting refugees in the past,
neither country could be expected to do much more 1 . Yet the
limits of this generosity had been defined over three years
previously, at a time when the Nazis had shown that Jews who
failed to emigrate faced systematic and extreme persecution.
1 Foreign Office to Washington, 12 Jan 1943, PR FO
371/36648, W607/49/48.
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The Holocaust could not be foreseen in August 1939, but the
dire situation of Jews under Nazi domination was not in
doubt, and harsh calculations had already been made about
who would be helped to emigrate. The old had fared worst in
this process: Bentwich, one of the chief architects of
Jewish emigration policy, had regarded Jews from Germany as
ot fitted for schemes of emigration if aged over forty-
five 2 . In 1941 he acknowledged the hopeless situation of old
people left under Nazi rule, writing
When the iron wall of war was raised between us and Germany,
200,000 men and women, largely past middle age, were left to
be crushed to dust. It was some consoation that less than
50,000 were under forty years of age"
Thus, although many Jews were helped to escape from German
rule, it was not thought possible or desirable, even before
the war, to arrange emigration for all those under threat.
In the 1930s, the defence of British sovereignty over
internal affairs had been the watchword for opposition to
internationally imposed obligations to aid refugees. In the
period 1942-43, the very survival of that sovereignty was
put forward as a key reason for the British government's
taking no action to save Jews. However, by this time, to put
forward the risk of losing the war was an insufficient
response to all requests for action: victory was far from
within the Allied grasp in the last quarter of 1942, but
British leaders knew that it would come in the end. The
choice of almost total inaction was not a matter of national
2 Bentwich to Porter Goff, 15 Dec 1938, Papers of Mrs
Leslie Edgar, Anglo-Jewish Archive, AJA 398 (now in Parkes
Library, University of Southampton).
Bentwich, Wanderer between Two Worlds, London 1941,
p. 29.
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survival, but a question of priorities and subordination to
the ruthless prosecution of the war. The policy ruling out
humanitarian admissions or other humanitarian action
reflected a dominant principle, which Churchill embodied and
fostered, of ruthlessness in the pursuit of victory.
Ruthlessness towards the populations of occupied Europe was
an element in this policy. Bomber Command ordered the RAF to
bomb enemy and Allied civilian targets, while the Ministry
of Economic Warfare starved enemy and Allied populations
alike. Such policies accommodated few distinctions, and only
isolated exceptions. Priorities linked with the overriding
need for victory formed only part of the picture: ministries
retained their departmental priorities when dealing with the
issue. The Home Office had War Cabinet authority to turn its
back on enemy and Allied refugees abroad, but the Home
Secretary was also motivated by considerations of domestic
and post-war policy, particularly questions of public order,
antisemjtjsm and immigration control. The Foreign Office and
Colonial Office restricted the flow of Jews from Europe to
Palestine largely because of political considerations
concerning post-war policy in Palestine.
Did Britain make fewer humanitarian efforts for would-be-
refugees because they were Jews? Jewish stereotypes worked
both for and against the refugees. The British government's
belief that Jews would 1ok after their co-religionists was
a natural conclusion from the impressive record of Anglo-
Jewish work with immigrant Jews. The belief that they could
afford to do so reflected knowledge of substantial resources
within the Jewish community, but also encompassed an
inflated view of Jewish wealth, which was later challenged
by the financial collapse of the Jewish refugee organisation
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at the end of 1939. Government ministers and officials
seemed to assume that the main reservoir of humanitarian
concern for persecuted Jews was within the Jewish community.
Members of that community, albeit with a leavening of their
own concerns, undertook an extraordinary range of activities
to aid Jews in Nazi Europe. Jewish deputations and
representatives proposed the majority of new governmental
measures which were taken to help Jewish refugees. It was as
if British policy-makers relied on Jewish representatives to
act as their humanitarian mind and conscience, presenting
them both with appropriate policy options and the
wherewithal to carry them out.
Jews, whether or not they were refugees, evoked ambivalent
reactions in British officials and ministers 4 . It would be
easy to assemble from this thesis and other sources a large
catalogue of remarks showing anti-Jewish prejudice by
politicians and civil servants who held mainstream political
views and deplored political antisemitism and extreme anti-
Jewish persecution. Yet what is their value for the analysis
of refugee policy? As this study has shown, people who gave
humanitarian help to Jewish refugees, such as Rumbold and
Chamberlains made prejudiced remarks about Jews. Prejudice
towards Jews cannot explain British policy. The testimony of
prejudice must, however, be added to other evidence showing
the existence of a climate in which Jews were regarded as
different and alien, in a negative sense, making the loyalty
of Jewish residents questionable, and the entry and
absorption of Jewish immigrants problematic.
For analysis of the British tradition of
antisemitism, see Kushner, 'The impact of British
Antisemitism, 1918-1945', in ed. Cesarani, Making of Anglo-
Jewry, op. cit. pp. 191-298.
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It was seen as prudent, therefore, to soften the alien
impact of those who came, by the selection of people who
might be expected to assimilate easily. This was synonymous
either with not being too visibly foreign, or becoming less
so. Such transformations were much easier in the case of
children, who would learn to speak good English, be brought
up in British homes with an English education, and emerge,
it was hoped, thoroughly Anglicised 5 . Changes in behaviour
were seen as the duty of the alien, not the natives. If
British prejudice against Jews was to diminish, this was
seen as a matter not for leadership by government, but for
Anglo-Jewry, whose leaders launched a range of projects to
combat such prejudice. Anglo-Jewish leaders exhorted
refugees not to display their alienness by talking German
loudly; the refugees' response to pressure for linguistic
assimilation was to evolve a distinctive patois which,
Puizer has said, "combined a language that they were slowly
forgetting with one they would never master" 6 . In this, as
in other adaptations to their new situation, the refugees
demonstrated that they had imported from Central Europe an
ideal of assimilation, which, Pulzer argues, helps to
explain their relentless upward mobility in the UK 7 . To
Puizer's reminder that success was the exception and
obscurity the norm, and that such success is still
overwhelmingly measured in terms of achievements by a
visible elite, one may add the point that the elite
For the assimilation issue, see this author's,
'Jewish Refugees', op cit., pp. 184-190.
6 Peter Pulzer, 'Foreigner : The Immigrant in
Britain', in Mosse, op. cit, p. 8.
Ibid., p. 9.
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consisted almost exclusively of men, themselves a minority
within the refugee community.
How did the fact that the refugees were Jews affect the
overall numbers admitted to the UK? Selection by class,
nationality, age and sex have been addressed in the text. On
the question of numbers, it should be emphasised that there
was a consensus between Jewish leaders and the government
that there was a limit to the number of Jews any country
could be expected to accept. Chaim Weizmann put forward a
version of this belief in March 1936, at a conference held
in London by the newly-formed Council for German Jewry:
untiring, as ever, in his advocacy of emigration to
Palestine, Weizmann claimed that other nations had limited
toleration for the immigration of Jews.
We know that a certain number of Jews can be absorbed into a
country, and as Jews have proved that they are an
"insoluble" element - to use a chemical term - the quantity
which can be absorbed in each country proves to be small.
The formula reacts quickly, and saturation point is rapidly
reached, and the Jewish communities in the respective
countries are always full of anxiety lest ther will be too
many and that anti-semitism may be stimulated.
This statement graphically conveys an assumption, held by
Jewish leaders and British policy-makers with very different
views from Weizmann's, that there was some absolute, but
imprecise limit above which Jewish immigration was
undesirable, and that this reflected unalterable differences
between Jews and the UK population as a whole, which not
even British nationality could eradicate, Palestine was seen
as different: it was a place where Jews might settle in
large numbers. The same was not true of the UK.
8 Speeches delivered at Anglo-Jewish Confernence,
convened by the Council for German Jewry at the Dorchester
Hotel, Sunday 15 March 1936, CBF, Reel 4, file 15.
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These assumptions about Jews acted as a brake on
humanitarian action. In addition there seemed few political
advantages to be gained in saving stateless Jews from
persecution or murder. Nor did there seem to be a political
price for failing to do so. The USA was acknowledged to be
different, because Roosevelt's political survival required
consideration of a Jewish electorate s although this only
produced a challenge to British policy when the Americans
began to rescue Jews in 1944. A prediction that there would
be a high price to be paid for the British failure to act
during the Holocaust was made in letter to The Times
2
published on 16 February 1943, whose/distinguished
signatories, including EM Forster, RH Tawney and Rebecca
West, had between them some claim to represent British
humane traditions:
if we do nothing while a helpless people is assassinated, we
shall breed a temper of acquiescence in the barbarism of
tyrants which may bcome one of the unhappiest legacies of
this epoch of agony'.
Breitman and Kraut have suggested that the Allied inaction
in the face of the Holocaust demands explanation and
evaluation because it represents a fundamental failure of
western civilized values' 0 . Yet our concern about this
episode is more profound than concern over an aberration, or
failure to live up to the standards we set ourselves. The
catalogue of failures to act suggests a more unpalatable
conclusion that our standards and the values they reflect
are themselves less civilized than we may like to think. We
are perhaps therefore contemplating not an aberration, but a
The Times, 16 Feb 1943, p.5
10 Breitman and Kraut, op. cit., p. 2.
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particularly disturbing reflection of what our civilization
has become.
This study has shown that British policy-makers, not without
backward glances, relegated humanitarian values largely to
the areas of private conscience, religion, philanthropy and
the family. In the sphere of refugee policy, although some
relevance to policy-making was conceded to humanitarian
considerations, they were nevertheless seen as more
appropriate to an idealised past. There is a risk that
British policy on Jewish refugees is nowadays the object of
similar myth-making, when the allegedly open-handed response
to that generation of refugees is invoked to demonstrate
that the UK will respond generously when genuine refugees
seek asylum. This claim is divorced from history. Such myth-
making, whether used to idealise the past or to legitimise
harsh policies towards refugees today, is dangerous.
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APPENDIX 1
BioraDhica1 notes
Note: These biographical notes give brief details about
persons of particular significance for the topic of this
study. Most of the subjects of the notes were ministers or
officials of Principal or more senior rank within the
British government in the period 1933-1942. Certain other
persons who were not part of the government, but were
prominent in matters concerning refugees during this period,
are also included. A separate list of holders of the offices
of Home Secretary and Permanent Under Secretary at the Home
Office (the civil servant who headed the department) is
provided in Appendix 2.
These notes highlight aspects of their subjects' lives which
are relevant to this study. The details in the notes relate
principally to the period 1933-1942. In selected cases
details are also included of earlier or subsequent careers.
Honours conferred by 1933 are incorporated in the subject's
name. Honours conferred in 1933 or later are recorded in the
body of the entry. References to honours are normally
confined to peerages and knighthoods. Repetition of
biographical details already provided in footnotes is
minjmised. Entries in respect of career civil servants begin
with the name of the government department in which the
person concerned was serving in 1933, or if later, in which
he first served.
The following abbreviations are used:
Sec	 - Secretary
US	 - Under Secretary
PPS	 - Parliamentary Private Secretary (backbench member
of parliament working unpaid for a minister)
Pan US - Parliamentary Under Secretary (junior minister)
Parl Sec - Parliamentary Secretary (junior minister)
PUS	 - Permanent Under Secretary (civil servant at head
of government department)
ANDERSON, SIR JOHN, 1st Viscount Waverley (1952).
(1882-1958): PUS Home Office 1922-32. Governor of Bengal
1932-7. md Nat MP 1938-50. Ld Privy Seal 1938-9. Home Sec
and Mm of Home Security 1939-40. Ld Pres of Council 1940-3;
Chancellor of Exchequer 1943-5.
ATTLEE, CLEMENT RICHARD, 1st Earl Attlee (1955)
(1883-1967): Lab MP 1922-50. Leader of Labour party 1935-55.
Ld Privy Seal 1940-2. Sec for Dominions 1942-3. Ld Pres of
Council 1943-5. Deputy Prime Minister 1942-5. Prime Minister
1945-51.
BALDWIN, STANLEY, 1st Earl Baldwin (1937)
(1867-1947): Prime Minister 1923-4, 1924-9, 1935-7; Ld Pres
of Council 1931-5; Ld Privy Seal 1932-4. Leader of
Conservative party 1923-37.
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BARCLAY, SIR COLVILLE HERBERT SANDFORD, Bart.
(b. 1913): Foreign Office. 3rd Sec 1937. Appointed to
Foreign Office Feb 1939. Clerk in Refugee Section, General
Dept 1941. Enlisted in Navy Nov 1941. Service RNVR 1942-6.
BENTWICH, NORMAN DE MATTOS
(1883-1971): Attorney-General of Palestine 1921-9. Prof of
International Relations, Hebrew Univ of Jerusalem 1932-51.
Zionist. Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees 1933-6.
Honorary Director and member of professional Committee,
Council for German Jewry(CGJ) 1936. CGJ Director of
Emigration and Training 1938. Service in Mm of Information
and Air Ministry during Second World War.
BEVERIDGE, SIR WILLIAM HENRY, 1st Baron Beveridge (1946)
(1879-1963) Social reformer and economist. Director, London
School of Economics 1919-1937. Founder, Academic Assistance
Council 1933. Master, University College Oxford 1937-44.
BLAND, GEORGE NEVILE MALTBY
(1886-1972): Foreign Office. Brussels, 1930-4; KCVO 1937;
Head of Treaty Dept 1935-1938; Br Mm at The Hague Sept
1938. Br Mm to Netherlands government in London May 1942.
BUNBURY, SIR HENRY NOEL
(1876-1968): Comptroller and Auditor-General of Post Office
1920-37. Authority on control of public expenditure.
Administrative work for German Jewish Aid Committee, 1938-9.
Director, Czech Refugee Trust Fund 1939.
BUTLER, RICHARD AUSTEN, Lord Butler (1965)
(1902-1982): Con HP 1929-65. Parl US India Office 1932-7.
Parl Sec Mm of Labour 1937-8. Parl US Foreign Office Feb
1938-41. President Board of Education 1941-4. Mm of
Education 1944-5.
CADOGAN, ALEXANDER GEORGE MONTAGU
(1884-1968): Foreign Office. Head, League of Nations Section
1921-33. Br Minister Peking 1934-5. KCMG 1934. Dep US 1936.
PUS 1938-46.
CAMPBELL, RONALD HUGH
(1883-1953): Foreign Office. Paris 1929-35. Belgrade 1935-9.
KCMG Jan 1936. Amb at Paris Nov 1939. London from Jun 1940.
Amb at Lisbon Dec 1940-45.
CARVELL, JOHN ERIC MACLEAN
(1894-1978) Port Alegre 1932. New York 1934. Consul-General
Munich Apr 1938. London Aug 1939. Head, Refugee Section in
General Dept 1940. Acting Consul-General, then Consul
General, Algiers 1942. Los Angeles 1945.
CHAMBERLAIN, (ARTHUR) NEVILLE
(1869-1940): Con HP 1929-40. Chancellor of the Exchequer
1931-7. Prime Minister 1937-40. Leader of Conservative Party
1937-40. Ld Pres of Council 1940.
CHURCHILL, WINSTON LEONARD SPENCER
(1874-1965): Lib MP 1904-22. Home Sec 1910-11. Con MP 1924-
64. First Ld of Admiralty and member of War Cabinet 1939-40.
Prime Minister and Mm of Defence 1940-5. Leader of
Conservative Party 1940-55. KG 1953.
481
COOPER, ERNEST NAPIER, OBE
(1883-1948): Home Office: Factory Inspectorate, Inspector
Class II 1910. 1918-20 lent to another department.
Superintending Inspector (Western and Northern Division),
Aliens Branch 1925-31. Seconded for duty as Principal in
Aliens Department 1930-1 (move permanent by 1932). Acting
Asst Sec by 1939. Chairman, CID Sub-committee on Control of
Aliens in Wartime 1939. Asst Sec by 1940. Ret 1943. Working
for Central Office for Refugees 1944. Remarried (widower)
Gertrud Kallmann, Apr. 1946.
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, ROBERT ARTHUR JAMES GASCOYNE-CECIL, 5th
Marquess of Salisbury from 1947
(1893-1972): PPS to Eden(qv) 1934-5. Pan US Foreign Office
1935-8. Resigned with Eden Feb 1938. Paymaster-General May
1940. Sec for Dominions Oct 1940-1. Entered House of Lords
Jan 1941. Sec for Colonies 1942. Ld Privy Seal 1942-3. Sec
for Dominions Oct 1943-5.
CULPIN, EWART G.
(1877-1946): Architect. Labour London County Council member
1937-46. Chairman of the Council 1938-9. Trustee, Czech
Refugee Trust Fund 1939.
DELEVIGNE, SIR MALCOLM
(1868-1950): Home Office. Junior Clerk 1892. Asst US 1913,
Dep US 1922-32. Ret 1932. Trustee, Czech Refugee Trust Fund
1939.
EDEN, (ROBERT) ANTHONY(Sir), 1st Earl of Avon (1957)
(1897-1977): Con MP 1923-57. Pan US Foreign Office 1931-3.
Ld Privy Seal 1933-5. Mm for League of Nations Affairs Jun
1935. Foreign Sec Dec 1935-Feb 1938(resigned). Sec for
Dominions 1939-40. Sec for War May-Dec 1940. Foreign Sec
1940-5.
EMERSON, SIR HERBERT WILLIAM
(1881-1962) Governor of Punjab 1933-8. League High
Commisioner for Refugees 1939. Director, Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees 1939. Director Central Council for
Refugees 1940. Chairman, Advisory Council on Aliens 1940.
FISHER, SIR (NORMAN FENWICK) WARRREN
(1879-1948): Treasury. Permanent Sec, Treasury and Head of
Civil Service 1919-39.
GAME, AIR-VICE MARSHALL SIR PHILIP WOOLCOTT
(1876-1961): Commissioner, Metropolitan Police 1935-45.
GILMOUR, SIR JOHN
(1876-1940): Unionist MP 1910-40. Home Sec Sep 1932 - Jun
35. Mm of Shipping 1939-40.
GUINNESS, WALTER EDWARD, 1st Lord Moyne
(1880-1944): Joint Parl US Mm of Agriculture 1940-1. Sec
for Colonies and Leader of House of Lords Feb 1941 - Feb
1942. Mm in Middle East 1944 (murdered).
HAlLEY, WILLIAM MALCOLM, 1st Baron Hailey (1936).
(1872-1969): Indian Civil Service 1896-1934. Governor United
Provinces 1928-34. Writer on Africa. Employed on missions to
African colonies and Belgian Congo 1938-9. Chairman Co-
ordinating Committee for Refugees 1938-9.
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HALDANE PORTER, (SIR) WILLIAM
1867-1944: Home Office. Inspector under the Aliens Act 1906.
Chief Inspector, Aliens Branch 1919-29.
LORD HALIFAX, see WOOD, EDWARD FREDERICK LINDLEY
HANKEY, SIR MAURICE PASCAL ALERS, 1st Baron Hankey (1939)
(1977-1963): Sec to Committee of Imperial Defence 1912-38.
Sec to Cabinet 1916-38. In War Cabinet as Mm without
Portfolio Sept 1939-May 1940. Chancellor of Duchy of
Lancaster May 1940-1. Paymaster-General Jul 1941-2.
HAYTER, WILLIAM GOODENOUGH
(b. 1906): Foreign Office. 3rd Sec Vienna 1931. Moscow 1934.
2nd Sec 1935. London 1937. China Oct 1938. 1st Sec Dec 1940.
Washington 1940. London 1944. Assts US 1948. Br Mm at Paris
1949. Amb to USSR 1953-7. KCMG 1953. Dep US 1957-8.
HOARE, SIR SAMUEL JOHN GURNEY, 1st Viscount Templewood
(1944).
(1880-1959): Con HP 1910-44. Sec for India 1931-5. Foreign
Sec 1935. First Ld of Admiralty 1936-7. Home Sec May 1937-
Sept 1939. Ld Privy Seal and member of War Cabinet 1939-40.
Sec for Air 1940. Amb to Spain 1940-4.
HOLDERNESS, SIR ERNEST W E, Bart
(1890-1968): Home Office. Jr Clerk 1913. Private Sec to Pan
US 1920. Asst Principal by 1925. Principal by 1927. Asst Sec
by 1933. Running Aliens Dept 1933. Seconded to other
department 1943.
JEFFES, MAURICE
(1888-1954): Foreign Office, Passport Control
Department(PCD). Service with Army in France 1916-19
including Intelligence Corps. Service in unestablished
capacity in PCD from 1919. Director, PCD Jul 1938.
KELL, MAJ-GEN SIR VERNON
(1873-1942): M15. Retired from Imperial Defence Committee
1909. Re-employed War Office, 1909. Head of M15, 1916-40.
LATHAM, RICHARD THOMAS EDWIN
(d. 1943): Barrister and scholar. Temporary Clerk in Foreign
Off ice General Dept Refugee Section 1939-41. War service
1941-3. Killed in action 1943.
LASKI, NEVILLE
(1890-1969): Barrister. President of Board of Deputies of
British Jews and Chairman of Joint Foreign Committee, 1933-
1940.
LEITH-ROSS, SIR FREDERICK WILLIAM
(1887-1968): Treasury. Chief Economic Adviser 1932.
negotiated revised German payments agreement 1938. Director-
General, Mm of Economic Warfare 1939-42. Director-General,
UNRRA, 1942-6.
MACDONALD, MALCOLM JOHN
(1901-1981): Pan US for Dominions 1931-5. Sec for Colonies
Jun - Nov 1935. Sec for Dominions Nov 1935-8. Sec for
Colonies May 1938-40. Mm of Health May 1940-1. High
Commissioner in Canada 1941-6.
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MACDONALD, JAMES RAMSAY
(1866-1937): Lab MP 1906-18, 1922-31. National Labour MP
1931-5, 1936-7. Prime Minister 1924, 1929-31, 1931-5. Ld
President of Council 1935.
MCKILLOP, DOUGLAS
(1891-1959): Foreign Office. Brussels 1932-6. Moscow 1936-7
Peking 1937, Riga 1938-40. Berne 1940. Head of Refugee
Department 1946. Head of Claims Dept 1947.
MAKINS, ROGER MELLOR, Lord Sherfield (1964)
(b. 1904): Foreign Office. 3rd Sec Washington 1931. 2nd Sec
1933. Charge d'Affaires Oslo May 1934. London Sept 1934.
League of Nations and Western Department 1935-8. Asst
Adviser on League of Nations Affairs 1937, later Adviser.
Central Dept 1939. Acting 1st Sec Sept 1939. Acting
Counsellor Aug 1940. Head of Central Dept 1941-2. Seconded
to Treasury for service with Minister Resident in West
Africa July 1942. Counsellor 1942. Washington 1945-7.
Minister Aug 1945. Asst US 1946. Dep US 1948-52. Amb to US
1953-6. Joint Permanent Sec of Treasury 1956-59. KCMG 1959.
MALCOLM, MAJ-GEN SIR NEILL
(1869-1953): Army. GOC Malaya 1921-4. Ret 1924. High
Commissioner for Refugees 1936-8.
MASON, PAUL
(1904-1978): Foreign Office. 1st Sec Br Embassy Lisbon 1941.
Acting Head, Refugee Department 1944-5. Acting Counsellor
1945. Head, United Nations Dept 1946. KCMG 1954.
MAXWELL, (SIR) ALEXANDER
(1880-1963): Home Office. Asst US 1924, Dep US 1932. KBE
1936. PUS, Home Office 1938-48.
MORRISON, HERBERT STANLEY, Baron Morrison (1959)
(1891-1965): Lab MP 1923-4, 1929-31, 1935-59. Leader, London
County Council 1934-40. Mm of Supply 1940. Home Sec and Mm
of Home Security Oct 1940-May 1945. Member of War Cabinet
1942-5.
LORD MOYNE, 1st Baron, see GUINNESS, WALTER EDWARD
NEWSAM, FRANK AUBREY
(1893-1964): Home Office. Private Sec to Sir John Anderson
1925-8. Principal Private Sec to Home Sec 1928-33. Asst Sec
1933. Principal Officer, South st Civil Defence Region 1939.
Asst US in charge of security 1940. Dep US 1941. KBE 1943.
PUS 1948-57.
PARKIN, REGINALD THOMAS
(b. 1882): Foreign Office, Passport Control Department.
Served in war of 1914-18. Employed subsequently in the
intelligence departments of War Office and Home Office. Asst
Director, Passport Control Department Nov 1919. Senior Staff
Officer 1940. Employed in Foreign Office from Aug 1941. Ret
Feb 1942.
PEAKE, OSBERT, 1st Viscount Ingleby (1955)
(1897-1966): Con MP 1929-55. Parl US, Home Office 1939-44.
PEDDER, SIR JOHN
(1869-1956): Home Office. Asst Sec 1914. Principal Asst Sec
by 1925. Ret 1932.
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PHILLIPS, SIR FREDERICK
(1884-1943): Treasury. US 1933. Treasury representation in
Washington 1940-3. Second Sec Jul 1942.
PLAYFAIR, EDWARD WILDER
(b. 1909): Board of Inland Revenue Secretaries' Office 1931-
4. Asst Principal 1933. Treasury 1934-46 and 1947-56. PUS
War Office 1956-59. Permanent See, Mm of Defence 1960-1.
KCB 1957.
RANDALL, ALEC WALTER GEORGE
(1892-1977): Foreign Office. Sec to Legation to Holy See
1925. Bucharest 1930. 1st Sec (Far Eastern Dept) 1933-5.
Copenhagen 1935-8. Acting Counsellor in Foreign Office Oct
1938. Adviser on League of Nations Affairs 1939. Seconded to
Mm of Information Dec 1939. Resumed duty in Foreign Office
Jun 1940. Counsellor Oct 1940. Head, Refugee Department
1942-44. Br Mm Copenhagen Jun 1945. KCMG 1947.
ROBINSON, COURTENAY DENIS CAREW
(1887-1958): Home Office. Asst Sec 1932. Asst US by 1938.
Seconded to Prison Commission as Acting Chairman 1940.
ROTHSCHILD, ANTHONY GUSTAV DE
(1887-1961): Banker. Partner in firm N H Rothschild & Sons.
Chairman of Central British Fund for German Jewry 1939.
ROTHSCHILD, (LORD) NATHANIEL MAYER VICTOR
(1910-1990): Succeeded his uncle as 3rd Baron Rothschild
1937. Scientist. Fellow Trinity College, Cambridge, 1935-39.
RUMBOLD, SIR HORACE GEORGE MONTAGUE, Bart
(1869-1941) Foreign Office. Br Amb in Berlin 1928-33. Vice-
Chairman, Palestine Royal Commission, 1936.
SAMUEL, SIR HERBERT LOUIS, 1st Viscount Samuel (1937)
(1870-1963): Liberal MP 1902-18 1929-35. Parl US Home Office
1905. Chancellor Duchy of Lancaster 1909. Postmaster-General
1910. President Local Govt Board 1914. Postmaster-General
1915. Chancellor Duchy of Lancaster 1915. Home Sec 1916.
Resigned 1916. 1st High Commissioner for Palestine 1920-5.
Home Sec Aug 1931-Sept 1932. Resigned 1932. Chairman Council
for German Jewry 1936-9. Chairman Movement for Care of
Children from Germany 1938-9. Liberal Leader in House of
Lords 1944-55.
SCHIFF, OTTO MORRIS, OBE
(1875-1952): Born Frankfurt, Germany. Emigrated to UK.
Stockbroker. Voluntary work with refugees during and after
First World War. President of Jews' Temporary Shelter from
1922. Founder and Chairman of Jewish Refugees Committee from
March 1933. CBE 1939.
SCHONFELD, RABBI SOLOMON
(1912-1984): Presiding Rabbi Union of Orthodox Hebrew
Congregations and Adath Yisroel Synagogue. Principal Jewish
Secondary Schools. Executive Director Chief Rabbi's
Religious Emergency Council from 1938.
SCOTT, SIR (ROBERT) RUSSELL
(1877-1960): Home Office. PUS 1932-1938.
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SIMON, SIR JOHN ALLSEBROOK, 1st Viscount Simon (1940).
(1873-1954): Foreign Sec 1931-5. Home Sec 1935-7. Chancellor
of Exchequer 1937-40. Ld Chancellor 1940-5.
SIMPSON, SIR JOHN HOPE
(1868-1961): Authority on refugee problems. Indian Civil
Service 1889-1916. Lib MP 1922-4. Vice-President League of
Nations Refugee Settlement Commission, Athens 1926-30.
Chosen to report on administration of Palestine 1930.
Director, National Flood Relief Commission, China 1931-4.
Administration of Newfoundland 1934-6. KBE 1937. Author of
studies of refugee problem 1938-9.
SNOW, THOMAS MAITLAND
(b. 1890): Foreign Office. Tokyo 1930. Madrid 1934. Br
Minister Havana 1935-7, Helsinki 1937. Transferred to
Foreign Office 1940. Head of Refugee Section, General Dept
of Foreign Office 1941. Br Minister Bogota 1941-4, Amb 1944-
5. Switzerland 1946-9. Ret 1950.
STOPFORD, ROBERT JEMMETT
(1895-1978): Banker. Served in First World War, Friends'
Ambulance Unit 1914-15, RASC 1915-19 reaching rank of
Lieutenant. Salonika 1915. Palestine and Egypt 1917. Banking
1921-38. Private Sec Chairman of the Indian Statutory
Commission 1928-30( Chairman was Sir John Simon to whom he
was related by marriage). Sec to Cons delegation to Indian
Round Table Conferences 1930-2. Sec to Joint Cttee of
british Short term Creditors(standstill Committee) 1933-8.
Temporarily attached to Treasury for negotiations in
connection with the Anglo-German Payments Agreement 1938.
Member of Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia 1938. Treasury
Liaison Officer for financial and refugee questions with
Czech government Nov 1938 - Aug 1939. In Second World War
Head of Financial Pressure Department, Mm of Economic
Warfare Sept 1939-Jul 1940, and as Financial Counsellor to
Washington Embassy July 1940-3. Deputy Director of Civil
Affairs(Economics), later Director of Economics (Civil
Affairs), War Office 1943-5. Trieste Boundary Commission and
administration of Trieste 1946-9. Vice-Chairman Imperial War
Museum 1954-68.
STEVENSON, RALPH CLARMONT SKRINE
(1895-1977): Foreign Office 1933. Acting Counsellor Jan
1937. Adviser on League of Nations Affairs 1937-8. Barcelona
Oct 1938. Private Sec to Foreign Sec Dec 1939. Br Mm
Montevideo Aug 1941. Amb to Yugoslav Govt in Cairo 1943.
KCMG 1946
STRANG, WILLIAM, 1st Baron Strang (1954)
(1893-1978): Foreign Office Acting Counsellor Moscow 1930.
London Oct 1933. Adviser on League of Nations Affairs 1936.
Head of Central Dept 1937-9 . Acting Asst US Sept 1939. KCMG
Nov 1943. UK Rep on European Advisory Commission w rank of
Ambassador Nov 1943. PUS 1949-53.
TURK, ERICH
Jewish War Refugees Committee. Hon Secretary Jews' Temporary
Shelter in 1933. British Committee for Refugees from
Czechoslovakia 1938-9. Trustee, Czech Refugee Trust Fund
1939.
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TURNOUR, EDWARD, 6TH EARL WINTERTON
(1883-1962): Irish peer (became member of House of Lords
when created English peer in 1952). Con NP 1904-51.
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster 1937-9. March 1938 entered
Cabinet as Deputy Sec for Air. Paymaster-General Jan - Nov
1939 (no longer in Cabinet). Displaced 1940-45. Represented
UK at Evian Conference July 1938. Chairman Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees 1938.
VANSITTART, SIR ROBERT GILBERT, Lord Vansittart (1941)
(1881-1957): Foreign Office. PUS 1930-7. Chief Diplomatic
Adviser Jan 1938-41.
WALEY, (SIR SIGISMUND) DAVID (né SCHLOSS)
(1887-1962): Treasury from 1910. Military service 1916-19.
Worked on international finance with Sir Frederick Leith-
Ross from 1919. Asst Sec 1924. Princ Asst Sec 1931. Worked
on structure of exchange control during 1939-45 war. KCMG
1943. Third Sec 1946-7.
WALKER, EDWARD ALAN
(b. 1894): Foreign Office. 1st Sec 1932. Athens 1934-6.
Transferred to Foreign Office Jul 1936. Stockholm May 1938.
Angora(Ankara) May 1939. London May 1941. In Refugee
Department 1941-4.
WEIZMANN, CHAIN
(1874-1952): Zionist leader. 1st President of State of
Israel 1948.
WHISKARD, SIR GEOFFREY GRANVILLE
(1886-1957): Dominions Office. Asst US and Vice Chairman of
Oversea Settlement Department in 1933. PUS Mm of Works
1941-3, Town and Country Planning 1943-6.
LORD WINTERTON, 6TH EARL See TURNOUR, EDWARD.
WOLFE, HUMBERT
(1886-1940): Mm of Labour. Director of Services and
Establishments in 1933. Head of Employment and Training
1934. Deputy Secretary 1938-40.
WOOD, EDWARD FREDERICK LINDLEY, Baron Irwin
(1881-1959): Succeeded father as Viscount Halifax 1934. Cr
Earl 1944. Sec for War 1935. Ld Privy Seal and leader of
House of Lords 1935-7. Ld Pres of Council 1937. Foreign Sec
Feb 1938-40. Br Amb to USA 1940-6.
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General. published:
Note: Information drawn from annual publications may be
several months out of date.
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British Imperial Calendar and Civil Service List, London,
annually (not published 1921-4, 1926, 1942, 1944, 1946-7)
Butler, David and Gareth, British Political Facts, 1900-
1985, 6th Edn, London 1986
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Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford, decennially
Foreign Office List, London, annually.
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The Times, London, daily
Who Was Who, London, decennially
Who's Who, London, annually
General. un-Dublished:
Records of government departments in the Public Record
Office cited elsewhere in this thesis
General Register Office (Births, Deaths and Marriages),
London
Schonfeld papers, University of Southampton
Stopford papers, Imperial War Museum
SDecialist. Dublished:
Pellew, Jill, 'The Home Office and the Aliens Act 1905', The
Historical Journal, Vol. XXXII, no. 2, (1989), pp. 369-385.
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ADDend ix 2
HOME SECRETARIES AND HOME OFFICE PERMANENT UNDER
SECRETARIES. 1906-1950
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Date
appointed
10 Dec 1905
14 Feb 1910
23 Oct 1911
25 May 1915
10 Jan 1916
10 Dec 1916
10 Jan 1919
24 Oct 1922
22 Jan 1924
6 Nov 1924
7 Jun 1929
25 Aug 1931
28 Sep 1932
7 Jun 1935
28 May 1937
3 Sep 1939
3 Oct 1940
24 May 1945
3 Aug 1945
H Gladstone
W Churchill
R McKenna
Sir J Simon
Sir H Samuel
Sir G Cave (Vt)
Sir E Shortt
W Bridgeman
A Henderson
Sir W Joynson-Hicks
J Clynes
Sir H Samuel
Sir J Gilmour
Sir J Simon
Sir S I-bare
Sir J Anderson
H Morrison
Sir D Somervell
J Chuter Ede
PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARIES OF THE HOME DEPARTMENT
1903
	 Sir M Chalmers
1908
	
Sir E Troup
1922
	 Sir J Anderson
1932
	 Sir R Scott
1938
	 Sir A Maxwell
1948
	 Sir F Newsam
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